Judges: JOHN L. HILL, Attorney General of Texas
Filed Date: 10/12/1978
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
Honorable Leslie C. Acker County Attorney Midland County Courthouse Midland, Texas 79701
Re: Donation of city street right-of-way to county.
Dear Mr. Acker:
In Attorney General Opinion
Article 3, section 52 of the Constitution reads in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided by this section, the Legislature shall have no power to authorize any county, city, town or other political corporation or subdivision of the State to lend its credit or to grant public money or thing of value in aid of, or to any individual, association or corporation whatsoever, or to become a stockholder in such corporation, association or company.
Counties are considered to be municipal corporations or quasi-corporations within the scope of this and similar constitutional provisions, and gratuities to them by other municipal bodies, or even by the state itself, are unconstitutional. See Bexar County v. Linden,
The question of whether the expansion of courthouse facilities within the city would so benefit the City of Midland as to furnish an adequate consideration for the transaction is one initially for the Midland City Council, and ultimately for the courts. See Davis v. City of Lubbock,
With respect to your question on the impact of article 1019, V.T.C.S., we have concluded that it has no effect. Although that statute speaks to the abandonment of city streets and provides that no part of a street is to be closed until the question of closing it is submitted to the voters of the city, governing bodies with the power of eminent domain need not secure the consent of an electorate to obtain property they need for public purposes. Bolton v. City of Waco,
Midland County possesses the power to condemn public property needed for courthouse purposes and could seek to condemn the right-of-way. V.T.C.S. art. 3264a. Of course, the success of condemnation proceedings by one political subdivision against property already devoted to a public use, if not controlled by statute, depends upon the paramount need of the public. If the city and the county agree that the paramount need is a need for courthouse facilities, there is no difficulty. What Midland County might do by resort to condemnation proceedings, it can do by agreement with the City of Midland. See Kingsville Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Crenshaw,
If the city and the county reach agreement respecting the paramount public use of the property, and if the exchange is made for an adequate consideration or to accomplish a proper public purpose, we believe a transfer of the property to Midland County without an election would probably be upheld by the courts. Attorney General Opinions H-413 (1974); H-108, H-93 (1973).
Very truly yours,
John L. Hill Attorney General of Texas
Approved:
David M. Kendall First Assistant
C. Robert Heath Chairman Opinion Committee
San Antonio River Authority v. Shepperd , 157 Tex. 73 ( 1957 )
City of Tyler v. Smith County , 151 Tex. 80 ( 1952 )
El Paso County v. City of El Paso , 357 S.W.2d 783 ( 1962 )
Davis v. City of Lubbock , 160 Tex. 38 ( 1959 )
Austin Independent School District v. Sierra Club , 495 S.W.2d 878 ( 1973 )
Bexar County v. Linden , 110 Tex. 339 ( 1920 )
City of San Antonio v. Congregation of the Sisters of ... , 360 S.W.2d 580 ( 1962 )
Bolton v. City of Waco , 447 S.W.2d 718 ( 1969 )
Kingsville Indep. Sch. v. Crenshaw , 164 S.W.2d 49 ( 1942 )