DocketNumber: No. 04-18-00039-CV
Citation Numbers: 551 S.W.3d 833
Judges: Martinez
Filed Date: 4/18/2018
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/21/2022
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... [Under Texas law] [t]o establish economic feasibility, the plaintiff must ... introduce proof of the cost of incorporating this technology.
So all these cases, Judge, go to what we're required to prove to carry the day and what we're trying to prove.
Now, Judge, two of the components, the RSC and the ECS, they were available as optional features on the truck Mr. Garza was driving, so to demonstrate economic feasibility, we need to show the costs and sales price of those *840components and the costs and sales price of the truck that Mr. Garza was driving, as well as the costs and sales price of the trucks of the type that Mr. Garza was driving. Two other components, the automatic seat pull down system and the seat integrated side airbag are known collectively as the roll tech system, they're either standard or optional features in the companion Cascadia model that Mr. Moore identified in his deposition that had been manufactured and came off the assembly line before this truck was manufactured.
So and there again to prove economic feasibility, which is what we're required to do, we have to show the costs and the sales price of those components when they're added to a truck and the costs and sales price of the truck to which they would be added, which includes the Cascadia.
And then lastly, Judge, the remaining two design changes, the strengthening certain features of the cab installing a roll bar, they're not presently available as options on the truck that Mr. Garza was driving, but to determine economic feasibility of strengthening the cab features, we'd have to know at the outset the cost of the features in their current condition in the tractor Mr. Garza was driving. We need to know whether Daimler attempted to strength the cab in the related Cascadia model that Mr. Moore identified. And if so, the costs of doing that in the Cascadia model. ...
But, Judge, in sum, the information identified in the Diab affidavit is necessary to a fair adjudication of the plaintiff's claim, which is what the case law tells us. And we have to get this information in order to prove our case.
Other than counsel's arguments, plaintiffs offered no witness testimony or other evidence that the information they sought from relator was necessary for a fair adjudication of their claims. Instead, plaintiffs' attorney merely pointed to the allegations in plaintiffs' petition and to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 82, and argued that because section 82.005 required certain proof, the information sought from relator was necessary to a fair adjudication of plaintiffs' case. Relator objected that the plaintiffs needed more than mere arguments from an attorney. We agree.
Although the Texas Supreme Court has not provided a specific test to be applied in determining whether the requesting party has carried its burden to show that trade secret information is necessary to a fair adjudication of its claim, the Court has stated the test is not satisfied by general assertions of unfairness or relevance. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. ,
Nor is it enough to show that the information would be useful to the party's expert; rather, the party must show that it is necessary. See Cont'lGen. Tire ,
In Continental General Tire , the Supreme Court noted:
... The plaintiffs contended at oral argument before this Court that their expert has found sulfur on the belt surfaces of this tire, and that plaintiffs need Continental's formula to determine whether sulfur is a regular component of the skim stock or whether it was a foreign material improperly introduced during manufacture. Regardless of whether this theory might otherwise justify discovery of the compound formula, an issue on which we express no opinion, plaintiffs presented no evidence supporting this theory to the trial court. Under these circumstances, given the highly proprietary nature of the information, the plaintiffs have not carried their burden under Rule 507 of demonstrating that the information is necessary for a fair trial. [Emphasis added.]
We hold that an attorney's argument that trade secret information is necessary is not sufficient to satisfy the burden. Instead, a party must present evidence to support discovery of trade secrets.
Plaintiffs alternatively contend the trial court had before it the testimonial evidence of the Diab affidavit and the deposition of relator's corporate representative Anthony Moore based on which the trial court could conduct a balancing test. See
We conclude plaintiffs did not meet their burden to establish the information they sought is "necessary for a fair adjudication of [their] claims." Cont'lGen. Tire ,
VAGUENESS
Relator also challenges the portion of the trial court's order that states: "[Relator] SHALL designate one or more individuals to testify on its behalf with respect to such matters to the extent such matters are known or reasonably available to [relator] ...." Relator asserts the meaning of the phrase "reasonably available" is unclear and requires it to create evidence that does not exist.
"The rules do not permit the trial court to force a party to create documents which do not exist, solely to comply with a request for production." In re Guzman ,
We conclude the trial court's order is not vague and does not require relator to create evidence that does not exists.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the trial court erred by ordering relator to designate a corporate representative to testify about the "30 subject matters identified in the Diab affidavit" because the plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden. Therefore, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and order the trial court to vacate that portion of its order requiring relator to "designate one or more individuals to testify on its behalf with respect to" "the 30 subject matters identified in the Diab affidavit as encompassing trade secret information." The writ of mandamus will issue only if the trial court fails to comply within fifteen days from the date of our opinion and order.
Dissenting Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
DISSENTING OPINION