Irvin Vladimi Campos-Hernandez v. the State of Texas

Affirmed and Opinion Filed May 24, 2021
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-19-01489-CR
IRVIN VLADIMI CAMPOS-HERNANDEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F19-32862
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Carlyle
Opinion by Justice Myers
Appellant Irvin Vladimi Campos-Hernandez was indicted for aggravated
robbery. Following a jury trial, he was found guilty of the offense. The jury assessed
punishment at five years in prison and a $1,500 fine.
Appellant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. The motion is supported
by a brief in which counsel professionally and conscientiously examines the record
and applicable law and concludes this appeal is frivolous and without merit.
Counsel certifies that he provided appellant with a copy of the brief and the
motion to withdraw. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967). The brief presents a professional evaluation of the record showing
why, in effect, there are no arguable grounds to advance. See High v. State, 573
S.W.2d 807, 812–13 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (determining whether brief
meets requirements of Anders); see also Arevalos v. State, 606 S.W.3d 912, 915–16
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, no pet.) (citing High and concluding Anders brief in
support of motion to withdraw did not meet requirements of Anders and was
deficient as to form). We advised appellant by letter of his right to file a pro se
response, but he has not filed a pro se response. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313,
319–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (appellant has right to file pro se response to Anders
brief filed by counsel).
We have reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. See Bledsoe v. State, 178
S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (explaining appellate court’s duty in
Anders cases). We agree the appeal is frivolous and without merit, and we find
nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.
Although not arguable issues, we note two clerical errors in the judgment.
First, the judgment states that the “Attorney for State” was “ELMAZI VERIME
24042652” when the record and counsel’s Anders brief show Chalana Oliver, State
Bar of Texas (SBOT) number 24103139 and Thomas Adams, SBOT number
24073824, represented the State. The record does not indicate Elmazi Verime
represented the State in any capacity. Second, the judgment cites the statutory basis
for the deadly weapon finding as “Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 42.12 § 3g.” Article
42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure was repealed and replaced with
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Chapter 42A, effective January 1, 2017. See, e.g., Wright v. State, No. 05-19-00112-
CR, 2019 WL 6124737, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication); Caballero v. State, No. 05-18-01338-CR, 2019
WL 5112270, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 10, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Tarver v. State, No. 05-18-00589-CR, 2019 WL
1785342, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas April 24, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op. not designated
for publication).
The statute relevant to the trial court’s entry of an affirmative deadly weapon
finding is now codified in article 42A.054(c). See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
42A.054(c). The indictment alleges the offense was committed on or about
December 5, 2018, and the judgment was entered on November 8, 2019. Hence,
article 42A.054(c) is the applicable statute. See, e.g., Wright, 2019 WL 6124737, at
*2 (modifying judgment to reflect correct statutory basis to support deadly weapon
finding as article 42A.054(c)).
When the record provides the necessary information to correct inaccuracies in
the trial court’s judgment, we have the authority to reform the judgment to speak the
truth. TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991,
pet. ref’d). Accordingly, we sua sponte modify the judgment to reflect that the
attorneys for the State were “CHALANA OLIVER 24103139” and “THOMAS
ADAMS 24073824.” Additionally, because the citation to Article 42.12 § 3g in the
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judgment is a clerical error and not an error of judicial reasoning, we further modify
the judgment to reflect that the statutory basis for the affirmative deadly weapon
finding is “Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 42A.054(c).”
We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and, as modified, affirm the
judgment.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE
191489f.u05
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P 47.2(b)
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
IRVIN VLADIMI CAMPOS- On Appeal from the Criminal District
HERNANDEZ, Appellant Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-1932862.
No. 05-19-01489-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Myers.
Justices Osborne and Carlyle
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
MODIFIED as follows:
In the portion of the judgment entitled “Attorney for State,” “ELMAZI
VERIME 24042652” is replaced with “CHALANA OLIVER
24103139” and “THOMAS ADAMS 24073824”;
In the statutory basis for the special findings section on the second page
of the judgment, “Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 42.12 § 3g” is replaced
with “Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.054(c).”
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 24th day of May, 2021.
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