San Jacinto River Authority v. Richard Guajardo, John Taylor, Robert Lowry, and Fountain Maturi

Opinion issued May 11, 2021
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-20-00662-CV
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SAN JACINTO RIVER AUTHORITY, Appellant
V.
RICHARD GUAJARDO, JOHN TAYLOR, ROBERT LOWRY, AND
FOUNTAIN MATURI, Appellees
On Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 1
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 112343
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case is an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of appellant San
Jacinto River Authority’s motion to dismiss or transfer improperly joined plaintiffs
pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 15.003, which requires
each plaintiff in a multi-plaintiff lawsuit to “independently establish proper venue.”
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(a). Because we conclude that the trial court
erred, we reverse and remand.
Background
The River Authority is a conservation and reclamation district and subdivision
of the State of Texas, charged with developing, conserving, and protecting water
resources in the San Jacinto River basin. Included among its various duties, the River
Authority oversees releasing water from the Lake Conroe Dam into the West Fork
of the San Jacinto River. In the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey, which made landfall
along the Texas Gulf Coast in August 2017, the River Authority determined that a
release of water from the Lake Conroe Dam was necessary to adjust for the dramatic
flooding caused by the storm. The release of the water flooded downstream
properties.
In August 2019, appellees John Taylor, Robert Lowry, and Fountain Maturi,
along with thirteen other individuals, filed suit against the River Authority in Harris
County Civil Court at Law No. 1 in a case styled Melvin Grothe, et al. v. San Jacinto
River Authority (the Grothe case). Appellee Richard Guajardo and two other
individuals filed a separate suit, styled William Collins, et al. v. San Jacinto River
Authority, in the same court (the Collins case). Both petitions asserted a cause of
action for inverse condemnation and unconstitutional taking, alleging that the River
Authority was liable for damages to real property caused when it released water from
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the Lake Conroe Dam. In their petitions, the majority of the Grothe and Collins
plaintiffs identified their affected properties as being in Harris County. The four
appellees here—Taylor, Lowry, Maturi, and Guajardo—provided addresses for
properties located in Montgomery County. The plaintiffs in both the Grothe and
Collins cases further alleged that venue was proper in Harris County pursuant to
Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 15.002 (the general-venue provision) and
15.011 (a mandatory venue provision for suits involving land). The River Authority
filed answers in both the Grothe and Collins cases.
On June 9, 2020, the trial court consolidated the Grothe and Collins cases into
the underlying lawsuit, which raised the same issues.
On August 11, 2020, the River Authority filed a “Motion to Dismiss/Transfer
Improperly Joined Plaintiffs.” The motion, filed pursuant to Civil Practice &
Remedies Code section 15.003, argued that Taylor, Lowry, Maturi, and Guajardo
(the Montgomery County plaintiffs) had been improperly joined with the other
plaintiffs whose property was in Harris County. The River Authority cited Civil
Practice and Remedies Code section 15.011, providing that venue was mandatory
where all or part of the real property was located. Thus, the River Authority argued,
the Montgomery County plaintiffs could not establish, independently of the other
plaintiffs in the consolidated cases, that venue was proper in Harris County. The
River Authority requested the trial court to transfer the claims of the Montgomery
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County plaintiffs or to dismiss them because their properties are in Montgomery
County.
The Montgomery County plaintiffs responded to the motion, pointing out that
the River Authority had answered the original Grothe and Collins petitions and
participated in litigation prior to the consolidation of the cases. They asserted that
the Motion to Dismiss/Transfer Improperly Joined Plaintiffs was untimely because
it had not been filed before any other pleading as required by Rule of Civil Procedure
86(1). At the hearing on the motion, the Montgomery County plaintiffs further
argued that the River Authority had “judicially admitted” the elements of section
15.003(a), which provides a limited exception to the general rule that all plaintiffs
must independently establish proper venue.
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss/Transfer Improperly Joined
Plaintiffs without explaining its reasoning or making findings. This interlocutory
appeal followed. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(c) (permitting
interlocutory appeal from ruling under section 15.003).
Analysis
In its sole issue on appeal, the River Authority argues that the trial court erred
in denying its Motion to Dismiss/Transfer Improperly Joined Plaintiffs filed
pursuant to Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 15.003.
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Section 15.003 provides:
In a suit in which there is more than one plaintiff, whether the plaintiffs
are included by joinder, by intervention, because the lawsuit was begun
by more than one plaintiff, or otherwise, each plaintiff must,
independently of every other plaintiff, establish proper venue. If a
plaintiff cannot independently establish proper venue, that plaintiff’s
part of the suit, including all of that plaintiff’s claims and causes of
action, must be transferred to a county of proper venue or dismissed, as
is appropriate, unless that plaintiff, independently of every other
plaintiff, establishes that:
(1) joinder of that plaintiff or intervention in the suit by that plaintiff is
proper under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure;
(2) maintaining venue as to that plaintiff in the county of suit does not
unfairly prejudice another party to the suit;
(3) there is an essential need to have that plaintiff’s claim tried in the
county in which the suit is pending; and
(4) the county in which the suit is pending is a fair and convenient venue
for that plaintiff and all persons against whom the suit is brought.
Id. § 15.003(a).
Because section 15.003(a) “takes as its starting point” a plaintiff who cannot
establish proper venue, we must first determine whether a plaintiff can
independently establish proper venue. Surgitek, Bristol-Myers Corp. v. Abel, 997
S.W.2d 598, 602 (Tex. 1999) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(a)).
This determination is made “using venue proof standards—if the plaintiff offers
prima facie proof through pleadings and affidavits that venue is proper, the inquiry
is over.” Id. “Proper venue” means: (1) the venue, as provided by subchapter B of
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Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code or any other statute prescribing
mandatory venue; or (2) if there is no mandatory venue, the venue provided under
the general venue statute or the permissive venue provisions of subchapter C of
chapter 15. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.001(b).
The Montgomery County plaintiffs identified their addresses in their original
petitions, and they do not dispute that their affected properties are in Montgomery
County. Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 15.011 provides that, for suits
involving land, venue is mandatory in the county where the property is located:
Actions for recovery of real property or an estate or interest in real
property, for partition of real property, to remove encumbrances from
the title to real property, for recovery of damages to real property, or to
quiet title to real property shall be brought in the county in which all or
a part of the property is located.
Id. § 15.011. Because this suit involves injury to land, this mandatory venue
provision applies. Accordingly, we conclude that the Montgomery County plaintiffs
cannot independently establish that venue for their claims is proper in Harris County.
See id. §§ 15.001, 15.011.
We turn next to whether the limited exception set out in section 15.003(a)
applies to the claims of the Montgomery County plaintiffs. “[S]ection 15.003(a)
expressly places the burden on the plaintiff to ‘establish’ four elements before she
can join venue for the suit.” Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 602. The plaintiff must offer
prima facie proof of the four elements. The statutory language “contemplates the
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admission, in some instances, of a broader range of evidence than would be
admissible in a venue hearing.” Id.
When reviewing on interlocutory appeal a trial court’s section 15.003 ruling,
this Court must “determine whether the trial court’s order is proper based on an
independent determination from the record and not under either an abuse of
discretion or substantial evidence standard.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 15.003(c)(1). We thus conduct a “de novo review of the entire record to determine
whether a trial court’s section 15.003(a) joinder determination was proper.”
Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 603.
The Montgomery County plaintiffs did not present any evidence on the four
elements set out in section 15.003(a). At the hearing before the trial court, they
argued that, in an unopposed motion to consolidate filed by the River Authority in
September 2019, the River Authority “judicially admitted each one of the elements
to the exception in 15.003.” In that motion, the River Authority indicated that it was
“unopposed to the motion to consolidate in two other inverse condemnation cases”
based on the same allegations at issue in this case. The River Authority recognized
that the lawsuits were “practically identical, including the fact that all such Plaintiffs
share the same counsel, [and] other than individual addresses, all involve common
questions of law and fact.”
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Assuming without deciding that the statements in this motion constitute
judicial admissions,1 we conclude that they fail to establish the Montgomery County
plaintiffs’ entitlement to the limited exception in section 15.003(a). The fact that the
cases are “practically identical” except for the differing addresses and that they share
common questions of law and fact are insufficient to establish element 3, which
requires proof that “there is an essential need to have that plaintiff’s claim tried in
the county in which the suit is pending.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §
15.003(a)(3). Proof of an “essential need” to have the claim tried in Harris County
requires more than proof of convenience or the need to pool resources. See Surgitek,
997 S.W.2d at 604. Rather, each plaintiff must prove that suit in Harris County is
“indispensably necessary.” Id. (recognizing that this burden is “very high”).
1
The River Authority argues that its statements in the motion identified by the
Montgomery County plaintiffs do not qualify as judicial admissions. The River
Authority points out that the motion was never presented to the trial court and was
never ruled upon, and it argues that the statements were not clear and unequivocal
statements of fact. See, e.g., Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d
887, 905 (Tex. 2000) (requiring “a clear, deliberate, and unequivocal” statement of
fact for statement to constitute judicial admission); Weslaco Fed. of Teachers v. Tex.
Educ. Agency, 27 S.W.3d 258, 263 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (“To qualify
as a judicial admission, a statement must be (1) made in the course of a judicial
proceeding; (2) contrary to an essential fact for the party’s recovery; (3) deliberate,
clear and unequivocal; (4) related to a fact upon which judgment for the opposing
party could be based; and (5) enforcing the admission would be consistent with
public policy. A true judicial admission is a formal waiver of proof usually found in
pleadings or the stipulations of the parties.”). Because we conclude that the
statements identified by the Montgomery County plaintiffs did not satisfy their
burden of proof under section 15.003(a), this contention is irrelevant to our analysis.
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The facts cited by the Montgomery County plaintiffs—that the suits share
common questions of fact and law and are tried by the same counsel—do not
establish an essential need to proceed in Harris County.2 Those facts are relevant to
the elements of prejudice or the convenience of the selected venue, but they do not
prove that venue in Harris County is indispensably necessary to the resolution of the
Montgomery County plaintiffs’ claims against the River Authority. See, e.g.,
Ramirez v. Collier, Shannon, Scott, PLLC, 123 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (holding benefits of pooling resources,
shared facts and issues, and location of witnesses does not show essential need);
Smith v. Adair, 96 S.W.3d 700, 707 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied)
(recognizing essential need means more than judicial economy or convenience);
O’Quinn v. Hall, 77 S.W.3d 438, 451 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002,
no pet.) (“[T]he mere fact that a related suit is already proceeding in that county is
insufficient to establish that it is indispensably necessary for the plaintiff seeking
joinder or intervention to try his claims there.”). Because the Montgomery County
plaintiffs failed to establish the essential-need element, we need not address the other
joinder factors. See Smith, 96 S.W.3d at 708.
2
The River Authority argued that the Montgomery County plaintiffs affirmatively
cannot establish an essential need to maintain their claims in Harris County because
numerous other claims have been filed in surrounding counties, including in
Montgomery County.
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Because the Montgomery County plaintiffs did not establish that venue was
proper in Harris County, nor did they establish the applicability of section
15.003(a)’s exceptions, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the River
Authority’s motion to dismiss or transfer pursuant to section 15.003.
The Montgomery County plaintiffs argue that the River Authority’s motion
was untimely, pointing out that the River Authority did not challenge venue until
after it had answered the Grothe and Collins cases and after it had otherwise
participated in litigation after those cases were consolidated into the underlying suit.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 86(1) (“An objection to improper venue is waived if not made
by written motion prior to or concurrently with any other plea, pleading or motion
except a special appearance[.]”). This argument, however, ignores the unique nature
of section 15.003.
“Section 15.003 is not a venue statute; it is a joinder statute. The statute allows
an interlocutory appeal for one specific purpose: to contest the trial court’s decision
allowing or denying intervention or joinder.” Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Clark, 38
S.W.3d 92, 96 (Tex. 2000); Ramirez, 123 S.W.3d at 49 (“A trial court’s ruling under
section 15.003 is not a venue ruling; it is ruling on intervention or joinder. . . .”); see
Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 602 (“The fact that section 15.003(a) appears in the venue
chapter of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code informs but does not control what
type of hearing or standard of proof governs a section 15.003(a) joinder
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determination.”). The plain language of section 15.003 contemplates that all
plaintiffs must independently establish proper venue regardless of when or how they
enter the suit. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(a).
Our sister court of appeals addressed a similar argument in Wells Fargo Bank
Texas, N.A. v. Barton, 100 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). In
that case, the Barton appellees argued that the Bank’s challenge to joinder was, in
reality, a motion to transfer venue, and, thus, the Bank waived its right to challenge
joinder under section 15.003 because the motion to transfer was not filed and ruled
upon prior to the Bank’s seeking other affirmative relief. Id. at 459. The San Antonio
Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating that “[a]n order transferring venue
of certain claims based upon a finding of improper joinder is still a joinder decision,
even though the remedy for misjoinder may be transfer rather than outright
dismissal.” Id. (citing Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 604 and O’Quinn, 77 S.W.3d at 445).
The court held that “[t]here is no requirement that a motion to dismiss a party seeking
joinder must be filed before any other pleading or request for relief.” Id.; compare
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003 (no due course of pleading requirement)
with TEX. R. CIV. P. 86(1) (motion to transfer venue is waived if not filed prior to or
concurrent with any other pleading).
Other courts have reached a similar conclusion. In Wyeth v. Hall, the
Beaumont Court of Appeals held that “section 15.003 has no due diligence
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requirement.” 118 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2003, no pet.) (applying
general rule that complaint about misjoinder must be made prior to submission of
case to trial court in determining that party did not waive section 15.003 challenge
by failing to diligently pursue hearing on motion to transfer venue); see UPS Ground
Freight, Inc. v. Trotter, 606 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2020, pet. filed)
(holding that Rule 87(5)’s provision limiting availability of motion for rehearing on
venue rulings “is at odds with Section 15.003’s insistence that all plaintiffs prove
venue is appropriate as to them even though they entered the suit at different times”);
In re Estate of Griffith, No. 05-19-01144, 2020 WL 113675, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Jan. 10, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (recognizing that section 15.003 provides
exception to section 15.064’s and Rule 87’s prohibition on interlocutory appeals by
permitting appeal). We find the reasoning in these cases persuasive here and
determine that the River Authority did not waive its complaint under section 15.003.
We sustain the River Authority’s sole issue.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order denying the River Authority’s Motion to
Dismiss/Transfer Improperly Joined Plaintiffs filed pursuant to Civil Practice and
Remedies Code section 15.003. We remand the case to the trial court to transfer the
Montgomery County plaintiffs’ claims to a county of proper venue or to dismiss
them, as appropriate. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.003(a).
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Richard Hightower
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Landau, and Hightower.
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