Michael Casey Foran v. State

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Nos. 04-18-00227-CR
Michael Casey FORAN,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 11, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 518258
Honorable Tommy Stolhandske, Judge Presiding
No. 04-18-00230-CR
Michael Casey FORAN,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2016CR10025
Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Karen Angelini, Justice
Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 12, 2018
AFFIRMED
04-18-00227-CR & 04-18-00230-CR
In Appeal Nos. 04-18-00227-CR and 04-18-00230-CR, Appellant Michael Foran appeals
the denial of his motions to suppress, arguing that the arresting officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to stop his vehicle for a traffic violation. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In the early hours of May 19, 2016, Foran’s vehicle was stopped at a red light, with its left-
turn signal blinking, at the intersection of St. Mary’s Street (a two-way street) and U.S. Highway
281 in San Antonio, Texas. When the light turned green, Foran proceeded through the light, drove
under Highway 281’s overpass, and began turning left onto Stadium Drive, which acts as a feeder
street to Highway 281 and is a one-way street with three lanes. The far-left lane only allows the
driver to make a left turn. The middle lane only allows the driver to go straight. The far-right lane
allows the driver to go either straight or to make a right turn. Video from the arresting officer’s
dash camera reflects that when Foran began his left-hand turn, he did not make a wide sweeping
left turn in the intersection and turn into the far-right lane from the intersection. Instead, Foran cut
diagonally across the intersection. The tires of his vehicle first crossed over the broken white line
separating the left-turn only lane and the middle lane. As Foran continued down Stadium Drive,
the tires of his vehicle crossed the middle lane and then the broken white line separating the middle
lane and far-right lane. By the time Foran finally finished traveling to the far-right lane, he had
almost reached the next intersection of Stadium Drive and Mulberry Avenue. When he stopped
for a red light at Stadium Drive and Mulberry Avenue, his left-turn signal was still on. The
arresting officer, who was following Foran, then initiated the stop for a traffic violation.
Foran was subsequently charged with driving while intoxicated (Trial Court No. 518258)
and possession of a controlled substance in an amount less than one gram (Trial Court Cause No.
2106-CR-10025). In each cause number, Foran filed a motion to suppress, arguing that he was
arrested and evidence was seized in violation of his constitutional rights and article 38.22 of the
-2-
04-18-00227-CR & 04-18-00230-CR
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Both the district court judge and the county court judge
referred the respective motions to suppress filed in their courts to Bexar County Magistrate Judge
Andrew Carruthers.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Jorge Coronado testified that he “observed the vehicle
making an improper turn.” He explained that Foran “was in the middle lane and then he proceeded
to go to the farther right lane and did not use the signal to make that lane change.” Officer Coronado
was asked, “So after he made the left turn, in your opinion, he entered the middle lane and then
went into the right lane?” Officer Coronado replied,
Well, he was already in the middle lane. And as he was in the middle lane, he then
changed over to the right lane. You can see in his – in the video clearly that his
vehicle is already traveling in the middle lane and then he diverts and changes lanes
. . . . As he’s making the left turn, sir, he goes into the middle lane and you can see
and observe that he switches over to the right lane. . . . From viewing the video, he
is in the middle lane when he makes that left turn. Okay. And then he drifts over to
the right lane without using his turn signal. . . . When he was coming from St.
Mary’s, goes under 281, he makes the left turn, he’s doing it the right way. He is
going into the middle lane, which is where he needs to be. And then you can visually
see [sic] that he starts drifting to the right lane without using his turn signal. If there
was to be [sic] other drivers, he’s not alerting the other drivers [who are] in that
lane that he ended up in that he’s making that lane [change].
According to Officer Coronado, “the only reason that [Foran] was pulled over was for not using
his turn signal.” In addition to Officer Coronado’s testimony, the video from his dash camera and
his case report was introduced in evidence.
At the end of the suppression hearing, Foran argued that the arresting officer did not have
reasonable suspicion to stop him for a traffic violation. Magistrate Judge Carruthers denied the
motions to suppress and orally stated his findings of fact and conclusions of law:
Here are my findings of fact and conclusions of law. The officer’s testimony and
the video from the officer’s dash camera provide reasonable suspicion for the stop
in that the defendant moved from the center lane to the right lane without a signal.
This provided reasonable suspicion for the stop; therefore, the stop was
constitutional.
-3-
04-18-00227-CR & 04-18-00230-CR
In both cause numbers, the trial courts adopted the findings and ruling of Magistrate Judge
Carruthers. 1 Foran has appealed the trial courts’ rulings on his motions to suppress in both cause
numbers, which have been consolidated on appeal.
DISCUSSION
In his sole issue, Foran argues the trial courts erred in denying his motions to suppress
because the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop Foran for a traffic violation.
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, an appellate court “afford[s] almost
total deference to the trial [court]’s determination of facts (if those facts are supported by the
record).” State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). “That same deferential
standard of review applies to a trial court’s determination of historical facts even when that
determination is based on a videotape recording admitted into evidence at a suppression hearing.”
Id. (quotation omitted). “Although appellate courts may review de novo ‘indisputable visual
evidence’ contained in a videotape, the appellate court must defer to the trial [court]’s factual
finding on whether a witness actually saw what was depicted on a videotape or heard what was
said during a recorded conversation.” Id. at 570-71 (citations omitted). Further, whether the trial
court grants or denies a motion to suppress, an appellate court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. at 571. That is, the “winning side is afforded the ‘strongest
legitimate view of the evidence’ as well as all reasonable inferences that can be derived from it.”
Id. (citations omitted). Finally, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s application of search
1
After the trial courts denied his motions to suppress, Foran entered into plea bargain agreements with the State in
both cases. In the county court case, he was sentenced to one year of detention and then placed on community
supervision for twelve months. In the district court case, he was given deferred adjudication and was placed on
community supervision for one year. The trial courts in both cases certified that although these were plea-bargain
cases, “matters had been raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial and not withdrawn or waived,” and
Foran had the right of appeal.
-4-
04-18-00227-CR & 04-18-00230-CR
and seizure law to the facts de novo and will affirm the trial court’s ruling “if the record reasonably
supports it and it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Id.An officer may make a warrantless traffic stop if the “reasonable suspicion” standard is
satisfied. Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Reasonable suspicion
exists when, based on the totality of the circumstances, “the officer has specific articulable facts
that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to reasonably
suspect that a particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaging in criminal activity.”
Id. (quotation omitted). Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard that disregards any
subjective intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether an objective basis for
the stop exists. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
At issue in this appeal are two sections of the Texas Transportation Code. Section 545.101
requires an operator of a vehicle making a left turn from a two-way road to a one-way road to
“approach the intersection in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully available to a vehicle moving in
the direction of the vehicle.” TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.101(b)(1). Then, “after entering the
intersection,” the operator shall turn left, “leaving the intersection so as to arrive in a lane lawfully
available to traffic moving in the direction of the vehicle on the roadway being entered.” Id.
§ 545.101(b)(2). Section 545.104 of the Texas Transportation Code requires an operator of a
vehicle to use a signal to indicate a lane change. Id. § 545.104(a). We interpret “a statute in
accordance with the plain meaning of its language unless the language is ambiguous or the plain
meaning leads to absurd results that the Legislature could not possibly have intended.” Wagner v.
State, 539 S.W.3d 298, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Foran argues that the issue in this appeal “boils down to whether a motorist can traverse
the [broken white lines between the lanes] on the path to the destination lane to make a lawful left
turn.” According to Foran, if, in making a left turn, a motorist can traverse the broken lines between
-5-
04-18-00227-CR & 04-18-00230-CR
the lanes on his path to his destination lane, then he did not commit a traffic violation. However,
the issue in this case is not whether Foran was guilty of the traffic offense but whether the arresting
officer had a reasonable suspicion that he was. See Jaganathan, 479 S.W.3d at 247; see Tex. Dep’t
of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (explaining that
the State “is not required to show a traffic offense was actually committed, but only that the officer
reasonably believed a violation was in progress”).
Both Foran and the State agree that section 545.101(b) permitted Foran to turn left from
the two-way street and turn into either of the three one-way lanes available. What they disagree
about is whether Foran turned into the middle lane or into the far-right lane. The arresting officer
testified at the suppression hearing that Foran turned into the middle lane and then changed lanes
without signaling. In reviewing the video from the arresting officer’s dash camera in the light most
favorable to the trial courts’ rulings, we conclude the arresting officer could have reasonably
determined that Foran turned into the middle lane and then failed to signal his lane change to the
far-right lane. Therefore, we hold the trial courts did not err in denying Foran’s motions to
suppress.
The judgments of the trial courts are affirmed.
Karen Angelini, Justice
Do not publish
-6-