in the Interest of A.H., a Child

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-12-00096-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A.H., A
CHILD
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FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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Appellant L.H. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her
parental rights to her son, A.H. (Andy).2 In four issues, Mother contends that the
evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment.
We affirm.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
To protect A.H.’s identity, we will use “Andy” as an alias to refer to him,
and we will also use aliases to refer to other people associated with the
termination of Mother’s parental rights. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
Background Facts
Mother was born in 1987. By her teenage years, she was living with her
grandmother, E.H. (Edith). At age fifteen, Mother ran away from Edith’s house
and moved in with P.H. (Peter), who was then twenty-four years old. Peter
introduced Mother to cocaine, and when Mother was still fifteen years old, she
and Peter conceived a child, C.H. (Charles), while both were under the influence
of the drug. Mother continued to use cocaine while pregnant with Charles and
gave birth to him in approximately 2004. Around that same time, Mother and
Peter, who eventually married each other, moved to Kansas.
Mother and Peter had a second child, B.H. (Bethany), a couple of years
after Charles was born. Soon after Bethany was born, Peter used
methamphetamine and began drinking heavily, and Mother and Peter divorced.
In 2007, when Mother and the children were spending the night at Peter’s house,
Mother and Peter got into a fight, for which Mother was arrested and later
convicted of “domestic violence.” Soon after that fight, Kansas Social
Rehabilitation Services (SRS) obtained custody of Charles and Bethany, and
they initially went to foster care. Mother attempted to work with SRS to have her
children returned, but Mother was unable to get adequate housing as requested
by SRS, so the children eventually went to live with Peter’s sister.
Also in 2007, Mother met C.W. (Father) and moved in with him. At the
time, Father was forty-two years old. Mother knew that Father was addicted to
methamphetamine, and soon after their relationship started, they began using
2
drugs together. In August 2007, they were pulled over by police in Kansas while
riding in a car together. Mother was arrested for driving without a license, while
Father was arrested for obstruction of justice because he gave the police a false
name. According to Mother, while she was being booked into jail, guards found a
bag of methamphetamine in her pants pocket, for which she was charged with
possession of methamphetamine and trafficking methamphetamine in a penal
institution.3 Mother testified that after her arrest for driving without a license, it
“slipped [her] mind” that she had the methamphetamine in her pocket. She pled
nolo contendere to the charges.
Mother was released from confinement in July 2008, seemingly to serve
probation. Andy was conceived in early August 2008, shortly before Mother was
sentenced to incarceration in a Kansas penitentiary on August 20, apparently for
violating the probation by “not reporting.”
Mother was incarcerated in Kansas for all nine months of her pregnancy
with Andy, and in May 2009, she gave birth to him. Upon Andy’s birth, Edith
(Mother’s grandmother) went with L.H. (Lois), Mother’s mother, to Kansas to pick
3
The record contains criminal judgments from Kansas. One judgment, for
possession of methamphetamine, has a “Date of Offense” of August 15, 2007,
which is the date that Mother said that she was arrested for driving without a
license. The possession of methamphetamine judgment relates that Mother was
placed on probation. The second judgment, for “Traffic in Contraband in a Penal
Institution,” states that the offense was committed on September 21, 2007 and
that Mother received a thirty-six-month probated sentence. There is no
explanation in the record concerning why Mother’s judgments bear different
offense dates or why the second judgment bears an offense date that is different
than the date on which Mother testified that the crime occurred.
3
him up. Mother chose to have Andy live with Edith in Texas because Edith was
“the only family [she had] and [Andy’s] father was not capable of taking care of
him at the time.”4 Mother believed that Edith could adequately care for Andy until
Mother was released from confinement.
On August 9, 2010, when Andy was approximately fifteen months old, the
Fort Worth Fire Department was called to Edith’s house. A mattress in the house
had caught fire in a room where Lois was sleeping. Andy was home when the
fire started.
Officer Rena Dulworth of the Fort Worth Police Department was called to
Edith’s house by the fire department to investigate the possible kidnapping of
Andy. A dispute had arisen between Edith and Lois about who should care for
him. Edith told Officer Dulworth that Lois had removed Andy from the house and
had placed him in a van driven by Lois’s boyfriend. Lois claimed that Edith was
unable to take care of Andy and that Lois was his primary caregiver. Edith
claimed that she had custody and that Lois did not. The van was found driving
around the neighborhood not far from the house, and Andy was returned to
Edith. In speaking with Edith, Officer Dulworth noticed that she did not seem
well. Particularly, Edith moved around very slowly, was unsteady on her feet,
and appeared to have soiled herself. Officer Dulworth testified that she could not
imagine that Edith could have cared for a small child.
4
Edith was born in 1948, so she was approximately sixty-one years old in
2009 when she went to Kansas to get Andy.
4
Officer Dulworth obtained the consent of J.H., Andy’s great-grandfather, to
search the home. Upon the search, Officer Dulworth found the home to be in a
state of disarray. The carpet was heavily stained and littered with dirt, trash, and
food particles. Items and clothing were stacked and strewn all around the house.
Officers found a loaded semi-automatic pistol on a windowsill in a bedroom
where Andy sometimes slept. They also found loose pills within Andy’s reach.
During the search, Officer Dulworth saw Andy roaming freely around house, at
one point picking up a plastic knife and running with it. Based on the state of the
home, Officer Dulworth became concerned for Andy’s safety and called for the
Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) to evaluate the
home.
An investigator from the Department, Teresa Shipley, went to the home
that evening and determined that Edith was unable to care for Andy, that the
home was unsafe for him, and that Edith had a history with the Department
because she had previously “refused to accept parental responsibility” of a child.
In the home, Shipley found “lots of little pieces of stuff like screws, trash, things
all over the carpet, . . . [and] various small items.” Shipley also noticed a bad
odor in the home. Shipley saw that Edith had difficulty moving around the house.
The Department removed Andy from the home, placed him in foster care, and
filed its petition for termination soon thereafter.
At the time of the trial in July 2011, Mother was still incarcerated in
Kansas, and Andy was two years old and had been in his foster placement for
5
almost a year. Mother, who testified telephonically, said that excluding time that
she had been incarcerated, she had not been sober for more than three
consecutive months since she began using cocaine with Peter at age fifteen.
Mother also admitted that prior to the arrest that had led to her current
incarceration, she had been convicted of theft and driving while her license was
suspended in addition to her conviction for hitting Peter. She stated that she had
known that Father used methamphetamine when they met but that she had not
known that he had an extensive criminal record.
Mother testified that she was not aware of the condition of Edith’s home or
of Edith’s poor physical condition. Mother conceded, however, that she knew
that her mother, Lois, lived in Edith’s home, that Lois had a long history of drug
abuse, and that she had considered Lois’s addiction when placing Andy in the
home but was not concerned about it. When asked about her work and living
history, Mother testified that the longest she had ever held a job was eight
months, that she had worked at two other jobs for one and four months each,
and that she had never rented or owned a residence on her own.
When asked whether she had completed the court-ordered service plan,
Mother testified that she had completed some of the plan but that she could not
complete other requirements—regular visitation with Andy, proof of income, and
appropriate housing—because she was incarcerated. She stated that she has
earned a certificate in landscaping and would pursue employment in that field
upon her release, which she believed would occur a little more than a month after
6
the trial concluded. She claimed that upon her release, she would immediately
enter a thirteen-week program to help her find housing and employment.
She believed that she would be able to provide an appropriate home for Andy
within a month, but she conceded that she would not likely have a job for five or
six weeks after her release, and she was “not sure” about what she would do
with Andy until she was ready to take him.
Mother testified that she will be required to live in Topeka as a condition of
her parole and that she has no family and only one friend there. She testified
that while she planned on completing drug treatment upon her release, she felt
that she did not need it. Mother also planned on resuming her relationship with
Father, whom she admitted has a drug problem and is in need of treatment. She
also admitted that she did not have a problem with Andy staying in an adult
treatment facility with many felons.
Kimberly Bailey, who works for the Department as a conservatorship
supervisor, testified that the original goal for Andy was reunification with his
parents. However, Bailey testified that as the Department attempted to work
toward returning Andy with Mother and Father and their families, the goal
changed to termination when it became clear that neither parent would be in a
position to care for Andy in the near future. Bailey testified that no family
member had requested custody of Andy since he was removed from Edith’s
home and that the Department had determined that none of the placements
proposed by Mother and Father were appropriate since the only blood relatives
7
proposed were not able to take care of Andy. Bailey stated that Father had not
completed any of the services listed in his service plan, such as parenting
classes or counseling, and had not been in regular contact with CPS. She
conceded, however, that while confined, Father was “on a unit that was more
restrictive in terms of accessibility to the types of services that [the Department]
had requested that he participate in.”
Bailey also opined that Andy had bonded with his foster mother, while he
had little to no bond with Mother or any blood relatives. She explained that Andy
was “doing great” physically and was on target developmentally, and she
expressed that the Department planned on allowing his foster parent to adopt
him. She stated that with his foster parent, Andy seemed “comfortable” and “at
home.” When Bailey was asked why she believed that termination of Andy’s
parents’ rights was in his best interest, she testified, “[Andy] deserves an
opportunity to be in a home where he’s safe, where all his needs are being met,
and [where] he has an opportunity to thrive, and I don’t believe his parents have
demonstrated that they can do it and will do it.”
G.F. (Grace), Andy’s foster mother, testified on her own behalf as an
intervenor in the case. Grace said that she loved Andy, that Andy loved her, and
that Andy had bonded with her and her family. She testified that Andy was
happy and healthy, with the exception of recurring problems with ear infections,
for which he was receiving appropriate treatments. Grace testified that neither
Father nor Mother had been in contact with Andy since he began living with her
8
and that the only contact he had with any blood relatives consisted of two or
three visits from Edith and a maternal aunt, the last of which was several months
before the trial. Grace expressed her desire to adopt Andy.
The trial court terminated Mother’s paternal rights to Andy, finding that she
had engaged in conduct or had knowingly placed Andy with persons who had
engaged in conduct that endangered his physical or emotional well-being, had
knowingly placed or allowed him to remain in conditions or surroundings that
endangered his physical or emotional well-being, and had failed to comply with a
court order setting out the actions necessary to secure his return.5 The trial court
also found that termination was in Andy’s best interest. Mother brought this
appeal.
Evidentiary Sufficiency
In her first three issues, Mother contends that the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to sustain the trial court’s finding that she committed one of
the grounds for termination listed in section 161.001(1) of the family code. In her
fourth issue, she argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the
trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in Andy’s best
interest.
5
See Tex. Family Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E), (O) (West Supp. 2012).
The trial court also terminated Father’s parental rights, but he is not a party to
this appeal.
9
A parent’s rights to “the companionship, care, custody, and management”
of her children are constitutional interests “far more precious than any property
right.” Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758–59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397 (1982);
In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003). In a termination case, the State
seeks not just to limit parental rights but to erase them permanently—to divest
the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers normally
existing between them, except for the child’s right to inherit. Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 161.206(b) (West 2008); Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985).
We strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and strictly construe involuntary
termination statutes in favor of the parent. Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20–21; In re
R.R., 294 S.W.3d 213, 233 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under
section 161.001 of the family code, the petitioner must establish one ground
listed under subsection (1) of the statute and must also prove that termination is
in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; In re J.L., 163
S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). Termination decisions must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001. Evidence is clear
and convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id.
§ 101.007 (West 2008). Due process demands this heightened standard
because termination results in permanent, irrevocable changes for the parent
and child. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002).
10
In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental termination
cases, we determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were
proven. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We review all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and judgment. Id. We resolve
any disputed facts in favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could have
done so. Id. We disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have
disbelieved. Id. We consider undisputed evidence even if it is contrary to the
finding. Id. That is, we consider evidence favorable to termination if a
reasonable factfinder could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a
reasonable factfinder could not. Id.
We cannot weigh witness credibility issues that depend on the appearance
and demeanor of the witnesses, for that is the factfinder’s province. Id. at 573,
574. And even when credibility issues appear in the appellate record, we defer
to the factfinder’s determinations as long as they are not unreasonable. Id. at
573.
In reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to
the factfinder’s findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own. In re
H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the entire
record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the
parent violated one subsection of section 161.001(1) and that the termination of
the parent-child relationship was in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code
11
Ann. § 161.001; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002). If, in light of the entire
record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have
credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not
reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction in the truth of its finding, then
the evidence is factually insufficient. H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.
Mother’s endangerment of Andy
In her second issue, Mother contends that the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to sustain the ground for termination under section
161.001(1)(E) of the family code. See Tex. Family Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(E).
Under section 161.001(1)(E), termination may be supported by a finding that a
parent engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who
engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the
child. See id.
As we have explained,
Endangerment means to expose to loss or injury, to
jeopardize. Under section 161.001(1)(E), the relevant inquiry is
whether evidence exists that the endangerment of the child’s . . .
well-being was the direct result of [the parent’s] conduct, including
acts, omissions, or failures to act. Additionally, termination under
subsection (E) must be based on more than a single act or omission;
the statute requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of
conduct by the parent. It is not necessary, however, that the
parent’s conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually
suffer injury. The specific danger to the child’s well-being may be
inferred from parental misconduct standing alone. Moreover, a
parent’s mental state may be considered in determining whether a
child is endangered if that mental state allows the parent to engage
in conduct that jeopardizes the physical or emotional well-being of
the child. To determine whether termination is necessary, courts
12
may look to parental conduct occurring both before and after the
child’s birth.
In re M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d 254, 261–62 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet.
denied) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
The evidence reveals a pattern of Mother’s acts by which the trial court
could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction that she knowingly
engaged in conduct that endangered Andy’s physical or emotional well-being.
This is true even though, as Mother testified at trial and argues on appeal, she
had no knowledge of the condition of Edith’s home or of the deterioration of
Edith’s health at the time of Andy’s removal.6
Mother’s testimony established that she has a long history of abusing
controlled substances and that the use of those substances has exposed her to
imprisonment and to her separation from Andy. She testified that she had begun
using cocaine at age fifteen and that she had used it while pregnant with her first
child, Charles. Mother admitted to using illegal drugs with both of the fathers of
her children, and she is currently incarcerated because she possessed
contraband in a jail facility. Mother testified that other than the time she has been
incarcerated, the longest period of time she has even been sober since she
turned fifteen years old was three months. Despite this, Mother, who at the time
of trial was twenty-three years old, testified that she does not believe she is in
6
Bailey agreed that neither parent was aware of the conditions of Edith’s
home at the time of Andy’s removal from that home.
13
need of drug treatment. A parent’s use of narcotics, both before the birth of a
child and while the parent had custody of older children, can constitute
endangering conduct. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009) (“[A]
parent’s use of narcotics and its effect on his or her ability to parent may qualify
as an endangering course of conduct.”); M.E.-M.N., 342 S.W.3d at 263; see also
Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (“Because it exposes the child to the
possibility that the parent may be impaired or imprisoned, illegal drug use may
support termination under section 161.001(1)(E).”). Thus, the trial court could
have found that Mother endangered Andy’s physical or emotional well-being
through her long-term drug abuse.
Mother also has a history of criminal violations (including some that are not
drug related) and incarceration. She was convicted of theft at some point after
her other two children had been removed from her care in Kansas. Mother
testified that she had “picked up $24 at McDonald’s and it happened to belong to
somebody else.” Mother was also convicted in 2007 for hitting Peter, the father
of her oldest children, while the children were present in Peter’s home. Mother
was also convicted of possession of methamphetamine and attempting to take
methamphetamine into a jail, for which she has been incarcerated for Andy’s
entire life. Further, Mother admitted to violating prison regulations during her
current incarceration, resulting in her loss of thirty-two days of good time credit
14
and therefore delaying her release. Mother lost “good time” more than once for
having cigarettes in jail, which Mother knew was illegal.
Because of her current incarceration, Mother was not able to care for Andy
and gave him to Edith, knowing that Lois, who had a history of using drugs and
committing crimes, lived in Edith’s home.7 Similarly, Mother had left Charles and
Bethany for about a month with a known drug user, Peter, before their removal in
Kansas while she “went to obtain new housing.” Mother’s endangering conduct
toward her other children is relevant to whether she endangered Andy. See In re
W.J.H., 111 S.W.3d 707, 716 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). And as
of the beginning of the trial, even though Mother had received knowledge about
the dangerous conditions in Edith’s home at the time of Andy’s removal, Mother’s
immediate plan for Andy was to return him to that home.
While criminal violations and incarceration are not enough to show
endangerment by themselves, they can be evidence of endangerment if shown
to be part of a course of conduct that is endangering to the child. Tex. Dep’t of
Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533–34 (Tex. 1987); Perez v. Tex.
Dep’t of Protective and Regulatory Servs., 148 S.W.3d 427, 436 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2004, no pet.). Combined with her drug use, her unstable work and living
history, and her decisions to leave her children with known drug users, the trial
court could have reasonably concluded that Mother’s history of criminal violations
7
Lois had been arrested for possessing marijuana, unlawfully carrying a
weapon, theft by check, and possessing a controlled substance.
15
and incarcerations affected her ability to provide a stable living environment for
Andy and thus endangered his physical or emotional well-being. See In re V.V.,
349 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (en
banc) (holding that constant incarceration, failure to provide support for child, and
failure to maintain any relationship with child is evidence of endangerment); In re
M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 818–19 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (holding
that the placement of a child in a living situation with known drug users was a
factor supporting endangerment); Perez, 148 S.W.3d at 436–37 (holding parent’s
history of substance abuse, criminal conduct, and incarceration sufficient to show
endangerment); see also In re A.J.M., No. 02-11-00137-CV, 2012 WL 2877457,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 16, 2012, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (en banc)
(“Even evidence of criminal conduct, convictions, and imprisonment prior to the
birth of a child will support a finding that a parent engaged in a course of conduct
that endangered the child’s well-being.”).
We hold that under the applicable standards of review, considering all of
the facts described above, the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
sustain the trial court’s finding that Mother engaged in conduct that endangered
Andy’s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(1)(E). We therefore overrule Mother’s second issue. Because one
finding under section 161.001(1), along with a finding that termination is in the
child’s best interest, is sufficient to sustain an order of termination, we decline to
address Mother’s first and third issues, which challenge the sufficiency of the
16
evidence to prove the grounds of termination under section 161.001(1)(D) and
(O). See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; In re Z.C., 280 S.W.3d 470, 475 n.22 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied).
Andy’s best interest
In her fourth issue, Mother contends that the evidence is factually
insufficient to sustain the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights
is in Andy’s best interest. There is a strong presumption that keeping a child with
a parent is in the child’s best interest. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex.
2006). Prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is
also presumed to be in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 263.307(a) (West 2008).
Nonexclusive factors that the trier of fact in a termination case may use in
determining the best interest of the child include the desires of the child, the
emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future, the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future, the parental abilities of the
individuals seeking custody, the programs available to assist these individuals to
promote the best interest of the child, the plans for the child by these individuals
or by the agency seeking custody, the stability of the home or proposed
placement, the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the
existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, and any excuse for the acts
or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex.
1976). Undisputed evidence of just one factor may be sufficient in a particular
17
case to support a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child. C.H.,
89 S.W.3d at 27. On the other hand, the presence of scant evidence relevant to
each factor will not support such a finding. Id.
A factfinder may consider a parent’s continuing use of illegal drugs as a
factor affecting the best interest of the child. See M.R., 243 S.W.3d at 820; In re
S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 887–88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). A parent’s
criminal record also reflects on the best interest of the child in maintaining a
relationship with that parent. See V.V., 349 S.W.3d at 558.
Most of the factors listed above weigh in favor of the trial court’s decision
that termination is in Andy’s best interest. For example, based on Andy’s lack of
an emotional connection to either parent or any of his biological family, his bond
with his foster mother, Mother’s history of failing to provide for her children, her
problems with drug addiction, her criminal history, her stated plans (including
reuniting with Father, who has an extensive criminal and drug history),8 and her
lack of a supporting extended family, the trial court could have reasonably
concluded that it is unlikely that Mother would be able to consistently provide for
Andy’s physical and emotional needs and that Mother would instead present a
threat to his future well-being. Regarding Mother’s drug use, although her
confinement had provided her with an extended period of sobriety, the trial court
8
The record contains documents establishing that Father has been
convicted for selling marijuana, possessing marijuana, possessing drug
paraphernalia, possessing methamphetamine, criminally using a credit card, and
driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
18
could have been reasonably skeptical about her ability to maintain a drug-free
lifestyle upon her release from confinement even if, as she testified, she planned
on attending Narcotics Anonymous. Mother had not demonstrated that she could
achieve extended sobriety while not incarcerated, and she opined that she did
not need treatment for her drug abuse.
Moreover, Mother recognized that upon being released from confinement
and obtaining a place to live, Andy would not recognize her and would likely have
anxiety about being placed with her. She conceded that it was best for Andy to
be in a place where he is safe, stable, and could be loved and protected. Mother
kept minimal contact with Andy (she sent him a blanket, a birthday card, and
wrote letters “three or four times”); in contrast, Mother wrote letters to Father
“once or twice a week.” The evidence demonstrated that Andy was being
nurtured in Grace’s home, had bonded with her, and was also “very close” to
Grace’s parents and other family members. Evidence of a child’s bond with a
foster family is a factor that may support termination. See In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d
222, 230 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).
In jail, Mother obtained her GED; took classes on offender workforce
development, nutrition management, and money management; and completed
Thinking For A Change, a ten-week program aimed at developing positive
thought processes. She also finished part of her service plan, including taking
parenting classes and a psychological evaluation and participating in counseling.
But Mother had not demonstrated proper parenting abilities in the past to any of
19
her three children, and the trial court could have considered that it was unlikely
that she had developed those skills while incarcerated because, for example, she
proposed to allow Andy to return to live with Edith or to bring Andy into a
residential program for felons before having a job or being able to financially
provide for Andy’s needs. Also, although Mother indicated a desire to “follow the
rules” upon being released from confinement, she recognized that even while
she was confined, she was not able to control her conduct. Mother planned on
taking a thirteen-week job-skills program upon being released from confinement,
but the trial court could have been reasonably skeptical about her ability to
maintain employment based on her prior work history. Mother offered no excuse
for her behavior at trial.
Applying the appropriate standards of review, we hold that the evidence is
factually sufficient to support the trial court’s decision that termination of Mother’s
rights is in Andy’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(2). We
therefore overrule Mother’s fourth issue.
20
Conclusion
Having overruled all of Mother’s issues necessary for disposition, we affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
TERRIE LIVINGSTON
CHIEF JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; WALKER and MCCOY, JJ.
DELIVERED: September 27, 2012
21