DocketNumber： 06-07-00067-CV
Filed Date： 1/29/2008
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 2/1/2016
OF CARTHAGE, BRIARCLIFF HEALTH CENTER, LTD.,
AND B.H. CENTER, L.L.C., Appellants
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Carthage SNF, LP d/b/a Briarcliff Health Center of Carthage, Briarcliff Health Center, Ltd., and B.H. Center, L.L.C., the appellants in this case, have filed a motion seeking to dismiss their appeal. Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a), the motion is granted.
We dismiss the appeal.
Bailey C. Moseley
Justice
Date Submitted: January 28, 2008
Date Decided: January 29, 2008
argin-right: 0.5in">ALLAN CUNNINGHAM, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Sixth Judicial District Court
Lamar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 19932
Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Ross
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Allan Cunningham appeals from his conviction for robbery. A jury assessed his punishment at seventy-five years' imprisonment and a $10,000.00 fine. On appeal, Cunningham raises exactly the same issues (with one addition) in this appeal that he brought before this Court in his companion appeal in cause number 06-05-00215-CR, an appeal from his conviction for burglary of a habitation. In this case, the theft involved is the one we addressed in the companion case, with the additional element of causing bodily injury.
The evidence shows the following sequence of events. Cunningham was riding around with Bobby Lemon and Christopher Ray when they stopped in front of John Lightfoot's house. Lemon testified he went inside the garage to steal something, and ended up taking beer out of an ice chest. When Lemon came back out with stolen beer in hand, Cunningham was arguing with one of Lightfoot's neighbors, Larry Buster. A fight ensued, and both Cunningham and Lemon struck Buster before they drove away. Ray testified that he stayed in the car, that Lemon said it was a friend's house, and that, before Lemon went into the garage, he had no idea a crime would occur.
Buster testified that, when he saw the car backed in Lightfoot's driveway, he went over to see what was going on, and that Cunningham was in the car. Buster testified that Cunningham yelled at him and got out of the car, and at about the same time, he saw someone else come out of the garage with beer in his hand, and that both Cunningham and Lemon hit and kicked him until he blacked out.
Lightfoot testified that he was in the house at the time and did not hear the fight. Buster, bloody from the battle, banged on Lightfoot's door and told him what had happened. Lightfoot checked his garage, and eventually realized some beer was missing from an ice chest.
Lemon testified that, after this occurred, while they were driving around, he saw a pickup truck with tools in the back, and that he got out and stole the truck and drove away in it—with Cunningham following in his own car. Lemon stopped near a business, unloaded the items in the truck into the car, left the truck there, and drove away. When they stopped again a few minutes later, Ray got into a fight with Cunningham about a number of things involving their behavior, and, ultimately, Ray threw cans of beer at Cunningham and Lemon, and ran off.
Officer Steven Hill testified that he worked the assault and burglary. Officers stopped the car and arrested Lemon and Cunningham. When officers inventoried the car, they found three cans of beer of the type in Lightfoot's ice chest, and also found tools, a C.D. case, a rifle, a cell phone, a video camera, and other items that were identified as stolen property belonging to Dr. Wally Kraft—the owner of the pickup truck.
Cunningham first contends that Lemon was an accomplice as a matter of law and that the court erred by failing to so instruct the jury, and that there was insufficient nonaccomplice evidence that tended to connect Cunningham to the crime. We have addressed the legal issue in both companion appeals. For the same reasons as set out in those opinions, we also conclude the failure to give the instruction was error. However, as we pointed out in the companion appeals, there was testimony from the neighbor that Cunningham was in the car and that Cunningham attacked him for no reason other than his questions. This is not a typical response, and the jury could easily have taken this as a response not to his questions—but to being caught waiting for a friend to get back with the stolen items. The jury could reasonably have taken this violent reaction and the attack as showing Cunningham's intent to help Lemon complete the theft and escape.
Ray, the other person in the car, testified that he saw Cunningham stomping and kicking Buster and that he told them they had done a bad thing by attacking and beating the man—after which they beat up Ray.
The evidence shows that Lemon did steal the beer from the house and the items from the pickup truck, that Lemon and Cunningham beat Buster, and that Lemon and Cunningham were arrested together—with the results of both thefts found in the car. Intent may be directly proven, or it may be inferred from circumstantial evidence such as acts, words, and the conduct of the appellant. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Although it is clear that such a charge should have been sent to the jury, it is not apparent that egregious harm resulted from its absence. The nonaccomplice evidence, as summarized above, is not "so unconvincing in fact as to render the State's overall case for conviction clearly and significantly less persuasive." Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621, 632 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). We further conclude the nonaccomplice evidence detailed above is sufficient to "tend to connect" Cunningham to the crime. The contention of error is overruled.
Cunningham also contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the verdict. Utilizing the usual standards of review as set out in detail in the companion case styled Cunningham v. State, cause number 06-05-00215-CR, we acknowledge that there was no evidence Cunningham personally committed any aspect of this crime—except for personally causing bodily injury to Buster. We also recognize, as in the companion cases, that the jury could find him guilty as being criminally responsible as an accomplice to the unlawful acts of Lemon. The evidence detailed above shows presence, assistance, and behavior designed to assist Lemon in his acts—and there is no evidence showing the contrary. This is both legally and factually sufficient to support the verdict. The contentions of error are overruled.
Cunningham's final contention of error is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. With one exception, the errors by counsel alleged are the same ones, based on the same reasoning, as those addressed in cause number 06-05-00215-CR, and we adopt the rulings in that opinion on those contentions.
Cunningham brings one additional contention of ineffective assistance that is unique to this appeal. He contends that counsel was ineffective because he did not request a jury charge on a lesser included offense. Specifically, he contends that counsel should have requested the lesser included offense of assault because there was evidence that a jury could have believed that Cunningham was guilty only of assaulting Buster, not as a party to the theft itself.
A defendant is entitled to a charge on a lesser offense if (1) the lesser offense is included within the proof necessary to establish the offense charged, and (2) there is some evidence that would permit the jury rationally to find that, if the defendant is guilty, he or she is guilty only of the lesser offense. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Rousseau v. State, 855 S.W.2d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Further, the evidence must establish the lesser-included offense as a valid rational alternative to the charged offense. Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 113; Arevalo v. State, 943 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). This means that the evidence must allow a jury to rationally conclude that the appellant was guilty only of the lesser offense. Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 113.
We have detailed the evidence above. We must also recognize that Lemon's testimony about the events was inconsistent with prior statements. He testified at trial that he was drunk, and he could not remember having a conversation with Cunningham about deciding to steal something out of somebody's home, although Officer Brooks testified that, when he interviewed Lemon, he said they had such conversations before arriving at the Lightfoot residence. There is conflicting evidence about which of them drove to Lightfoot's house and backed the vehicle into his driveway, after which Lemon got out and went into the garage. The evidence also shows that, when a neighbor came over to ask what they were doing, Cunningham got out of the car and attacked him. The evidence finally shows that, when Lemon got back in the car, the beating concluded, and with newly-acquired beer in hand, Cunningham drove away.
In an argument based on a claim of inadequate assistance of counsel, an appellant must, by a preponderance of the evidence, prove: (1) trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient representation prejudiced the appellant's defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). If, however, "there is at least the possibility that the conduct could have been legitimate trial strategy," then we must "defer to counsel's decisions and deny relief on an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal." Murphy v. State, 112 S.W.3d 592, 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Our review of counsel's representation is highly deferential, and we indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable representation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
In this case, there is substantial, albeit partially controverted, evidence from multiple sources to show that Cunningham was indeed involved in all aspects of the criminal activity. Although there was evidence from which a jury could arguably have concluded that Cunningham was not a party to this offense, in light of the strength of, and nature of the evidence about the criminal act, it is within the bounds of reasonable representation for counsel to conclude that seeking an instruction on a lesser offense was a futile act.
There is also a further argument that counsel may have decided to "roll the dice" in hopes of getting an acquittal on the greater offense without providing the jury with the opportunity to compromise and convict him of the lesser. By not requesting an instruction on a lesser included offense, the accused hopes the jury will acquit of the greater offense, rather than convict on what he or she believes is arguably insufficient evidence. "The accused is counting on the jury to comply with the instructions that the state's burden is to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." See Collier v. State, 999 S.W.2d 779, 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Although we might not agree with the tactical decision, the arguments are not unreasonable and, in that situation, we must defer to counsel's decision. The contention of error is overruled.
We affirm the judgment.
Donald R. Ross
Justice
Date Submitted: August 16, 2006
Date Decided: September 19, 2006
Do Not Publish
Arevalo v. State , 1997 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 12 ( 1997 )
Wesbrook v. State , 2000 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 86 ( 2000 )
Rousseau v. State , 1993 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 50 ( 1993 )
Guevara v. State , 2004 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1750 ( 2004 )
Murphy v. State , 2003 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 118 ( 2003 )
Strickland v. Washington , 104 S. Ct. 2052 ( 1984 )