Paul Cody Teague v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-20-00074-CR
PAUL CODY TEAGUE, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 181st District Court
Randall County, Texas
Trial Court No. 28,243-B, Honorable John B. Board, Presiding
June 24, 2021
OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.
Appellant, Paul Cody Teague, appeals from a jury verdict finding him guilty of
aggravated sexual assault, two counts of sexual assault, and one count of aggravated
kidnapping. After appellant pled true to an enhancement allegation regarding a prior
conviction for aggravated sexual assault, the trial court sentenced appellant to life
imprisonment on all counts. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions for aggravated sexual assault and one of the sexual assault
counts. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
The victim1 in this case was informed by a friend that a “Dean Winters” might be
able to help her obtain steady income and stable housing. Victim reached out to Winters
online, informing him of her current circumstances. Winters offered Victim a place to stay
in exchange for sex, but Victim declined. A couple of weeks later, Winters contacted
Victim and offered to provide her a place to stay if she would work for a call service he
operated out of his home. Victim agreed to this arrangement and Winters sent a cohort
to pick up Victim. At some point, Victim became aware that “Winters” was actually
appellant.
Appellant’s cohort took Victim to appellant’s trailer home located outside of Canyon
on Sunday, October 15, 2017. Upon entering appellant’s home, the driver immediately
stripped naked and began smoking methamphetamine in front of appellant, Victim, and
another associate of appellant. Feeling that the entire situation was “very weird,” Victim
walked out of appellant’s house, intending to leave, but appellant followed her out and
convinced her to stay the night.
Over the course of the following day, appellant had Victim assist him with the call
service, as she expected. However, soon thereafter, appellant accused Victim of
breaking his headphones and demanded that she replace them. Victim replaced the
headphones, but appellant insisted that this was not sufficient. He claimed that, by
breaking his headphones, Victim had caused appellant to lose his job. To repay him,
1 To protect the privacy of the victim in this case, we will refer to her as “Victim.”
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appellant demanded that Victim have sex with him. When Victim refused, appellant
repeatedly shoved her to a back bedroom where he told her that she could not leave until
she had sex with him. Victim succumbed to appellant’s demand. Even though appellant
told Victim that he would take her home after she had sex with him, after she complied,
he continued to refuse to let her leave.
Appellant confined Victim in a bedroom where he stripped her naked and told her
that she was going to have sex with people appellant brought to the house in order to
repay him for breaking his headphones and costing him his job. Appellant restricted
Victim to this single room for a day, even posting “guards” at the door to the room.
Appellant also instigated a fight between Victim and another woman that resulted in the
other woman biting Victim’s ear. Victim, fearing that appellant intended to make good on
his promise to force her into prostitution, attempted to escape by running out of the back
door of the trailer. However, she was recaptured while running through an open field.
Appellant choked Victim unconscious and dragged her back to the trailer. Once inside
the trailer, appellant chained Victim to a toilet.
Over the next few days, Victim was sexually assaulted multiple times in varying
ways. In one such incident, appellant hit Victim with his fists until she lost consciousness.
Just before she lost consciousness, Victim saw another man, James Washburn, pull a
phallic sex toy, commonly known as a dildo, from his backpack. Whenever Victim would
regain consciousness during this period, appellant hit her until she would again lose
consciousness. When she was finally allowed to awaken, Victim discovered that she was
again chained by the neck and she felt like her “insides were just wounded, very
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wounded.” Appellant informed Victim that Washburn had penetrated her anus with the
dildo. When he informed Victim of this, appellant also told Victim that “You’re a fighter,
aren’t you?”
Later, appellant sexually assaulted Victim in the living room of the trailer in front of
others. One of the other people at appellant’s trailer recognized that Victim needed
medical attention and tried to convince appellant to take her to the hospital, but he
refused. Victim lay on the floor barely able to move. Regardless, appellant forced Victim
to have sex even though she was throwing up bile and told him that she could not have
sex.
Finally, one of the people that had been at appellant’s trailer informed law
enforcement that a woman had been kidnapped and was being held inside appellant’s
trailer. As a result, an officer knocked on appellant’s door, but no one answered. At that
time, Victim was locked in a closet and was barely able to move.
Following the visit by the police, appellant told Victim that she needed to leave but
that she needed to be quiet because the police had just been by the trailer. Appellant
suggested that Victim be dropped off at her grandmother’s house in Pampa. Victim,
knowing that she needed immediate medical attention, convinced appellant to drop her
off at the Pavilion in Amarillo. She told appellant that she would say that she was “crazy”
and that she had made up the abduction. Appellant eventually agreed but made clear to
Victim that she needed to “keep her mouth shut.” Victim was dropped off at the Pavilion
at 6:33 p.m. on Thursday, October 19.
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Victim was transferred to the hospital. While being evaluated, Victim told a sexual
assault nurse examiner that, “I was grabbed and chained around the neck and left in a
dirty bathtub. I was raped multiple times by three people. The men put their penises in
my mouth, my anus[,] and my vagina.” She further explained that, “They beat me many
times. One of the males used a dildo in my anus a lot. It hurt so much.”
The results of Victim’s medical evaluation revealed that her colon was beyond six
inches from her sphincter, which means that the object that caused the injury had to have
penetrated at least that far. Any object that penetrates that deeply can cause the injury
sustained by Victim. The penetration caused a hole in Victim’s colon. This is a
significantly dangerous injury because the hole can allow air and stool to leak out, which
can cause infection and sepsis. The pain level that is expected from this injury would
prevent most people from walking, let alone having sex.
Police officers returned to appellant’s trailer and, based on the information
provided by Victim, placed appellant under arrest. Appellant was subsequently indicted
for three counts of aggravated sexual assault and one count of aggravated kidnapping.
The indictment included an enhancement allegation that appellant had previously been
convicted of the felony offense of aggravated sexual assault. After a jury trial, appellant
was found guilty of one count of aggravated sexual assault, two counts of the lesser-
included offense of sexual assault, and one count of aggravated kidnapping. Appellant
pled true to the enhancement allegation. After a very brief punishment hearing, the trial
court sentenced appellant to life imprisonment on all counts. Appellant did not file a notice
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of appeal but sought an out-of-time appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeals, which was
granted on January 29, 2020.
By his appeal, appellant presents two issues. His first issue contends that the
evidence is insufficient to show that appellant, acting as a party to the offense, intended
for his co-defendant to inflict serious bodily injury on Victim. By his second issue,
appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that appellant committed the
sexual assault under Count III of the indictment because it fails to establish whether the
complained of conduct was done without consent.
Standard of Review
Both of appellant’s issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
conviction. In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether, based on the evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622
(Tex. Crim. App. 2017). “[O]nly that evidence which is sufficient in character, weight, and
amount to justify a factfinder in concluding that every element of the offense has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to support a conviction.” Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 917 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (Cochran, J., concurring). We are mindful
that “[t]here is no higher burden of proof in any trial, criminal or civil, and there is no higher
standard of appellate review than the standard mandated by Jackson.” Id. When
reviewing all the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, the ultimate question is
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whether the jury’s finding of guilt was a rational finding. See id. at 906-07 n.26 (discussing
Judge Cochran’s dissenting opinion in Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 448-50 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006), as outlining the proper application of a single evidentiary standard of
review). “[T]he reviewing court is required to defer to the jury’s credibility and weight
determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the
weight to be given their testimony.” Id. at 899. In our review, we must evaluate all the
evidence in the record, both direct and circumstantial, regardless of whether that evidence
was properly or improperly admitted. Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016). We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the elements of the
offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State,
953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Issue One: Party Liability
By his first issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish
his guilt as a party to aggravated sexual assault under Count I, specifically whether he
intended Washburn to cause Victim substantial bodily injury. To establish the elements
of aggravated sexual assault as alleged in Count I, the State had to prove that Washburn
intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of Victim’s anus with a dildo without her
consent and in a manner causing her serious bodily injury and that appellant, acting with
intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, solicited, encouraged, directed,
aided, or attempted to aid Washburn in committing the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE
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ANN. §§ 7.02(a)(2) (West 2021),2 22.021(a)(1)(A)(i) (West 2019). Sexual assault, which
contains the same elements as aggravated sexual assault other than causing serious
bodily injury, is a conduct-oriented offense. Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999).
Appellant admits, in his brief, that the evidence is sufficient to establish that he was
a party to the lesser-included offense of sexual assault under Count I. He concedes that
the jury was free to believe that, at the least, appellant was in the room with Washburn
and Victim at the time when Washburn penetrated Victim’s anus with the dildo, repeatedly
knocked Victim unconscious before and during the assault, and played a role in
restraining Victim throughout the assault. He admits that this is sufficient evidence to
prove that he acted with the intent to promote or assist in Washburn’s commission of the
offense of sexual assault. However, appellant contends that, by charging him under the
law of parties, the State was required to establish that appellant intended Washburn’s
actions to result in serious bodily injury to Victim.
When an offense prescribes a culpable mental state to only some elements, “the
lack of express language requiring an additional mens rea with respect to other elements
is a compelling indication that the Legislature did not intend an additional culpable mental
state.” Rodriguez v. State, 538 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Specifically, in
an aggravated assault case, since the statute is silent as to the mental state with respect
to causing serious bodily injury, the state is not required to establish mental culpability
2 While there are multiple ways to incur criminal liability as a party, for purposes of this opinion,
references to party liability refer only to “acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of an offense,
[the actor] solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense . . . .”
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2).
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with respect to the aggravating element. Id. at 630. Consequently, the identification of a
specific mental state as to one element and not as to others demonstrates the
Legislature’s intent to dispense with a mental state as to the other elements. Id. at 628.
As is true with sexual assault and aggravated sexual assault,3 the aggravating element
that separates assault and aggravated assault is serious bodily injury. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(a)(1) (West Supp. 2020), 22.02(a)(1) (West 2019). Thus, in both the
assault/aggravated assault and the sexual assault/aggravated sexual assault contexts,
the aggravating element of serious bodily injury does not separate lawful conduct from
unlawful conduct. Rodriguez, 538 S.W.3d at 629. The law provides that once the actor
intentionally commits the prohibited act and causes injury, he is responsible for whatever
degree of injury his intentional act caused. Id.Appellant cites Nava v. State for the proposition that the “intent to promote or
assist” element of party liability required the State to prove that appellant intended the
result of Victim suffering serious bodily injury. See 415 S.W.3d 289, 298-99 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013). In Nava, Nava and two co-conspirators made a deal with undercover agents
to purchase a truckload of stolen televisions. Id. at 292. During the deal, one of Nava’s
co-conspirators brandished a firearm and demanded the keys to the truck containing the
stolen items. Id. Ultimately, the co-conspirator shot and killed the undercover officer. Id.
at 293. Nava was charged with felony murder under the theory of party liability. Id. The
court explained that “[c]ombining the language of [Texas Penal Code section] 7.02(a)(2)
with the felony murder statute, then, requires an intent to promote or assist, not only the
3 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.011(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2020), 22.021(a)(2)(A)(i).
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commission of the underlying felony and the unreasonably dangerous act, but also the
result of the offense of felony murder—the death of an individual.” Id. at 299-300. We
conclude that a charge of aggravated sexual assault as a party is distinguishable from
the charge of felony murder as a party in Nava. The underlying felony in Nava was theft.
Nava’s intent to promote or assist the commission of that offense cannot be said to have
applied to the unexpected murder. Unlike the felony murder charge in Nava, the conduct
that constitutes the underlying offense of sexual assault, the penetration of Victim’s anus
with a dildo, is the same conduct that led to Victim’s foreseeable serious bodily injury.
See Rodriguez, 538 S.W.3d at 629 (once an actor intentionally commits the prohibited
act and causes injury, he is responsible for whatever degree of injury his intentional act
caused).
In the present case, we believe that it is appropriate to apply the doctrine of
transferred intent. “A person is criminally responsible for causing a result if the only
difference between what happened and what she desired, contemplated, or risked is that
a different offense was committed.” Metcalf v. State, 597 S.W.3d 847, 862 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2020) (Keel, J., concurring) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(b)(1) (West 2021)).
In other words, if a defendant intends to promote or assist the commission of one type of
sexual assault, but his co-defendant commits a different type of sexual assault, that
difference does not shield him from party liability, and he would still be guilty of sexual
assault if the other elements of party liability are met. Id. The transfer of a culpable
mental state between offenses contained in the same statute and between greater and
lesser included offenses is explicitly authorized by Texas Penal Code section 6.04(b)(1).
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(b)(1); Thompson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 787, 800 (Tex. Crim.
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App. 2007). Likewise, where several people act together in pursuit of an unlawful act,
each is liable for collateral crimes, even if those crimes were unplanned or unintended, if
those crimes are foreseeable, ordinary, and probable consequences of the intended
unlawful act. Curtis v. State, 573 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Specifically,
in Curtis, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that because the victim’s death was a
foreseeable consequence of the assault that the defendant promoted, the defendant was
liable for the collateral crime of murder even though there was no prior intent or plan to
kill the victim. Id. (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(b)(1)).
Applying the doctrine of transferred intent to the present case establishes that the
evidence is sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for the offense of aggravated
sexual assault. Appellant concedes that the evidence is sufficient to establish his guilt for
the offense of sexual assault as a party. The evidence establishes that appellant was in
the room with Washburn when Washburn sexually assaulted Victim, repeatedly knocked
Victim unconscious before and during the assault, and played a role in restraining Victim
throughout the assault. This evidence is sufficient to establish that appellant intended to
promote or assist Washburn’s commission of the offense of sexual assault. Under the
theory of transferred intent, appellant is guilty of the greater offense of aggravated sexual
assault if it was foreseeable, ordinary, and probable that Victim would suffer serious bodily
injury from Washburn’s actions. See id. The evidence established that appellant was
present during Washburn’s assault of Victim, which means that appellant witnessed the
force used by Washburn. See Nisbett v. State, 552 S.W.3d 244, 267 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018) (defendant’s culpable mental state may be inferred from the nature and extent of
the victim’s injuries). Further, appellant repeatedly hit Victim hard enough to knock her
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unconscious. It is foreseeable, ordinary, and probable that Victim would suffer serious
bodily injury as a result of these assaults. The fact that the manner in which Victim
suffered serious bodily injury was not from appellant hitting and restraining her does not
alter the fact that these actions were reasonably likely to cause Victim serious bodily
injury. Consequently, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to establish that
appellant is guilty of the offense of aggravated sexual assault as a party.
We overrule appellant’s first issue.
Issue Two: Consent
By his second issue, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to
establish the sexual assault under Count III, specifically whether appellant penetrated
Victim’s mouth without her consent. To establish the elements of the sexual assault
alleged in Count III, the State had to prove that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused
the penetration of the mouth of Victim with his sexual organ without Victim’s consent. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(a)(1)(B).
Victim testified that appellant penetrated her mouth with his penis three times while
she was at appellant’s trailer. The evidence also establishes that appellant committed
this act intentionally. What appellant challenges is the sufficiency of the evidence
regarding whether Victim consented. According to appellant, Victim testified that her first
sexual encounter with appellant, which included fellatio, was consensual. His argument
relies on Victim’s testimony that she had sex with appellant the first time “because he told
[her that] he [would] take [her] home [afterward].” Appellant contends that it is possible
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that Victim performed oral sex on him three times during this first sexual encounter and,
because he contends that this first encounter was consensual, the jury could not conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that he sexually assaulted her by penetrating her mouth with
his penis without her consent.
Under the Penal Code, a sexual assault is without the consent of the other person
if the actor compels the other person to submit or participate by the use of physical force,
violence, or coercion. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(1). In the present case, the
evidence established that, prior to appellant’s first sexual contact with Victim, he shoved
her through the trailer and into a back bedroom while telling her that she could not leave
because she owed him for making him lose his job. Appellant then told Victim that he
would allow her to leave only if she first had sex with him. Appellant’s use of physical
force coupled with his refusal to let Victim leave unless she had sex with him is sufficient
evidence to allow a rational jury to conclude that appellant coerced Victim to have sex
with him the first time. The evidence is clear that all subsequent sexual acts between
appellant and Victim were without her consent. Consequently, the evidence supports the
rational inference by the jury that Victim never had consensual sex with appellant and,
thus, appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s decision
to find appellant guilty of sexual assault under Count III is without merit.
We overrule appellant’s second issue.
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Conclusion
Having overruled both of appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial
court.
Judy C. Parker
Justice
Quinn, C. J., concurs in the result.
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