Winston Charles Heron v. Jane Thompson Heron

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-20-00171-CV
__________________
WINSTON CHARLES HERON, Appellant
V.
JANE THOMPSON HERON, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 19-03-04047-CV
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se appellant Winston Charles Heron (“Winston”) filed a notice of appeal
from “all portions” of the trial court’s reformed final decree of divorce, which was
signed on March 6, 2020. For the reasons explained herein, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
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BACKGROUND
Appellee Jane Thompson Heron (“Jane”) filed a petition for divorce from
Winston. Jane alleged that if the parties were unable to reach an agreement regarding
the division of their property, she should be awarded a disproportionate share of the
parties’ estate.
Winston filed a pro se answer to Jane’s petition. In his answer, Winston
asserted that Jane’s petition was frivolous and filed “for the purpose of harassment”
and was “intended to cause unnecessary delay and increase [the] cost of litigation.”
Winston contended that he and Jane had reconciled, and he argued that Jane had
failed to describe any fault. In a subsequent pleading, Winston asserted that he and
Jane had attended mediation, resulting in an impasse, and that property distribution
was “the single point of contention between the parties[.]”
On September 30, 2019, the trial court conducted a bench trial, at which
Winston and Jane were the only witnesses. Jane and Winston each testified regarding
the nature and value of their real and personal separate and community property. On
November 6, 2019, the trial judge issued a letter ruling, in which she granted a
divorce, divided the parties’ property, and asked Jane’s counsel to prepare a
proposed final decree. On December 5, 2019, the trial court issued another letter,
reforming its previous rendition.
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On January 8, 2020, the trial court signed a final decree of divorce. Jane signed
the decree, but Winston did not. Winston filed a motion for new trial on February 5,
2020, and Winston filed a notice that his motion had been set for hearing on March
5, 2020. At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Winston contended that although
Jane’s counsel “claims that the divorce decree was finalized and signed by [the
judge] on January 8[,]” he did not receive notice. The trial judge informed Winston
that she signed the document. Winston stated that he did not sign the decree, and that
he had “submitted motions to the Court with objections that [were] never
considered.” Winston asserted that he objected to all of the “conditions” and that it
is “not a fair judgment.” After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial judge found
that Winston’s motion for new trial did not state grounds for granting a new trial,
but she sua sponte reformed the decree to remove the acknowledgment provision
and the indemnification provision. The trial judge stated that she would “just black
through those paragraphs” and sign a reformed decree. On March 6, 2020, the trial
judge signed a reformed final decree of divorce, and on March 10, 2020, the trial
court signed an order denying Winston’s motion for new trial.
Winston retained counsel, and his counsel filed a second motion for new trial
and subsequently withdrew from representing Winston. Winston asserted in the
second motion for new trial that the trial court should grant a new trial because “all
of the community property of the parties was not divided.” Specifically, Winston
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argued that the trial court’s decree did not divide the parties’ life insurance proceeds
and did not award the Missouri real estate to either party. Jane filed a response to the
motion for new trial, in which she asserted that the proper remedy is a motion to
reform the judgment. The record does not reflect that Winston obtained a hearing on
this motion. In June 2020, Winston filed a notice of appeal from the March 6
reformed decree of divorce.
ANALYSIS
Winston filed a two-page, single-spaced letter as his appellate brief. Because
Winston appears pro se on appeal, we will construe his brief liberally. See Sterner
v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989); Giddens v. Brooks, 92
S.W.3d 878, 880 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied). However, a pro se
litigant must properly present his case on appeal. See Strange v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 126
S.W.3d 676, 677 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied). Appellate briefs “must
contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate
citations to authorities and to the record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). An issue that is
unsupported by argument or citation to any legal authority presents nothing for the
court to review. Plummer v. Reeves, 93 S.W.3d 930, 931 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2003, pet. denied). An appellant must put forth specific argument and analysis
demonstrating that the record and the law support his contentions. San Saba Energy,
L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no
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pet.). A pro se litigant is held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must
comply with applicable laws and rules of procedure. In re Office of Attorney Gen. of
Tex., 193 S.W.3d 690, 693-94 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2006, orig. proceeding). “An
appellate court has no duty – or even right – to perform an independent review of
the record and applicable law to determine whether there was error.” Valadez v.
Avitia, 238 S.W.3d 843, 845 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007, no pet.). Performing such
an independent review would constitute abandonment of this Court’s role as neutral
adjudicator and would make the Court an advocate for pro se appellants. Id.In his letter brief, Winston asserted that the trial judge “has reached
agreement with” Jane regarding a property settlement, and he requested a thirty-day
extension should such a property settlement not occur. Winston also argued that he
did not receive notice of the filing of Jane’s original petition for post-divorce
division of property in a case bearing trial cause number 20-05-05897. 1 Winston
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also contended in his letter brief that he had accused Jane’s counsel of obstruction
of justice, and he alleged that the trial judge and various court personnel “may be
complicit in this alleged felony.” Additionally, Winston asserted that he had sued
Jane’s counsel in the 284th District Court of Montgomery County. Winston further
contended that he had been arrested while attempting to enter the property in Willis.
1
The trial cause number of the matter before this Court is 19-03-04047-CV.
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Winston’s brief does not concisely state his issue for review or contain clear
and concise argument for the contentions made or appropriate citations to authorities
and to the record. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f), (i). In addition, Winston’s brief does
not clearly state the nature of the relief sought. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(j). For all
these reasons, we conclude that Winston has failed to properly present any issues for
appellate review. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f), (i), (j); San Saba Energy, 171 S.W.3d
at 338; Strange, 126 S.W.3d at 677; Plummer, 93 S.W.3d at 931. However, in the
interest of justice and despite the inadequacies of Winston’s brief, we will liberally
construe Winston’s brief as challenging the trial court’s signing of a reformed decree
on March 6, 2020. See Demayo v. Demayo, No. 09-05-068 CV, 2006 WL 1510873,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont June 1, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). All other issues are
overruled. See id.When a motion for new trial has been filed, the trial court has plenary power
to modify, correct, or reform its judgment until thirty days after the timely-filed
motion for new trial is overruled, whether by signed order or by operation of law.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(e). As discussed above, Winston timely filed a motion for new
trial after the trial court signed its judgment in January, and the trial judge therefore
retained plenary power over the case when she signed a reformed decree. Winston
has not demonstrated that the trial judge abused her discretion by modifying her
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decree. See id. Accordingly, we overrule Winston’s issue and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on March 15, 2021
Opinion Delivered April 29, 2021
Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
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