DocketNumber: NO. 02-16-00435-CV
Citation Numbers: 545 S.W.3d 714
Judges: Kerr, Pittman, Sudderth
Filed Date: 3/22/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/21/2022
Geoffrey Ali Jahan Tigh appeals from the trial court's August 17, 2016 judgment domesticating a Pennsylvania judgment that was filed in Texas on September 18, 2012. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Background
In December 2005, Appellee De Lage Landen Financial Services sued Tigh in Pennsylvania state court. De Lage moved for alternative service after it was unable to serve Tigh. The Pennsylvania court granted De Lage's motion, giving it permission to serve Tigh by regular mail at his last-known address "in substantially the same manner" provided by Pennsylvania civil-procedure rule 403(1). De Lage then sent Tigh the complaint by regular mail, but Tigh did not appear. On July 28, 2006, the Pennsylvania court entered a default judgment against Tigh for over $64,000.
Some six years later, on September 18, 2012, De Lage filed in Tarrant County district court a certified copy of the Pennsylvania judgment, an affidavit stating Tigh's name and Tigh's and De Lage's last-known addresses, and a filing notice under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA). See
Tigh also timely filed a notice of appeal on December 17, 2012. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a)(1). The next day, the trial court granted Tigh's new-trial motion "to determine *718if the judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction." See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(e). In light of that ruling, we informed the parties that it appeared the trial court's granting of the motion rendered the appeal moot; we warned them that we would dismiss the appeal unless, within ten days, one of the parties explained why we shouldn't. See Jahan-Tigh v. De Lage Landen Fin. Servs. , No. 02-12-00509-CV,
After a bench trial in August 2016-nearly four years after De Lage came to court in Texas-the trial court signed a judgment finding that the Pennsylvania court had jurisdiction over Tigh and that the Pennsylvania judgment was valid. Based on these findings, the trial court denied Tigh's motion to vacate the judgment and motion for new trial. The trial court entered a judgment nunc pro tunc in February 2017 to correct the date of the Pennsylvania judgment recited in the Texas judgment.
Tigh has appealed raising four issues: (1) the August 2016 judgment and February 2017 judgment nunc pro tunc are void because they were signed after the trial court's plenary power expired; (2) a trial court cannot enter a judgment "domesticating a foreign judgment" in a UEFJA proceeding; (3) the Pennsylvania judgment was dormant and unenforceable when the trial court signed the August 2016 judgment;
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
The United States Constitution requires that each state give full faith and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. A judgment creditor may enforce a foreign judgment
The Trial Court's Jurisdiction
In his first issue, Tigh complains that the August 2016 judgment and the February 2017 judgment nunc pro tunc are void because they were signed after the trial court's plenary power had expired.
A party seeking to enforce a foreign judgment under the UEFJA has the initial burden to present a judgment that *719appears on its face to be a final, valid, and subsisting judgment. Mindis Metals, Inc. v. Oilfield Motor & Control, Inc. ,
The Pennsylvania judgment became enforceable as a Texas judgment on September 18, 2012, the day De Lage filed an authenticated copy of the Pennsylvania judgment
The next month, Tigh timely moved to vacate the judgment and for a new trial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(a) ; Moncrief ,
Tigh asserts that by granting his new-trial motion, the trial court effectively denied enforcement of the Pennsylvania judgment, and thus, the new-trial order was final and appealable, the postjudgment deadlines started to run, and De Lage should have either appealed that order or filed a common-law action to enforce the judgment. Tigh relies on a case in which one of our sister courts concluded that an order vacating a domesticated foreign judgment was final and appealable. See Mindis Metals ,
Here, in contrast, the trial court granted the motion for new trial but did not deny or refuse enforcement of the Pennsylvania judgment in Texas. It simply gave Tigh the chance to prove that the judgment was jurisdictionally void, one of the five grounds on which a Texas court can decline to give a foreign judgment full faith and credit. See
The Trial Court's Judgment
In his second issue, Tigh argues that assuming the trial court still had jurisdiction over the case in August 2016, the Pennsylvania judgment stands on its own, and the trial court erred by entering a separate judgment domesticating the Pennsylvania judgment.
The UEFJA is one of the two recognized methods of enforcing a foreign judgment in Texas. In addition to the UEFJA, a judgment creditor may bring a common-law action to enforce a foreign judgment. See
Here, in addition to the relief noted above, the August 2016 judgment and the February 2017 judgment nunc pro tunc ordered as follows:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff De Lage Landen Financial Services, Inc. do have and recover of and from Defendant a domesticated judgment pursuant to the Pennsylvania judgment entered against Defendant on July 28, 2006,[6 ] in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, Pennsylvania, cause # 05-10157, in the principal sum of $64,370.30 with all postjudgment interest thereon at the statutory rate from date of judgment, and with its costs in this behalf expended (the "Judgment"), and that Plaintiff have its execution. Such Judgment shall be fully recognized and enforced in the courts of the State of Texas.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all writs and processes, including any writ of execution, for the enforcement and collection of this judgment or the costs of court shall issue as necessary in favor of Plaintiff.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that this Judgment finally disposed of all claims and all parties and is appealable.
Because De Lage opted to proceed under the UEFJA, Tigh argues that the only relief that the trial court granted in 2016 that was consistent with the UEFJA was to deny his motion for new trial and that the UEFJA did not permit the trial court to enter a separate judgment. We agree. The trial court should have allowed the Pennsylvania judgment to speak for itself and should not have entered a new judgment replacing it. We therefore sustain Tigh's second issue.
Limitations and Dormancy
In his third issue, Tigh contends that because the Pennsylvania judgment was more than ten years old by the time the trial court ruled on his motion to vacate the judgment and motion for new trial, enforcement of that Pennsylvania judgment was time-barred under civil practice and remedies code section 16.066, and also that the Pennsylvania judgment was dormant under civil practice and remedies code section 34.001. See
As noted, the expiration of limitations under section 16.066 is one of the five grounds on which a Texas court can decline to give a foreign judgment full faith and credit. See Mindis Metals ,
Tigh next asks us to hold that when the trial court overruled his motion to vacate the judgment and motion for new trial in August 2016, the Pennsylvania judgment was dormant under civil practice and remedies code section 34.001(a). Section 34.001(a) provides that "[i]f a writ of execution is not issued within 10 years after the rendition of a judgment of a court of record or a justice court, the judgment is dormant and execution may not be issued on the judgment unless it is revived."
Tigh does not cite, nor have we found, any authority that section 34.001(a) applies to foreign judgments or that even if it does, section 34.001(a) prevents a trial court from concluding that a foreign judgment filed within limitations and before the foreign judgment was dormant under Texas law is entitled to full faith and credit. De Lage's filing the Pennsylvania judgment in Texas state court in September 2012 simultaneously started the UEFJA enforcement proceeding and created a Texas judgment. See Moncrief ,
The Pennsylvania Court's Jurisdiction
As we mentioned, the rendering state's lack of jurisdiction because of inadequate service of process is another of the five grounds on which a Texas court can decline *723to give a foreign judgment full faith and credit. See Mindis Metals ,
We review a trial court's order on a motion contesting a foreign judgment's enforcement for an abuse of discretion. Ward v. Hawkins ,
Normally, we would review the record to determine whether the trial court misapplied the law to the established facts when it concluded that Tigh had not established an exception to the full-faith-and-credit doctrine. See
Pennsylvania civil-procedure rule 403(1) provides
If the mail is returned with notation by the postal authorities that the defendant refused to accept the mail, the plaintiff shall have the right of service by mailing a copy to the defendant at the same address by ordinary mail with the return address of the sender appearing thereon. Service by ordinary mail is complete if the mail is not returned to the sender within fifteen days after mailing.
Pa. R. Civ. P. 403(1). Because we must imply all facts necessary to support the trial court's judgment, uphold the judgment on any theory the record supports, and indulge every presumption in the judgment's favor, we must assume that the evidence supported both the trial court's implied finding that De Lage satisfied rule 403(1) 's requirements and its conclusion that the Pennsylvania court therefore had jurisdiction over Tigh when it rendered the Pennsylvania judgment. We overrule Tigh's fourth issue.
Conclusion
Having sustained Tigh's second issue, we reverse only that part of the August 2016 judgment and the February 2017 judgment nunc pro tunc awarding De Lage judgment on the Pennsylvania judgment.
*724The Pennsylvania judgment remains entitled to full faith and credit and is fully enforceable in Texas. Having overruled Tigh's first, third, and fourth issues, we affirm the remainder of the trial court's judgment.
See
A "foreign judgment" is "a judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other court that is entitled to full faith and credit in this state."
"A defendant may challenge the jurisdiction of a sister state by demonstrating that (1) service of process was inadequate under the rules of the sister state or (2) the sister state's exercise of personam jurisdiction offends the due process of law." Mindis Metals ,
Tigh does not dispute that De Lage filed an authenticated copy of the Pennsylvania judgment, thereby presenting a prima facie case for its enforcement in Texas. See
The delay might have been puzzling and unfortunate, but it did not affect the trial court's continuing jurisdiction.
The 2016 judgment incorrectly stated that the date of the Pennsylvania judgment was July 28, 2016. The 2017 judgment nunc pro tunc corrected the year to 2006.
Section 16.006(a) states that "[a]n action on a foreign judgment is barred in this state if the action is barred under the laws of the jurisdiction where rendered."
Tigh is a Texas resident, and he does not dispute that he resided here for ten years before De Lage's UEFJA action.
In section 16.066, a " 'foreign judgment' means a judgment or decree rendered in another state or foreign country."
In a letter to this court, the court reporter stated, "I have not received a designation from Counsel to prepare a Reporter's Record, and after reviewing my files, I do not see that anything has ever been reported in this matter."