418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of two
aggravated sexual abuse causes, sentenced to forty and thirty years' imprisonment, indecency with
a child, sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, burglary of a habitation, sentenced to thirty years'
imprisonment, and aggravated rape, sentenced to ten years' imprisorunent. The Fifth Court of
Appeals affirmed his convictions for one of the aggravated sexual abuse cases and the burglary of
DCT 0 6 ?OfHI
RMR 000014
·a habitation. Phillips v. State, No. 05-83-1058-CR (Tex. App.-Dallas, delivered October 26, 1984)
and Phillips v. State, No. 05-82-01260-CR (Tex. App.-Dallas, delivered January 4, 1984). Applicant
pleaded guilty to the other causes and no appeal was taken from those.
Applicant contends that he has newly discovered evidence that he is actually innocent of
these offenses. The trial court has determined that no rational jury would have convicted Applicant
in light of the new evidence, which was previously unavailable to Applicant. The evidence, obtained
pursuant to post-conviction DNA testing and investigation, indicates that it was another individual,
and not Applicant, who committed at least one of these offenses. Applicant is entitled to relief. Ex
parte Elizondo,
947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Relief is granted. The judgments in Cause Nos. F82-77700-Q; F82-77162-Q; F82-79140-Q
and F82-86866-Q in the 204 1h District Court of Dallas County and Cause No. F82-77161-M in the
1941h District Court of Dallas County are set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the
Sheriff of Dallas County to answer the charges against him.
Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional
Institutions Division and Parole Division.
Delivered: October 1, 2008
Do Not Publish
RMR 000015
J '/
1/r RECEIVED
'.
WRIT NO. WX0890025-Q 1 OCT l 4 20091
EXPARTE § IN THE 204th JUDICIAL
§ DISTRICT COURT
STEVEN CHARLES PIDLLIPS § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF
The Court, having considered the allegations contained in Applicant's Application for ·.
2
Writ of Habeas Corpus , Applicant's Memorandum of Law in Support ofHis Application for
. Writ of Habeas Corpus, the State's Response, and official court records in the above
numbered and entitled cause, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
IDSTORY OF THE CASE
On June 11, 1984, Applicant pled guilty to the offense of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Applicant was sentenced to ten years'
confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Applicant
did not appeal this conviction. Applicant discharged this sentence on June 3, 1992. See
State's Exhibit A.
ISSUES RAISED IN APPLICATION·. .
In the instant writ application, Applicant contends thaf: (1) newly discovered evidence
I The original case number for this writ was W82-79130-Q(B). The writ was refiled under the above .
case number, WX0890025-Q, by order of this Court, at the request of the parties. The writ seeks .
relief pursuant to Article I, Section 12 and Article 5, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution and Article
11.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. ·
2 Tue.Court has also considered each of Applicant's ten additional applications for writs of habeas
1
RMR 000016
establishes that he is actually innocent of the offense of which he was convicted; and (2) the
State failed to disclose statements material to guilt in violation of his due process rights.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper under Article 11.05. Applicant is not confined on this
conviction as he discharged his sentence approximately sixteen years ago, and he is not
facing other collateral consequences,
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following findings of fact.
1. On May 15, 1982, at approximately 9:30 a.m. a man in a hooded, gray sweatshirt, who
was carrying a handgun, walked into an Elaine Powers Figure Salon in Garland,
Texas, and commanded that the women in the salon disrobe while he masturbated.
See Applicant ~s Exhibit 3 I.
2. The assault was one of a string of sexual assaults in the Dallas area that were
committed by a single individual.· Applicant was investigated and prosecuted for the
crime spree .
. 3. Applicant was charged with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and indecency
with a child as a result of the incident at Garland Elaine Powers Figure Salon.
Applicant c:P,allenges his conviction for indecency with a child in writ number W82-
79140-Q(B).
4. Applicant was indicted for eleven offenses related to a string of sexual offenses that
occurred in the Dallas area over a two-day period on May 14 and 15, 1982. He was
also indicted for a sexual assault that occurred in February of 1982. The twelve cases
were considered related by police because the offenses had similar manner and means,
including but not limited to a man carrying a handgun wearing a gray hooded
corpus. Collectively the writs related to a single crime spree in Dallas in the Spring of 1982.
2
RMR 000017
sweatshirt, covering part of his face, assaulting individuals, and driving a similar
maroon car.
5. Appl1cant was identified by at least one victim as the perpetratorin.each of the twelve
indicted cases. Wanda S., one of the victims in the Elaine Powers Figure Salon in
Garland, identified Applicant in a live line-up approximately four weeks after the
assault. Wanda S. initially identified Sidney Goodyear, not Applicant, as the man
who assaulted her.
6. Prior to pleading guilty to the aggravated assault that is the subject of this writ,
Applicant faced two trials for the assault of Mary B, ~ne of the other victims in the
Dallas ·crime spree. In addition to being identified by Mary B. as her assailant, during
the trials, Applicant was identified by Michelle H., Susan W., Lani B., and Shannon
K., other victims in the Dallas crime spree, as the man responsible for the Dallas
crime spree. Each of these victims testified to Applicant's bad· reputation. The
testimony from the victims of other incidents in the Dallas crime spree was based on .
what we now know was their inaccurate belief that Applicant was the perpetrator of
the Dallas crime spree.
7. Applicant faced two separate trials for the assault of Mary B. He was first tried for
burglary of a habitation, found guilty, and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. A
year later he was tried for the charge of aggravated sexual abuse related to the same
incident. Applicant testified at the first trial, but he did not testify in the guilt phase of
the second trial.
8. At the first trial, Applicant presented a defense of misidentification and presented an
alibi supported by his own testimony and the testimony of his wife, his sister-in-law;
his brother-in-law, and-his uncle.
9. Applicant was found guilty artd sentenced to two concurrent thirty year terms in the
two trials he faced related to the Mary B. assault. (RR: 191, 462).
1O. On June 11, 1984, Applicant pled guilty to this offense - aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon - as well as eight other charges in the Dallas crime spree, after being
convicted for burglary of a habitation and the aggravated sexual abuse. of Mary B. in
which Michelle H. and the other victimi) in the Dallas crime spree testified against
him.
3
RMR 000018
11. The various Dallas area police departments where each of the incidents occurred
communicated with one another regardirig suspects in these cases. Further, there was
sharing of mformation with Kansas City police because they had experienced a string
of similar offenses two weeks after the crime spree in Dallas.
12. Following the crimes in the Kansas City area which occurred on May 27, 1982,
Kansas City police determined that Sidney Goodyear was responsible for the string of
assaults in that jurisdiction. Goodyear's criminal history showed manner and means
similar to the Pallas area offenses. See Applicant's Exhibits 1-34.
13. The fact that Goodyear was identified by Wanda S. as the man who assaulted her and
the other women in the Garland Elaine Powers Figure Salon was not shared with
Phillips or his counsel. See Applicant's Exhibit 40.
14. In the· case of victim Connie P ., Ms. P. identified Applicant as her assailant in an
aggravated sexual assault. This case was unlike the others in time (it occurred in
Febniary whereas the others were committed May 14 and 15), and the manner and
means were dissimilar. Police were made aware that Applicant was not responsible
for this offense prior to his first trial in the burglary of a habitation of Mary B. See
Applicant's Exhibit 37-38. This information· was not shared with Applicant or his
counsel. See Applicant's Exhibit 40. The case was dismissed after Applicant pled
guilty to the remaining indictments. See Applicant's Exhibit.39.
15. On June 6, 2001, Applicant filed a pro se motion for DNA testing of the evidence
collected in the complainant Mary B. cases. He was denied testing, appealed it, and
lost. While attempting to seek relief from the Court of Criminal Appeals, the State
agreed to testing on June 21, 2007. See State's Exhibit B.
16. The DNA results excluded Applicant as the perpetrator in the rape of Mary B., thus
also exonerating him from breaking into her apartment to commit said rape. See ·
Applicant's Exhibit 35.
17. The State pursued DNA testing of Sidney Goodyear. Results showed that Goodyear
was in fact responsible for the rape of Mary B. See Applicant's Exhibit 35.
18.After linking Goodyear's DNA to the rape of Mary B.; the State gathered the
following information about Goodyear: Goodyear committed a string of sexual
assaults throughout the coui1try in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and was wanted by
many local jurisdictions and the Federal Bureau ofinvestigations; Goodyear's crimes
in other jurisdictions were nearly identical to the manner and means used in the Dallas
4
RMR 000019
area crime spree; Goodyear was an.initial suspect in the Dallas crime spree; Goodyear
owned a car and handgun that were consistent with the car and handgun used by the
perpetrator in the Dallas crime spree; Goodyear was identified as the perpetrator inthe
Dallas crime spree by at least o:ne of the victims; and the evidence the State possessed
at the time of Applicant's prosecution that implicated Goodyear was not disclosed tb
Applicant.
GROUND ONE: ACTUAL INNOCENCE
C::::ONCLUSIONS OF LAW
19.The Court concludes that the DNA results excluding Applicant and implicating
Goodyear in the assault of Mary B. were unknown to Applicant at the time of trial and
that Applicant's failure to discover this information was not due to a lack of due
diligence on his part.
20. The Court concludes that the DNA results are newly discovered evidence that create a
doubt as to the efficacy of the verdict sufficient to undermine confidence in the
verdict. ·
21. The Court concludes that the State and Applicant agree that Goodyear, not Applicant,
committed the assault at the.Elaine Powers Figure Salon in Garland.
. 22. The Court concludes that the DNA results implicating Goodyear in the Dallas crime
spree and excluding Applicant are supported by -the following information: Goodyear
committed nearly identical crimes throughout the country both before and after the
Dallas area crime spree; the. Dallas police have at all times believed that each of the
crimes in Dallas were committed by the same individual; Goodyear owned th.e same
type of car and handgun that was used in the Dallas crime spree; Goodyear was an
initial suspect and identified by at least one of the victim's in the Dallas crime spree;
the victims in Dallas, including, but not limited to, Wanda S., and Mary B., provided
police similar descriptions of the perpetrator; and the assaults occurred within hours
of each other.
23. The Court concludes that relief should be granted to Applicant on his claim of actual .
innocence.
24. The Court concludes that Applicant's ground for relief should be granted and the
conviction set aside under authority of Ex parte Elizondo,
947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996), in that Applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence that
5
RMR 000020
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the newly discovered DNA
evidence and the other evidence demonstrating Goodyear's guilt and Applicant's·
innocence.
GROUND Two: BRADY CLAIMS
. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
25. The Court concludes that the State failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence as
is required by Bradyv. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that Applicant is entitledto
reliefbecause there is a reasonable probability that had the exculpatory evidence been
disclosed the outcome of the proceedings against Applicant would have been
different. United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Thomas v. State,
841
S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
26. The Court conCludes that Sidney Goodyear was a suspect in the crime spree for which
Applicant was investigated and prosecuted in Dallas. The Court· also finds that
Goodyear committed similar offenses throughout the country before and after the
DallaS crime spree. The Court also finds that at least one of the victims in the Dallas
crime spree identified Goodyear as the assailant in the Dallas crime spree.
27. The Court concludes that while the Dallas area police ideritified Goodyear as a
suspect in the Dallas crimes, knew he committed similar crimes in Kansas City two
weeks after the crime spree in Dallas, and knew that at least one victim in Dallas
identified Goodyear, this information was not disclosed to Applicant or his attorney.
28". The Court also concludes that, prior to Applicant's first trial, the Dallas Police
confirrm~d that John Parks, not Applicant, committed the assault of Connie P .,_one of
the Dallas victims who initially identified Applicant as her assailant. The Court finds
that this information confirming that Applicant was actually innocent of the assault on
Connie P. and the information that the police knew that Connie P. misidentified
Applicant as her assailant was not disclosed to Applicant or his attorney until after he
was found guilty at two trials and after he pled guilt)' to nine additional charges
related to the Dallas crime spree.
29. The Court concludes that the evidence identified in paragraphs 26:.28 constitutes
material, exculpatory evidence which should have been disclosed to Applicant. The
Court finds that there is a reasonable probability that there would have been a
different outcome at Applicant's trials and that he would not have pled guilty to the
remaining charges had the favorable evidence been disclosed by the State.
6
RMR 000021
30. The Court concludes that the State and Applicant agree that Applicant is entitled to
relief based on the State's failure to disclose the favorable evidence identified in
paragraphs 26-28.
31. The Court agrees and concludes that relief should be granted and the conviction set
of
aside under the authority Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
ORDERS OF THKCOURT
The Court ORDERS the following:
1. Applicant's writ of habeas corpus is granted pursuant to Article 11.05 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Applicant's conviction is vacate.ct based on a showing that he is actually innocent of
the crime pursuant to Ex parte Elizondo,
947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
3. Independently, Applicanes conviction is vacated based on the State's failure to
disclose material, exculpatory evidence as is required by Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S.
83 (19_61).
4. The CLERK is instructed to forward a copy of this ORDER to Applicant's counsel
and to counsel for the State .
. -k.,
SIGNED this !)'" day of a# '2008
~
. 204m JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
7
RMR 000022
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·~· RMR 000023
MOTION TO DISMISS PROSECUTION
STATE OF TEXAS § IN THE 204m
§
v. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
§
STEVEN CHARLES PHILLIPS § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
NO. F82-86866-Q(B) §
§
§
MOTION TO DISMISS
NOW COMES the District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas, and asks this Court to dismiss the
above-entitled and numbered cause for the following reasons, to-wit:
The Defendant stands charged with the offense of aggravated rape. The Defendant pied guilty to this
offense and was sentenced to ten years in prison. Post-conviction DNA testing establishes that the
Defendant did not commit this offense.
The Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was actually innocent of the charged
offense and that the State failed to tum over exculpatory evidence. The State agreed that the Defendant was
entitled to relief. This Court issued findings of fact and a recommendation that relief be granted and
transmitted them to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On October 1, 2008, the Court of Criminal
Appeals granted relief on actual innocence grounds, set aside the Defendant's conviction, and remanded the
case to this Cowi.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State respectfully requests that this case be
dismissed because Steven Charles Phillips has shown that he is actually im1ocent of the c!2-iJTged offense.
~) ':j:
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NOV O 7 ?fJOB ~
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Oismissed on Motion of Di:;t.
---``~-
Michaei VI an::
_ _ --=:::::,,,.. ________
-UtkinB ~
Assistant District Attorney al District Attorney
Dallas County, Texas Dallas County, Texas
RMR 000024
MOTION TO DISl\IISS PROSECUTION
STATE OF TEXAS § IN THE 204rn
§
v. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
§
STEVEN CHARLES PHILLIPS § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
NO. F82-79140-Q(B) §
§
§
MOTION TO DISMISS
NOW COMES the District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas, and asks this Court to dismiss the
above-entitled and numbered cause for the following reasons, to-wit:
The Defendant stands charged with the offense of indecency with a child. The Defendant pled guilty
to this offense and was sentenced to ten years in prison. Post-conviction DNA testing conducted in one of
the Defendant's eleven related cases establishes that the Defendant did not commit this offense.
The Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was actually innocent of the charged
offense and that the State failed to turn over exculpatory evidence. The State agreed that the Defendant was
entitled to relief. This Court issued findings of fact and a recommendation that relief be granted and
transmitted them to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On October 1, 2008, the Court of Criminal
Appeals granted relief on actual innocence grounds, set aside the Defendant's conviction, and remanded the
case to this Court.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State respectfully requests that this case be
dismissed because Steven Charles Phillips has shown that he is actually innocent of the charged offense.
NOV O7 2008 ~
0
z
UY/,· c__h aeJ
H
::-• 0
liSmissed on Motr.1n nf nkt. Attv. -..:
A'sst. Dist. Attv. l
vJa.10
``\
)
-··
,_.
``~
Michael Ware (__
Assistant District Attorney ·
Dallas Cotmty, Texas
RMR 000025
MOTlON TO DISMISS PROSECUTION
STATE OF TEXAS § IN THE 204rn
§
v. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
§
STEVEN CHARLES PmLLIPS § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
NO. F82-77162-Q(B) §
§
§
MOTION TO DISMISS
NOW COMES the District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas, and asks this Court to dismiss the
above-entitled and numbered cause for the following reasons, to-wit:
The Defendant stands charged with the offense of aggravated sexual abuse. The Defendant was
convicted of this offense in August of 1983 and was sentenced to thirty years in prison. Post-conviction
DNA testing establishes that the Defendant clid not commit this offense.
The Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was actually innocent of the charged
offense and that the State fail~d to turn over exculpatory evidence. The State agreed that the Defendant was
entitled to relief. This Court issued findings of fact and a recommendation that relief be granted and
transmitted them to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On October 1, 2008, the Court of Criminal
Appeals granted relief on actual innocence grounds, set aside the Defendant's conviction, and remanded the
case to this Court.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State respectfully requests that this case be
dismissed because Steven Charles Phillips has shown that he is actually innocent of the charged offense.
I
-....J
NOV 0 7 2008
Michael Ware
Assistant District Attorney
Dallas County, Texas
RMR 000026
MOTION TO DISMISS PROSECUTION
STATE OF TEXAS § INTHE204rn
§
v. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
§
STEVEN CHARLES PHILLIPS § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
NO. F82-77161-Q(B) §
§
§
MOTION TO DISMISS
NOW COMES the District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas, and asks this Court to dismiss the
above-entitled and numbered cause for the following reasons, to-wit:
The Defendant stands charged wit11 the offense of burglary of a habitation. The Defendant was
convicted of this offense in August of 1982 and was sentenced to thirty years in prison. Post-conviction
DNA testing establishes that the Defendant did not commit this offense.
The Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was actually innocent of the charged
offense and that the State failed to turn over exculpatory evidence. The State agreed that the Defendant was
entitled to relief. This Court issued findings of fact and a recommendation that relief be granted and
transmitted them to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On October 1, 2008, the Court of Criminal
Appeals granted relief on actual innocence grounds, set aside the Defendant's conviction, and remanded the
case to this Court.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State respectfully requests that this case be
dismissed because Steven Charles Phillips has shown that he is actually innocent of the charged offense.
NOV 0'7 2008 fl I
il-i.smissed on Motlbn of Dist. l\t~y. ( / '1 ; J Ct e_, j
IJG/e__;
Michael Ware Crai
Assistant District Attorney · 1al District Attorney
Dallas County, Texas Dallas County, Texas
RMR 000027
...__,_
MOTION TO DISMISS PROSECUTION 5EB- c,o
STATE OF TEXAS § IN THE 204rn
§
v. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
§
STEVEN C!L\RLES PHILLIPS § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
§
NO. FSZ-77700-Q(B) §
§
§
MOTION TO DISMISS
NOW COMES the District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas, and asks this Court to dismiss the
above-entitled and numbered cause for the following reasons, to-wit:
The Defendant stands charged with the offense of aggravated sexual abuse. The Defendant pied
guilty to this offense and was sentenced to forty years in prison. Post-conviction DNA testing conducted in
one of the Defendant's eleven related cases establishes that the Defendant did not commit this offense.
The Defendant filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was actually innocent of the charged
offense and that the State failed to turn over exculpatory evidence. The State agreed that the Defendant was
entitled to relief. This Court issued findings of fact and a recommendation that relief be granted and
transmitted them to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. On October 1, 2008, the Court of Criminal
Appeals granted relief on actual innocence grounds, set aside the Defendant's conviction, and remanded the
case to this Court.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State respectfully requests that this case be
dismissed because Steven Charles Phillips has shown that he is actually innocent of the charged offense.
Nov o 7 zoos
Oi'smissed on Motion of Dist. At-l:y. (fY} ,· chae { Asst. Dtst. Affy.J
Warf:..-/ --L2 -
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Michael Ware
Assistant District Attorney
Dallas County, Texas
RMR 000028
l '
Texa s Department of C riminal Ju s tice
Brad Livingston
Executive Director
November lJ, 2009
RECEIVlE.0
. ..
Leonard Higgins
Comptroller's Judiciary Section NOV l 8 2.009!
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts
P.O. Box 13528 ~rt~\.
Austin, Tx. 78711-3528
RE: Phillips, Steven Charles
The files of this Agency have been reviewed on offender Steven Charles Phillips,
pursuant to your request.
Offender Phillips was received into TDCJ custody on 2-22-1983 from Dallas County on eight-10-year
sentences, two- JO-years, and a 40-year sentence, with sentences to run concurrent.
Offenses County Cause Number Sentence Sentence Dnte Date of Offense Sentence Begin Maximum
Date fapiretion
Aggravated Dallas F82·82743-NKQ 10-years 6-11-1 984 5-15-1982 6-4-1982 6-3-1992
Assault
Aggravated Dallas F82-79130-JKQ 10-ycars 6-11-1 984 S-15·1982 6-4-1982 6·3-1992
Assault
Aggravated Dal las F82-76748· NKQ I 0-years 6-11-1984 5· 14-1982 6-4-1982 6·3-1992
Assault
Aggravated Dallas F82-86990·JKQ 10-years 6·11-1984 4-22-1 982 6-4-1982 6-3·1992
Assault
Burglary Dallas F82-8 7051-JKQ 10-years 6-11-1984 5-14-1982 6-4-1982 6-3-1 992
Habit3tion
Burglary Dallas F82-77699-QKQ JO-years 6-1 1-1984 S-14-1982 6-10-1982 6-9-1992
Habitation
Aggrava ted Oallas F82-86866-NKNKQ 10-ycars 6-11-1984 5-1 4-1982 6-4-1982 (6-3-1992)
Rave (10-27-08 vcr CCA mandalel
Indece ncy Oallas f82-7? 140-J KQ JO-yea rs 6-11-1984 5-15-1982 6- 10-1982 ( 6-9-1992)
W/Child (10-27-08 per CCA Mandatcl
Burglary Dallas F82-771Gl -NKM JO-yea rs 8-27-1982 5-14-1982 6-10-1982
Habitation (10-27-08 pe r CCA Mandate)
Aggn ~111ed
Sexual Abuse Dallas f82-77162-NKMKQ JO-years 3.•24-1983 5-14-1982 6-4-1 983
W/DW {10-27-08 per CCA i\landate)
Aggrava ted
Sexual Abuse Dallas F82.-77700-QKQ 4()-ycars 6-11-1984 5-14- 1982 6-4-1982
(10-27-08 per CCA Mandate)
Offender Phillips was released from TDCJ custody on mandatory superv1s1on on I 0-23- 1996, and
returned to TDCJ custody on 1-7-1998 with jail credit allowed from 5-14-1997 due to violation of
mandatory supervision, and pursuant to revocation warrant of arrest issued 11 - 18- 1997 by the Parole
Division. Offender Phillips was again released from TDCJ custody on 12-28-2007 on mandatory
supervision and remained on supervision until the Court of Appeals issued a mandate on cause numbers
F82-86866-NKNKQ, F82-79140-.JKQ, F82-77161-NKM, F82-77162-NKMKQ, and
F82-77700-QKQ, setting the cases aside on 10-27-2008.
Our mi.uirm Is to provide public .wfeo•. promote positive change in qffender
belurvior. ,·ci11tegrate offend~rs into soC'iety. and .a~sis1 victims of Cl'ime.
P.O. Oox 99
Huntsville. Texas 77342-0099
www.tdcj .stat1:.lx .us
RMR 000029
' ''
Phillips, Steven Charles TDCJ# 351441
Page 2
Offender Phillips spent a total of 2-years, I-month, and 10-days on mandatory supervision on the
two 30-years, and the 40-year sentence in cause numbers F82-77161-NKM, F82-77162-NKMKQ, and
F82-77700-QKQ. The sentences in the two IO-year sentences in cause numbers F82-86866-NKNKQ and
F82-79140~JKQ expired on 6-3-1992, and 6-9-1992, while Offender Phillips was in TDCJ custody.
Offender Phillips served a total of 25-years and 3-days of calendar time on these sentences, and is not
under TDCJ jurisdiction.
``
Charley Valaez
PS-III
Offender Time Management
Classification and Records
(936) 437-6380
cc: file
Our mission is to provide public safety, promote positive change 111 r!ffender
behm,ior, reintegrate offenders into society. and assist victims of crime.
P.O. Box 99
Huntsville, Texas 77342-0099
www. tdcj.state. tx. us
RMR 000030
C.HILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT
Post Office 8ox 637
l:krryville. Arkansas 72616
Phone: {870) 423·2979
Toll Fn:c(877) 900-151 4
Fa.x: (!170) 423-4n35
http://www.sllllc.ar.uslO'.K.T y;,. ·,1.-IBHT imce~ IS:.lUlID·B': THI: CWl1-C£ or cmr..o W !'!lOOT ENf'O!lC£ME!'f f TI!R-OL!GH IT£
ST ATE DISTRIBUTION UNIT SHALL BE CONSIDERED THE OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORD OF THE CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT IDSTORY. A REQUEST FOR A CERTIFIED PAY
HISTORY MUST BE TN WRITING FROM THE CUSTODIAN, NON-CUSTODI AL r ARENT OR THEIR ATIORNEY OF RECORD ro THE STATE DISBURSEMENT UNlT, CERTIFIED
PAY HISTORY REQUEST, P. 0. BOX 8128, LI TILE ROCK, AR 72203. UNOFFICIAL COPIES OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORDS MAY BE AV All.ABLE THROUGH THE LOCA L
COURT CLERKS OFFICE.
11/23/2009
RMR 000034
Page2 01
Receipt T)pe RCT Statu~ LookUp
Code Dw:ription Cade Description
0[} Regular collection H Hold
01 Prior Collection I Identified
02 IRS Collection M Manlllll Di~tribution
03 State Revenue Collection 0 Out Of Balance
04 BSD Collection R Research
05 Advance (1Jncfatributed Excess) s SHEP Special Har1dling
11 Increase Regular Collections x Refund
12 Increase Advance
13 Increase BSD
14 Increase IRS
15 Increase Stare R.1wenues
16 Incroase Prior CollectiollS
21 Decrease Regular Collections
22 Decrease Advance
23 D~easeESD
24 Decrease IRS
25 Decrease State Revenue
26 Decrease Prior C-0llections
Indicatnr LookUp DISB. Hold LookUp
Code Description Code De£criptlou
AAC Applioo To Anothtlf Case (s) A Address Hold
HOL On Hold D Daily Disbursement Hold
RNN Refunded To NCP l 6Month Hold
IUN Identified But Undistributed F Future Hold
RSC Research., Shef, Out Of Balance L Less 1118ll Zero Dollar Hokl
w Welfare DiWibution Hold
p Deceased Hold
E Foster Care Hold
DISCLAIM.ER: PURSUANT TO ARK. CODE ANNO§ 9-14-807 CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORD ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENTIBROUGH ITS
STA TE DISTRJBUTlON UNIT SHALL BE CONSIDERED THE OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORD OF THE CHlLD SUPPORT PAYMENT HISTORY. A REQUEST FOR A CERTIFIED PAy
msroRY MUST BE IN WRITING FROM THE CUSTODIAN, NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT OR THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD TO 1HE STATE DlSBURSEMENT UNI l, CERTIFIED
PA y msTORY REQUEST, P. 0. BOX 8128, LlTI'LE ROCK, AR 72203. UNOff!C!AL COPIES OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECQRDS MA y BE AVAILABLE IBROUGH THE LOCAL
COURT CLERKS OFFICE.
l 1!23/2009
RMR 000035
s u s
JI
A N
TE X A 5 C0 MPTR0 LL ER of PU B L IC A C C O U NT S
c 0 M B s P.O Box 13:32 6 • AUSl lH, TX 78 71 1·3!52 8
November 24, 2009
Mr. Steven C. Phillips
Dear Mr. Phillips:
The Comptroller's Judiciary Section is in receipt of your claim and supporting documentation
requesting wrongful imprisonment compensation. The claim has been approved for the follow ing
amount and pursuant to Section 103.15l(a), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the payment will
be mailed within 30 days of the date of this letter.
Lump-sum payment: $1,262,500.00
Pursuant to Section 103.00J(b), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the claim was
reduced because of concurrent sentences served from June 4, 1982 through June 9, 1992. 17ze
sentences served under cause numbers F82-82743 -Q, F82 -79130-Q, F82-76748-Q, F82-
86990-Q, F82-8705J-Q and F82-77699-Q ran concurrently with cause numbers F82-86866-Q,
F82-79140-Q, F82-77161-M, F82-77162-Q and F82 -77700-Q. (See attachment) The court
order submitted by the claimant did not grant relieffo r the sentences served under cause
numbers F82-82743-Q, F82-79130-Q, F82-76748-Q, F82-86990-Q, F82-87051-Q and F82-
77699-Q.
In addition, any compensalion for child support payments determined by the Comptroller to be owed
under Section l03.052(a)(2), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, will be paid within 30 days of
the date of this letter. In accordance with Section 103.052(c), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,
any compensation for child support payments will be paid on the claimant's behalf in a lump-sum
payment to the state disbursement unit, as defined by Section 101.0302; Texas Family Code, for
dis tribution to the obligee under the child support order. The Comptroller will notify the claimant of
the amount of any payment made on the claimant's behalf to the state disbursement unit.
If you have any questions or need additional infonnalion. please contact the Comptroller's Judiciary
Section by e-mail at leonard.higgins@cpa.state.tx..us or by phone at 1-800-531-5441 , extension 6-
6100.
Sincerely,
~-P{J;r:--
Leonard Higgins
Comptroller' s Judiciary Section
Attachment
RMR000036
1-- --· - ....
s u s ;\ N
T EXAS C 0 MP TR 0 L L ER fJ./ PU BL IC AC C 0 U N T S
;_
i! - -- -· -- - -- -......:• ;
; ! C 0 YI B S
1
PO Sox 1:35 28 • Au3T•N. TX 78 7 11 .'.3526 ff-~ j
i i '('.-:-\``i-``l-j I
i;·::::-.:.::::-;:=:::::::=.::::::-.:.::;::~=-=::::::=:::::.::.:::::::-.:::=:=:::-:.·.::.:.:::::==:::::::-.:-::::::-.:::;:::::-_-:.~:::::::.-=::-.::::::::.::-.::::::::-:-..::..--::~7'"-===--:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.:·:::::::::'.\\``
December 23, 2009 ..... ·
Mr. Steven C. Phillips
Dear Mr. Phillips:
Enclosed is your wrongful imprisonment compensation lump-sum payment in the amount of
$1,262,500.00. Pursuant to Section 103.00l(b), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the claim
was reduced because of concurrent sentences served from June 4, 1982 through June 9, 1992. The
sentences served under cause numbers F82-82743-Q, F82-79130-Q, F82-86748-Q. F82-86990-Q, F82-
8705 l-Q and F82-77699-Q ran concurrently with cause numbers F82-86866-Q, F82-79 l40-Q, F82-
77161-M, F82-77162-Q and F82-77700-Q.
The Comptroller's Judiciary Section received additional court orders submitted on your behalf by Mr.
Randall E. Turner on December 17, 2009. The additional orders were received after the 10 day time
period prescribed for applications to cure under Section 103.051(d), Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. The Comptroller will , however, consider the additional orders if a new compensation
claim is submitted for the time during which the six concurrent sentences were served.
· In addition, it appears that the claimant may be entitled to compensation for child support payments
under Section I03.052(a)(2), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. However, based on the records
submitted, the Comptroller is unable to detennine the appropriate amount of compensation that may be
owed under Section 103.052(a)(2). If supplemental information is submitted which enables a
determination of the appropriate amount owed, then payments will be made in accordance with Section
l03.052(c), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Such payments will be paid on the claimant's
behalf in a lump-sum payment to the state disbursement unit, as defined by Section 101.0302, Texas
Family Code, for distribution to the obligce under the child support order. The Comptroller will notify
the claimant of the amount of any payment made on the claimant's behalf to the state disbursement
unit.
If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact the Comptroller's Judiciary
Section by e-mail at leonard.higgins@cpa.state.tx.us or by phone at 1-800-53 1-5441, extension 6-
6100.
Sincerely,
``i;;~
Comptroller's Judiciary Section
RMR000037
STATE OF TEXAS
COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE
Claimant name ana aaaress
P.O. Box 13526
Auslin, TX 78711-3528
Call 1-800-531-5441, ext. G-5985 or {512) 936-5985
A verified copy of pardon I court order showing actual innocence and justifying application. Enclosed
A written statement from Texas Department of Criminal Justice verifying length of incarceration in a S tate prison. Enclosed
A written statement ve rifying the length of incarceration from any Texas County or Municipality where inca rcerated in relation to
the charges for wh ich daimant is eligible to make the claim.
Enclosed D
If applicable, a written statement from Texas Department of Criminal Justice verifying length of time spent on parole. Enclosed D
If applicable, a written statement from the Texas Department of Publlc Safety verifying registration as a sex offender and length of
registration.
Enclosed D
A certified copy each child support order , if applicable, under which child support payments became due during the time lhe
claimant served in prison and copies of the official child support payment records descnbed by Section 234.009, Family Code,
for that eriod .
Enclosed D
For proof of birth date provide a copy of birth certificate, or state driver's license, or state ID, or a notarized statement verifying
Enclosed
month, day and year of birth.
Total Amount of Claim Supported by the Attached Documentation: jf / . (,, o o, ;; oo ~
CLAIMANT'S CERTIFICATION
~q~:,;iL:....:::..;:.:::::_,,___L.-...::!l"-"i,4--i~L::--~--,,-,--,• do hereby certify that the amount requested is due and payable pursuant to Chapter
103 of the Texas Civil Practice and Re e ies Code and I will immediately notify the Comptroller's Judiciary Section in writing of any changes or
conditions which will disqualify this payment.
Claimanl Signalure Dale
Of o·1 10
AOdresstCity/S1a1eJzlp code
sign ...
here r /!)
RMR000038
Leonard Higgins 01-07-10
Comptrollers Judiciary Section
Texas State Comptroller of Public Accts.
PO box 13528
Austin, Texas 787 11-3528
Re: your 11-24-09 letter
Dear Mr. Higgins,
Please find the enclosed documents noted in your letter: Court orders
granting relief for sentences served under cause numbers F82-82743-Q, F-
82-79130-Q, F82-76748-Q, F82-86990-Q, F82-8705 1-Q and F82-77699-Q.
I hope these orders will enable you to proceed with my claim.
Thank You,
~ e , ;:,J,.:tt.j'-4
Steven C. Phillips
Attachment
RMR000039
\ .. :. .. . ':"'
: .....• . .... ·:.:· ...... ~ :···· .·...... .· .·~: . ..... -~· ....... . ':,, : ·~ . ... . .. ) ........ . . .. .
.... .....· •...: ..·.-..·................... .. •••.. ·:~ .. .... •... =--'!:.'l.:.• ..... . -.:· -t . ~ · ··
RMR 000040
'•
,.
Texas De p a r tment of Cr i mi n a l Justice
Brad Livingston
Executive Director
RECEIV ED
November 13, 2009 t'\O ~ 1 8 2.QU9
Leonard Higgins
Comptroller's Judiciary Section
\5!~
Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts
P.O. Box 13528
Austin, Tx. 787 11-3528
RE: Phillips, Steven Charles
The files of this Agency have been reviewed on offender Steven Charles Phillips,
pursuant to your request.
Offender Phillips was received into TDCJ custody on 2-22-1983 from Dallas County on eight-10-year
sentences, two- 30-years, and a 40-year sentence, with sentences to run concurrent.
Offenses County Cause Number Sentence Sentence Date Date of Offense Sentence Begin Maximum
Date Expiration
Aggravated 0 3llas F82-82743-NKQ 10-years 6-1t-1984 5- 15-1982 6-4-1982 6-3-1992
Assault
Aggravated Dalt as F82-79130-JKQ 10-years 6-1 1-1 984 5-15-1982 6-4-1982 6-3-1 992
Assault
Aggravaled Dallas F82· 76748-N KQ 10-years 6-1 1-1984 5-14-1982 6-4-1982 6-3-1992
Assault
Aggravated Dallas F82-86990-JKQ JO-years 6-1 1-1984 4·22-1982 6.;1-1982 6-3-1992
Assault
Burglary Dallas F82-8705 l-JKQ IO·}'Cars 6-11-1984 5-14-1982 6-4 -1 982 6-3-1992
Habitation
Burglary Dallas F82-77699-QKQ 10-ycars 6- 11-1984 5-14-1982 6-10-1982 6-9-1992
Habitation
Aggravated Oallas F82-86866-NKN KQ JO-years 6-11- 1984 5-14-1?82 6-4-1982 (6-3-1992)
Raoe OC>-27-08 oer CCA mandate)
Indec ency Oallas 1782-79140-JKQ 10-yca rs 6-11-1984 5-15-1982 6-10-1982 ( 6-9-1992)
W/Child 110-27--08 ner CCA i\landatel
Burglary Oallas F82-77 l61-NKM JO-years 8-27-1982 5-14-1982 6-10-1982
Habitation (10-27-08 oer CCA Mandate)
Aggravated
Se:tual Abuse Dallas F82-77162-NKMKQ JO-years 8-24-1983 5-14-1?82 6-4-1983
\ V/DW (10-27-08 per CCA Manda te)
Aggravated
Sexual Abuse Dallas F82-77700-QKQ 40-ycars 6-11-1984 S-14- 1982 6-4-1982
(10-27-08 per CCA Mandate)
Offender Phi llips was released from TDCJ custody on mandatory superv1s1on on 10-23- 1996, and
returned to TDCJ custody on 1-7-1998 with j ail credit allowed from 5-14- 1997 due to violation of
mandatory supervision, and pursuant to revocation warrant of arrest issued 11-1 8- 1997 by the Parole
Division. Offender Phillips was again released from TDCJ custody on 12-28-2007 on mandatory
supervision and remained on superv ision until the Court of Appeals issued a mandate on cause numbers
F82-86866-NKNKQ, F82-79140-JKQ, F82-77161-NKM, F82-77162-NK.Ml418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of two
aggravated sexual abuse causes, sentenced to forty and thirty years' imprisonment, indecency with
a child, sentenced to ten years' imprisonment, burglary of a habitation, sentenced to thirty years'
imprisonment, and aggravated rape, sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. The Fifth Court of
Appeals affirmed his couvictions for one of the aggravated sexual abuse cases and the burglary of
.OCT 0 6 ?nn!I
RMR 000043
1 1 I ~
'
·a habitation. Phillips v. State, No. 05-83-1058-CR (Tex. App.-Dallas, delivered October 26, 1984)
and Phillips v. Stale, No. 05-82-01260-CR (Tex. App.-Dallas, delivered January 4, 1984). Applicant
pleaded guilty to the other causes and no appeal was taken from those.
Applicant contends that he has newly discovered evidence that he is actually innocent of
these offenses. The trial court has determined that no rational jury would have convicted Applicant
in light of the new evidence, which was previously unavailable to Applicant. The evidence, obtained
pursuant to post-conviction DNA testing and investigation, indicates that it was another individual,
and not Applicant, who committed at least one of these offenses. Applicant is entitled to relief. Ex
parte Elizondo,
947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Relief is granted. The judgments in Cause Nos. F82-77700-Q; F82-77162-Q; F82-79140-Q
and F82-86866-Q in the 204 1h District Court of Dallas County and Cause No. F82-77161-M in the
194 1h District Court of Dallas County are set aside, and Applicant is remanded to the custody of the
Sheriff of Dallas County to answer the charges against him.
Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional
Institutions Division and Parole Division.
Delivered: October 1, 2008
Do Not Publish
RMR 000044
WRIT NOS.
W82-77162-Q(B), W82-77699-Q(B), W82-77700-Q(B), W82-79130-Q(B),
W82-79140-Q(B), W82-82743-Q(B), W82-86748-Q(B), W82-8686,6-Q(B),
W82-86990-Q(B), and W82-87051-Q(B)i (,A) f:>d-- ~ 111 Let - {YI,``) ~'. .'
EXPARTE ) IN THE 204th CRIMINAL .
)
) DISTRICT COURT - (_,)
) -.-.. ·
0
STEVEN CHARLES PHILLIPS ) DALLAS COUNTY, TEJEAS'
``
MOTION CLARIFYING JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURAL REMEDY FOR
APPLICANT'S WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS
Applicant Steve Charles Phillips files this motion amending his Memorandum of Law in
Support of his Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Mr. Phillips has ten applications for habeas corpus pending in this Court. These
applications were filed on June 20, 2008 and challenge convictions associated with the following
case numbers: F82-77162 (aggravated sexual abuse), F82-77700 (aggravated sexual abuse), F82-
79140 (indecency with a child), F82-86866 (aggravated rape), F82-77 699 (burglary of a
habitation), F82-79130 (aggravated assault), F82-82743 (aggravated assault), F82-86748
(aggravated assault), F82-86990 (aggravated assault), and F82-8705 l (burglary of a habitation).
Each of these ten writs was filed pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. On July 3, 2008, Mr. Phillips filed an amendment pursuing habeas relief pursuant to
Article 11.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article V, Section 8 and Article I,
Section 12 of the Texas Constitution.
Mr. Phillips files this motion to clarify the jurisdictional grounds and procedural remedies
for each of his applications. For his applications for writ of habeas corpus for the following
convictions, Mr. Phillips asserts thatArticle 11.07 is the exclusive remedy: F82-77162, F82-
RMR 000045
77700, F82-86-866, and F82-79140. 1 However, for the six remaining applications for writs of
habeas corpus pending in this Court (convictions F82-77699, F82-79130, F82-82743, F82-
867 48, F82-86990, and F82-8705 l) Mr. Phillips only seeks habeas relief pursuant to Article
11.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution,
and Article I, Section 12 of the Texas Constitution.
To the extent that Mr. Phillips has previously asserted that Article 11.07 is the proper
remedy for the six writs associated with the following convictions: F82-77699, F82-79130, F82-
82743, F82-86748, F82-86990, and F82-87051, he seeks to amend the applications to rely solely
on Article 11.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article V, Section 8 of the Texas
· Constitution, and Article I, Section 12 of the Texas Constitution.
Respectfully submitted this :1_ day of July, 2008
~
Bar Card No. 20369600
Sorrels, Udashen & Anton
2301 Cedar Springs Road, Suite 400
Dallas, Texas 75201
(214) 468-8100
Fax (214) 468-8104
Jason Kreag
Barry Scheck
Innocence Project, Inc.
100 Fifth Avenue, 3rd Floor
New York, NY 10011
(212) 364-5340
Fax (212) 364-5341
Attorneys for Mr. Phillips
1
Mr. Phillips also has an application for writ of habeas corpus pending in the 194th
Judicial District Court concerning his conviction in case number F82-7716 l. Mr. Phillips
continues to seek relief from that conviction under art. 11.07.
RMR 000046
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this!]_ day of July, 2008, a true and correct copy of Applicant Steven Charles
Phillips' Motion Clarifying Jurisdiction and Procedural Remedy for Applicant's Writs of Habeas
Corpus was delivered to the District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas.
R~
RMR 000047
WIUT NO. WX0890028-Q 1
EXPARTE § IN THE 204tb JUDICIAL
§ DISTRICT COURT
STEVEN CHARLES PHILLIPS § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF
The Court, having considered the allegations contained in Applicant's Application for
Writ ofHabeas Corpus 2, Applicant's Memorandum ofLaw in Support ofHis Application for
Writ of Habeas Corp_us, the State's Response, and official court records in the above
numbered and entitled cause, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions oflaw:
HISTORY OF THE CASE
On June 11, 1984, Applicant pled guilty to the offense of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon. 'P\irsuan( to a plea oilrgain, Applicant was sentenced to ten years'
confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division; Applicant
did not appeal this conviction. Applicant discharged this sentence onJune 3, 1992. See
··.·-~"'
State's Exhibit A.
ISSUES RAISEDJN APPLICATION
In the instant writ application, Applicant contends that: (1) newly discovered evidenc;e
I The qriginal case number for this writ was W82-86990-Q(B} The writ was refiled tlllderthe above
case munber, wX0890028-Q, by order of this Court, at the request of the parties. The writ seeks
relief pursuant to Article I, Section 12 and Article 5, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution and Article
11.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
2 The Court has also considered each of Applicant's ten additional applications for writs of habeas
RMR 000048
establishes that he is actually innocent of the offense of which he was convicted; and (2) the
State failed to disclose statements material to guilt in violation of his due process rights.
JUIUSDICTlON
Jurisdiction is proper under Article 11.05. Applicant is not confined on this
conviction as he discharged his sentence approximately sixteen years ago, and he is not
facing other collateral consequences.
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the-following findings of fact.
1. On April 22, 1982, at approximately 8: 10 p.m., a man in a hooded, gray sweatshirt,
who was carrying a handgun and holding a piece of clothe over his face, walked into
the laundry factilty at an apartment complex and sexually assaulted Lani B. See
Applicant's Exhibit 25. (At some poillt after the assault, but before Applicant's trials,
Lani B. changed her name to Lani T)
2. The assault was one of a string of similar sexual assaults that occurred in the Dallas
area in the spring of 1982 that were committed by a single individual.
3., Applicant was indi~:ted for el.even qffenses in the Dallas area crime spree. Ten of
these offenses 9ccurred over a two-day period on May 14 and 15, 1982, and one
.~occurred on-April 22, 1982. The assault on April22, 1982, is the subject of this writ. 'i;~'·
.... "c./i'r``i?;}f,£fmtwas .also indicted for a sexual assault that occurred in February of 1982.
<·Jhat Applicant's ground for relief sholJld_be granted .947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996), in that Applicant has shown by cl~ar and convincing evidence that
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the newly discovered DNA
evidence and the other evidence demonstrating Goodyear's guilt and Applicant's
innocence.
s
·...
RMR 000052
GROUND Two: BRADY CLAIMS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
23. The Court concludes that the State failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence as
is required by Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that Applicant is entitled to
relief because there is a reasonable probability that had the exculpatory evidence been
disclosed the outcome of the proceedings against Applicant would have been
different. United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Thomas v. State,
841
S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
24. The Court concludes that Sidney Goodyear was a suspect in the crime spree for which
Applicant was investigated and prosecuted in Dallas. The Court also finds that
Goodyear committed similar offenses throughout the country before and after the
·Dallas crime spree. The Court also finds that at least one of the victii;ns in the Dallas
crime spree identified Goodyear as the assailant in the Dallas crime spree.
25. 'rhe Court concludes that wh1Je the Dallas area police identified Goodyear as a
suspect in the Dallas crimes, knew he committed similar crimes in Kansas City two
weeks after the crime spree in Dallas, and knew that at least one victim in Dallas
identified Goody ea~:, this infonnation was not disclosed to Applicant or his attorney.
26. The Court also concludes that, prior to Applicant's first trial, the Dallas Police
confirmed that John Parks, not Applicant, committed the assault of Connie P., one of
the Dallas victims who initially identified Applicant as her assailant. The Court finds
that this information confirming that APJ2licant was actuallyiunocent of the assault on
Connie P. and the infornrntion that thepofice knew that Connie P. misidentified
Applicant as her assailant was not disclosed to Applicant or his attorney until after he
was found guilty at two trials and after he pied guilty to nine additional charges
···related to the Dallas crime spree.
27. The Court concludes that the evidence identified in paragraphs 24-26 constitutes
material, exculpatory evidence which should have been disclosed to Applicant. The
Court finds that there is a reasonable probability that there would have been a
different outcome at Applicant's trials an373 U.S. 83 (1963).
ORDERS OF THE COURT
The Court ORDERS the following:
1. Applicant's writ of habeas corpus is granted pursuant to Article 11.05 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Applicant's conviction is vacated based on a showing .that he is actually innocent of
the crime pursuant to Ex parte Elizondo,
947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
- .
3. Independently, Applicant's conviction is vacated based on the State's failure to
1isclose material, exctilpatory evidence as is required by Bradyv. Maryland,
373 U.S.
4. The CLERK is instructed to forward a copy of this ORDER to Applicant's counsel
and to counsel for the State.
fr.
--- SIGNED this·-£ day of .au>/ ,2008
- ·:·:....,
·arg~--0
204ru JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
7
-
RMR 000054
WRIT NO. WX0890024-Q 1
EXPARTE § IN THE 204th JUDICIAL
§ DISTRICT COURT
STEVEN CHARLES PHILLIPS § DAL~ASCOUNTY,TEXAS
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF
i
i
The Co~rt, having considered the allegations contained V1Applicant's1?-pplication for
i '
Writ ofHabea~ Corpus 2, Applicant's Memorandum ofLaw in Support ofHis Applicationfor
I
Writ of Habefs Corpus, the. State's Response, and official! court records in the above.
' . -
numbered
.·
and:entitled cause,
;
makes the following findings of:
fact and conclusions
'
oflaw::..: '
HISTORY OF THE CASE
On June 11, 1984, Applicant pled guilty to the offense of burglary of a habitation.
- ! . . !
Pursuant to a ~lea bargain, Applicant wllil sentenced to ten ye~rs' confinemerif in the T:xas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Aipplicant did not appeal this
.. :\;·i;l:~<~0``x~· . -.-1
. ..... ·· . · 1
conviction. Applicant discharged
-.
this
:·~
sentence on June 19, 1~92. See State''~Jtxhibit°fi"
.! ..
ISSUES RAISED IN APPLICATION
j ·. -.. · .. · · -- . · 1 • ,•'i·,:. •.•'S'!cc· ·,
, • • .. • •• •
··:-1n the iifstant writ application,Appli~antcontends that:-6) newly disco¥ered.eviden,ce.,...;~j;!~(;
l .···~(·;·$``~:.. . ' . . .
e>stablishes that he is actually innit 35.
18.After linking Goodyear's DNA to the rape of Mary B., the State gathered the
following infonnation about Goodyear: Goodyear committed a string of sexual .
assaults throughout the country in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and was wanted by
mar1y local jurisdictions and the Federal Bureau ofinvestigations; Goodyear's crimes
in other jurisdictions were nearly identical to the marmer and means used in the Dallas
area crime spree; Goodyear was an initial suspect in the Dallas crime spree; Goodyear
owned a car and handgun that were consistent with the car ar1947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.
C1:im. App. 1996), in that Applicant has shown by clear and convirldri.g evidence that
no reasonable juror would have convicted himin light of the newly discovered DNA
evidence and the other. evidence demonstrating Goodyear's guilt and Applicant's
innocence.
::,.,·
5 ·``,
.. -.. ::.~ ....
~----•v~ ¥<:~·---• ·----------•·
RMR 000059
GROUND Two: BRADY CLAIMS
·CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
25. The Court concludes that the State failed to disclose material exculpatory evjdence as
is required by Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that Applicant is entitled tD
relief because there is a reasonable probability that had the exculpatory evidence been
disclosed the outcome of the proceedings against Applicant would have been
different. United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Thomas v. State,
841
S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
26. The Court concludes that Sidney Goodyear was a suspect in the crime spree for which
Applicant was investigated and prosecuted in Dallas. The Court also finds that
Goodyear <;Qrnmitted similar offenses throughout the country before and after the
Dallas crime spree, The Court also finds that at least one ofthe~ictims in the Dallas
crime spree identified Goodyear as the assailant in the Dallas crime spree.
27. The Court concludes that-while the Dallas area police identified Goodyear as a
suspect in the Dallas crimes, knew he committed similar crimes in Kansas City two
weeks after the crime spree in Dallas, and knew that at least one victim in Dallas
i~entified Goodyear, this. info1m!ltion was not disclosed to Applicant or hjs attorney.
28. The Court also concludes that, prior to Applicant's first trial, the· Dallas Police
corififriied that John Parks, not Applicant, committed the assault of Connie P :, orte of
the Dallas victims who initially identified Applicant as her assailant. The Court finds
that this information confirming that Applicant was actually innocent of the assault on
Connie P. and the information that the police knew that Connie P. misidentified
Applicant as her assailant was.not disclosed to Applicant or his. attorney until after he
was found guilty at two trials and after he pied guilty to nine additional charges
related to the Dallas crime spree. .."<•.<·<-···
29. The Court concludes that the evidence identified in paragraphs 26-28 constitutes
material, exculpatory evidence which should have been disclosed to Applicant. The
Court finds that there is a reasonable probability tliat there would have been a
different outcome at Applicant's trials and that he would not have pied guilty to the
·remaining charges had the favorable evidence been disclosed by the State.
30. The Court concludes that thec,~ta{e.,Jl,QQ.Applicant agree that Applicant is entitled.to
. ,,q;~liefc!t``()J).::tbe State's failure to.5.li§.c!Qse the favorable evidence identified in
. . '" ~· .
.· ' paragraphs26~28. - ,,, ·
6
-----~---,-------·------·--~..--,...,------~-- ·----------------
RMR 000060
31. The Court agrees and concludes that relief should be granted and the conviction set
aside under the authority of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963}
ORDERS OF THE COURT
The Court ORDERS the following:
1. Applicant's writ of habeas corpus is gran_ted pursuant to Atiicle 11.05 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Applicant's conviction is vacated based on a showing that he is actually innocent o.(
the crime pursuant to Ex parte Elizondo,
947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
· · 3: Independently, Applicant's conviction is vacated based on the State's failure to
disclose material, exculpatory
.
evidence
-
as is required by Bradyv. Maryland, 373 ....U.S.
83 (1967).
4. The CLERK is instructed to forward a copy ofthi's ORDER to Applicant's counsel .,,
and tci counsel forthe State.
-IP·
SIGNED this-~ day of _____~+,,.<---~' 2008
204rn iUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
7
RMR 000061
WRIT NO. WX0890025-Q 1
EXPARTE § IN THE 204th JUDICIAL
§ DISTRICT COURT
STEVEN CHARLES PHILLIPS § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF
The Court, having considered the allegations contained ~Applicant's Application for
Writ of Habeas Corpus 2, Applicant's Memorandum ofLaw in &upporfofHis Application for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, the State's Response, and official court records in the above
numbered and entitled cause, makes the following findings of fa9t and conclusions of law:
HISTORY OF THE CASE
O~ June 11, 1984, Applicant pied guilty to the offense of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Applicant was sentertced to ·ten y.ears'
· confinement in the '[exas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Applicant
did not appeal this conviction. Applicant discharged this sentence on June 3, 1992. See
State's Exhibit A.
ISSUES RAISED IN APPLICATION
In the instant writ application, Applicant contends that:(,!) newly discovered evidence
I The original case nwnber for this writ was W82-79130-Q(B). The writ V{as refiled under the above
case number,_WX0890025-Q, by order ofthis Court, at the request of the parties. The writ seeks
relief pursuant to Article I, Section 12 and Article 5, Section 8 of the. Texas Constitution and Article
11.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedme. ·
}The Court has also considered each of Applicant's ten additional applicatfons for writs of habeas
..-.
1
RMR 000062
establishes that he is actually innocent of the offense of which he was convicted; and (2) the
State failed to disclose statements material to guilt in violation of his due process rights .
.fURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper under Article 11.05. Applicant is not confined on this
conviction 947 S.W.2d 202. (Tex,
Crim. App. 1996), in that Applicant has shown by dear
and convincing evidencetl``t
5
·--'-~.~..,,,,,.
·-·· _.. ··-----------~·----·----
RMR 000066
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the newly discovered DNA
evidence and the other evidence demonstrating Goodyear's guilt and Applicant's
innocence.
GROUNDTWO: BRADY CLAIMS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
25. The Co mt concludes that the State failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence as
is required by Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that Applicant is entitled to
relief because there is a reasonable probability that had the exculpatory evidence been
disclosed the outcome of the proceedings against Applicant would have been
.different. United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Thomas v. State,
841
S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex. Cri'm. App. 1992).
26. The Court concludes that Sidney Goodyear was a suspect in the crime spree for which
Applicant was investigated and prosecuted in Dallas. The Court also finds that
Goodyear committed sin1ilar offenses throughout the country before and after the
Dallas crime spree. The Court also finds that at least one of the victims in the Dallas .
crime spree identified Goodyear as the assailant in the Dallas crime spree.
27. The Court concludes that while the Dallas area police identified Goodyear as a
suspect in the Dallas crimes, kiiew he committed similar crimes in Kansas City two.
weeks after the crime spree in Dallas, and knew that at least one victim in Dallas
identified Goodyear, this information was not disclosed to Applicant or his attorney.
28. The Court also concludes that, prior to Applicant's first trial, the Dallas Police
confirmed that John Parks, not Applicant, committed the assault of Connie P., one.of ...
the Dallas victims who initially identified Applicant as her assailant. The Court . finds
thatthis information confirming that Applicant was actually innocent of the assault on .·· ·
Connie P. and the information that the police knew that Connie P. misidentified
Applicant as her assailant was not disclosed to Applicant or his attorney i.mtil after he
was found guilty at two trials and after he pled guilty to nine additional charges
related to the Dallas crime spree.
:-:·
29. The Court concludes that the evidenc.e identified in paragraphs 26-28 constitutes,,,, .:.
material, exculpat01y evidence which should have been disclosed to Applicant. The.
Court finds that there is a reasonable probability that there would have been a -
different outcome at Applicant's trials and that he would not have pied guilty to the
remaining charges had the favorable evidence been disclosed by the Sfate.
6
•
RMR 000067
30. The Court concludes that th~ State and Applicant agree that Applicant is entitled to
relief based on the State's failure to disclose the favorable evidence identified in
paragraphs 26"28.
31. The Court agrees and concludes that relief should be granted and the conviction set
aside under the authority of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
ORDERS OF THE COURT
The Cowi ORDERS the following:
1. Applicant's writ of habeas corpus is granted pursuant to Article 11.05 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Applicant's conviction is vacated based on a showing that he is actually innocent of
the crime pursuant to Ex partf Elizondo,
947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
3. Indcp~!!de~tly, Applicant's convic``on_i~ va~"1ted based on the State_) failure to
disclose material, exculpatory evidence as is required by Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S.
83 (1967).
4. The CLERK is instructed to forward a copy of this ORDER to Applicant's counsel
and to counsel for the State.
:.k•
SIGNED this !) day of df , 2008
``.
204TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
7
RMR 000068
WRIT NO. WX0890026-Q 1
EXPARTE § IN THE 204th JUDICIAL
§ DISTRICT COURT
STEVEN CHARLES PHILLIPS § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF
Tee Court, having considered the allegations contained in Applicant's Application for
Writ of Habeas Corpus 2, Applicant's Memorandum of Law in Support of His Application for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, the State's Response, and official court records in the above
numbered and entitled cause, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
HISTORY OF THE CASE
On June 11_, 1984, Applicant pied guilty to the offense of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Applicant was sentenced to ten years'
confinement in the Texas De,~artmentofCriminal Justice, Inst~h!tional Division. Applicant
-did not appeal this conviction. Applicant discharged this sentence on June 3, 1992. See
.State's F;xhibit A..
ISSUES RAISED IN APPLICATION
In the instant writ application, Applicant conte~g§ that: O) newly discovered evidence
I The origin.JI! case number for this wTit was W82-82743-Q(B). The writ was ri:;filed under the above
case nwnb~r, WX0890026-Q, by order of this Court, at the request of the parties. The writ seek~
relief p~rsuant to Article I, Section 12 and Article 5, S~ction 8 of the Texas Constitution and Article
··I 1.05 of1he Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
'.!The Court has also considered each of Applicant's ten additional,<}pplications for writs of habeas -··
RMR 000069
establishes that he is actually innocent of the offense of which he was convicted; and (2) the
State failed to disclose statements material to guilt in violation of his due process rights.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper under Alticle 11.05. Applicant is not confined on this
conviction as he discharged his sentence approximately sixteen years ago, and he is not
facing other collateral consequences.
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FINDIN<,;S Q.F FACT
The Court makes the following findings of fact.
1. On May 15, 1982, at approximately 10:30 a.m., a man in a hooded, gray sweatshirt,
who was carrying a handgun and holding a piece of clothe over his face, walked into
an Elaine Powers Figure Salon in Carrollton, Texas and commanded that the women
in the salon disrobe while he masturbated. One of the victims in the salon was Susan
. w.· 'See Applicant's Exhibit 32.
2. The assault was one of a string of similar sexual assaults that occurred in the Dallas
area in the spring of 1982 that were committed by a single individual. For example,
approximately one hour pefore the assault at the Elaine Powers Figure Salon in
Carrollton, a similar assault occurred at the Elaine Powers Figure Salon in Garland,
Texas. In total, there were approximately sixty victims in the Dallas area crime spree,
. each describing the same perpetrator.
3. Applicant wa.S.indicted for eleven offenses in the Dallas crime spree. Ten of these
offenses occurred over a two-day period on May 14 and 15, 1982, and one occurred
on April 22, 1982. Applicant was also indicted for a sexual assault that occurred in
February of 1982. The twelve cases were considered related by police because the
offenses had sin1ilar manner and means, in~luding but not limited to a man carrying a
h~dgurlwearing a gray hooded s~eatshirt, covering part of his face, assaulting
COJ:p.µs. C_qHt373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that Applicant is entitled to
relief because there is a reasonable probability that had the exculpatory evidence been
disclosed the outcome oL the proceedings against Applicant would have been
different. United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Thomas v. State,
841
S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). ·
24. The Court concludes that Sidney Goodyear was a suspect.in the crime spree for which
Applicant was investigated· and prosecuted in Dallas. The Couti also finds that
Goodyear committed similar offenses throughout the country befor~ and after the
Dallas crime spree. The Court also finds that at least one of the victims in the Dallas
crime spree identified Goodyear as the assailant in the Dallas area crime spree.
25. The Court concludes that while the Dallas area police identified Goodyear as a
suspect in the Dallas crimes, knew he committed similar crimes in Kansas City two
weeks after the crime spree in Dallas, and knew that at least one victim in Dallas
identified Goodyear, this information was not disclosed to Applicant or his attorney.
26. The Court also concludes that, prior to Applicant's first trial, the Dallas Police
confinned that John Parks, not Applicant, committed the assault of Connie P., one of
the Dallas victims who initially identified Applicant as her assailant. 'The Court finds
that this information confaming that Applicant W£!? actually innocent of the assault on
Connie P. and the infonnation that the police knew that Connie P: misidentified
Applicant as her assailant was not disclosed to Applicant or his atto_mey until after he
. •. was found guilty at two trials and after he pied guilty to nine additional charges
related to the Dallas crime spree.
27. The Court concludes that the evidence identified in paragraphs 24-26 constitutes
material, exculpatory evidence which should have been disclosed to Applicant. The
Court finds that there is a reasonable probability that' there would have· been a
different outcome at Applicant's trials and that he would not have pied guilty to the
remaining charges had the favorable evidence been disclosed by the State.
28. The Court concludes that the State and Applicant agree that Applicant is e;;fltfod to
relief based on the State's failure to disclose the favorable evidence identified in
6
.
- ~
RMR 000074
paragraphs 24-26.
29. The Court agrees and concludes that relief should be granted and the conviction set
aside under the authority of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
ORDERS OF THE COURT
The Court ORDERS the following:
l. Applicant's writ of habeas corpus is granted pursuant to Article 11.05 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure..
2. Applicant's conviction is vacated based on a showing that he_ is ac_tually innocent of
the crime pursuant to Ex parte Elizondo,
947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
3. Independently, Applicant's conviction is vacated based on the State's failure to
disclose material, exculpatory evidence as is required by Bradyv. Mmyland,
373 U.S.
83 (1967) ..
4. The CLERK is instructed to forward a copy of this ORDER to Applicant's counsel
arid to counsel for the State.
-~ dA``
SIGNED this . { . day of_,,_~
_ _,,,o;-----' 2008
DG ENA LEVARIO
204rn JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
7
___ ,..
RMR 000075
''
WRIT NO. WX089002<)-Q 1
EXPARTE § IN THE 204th JUDICIAL
§ DISTRICT COURT
STEVEN CHARLES PHILLIPS § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF
The Court, having considered the allegations contained in Applicant's Application for
Writ of Habeas Corpus2, Applicant's Memorandwn ofLaw in Support ofHis Application for
Writ of'Habeas Corpus, the State's Response, and official court ~·ecords in .the above
numbered and entitled cause, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
HISTORY OF THE CASE
- _.,_ -. On June 11, 1984, Applicant pied guilty to the offense of burglary of a habitation.
Pursuant to a plea bargain, Applicant was sentenced to ten years' confinement in the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Applicant did not app~;:i,~ this
conviction. Applicant discharged this sentence on June 3, 1992. See State's Exhibit A.
1ssu:Es R.AfsEP rn APPLICA'f10N
Ip. the instant writ application, Applicant contends tliat: (1} newlygis,p:iy_g~!(.d eyid~nc;e
establishes f!i.Clt`` is actually innocent of the offense of which he was convicted; and (2) the
.-.
I The original case number for this writ Was W82-8705 l-Q(B ). The writ was refiled under the above
case number, WX0890029-Q, by order of this Court; at the request ofth,e.parties. The writ seeks
relief pursuant to Article I, Section 12 and Article 5, Section 8 oftheTexas Consfrtution and Article
1L05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
2 The Court has also considered each of Applicant's ten additional applicat_ions for writs of habeas
RMR 000076
State failed to disclose statements material to guilt in violation of his due process rights.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper under Article 11.05. Applicant is not confined on this
.·' '·
conviction as he discharged his sentence approximately sixteen years ago, and he is not.
facing other collateral consequences.
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following findings of fact.
1-. On May 14, 1982, at approximately 11 :45 p.m., a man in a hooded, gray sweatshirt,
who was carrying a handgun, broke into an apartment.of Beverly S. See Applicant's
Exhibit 30.
2. The assailant forced Beverly S. and five other women who were present in the
apartment to take off their clothing and perform various sexual acts.
3. The assault was one of a string of similar sexual assaults that occurred in the Dallas
area in the spring of 1982. For example, several hours before the assault of Beverly
S., the perpetrator assaulted three other women in other apartment complexes in
Dallas. In total, there were approximately sixty victims in the Dallas crime spree,
eac~ describing the same peI]Je1r373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that Applicant is entitled to
relief because there is a reasonable probability that had the exculpatory evidence been
disclosed the outcome of the proceedings against Applicant would have been
different. United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Thomas v. State,
841
S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
25. The Court concludes that Sidney Goodyear was a suspect in the crime spree for which
Applicant was investigated and prosecuted in Dallas. The Court also finds that
Goodyear committed similar offenses throughout the country .before and after the
Dallas crime spree. The Court also finds that at least one of the victims in the Dallas
crime spree identified Goodyear as the assailant in the Dallas crime spree.
26. The Court concludes that while the Dallas area police identified Goodyear as a
suspect in the Dallas crin1es, knew he committed similar crimes in Kansas City two
weeks after the crime spree in Dallas, and knew that at least one victim in Dallas
iqentifie_d Goodyear,Jhis information was not disclosed to Applical)t or his attorney.
. . . . --~ .·· . . .
27. The Court also concludes that, prior to Applicant's first trial, the Dallas Police
confirmed that Jolu1Parks, not Applicant, committed the assaultof:Qonnie P., one of
the Dallas victims who initially identified AppliCant as her assailant. The Court finds
that this information confinning that Applicant was actually innocent of the assault on ,
· Connie P. and the information that the police knew that Connie P. misidentifi.e:d ··· •
Applicant as her assailant was no} disclosed to Applicant or his attorney until after he
was found guilty at two trials and after he pied guilty to nine .ad..ditional charges
related to the Dallas crime spree.
28. The Court concludes that the evidence identified in paragraphs 25-27 constitutes
material;,,yX\jUJpatory evidence which should have been disclosed to Applicant. The
Court finds that there is a reasonable probability that there would have been a
., differenJ~}ltcome at Applicant's trials and that he would not have pied guilty to the·
remainiiigchatges had the favorable evidence been disclosed by the State.
· 29.The Court ¢oncludes that the State and Applicant agree that Applicant is entitled to
relief based on the State's failure to disclose the favorable evidence identified in
·paragraphs 25-27.
RMR 000081
30. The Court agrees and conc;ludes that relief should be granted and the conviction set
aside under the authority of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
ORDERS OF THE COURT
The Court ORDERS the following:
1. Applicant's writ of habeas corpus is granted pursuant to Article 11.0§ of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Applic_imt's conviction is vacated bast:;d on a showing that he is actually innocent of
the crime pursuant to Ex parte Elizondo,
947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 199.6).
3. Independently, Applicant's conviction is vacated based on the State's failure to
disclose materiat exculpatory evidence as is required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
-83 (1967).
4. The CLERK is instructed to forward a copy of this ORDER to Applicant's counsel
and to counsel for the State.
_- -_ -A
SIGNED this .t:;' day of dup., ,2008
d?~
JUDGE LENA LEVARIO
204111 JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
-7
---- --- --- ------------~----.------------· -------------------
RMR 000082
WRIT NO. WX0890027-Q 1
EXPARTE § IN THE 204th JUDICIAL
§ DISTRICT COURT
STEVEN CHARLES PHILLIPS § DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
ORDER GRANTING RELIEF
The Court, having considered the allegations contained in Applicant's Application for
Writ of Habeas Corptis2 , Applicant's Memorandwn ofLaw in Support ofHis Application for
_\V'.rit of Habeas Corpus, the _State's Response, and official court records in the above
nwnbered and entitled cause, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
HISTORY OF THE CASE
On June} I,, 1984, Applicant pied guilty to the offense of aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Applicant was sentenced to ten years'
confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. Applicant
did 11ot appeal this conviction. Applicant discharged this sentence on June 3, 1992. See
State's Exhibit A.
ISSUES RAISED IN APPLICATION
In the instant writ application, Applicant contends that: ( 1) newly discovered evidence
l The original cast; number for this writ was W82-86748-Q(B). The writ was refiled under the above
case number, WX0890027-Q, by order of this Court, at the request of the parties. The writ seeks
relief pursuant to Article I, Section 12 and Article 5, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution and_ Article
--~
11.,PS of the Texas Code_ of Criminal Procedure.
2 The Court has.also considered.each of Applicant's ten.additional applications for writs of habeas
. ·- -··
RMR 000083
establishes that he is actually innocent of the offense of which he was convicted; and (2) the
State failed to di-sclose statements material to guilt in violation of his due process rights.
JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper under Article 11.05. Applicant is not confined on this
conviction as he discharged his sentence approximately sixteen years ago, and he is not
facing other collateral consequences.
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court makes the following findings of fact .
. I. On MayJ4, 1982, at approximately. 2:15 p.m., a man in a hooded, gray sweatshirt,
who was carrying a handgun, approached victim Carrie S. and her boyfriend, Mike
W., as they sunbathed next to an apartri:ient swimming pool. See Applicant's Exhibit
28. - -
2. The assailant forced victim Carrie S. to take off her clothes and "model" for him.
3. The assault was one of a string of similar sexual assaults that occurred in the Dallas
areain the spring of 1982. For example; approximately one hour before the assault of
C~ie S.,_a similar assault occurred at_~_dj(ferent apartment complex. pool in Dallas, _
4uring which the perpetrator assaulted Michelle H. Additionally, less than one hour
after the .assault of Carrie·. S., another similar assault occurred at third apartment-.
comp.lex, during which the perpetrator assaulted Mary B. In total, there were
approximately sixty victims in the Dallas crime spree, each describing the same
perpetrator.
4. ·Applicant was indicted for eleven offenses in the Dallas area crime spree. Ten of
these offenses occurred over a two-day period on May 14 and 15, 1982, and one
occurred on April 22, 1982. Applicant was also indicted for a sexual assault that
.. .corpus . ..Collecti:vely the writs.related to. a single crime spree in Dallas in the .Spring of 1982.
2
RMR 000084
occurred in February of 1982. The twelve cases were considered related by police
because the offenses had similar manner and means, including but not limited to a
man carrying a handgun wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt, covering part of his face,
assaulting individuals, and driving a similar inaroon car.
5. Applicant was identified by at least one victim as the perpetrator in each of the twelve
indicted cases. Carrie S. identified Applicant as her assailant in a photo line-up.
6. Prior to pleading guilty to the assault of Canie S., Applicant faced two· trials for·the
assault of Mary B. Applicant was found guilty of burglary of a habitation in the first ·
trial and aggravated sexual ab!;lse. i,n the second trial, and he was sentenced to
concunent thirty year terms.
- .
7. In addition to Mary B, several victims in the Dallas crime spree testified during
Applicant's trials and identified him as the man responsible for the Dallas crime
spree. Michelle H., Susan W ., Lani B., and Shannon K., other victims in the Dallas
crirne spree, testified at Applicant's second trial. Each of these victims testified to
Applicant's bad reputation. The testimony from the victims of other irlCidents in the
Dallas crime spree was based on.what we now know was their inaccurate belief that
Applicant was the perpetrator of the Dallas crime spree.
8. Applicant testified at the first trial, but he did not testify in the guilt phase of the
second trial. At the first trial, Applicant presented a defense of misidentific;ation and
presented an alibi supported by his own testimony and the testimony ofliis _wife, his
sister-in-law, his brother-_in-law, and his uncle.
9. On June 11, 1984, Applicantpled guilty to this offense - aggravated assaultwith a
deadly weapon related to the assault.of Carrie S. - as well as eight other charges in the
Dallas crime spree, after being convicted for burglary of a habitation and the
.aggravated sexual-al;mse:ofMary R
10. The various Dallas area police departments where each of the incidents occuITed
communi_cated with one another regarding suspects in these cases. Further, there was
sharing of ir1formation with Kansas City police because they had experienced a string
of sirnilar offenses two weeks after the crime spree ir1 Dallas.
11.Following the crimes in the Kansas City area which occurred on May 27, 1982,
Kansas City police determined that Sidney Goodyear was responsible for the string of
assaults in that jurisdiction. Goodyear's criminal history showed manner and means
similar to the Dallas area offenses. See Applicant's Exhibits 1-34.
3
•
0 n • :.~ -~=n~•nn •-•--n•••---·-•-•·-·---·•••••-••--•-
RMR 000085
12. Goodyear was identified by one Dallas victim, Wanda S., as.the man who assaulted
her. This info1mation was not shared with Phillips or his counse(·See Applicant's
Exhibit 40. She later identified Applicant as the man who assaulted her.
13. In the case of victim Connie P., Ms. P. identified Applicant as her assailant i.n an
aggravated sexual assault. This case was unlike the others. in time (it occurred in
February whereas the others were committed May 14 and 15), and the manner and
means were dissimilar. Police were made aware that Applicant was not responsible
for this offense prior to his first trial in the burgl.ary of a habitation of Mary B. See
Applicant's Exhibit 37-38. This information was not shared with Applicant or his
counsel. See Applicant's Exhibit 40. The case was dismissed after Applicant pied
guilty to the remaining indictments. See Applicant's Exhibit 39.
-
14. On June 6, 2001, Applicant filed a pro semotion for DNA testing of the evidence
collected in the complainant Mary B. cases. He was denied testing, appealed it, and
lost. While attempting to seek relief from the Co_urt of Crhninal Appeals, the State
agreed to testing on June 21, 2007. See State's Exhibit B.
15. The DNA results excluded Applicant as the perpetrator in the rape of Mary B. 1 thus
also exonerating him from breaking into her apartmentto commit.said rape. See
Applicant's Exhibit 35. . .
16. The State pursued DNA testing of Sidney Goodyear. Results showedl:hat Goodyear
was in fact responsible for the rape of Mary B. See Applicant's Exhibit 35.
· 17.After lillking Goodyear's DNA to the rape of Mary B., the State gathered the
following information about Goodyear: Goodyear col11111itted a string of sexual
assaults throughout the country ill the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and was wanted by
manylocaljurisdictions and the Federal Bureau.oflnvestigations; Goodyear's crhnes
in other jurisdictions were nearly ide11tical to the manner and means used ill the Dallas
area crime spree; Goodyear was an illitial suspect in the Dallas crime spree; Goodyear
owned a car and handgWl that were consistent with the car and handgun used by the
perpetrator in the Dallas crime spree; Goodyear was identified as the perpetrator in the
Dallas crin1e spree by at least one of the victims~ and the evidence the State possessed ·
at the time of Applicant's prosecution that implicated Goodyear was not disclosed to
Applicant. ··
4
.. --
---
'
RMR 000086
GROUND ONE: ACTUAL INNOCENCE
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
18. The Court concludes that the DNA results excluding Applicant and implicating
Goodyear in the assault of Mary B. were unknown to Applicant at the time of trial and
thatApp1reant's failure to discover this information was not due to a lack of due
diligence on his part.
19. The Court concludes that the DNA results are newly discovered evidence that create a
doubt as to the efficacy of the verdict sufficient to undermine confidence in the
verdiCt.
20. The Court concluqes that the State and Applicant agree that it is highly probable that
Goodyear, not Applicant, committed the assault of Carrie S.
21. The Court concludes that the DNA results implicating Goodyear in the Dallas crime
spree and excluding Applicant are supported by the following infom1ation: Goodyear
committed nearly identical crimes throughout the country both before and after the.
Dallas area crime spree; the Dallas police have at all times believed that each ofthe
crimes in Dalias were committed by the same individual; Goodyear owned the same
type of car and handgun that was used in the Dallas crime spree; Goodyear was an
initial suspect and identified by at least one of the victim's in the Dallas crime spree;·
the victims in Dallas, including, but not limited to, Carrie S. and Mary B., provided
police similar descriptions of the perpetrator; and the assaults occurred within hours
of each other.
22. The Court concludes that relief should be granted to Applicant on his claim Qf a.ch!{t!:&:,J';;,<. ·{':;:
mnocence.
innocence.
RMR 000087
GROUND Two: BRADY CLAIMS
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
24. The Court concludes that the State failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence as
is required by Brady v. Mmyland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and that Applicant is entitled to
relief because there is a reasonable probability that had the exculpatory evidence been
disclosed the outcome of the proceedings against Applicant would have been
different. United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Thomas v. State,
841
S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
25. The Court concludes that Sidney Goodyear was a suspect in the crime spree for which
Applicant was investigated and prosecuted in Dallas. The Court also finds that
Goodyear committed similar offenses throughout the coLmtry before and after the
Dallas crime spree. The Court also finds that at least one of the victims in the Dallas
crime spree identified Goodyear as the assailant in the Dallas crime spree.
26. The Comt concludes that while the Dallas area police identified Goodyear as a
suspect in the Dallas crimes, knew he committed similar crimes in Kansas City two
weeks after the crime spree in Dallas, and knew that at least one victim in Dallas
identified Goodyear, this information was not dis~!osed to Applicant or his attorney.
· 27. The Court also concludes that, prior to Applicant's first trial, the Dallas Police
confinned that Jolm Parks, not Applicant, committed the assault of Connie P., one of
the Dallas victims who initially identified Applicant as her assailant. The Court finds
,·_'.-;~:.,.. that this information confinning that Applicant was actually innocent of the assault on
.:'.>''``~§.,eonnie P. and the info1mation that the police knew that Connie P. misidentified
· .. - · .. ··':Applicant as her assailant was not disclm;ed to Applicant or hi!) attorney until after he
was found guilty at two trials and ·after he pied guilty to nine additional charges
. related to the Dallas crime spree. ..
28. The Court concludes that the evidence identified in paragraphs 25-27 constitutes
material, exculpatory evidence which should have been disclosed to Applicant. The
Court Tmds that there is a reasonable probability that there would have been a
different outcome at Applicant's trials and that he would not have pied guilty to tlle
remaining charges had the favorable evidence been disclosed by the State.
29. The Court concludes that the State and Applicant agree that Applicant is entitled to
relief based on the State's failure to disclose the favorable evidence identified in
paragraphs 25-27.
6
RMR 000088
30. The Court agrees and concludes that relief should be granted and the conviction set
aside under the authority of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963).
ORDERS OF THE COURT
The Court ORDERS the following:
l. Applicant's writ of habeas corpus is granted pursuant to Article 11.05 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. Applicant's conviction is vacated based on a showing that he is actually innocent of
the crime pursuan_t to Ex parte Elizondo,
947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
3. -·....Independently,·-· Applicant's conviction is vacated based on the State's
;.-. ...
failure to
disclose material, exculpatory evidence as is required by Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S.
83 (1967).
4. The CLERK is instructed to forward a copy of this ORDER to Applicant's counsel
and to counsel for the State.
...:
.:'
7
•
RMR 000089
::.:u.
CHlLD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT TRANSMITTAL #2 ·SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS
PP,tflionor • IV-Dease: [ ] TANF
[ J IV-E FOSTER CARE
[ J MEDICAID ONLY
R!l8pondenl
[ J FOAM EA ASSISTANCE
[ ] NEVER ASSISTANCE
Steven ?hi \Ii ~s Non-IV-0 Case: [ J
FILE STAMP
To: (Agency Name and Alt.!ress)
Leona.rd.. l.Ji j~'ns
Responding FIPS Code State
Aeopot1dlng IV·D Case No. - - - - -- - - -- - - -- - -
( 51 ~) 03l, ..- b I gtf- Responding Tribunal No.
From: (Conract Person, Jllg11ncy, Address, Phone, Fax, E-mali) Initiating FIPS Code Slats
Lt) f- 1si-.e,.-
00 'E - P.:e«'-) Vl \~. Initiating IV·O Casa No.
Initiating Tribunal No.
Send Payments To: (if different from above) Payment FIPS Co•.
Date PeIBOn Completing Form (Print or Type) Telephone Nurnber & ExteMlon
E-mail:-------------------
Child Support Enforcerrent Transmittal #2 - Subsequent Actions Retum this Page to the 1nitiating Juri$diction
OCSE • F\802 12104 2 of~·
RMR 000093
Page 1 OJ L.
ARKANSAS Cl:ULD SUFJ>QRT TRACKJNG SYSn:M
PAnIBNT HISTORY REPORT
FROM : 07/()Ul 997 TO : 10/1012002
Case ID:
Payor ID: Name: PHILLIPS C STEVEN Doc:ket Numbt:r
Payee ID: Name: MACUMBER S CHERI
NO of Other Cases Payor s Present: I
__ ____,___,_ ~ .. ---·· -----·-·· ...... .. ...
~-----..--_...,.~.....,..,...-....--------,,..--·--~-. ----~. ~-. ~-.---
DISCLAThiER: PURSUANT TO ARK. CODE ANNO § 9-14-807 CHlLD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORD ISSUED BY THE OFFICE Of CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT THROUGH ITS
STATE DISTRIBUTION UNIT SHALL BE CONSIDERED THE OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORD OF THE CHILD SUPPORT PAYM E.NT HISTORY. A REQUEST FOR A CERTIFIED PAY
lUSTORY MUST BE IN WRITING FROM THE CUSTODIAN, NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT OR TifEIR ATIORNEY OF RECORD TO THE STATE DISBURSEMENT UNIT, CERTIFIED
PAY HISTORY REQUEST, P. 0. BOX 8128, LITTLE ROCK, AR 72203. UNOFFICIAL COPrES OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORDS MAY BE. AVATLABLE THROUGH TifE LOCAL
COURT Cl.ER KS OFflCE.
2/19/20] 0 RMR000094
rage 2 011..
Receipt Type RCT Status LookUp
Code Descrlptl1m Code Description
00 Regular collection H Hold
01 Prior Collection I ldr;:utifierl
02 LRS Collection M Manual Distribution
03 State Revenue Collection 0 Out OfBal1mce
04 ESD Collection R Research
0:5 Advance (Undistributed Excess) s SHEF Special Handling
11 Increaw R.egtllar Collection~ x Refund
12 Increase Advanoe
13 Increase E'SD
14 Im.-rease IRS
15 Increase State Revenues
16 Jm:rease Prior Collections
21 Decrease Regular Collections
22 Decreiu;c Advance
23 Decrease ESD
24 Decrease m.s
25 Decrease State Rcvcm1e
26 Decrease Prior Colloorions
lndiCJ1.tor LookUp DISB. Hold LookUp
Code Des-crlption Code Description
AAC Applied To Another C<1se (s) A Address Hold
HOL On Hold D Dail}' Disbursement Hold
RNN Refunded To NCP [ 6 Month Hold
IUN Identified But Undistributed F Future Hold
RSC Research, Sfief, Out Of Balance. L Less Than Zero Dollar Ho!d
w Welfare Diiroihution Hold
p Deceased Hold
E Footer Care Hold
DISCLAIMER: PURSUANT TO ARK.. CODE ANNO§ 9-14-807 CHfi,D SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORD ISSUED BY THE OFFICE Of CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT THROUGH ITS
ST A TE DISTRIBUTION UNlT SHALL BE CONSIDERED THE OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORD OF THE CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT HISTORY. A REQUEST FOR A CERTIFTED PAY
HISTORY MUST BE IN WRITING FROM THE CUSTODIAN, NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT OR THEIRATIORNEY OF RECORD TO THE STATE DISBURSEMENT UNIT, CERTIFIED
PAY HISTORY REQUEST, P. 0. BOX 8128, UTILE ROCK, AR 71203. lJNOFFlCIAL COPIES OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORDS MAY BE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE LOCAL
COURT CLERKS OFFICE.
2/19/2010 RMR 000095
;r-
!1
.1
..i~ s
iiI u s A N
T EXA S C 0 M PT R 0 L L E R n/ P U 8 L IC A C C 0 U NT S
,,
:I
•' c 0 M B s P.O. Sox 135 2 8 . A U S T IN. TX 78 71 1·352 8
I:_M·-·-..n~ - ---- -
February 26, 2010
Dear Mr. Phillips:
The Comptroller' s Judiciary Section is in receipt of your claim and supporting documentation
submitted on January 12, 2010, requesting wrongful imprisonment compensation. The claim has been
approved for the following amount and pursuant to Section 103.15 l (a), Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, the payment will be mailed within 30 days of the date of this letter.
Lump-sum payment: $806,666.67
In addition. as compensation for child support payments under Section 103.052(a)(2), Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, a lump-sum payment will be paid on your behalf to the Texas Attorney
General's Office for payment to the Oklahoma disbursement unit. This payment will be made within
30 days of the date of this letter in accordance with Section 103.151(a), Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code. The Comptroller will give you notice of the payment amount.
If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact the Comptroller's Judiciary
Section by e-mail at leonard.higgins @cpa.state.tx.us or by phone at 1-800-53 1-5441, extension 6-
6 100.
-t 1-t-;r:-
Leo d Higgins
Comptroller's Judiciary Section
RMR 000096
HECEtVED
Vt/\1 05 2.0\G
p>"<} ~RV
;UD1v2h ·
May3, 2010
State of Texas Comptroller
Judiciary Section
Attn: Leonard Higgins
P.O. Box 13528
Austin, TX 78711-3528
Re: Steven Charles Phillips
SSN:
To Whom it may Concern,
This document is my effort to detail the events and a time period that have created a child
support payment that is severely in a state of arrears, and owed by the state of Texas.
Beginning with the years o - a n d . , two children were born to Steven and myself. (see
two attached documents) Our marriage ended in 1978 (see the attached divorce decree).
Our second child was born i n out of wedlock. The divorce decree acknowledges one child
for a child support order,
Here, I must acknowledge and point out that there is no child support order for the second
child. Steven and I were not at odds with each other prior to his incarceration, so he just paid
to me cash that I might need. We had no reason to believe that he would soon be in prison for
the rest of the chiIds young life.
When the children were ages 6 and 3, their father, Steven Charles Phillips was wrongfully
incarcerated for twenty-six years in the state of Texas. He was found innocent due to DNA
testing and released in late 2008.
During that time, both the state of Texas and the state of Arkansas, in reference to child
support, were unable to assist with child support for prisoners. However, child support cases
were opened with the Child Support Enforcement Unit of Arkansas for both children. A total of
$220 was paid in 1997 on one case. (see attached payment history documents) This amount
will show as a deduction within my calculations as to what is due.
Once the children became 18, I had given up hope. The children wondered if the nightmare
would be over and their father would ever be free. Please, keep in mind this incarceration
covers a span of 26 long years. So, I did not keep receipts, medical bill receipts, dental bills,
pharmacy bills, health insurance costs, education, etc. I did not keep the child support cases
open, I did not petition the courts to increase child support order to keep up with the changing
1
RMR000097
economy (there wasn't any child support).
Furthermore, and definately the most frustrating issue of all is that I did not have an order of
child support set up before Steven became entangled in the terrible web of the Texas prison
system. Both our hands were tied. Thank God he never gave up on proving his innocence.
My sincere effort has been put into arriving at a reasonable amount owed, and that it reflects a.
modest amount owed to these children by the state of Texas, accruing during the period of tme
that their father was wrongfully imprisoned.
Originally, I had attempted to arrive at a total by multiplying a dollar amount to} each child.
now realize that the most common way to come to a more suitable amount is to look at the
amount paid each month for two children. I have looked at child support charts that go back as
far as 1990.
I realize that the child support for~ates that only $100 per month was ordered
to be paid. Steven was in the milit~ years old, and I thought $100 a month was a
lot of money.
So, what I have done is this, I begin with the year 1982 and end with the year 1997. 1997 being
the year that ·the second child turned 18. Every third year I increase the amount of child
support, as I would have done had I had the opportunity to go before a judge and ask for an
alteration in the payment because of Steven's increased eamings, cost of living adjustments,
etc.
1982-1985 is 3 years 36 months @ $500 per month = $18,000 (two children)
1985-1988 is 3 years 36 months @ $650 per month = $23,400 (two children)
1988-1992 is 3 years 36 months @ $800 per month = $28,800 (two children) ·
1992-1994 is 2 years 24 months @ $900 per month = $21,600 (two children)
1994-1997 is 3 years 36 months @ $575 per month = $20.700 (one child)
$ 112,500 sub- total
1997 payments made total $220 - 220
$112,280 total due
As I stated earlier, I did not keep 15 years worth of receipts or bills, etc. but one could etimate
t hat over that period of time one could expect to spend approximately $8,000 per child on
health care, dental and orthodontia.
At last, that brings the final total to $128,280.
My greatest hope is that you will not hesitate. This money is for two very special young adults
who did not deserve to be so wronfully deprived of the financial and emotional support of their
father. These children are still "counting on me" to " see it through", and I am counting on you
to take positive action with this letter and the attached documents.
2
RMR 000098
., I ' ~
Please, feel free to contact me at any time.
cz:-;o i;_'Jlf``~
Su~ac~mber
Cheryl
3
RMR000099
Page I v. L
ARKANSAS C HI LD SUPPORT T RACKING SYSTEM
PAYMENT HISTORY REPORT
FROM : 01101/1976 TO: 11/23/2009
Case ID:
Payor ID: Name: ~ILLIPS c STEVW Docket Number:
Payee ID: Name: MACUMBER S CHERI
NO of Other 1
Collection before 0810111997
Receipt Number Receipt Date Receipt Type Receipt Amount Check NO
03/ 1411997 0025 0077 03/ 1211997 00
t i / ,1811997 0003 0016 04/16/1997 00
"!..!: /
DISCLAIMER: PURSUANT TO ARK. CODE ANNO§ 9-14-807 CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORD ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT THROUGH ITS
ST ATE DJSTRIBUTION UNIT SHALL BE CONSIDERED THE OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORD OF THE CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT HI STORY. A REQUEST FOR A CERTIFIED PAY
HISTORY MUST BE IN WRITING FROM THE CUSTODIAN, NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT OR THEfR ATTORNEY OF RECORD TO THE STATE DISBURSEMENT UNIT, CERTIFIED
PAY HISTORY REQUEST, P. 0 . BOX 8128, LITTLE ROCK, AR 72203. UNOFFICIAL COPIES OF CHILD SUPPORTPAYMENT RECORDS MAYBE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE LOCAL
COURT CLERKS OfFICE.
11 /23/2009 RMR OOOlOO
Page 2 (_,, ~
Receipt Type RCT Status Look Up
Code Description Code Description
00 Regular collection H Hold
01 Prior Collection I Identified
02 IRS Collection M Manual Distribution
03 State Revenue Collection 0 Out Of Balance
04 ESD Collection R Research
05 Advance (Undistributed Excess) s SHEF Special Handling
11 Increase Regular Collections x Refund
12 Increase Advance
13 Increase ESD
14 Increase IRS
15 Increase State Revenues
16 Increase Prior Collections
21 Decrease Regular Collections
·3·
Decrease Advance
·L Decrease ESD
24 Decrease IRS
25 Decrease State Revenue
26 Decrease Prior Collections
Indicator Look Up DISB. Hold LookUp
Code Description Code Description
AAC Applied To Another Case (s) A Address Hold
HOL On Hold D Daily Disbursement Hold
RNN Refunded To NCP I 6 Month Hold
!UN Identified But Undistributed F Future Hold
RSC Research , Shef, Out Of Balance L Less Than Zero Dollar Hold
w Welfare Distribution Hold
p Deceased Hold
E Foster Care Hold
DISCLAIMER: PURSUANT TO ARK. CODE ANNO§ 9-14-807 CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORD ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT THROUGH ITS
STATE DISTRIBUTION UNIT SHALL BE CONSIDERED THE OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORD OF THE CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT HISTORY. A REQUEST FOR A CERTIFIED PAY
HISTORY MUST BE IN WRITING FROM THE CUSTODIAN, NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT OR THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD TO THE STATE DISBURSEMENT UNIT, CERTIFIED
PAY HISTORY REQUEST, P. 0. BOX 8128, LITTLE ROCK, AR 72203. UNOFFICIAL COPIES OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORDS MAY BE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE LOCAL
COURT CLERKS OFFICE.
] 112312009 RMR 000101
Page I \,~ L
ARKANSAS CIULD SUPPORT TRACKING SYSTEM
PAYMENT HISTORY REPORT
FROM : 07121/1979 T O : 11123/2009
--·---~
Case ID:
Payor ID: Name: PHILLIPS C STEVEN Docket Number:
Payee ID: Name: MACUMBER S CHERI
NO of Other
- - - - -------- --
DISCLAIM ER: PURSUANT TO ARK. CODE ANNO § 9-14-807 CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORD ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT THROUGH ITS
STATE DISTRIBUTION UNIT SHALL BE CONSIDERED THE OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORD OF THE CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT HISTORY. A REQUEST FOR A CERTJFIED PAY
HISTORY MUST BE JN WRITING FROM THE CUSTODIAN, NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT OR THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD TO THE STA TE DISBURSEMENT UNIT, CERTIFIED
PAY HISTORY REQUEST, P. 0. BOX 8I28, UTILE ROCK, AR 72203. UNOFFICIAL COPIES OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORDS MAY BE AVA ILABLE THROUGH THE LOCAL
COURT CLERKS OFFICE.
1112312009 RMR000102
Page 2 or L
--..----···-------·
Receipt Type HCT Status LookUp
Code Description Code Description
00 Regular collection H Hold
01 Prior Collection I ldentified
02 IRS Collection M Manual Distribution
03 State Revenue Collection 0 Out Of Balance
04 ESD Collection R Research
05 Advance (Undistributed Excess) s SHEF Special Handling
11 Increase Regular Collections x Refund
12 Increase Advance
13 Increase ESD
14 Increase IRS
15 Increase State Revenues
16 Increase Prior Collections
1 Decrease Regular Collections
Decrease Advance
Decrease ESD
24 Decrease IRS
25 Decrease State Revenue
26 Decrease Prior Collections
Indicator LookUp DISB. Hold LookUp
Code Description Code Description
AAC Applied To Another Case (s) A Address Hold
HOL On Hold D Daily Disbursement Hold
RNN Refunded To NCP I 6 Month Hold
!UN Identified But Undistributed F Future Hold
RSC Research , Shef, Out Of Balance L Less Than Zero Dollar Hold
w Welfare Distribution Hold
p Deceased Hold
E Foster Care Hold
DISCLAIMER: PURSUANT TO ARK. CODE ANNO § 9-14-807 CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORD ISSUED BY THE OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT THROUGH ITS
ST ATE DISTRIBUTION UNIT SHALL BE CONSIDERED THE OFFICIAL PUBLIC RECORD OF THE CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT HISTORY. A REQUEST FOR A CERTIFIED PAY
HISTORY MUST BE IN WRITING FROM THE CUSTODIAN, NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT OR THEIR ATTORNEY OF RECORD TO THE STATE DISBURSEMENT UNIT, CERTJFlED
PAY HISTORY REQUEST, P. 0. BOX 8128, LITTLE ROCK, AR 72203. UNOFFICIAL COPIES OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENT RECORDS MAY BE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE LOCAL
COURT CLERKS OFFICE.
1112312009 RMR 000103
RMR 000104
This is a legal document. Signing this legal document gives you certain rights and responsibilities. Signing this
document is voluntary. You should consult an attorney if you have concerns about signing this legal document. If you
are not sure that the man named in this Acknowledgment is the biological father of the child, you should not sign this
document. You may want to get a genetic test. The biological father who signs this Acknowledgment becomes the
legal father of the child when this document is filed with the Department of State Health Services, Texas Vital
Statistics. This document requires an Entity Code completed in the lower right corner by an individual certified by the
Office of the Attorney General to administer Acknowledgments of Paternity.
Benefits, Rights, And Responsibilities Of Paternity
Establishing parentage makes it easier for a child to receive benefits such as social security, military and veteran's
benefits, health care coverage and life insurance, as well as inheritance.
Both parents have parental rights and duties as provided by state law. Either parent has the right to seek p1imary
custody of the child. A parent not living with the child may have the right to visit and maintain a relationship with the
child, either as both parents agree or as ordered by a court. This Acknowledgment has the same effect as a court
order establishing paternity. By signing this Acknowledgment, you may be ordered to pay child support and medical
support.
This document may be completed before the birth of the child, at the time of birth, or at any time after the birth of the
child. If this document is signed before the birth of the child, it is binding for any child born no later than 300 days
after the signature date on this document. When this Acknowledgment is properly filed with Texas Vital Statistics, it
creates a parent-child relationship between the man and child. Establishment of paternity is required for a father's name
to be entered on a birth certificate.
Child support services can be obtained through the
Office of the Attorney General, Child Support Division or by hiring an attorney.
Denial Of Paternity
If a child's mother is married to a man other than the biological father at the time of birth or within 300 days of the
ending of the marriage, the (ex) husband is presumed to be the legal father. To complete this document for a child that
has a presumed father, the presumed father must deny paternity by completing the Denial of Paternity section. The
mother must agree that the presumed father is not the biological father by also signing the denial section. The
acknowledgment section must also be completed by the biological father and mother, or the denial will not be accepted.
Upon the filing of this document, the presumed father is legally determined not to be the father of the child. His legal
duty to support the child is removed. Likewise, his legal right of custody or visitation with the child is terminated.
Change Of Mind
If any party to this document changes his/her mind about acknowledging or denying paternity, he/she may file a suit to
rescind this document. This has to be done within sixty (60) days after this legal document is filed with Texas Vital
Statistics or before the first hearing date in a proceeding involving the child, including child support, whichever occurs
firsl. After si..xty (60) days, or first hearing date, a lawsuit is required to challenge this document. Fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact in signing this form must be proven during the lawsuit. The suit must be brought within four
(4) years of the file date of this document.
If A Party Is A Minor
If a party to this document is a minor on the date the document is signed, the lawsuit required to challenge the
document must be filed within four (4) years of the date the party became an adult
All parties must receive oral notice of the above information before completing this Acknowledgment. You can receive
oral notice of the information by calling 1-866-255-2006 and selecting option 1, "Notice of Rights and Responsibilities
of a Parent."
If you have questions, you may call the Paternity Opportunity Program at 1-866-255-2006.
RMR 000105
• STATE OF TEXAS
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PATERNITY
This ts a legal document. Type or Print in black Ink. Parents are to be given a copy of th is completed document.
•
We declare under penalty of perjury that Steven Charles Phillips
-==0~
io~lo``ic~a~IF~
·``ha'>-:-~r.~-.1``~-=:.::::,~
11i~d<~lle``````-+b~S1=~=,.~
~"'--``````
is the biological father of
bo Arkansas
c:icy
to Chervl Sue Pltilli s
Molhc.t'S firs.1 middle fa'l.lttamc
We further declare under penalty of perjury that:
• We have been given wTitten and om! notice of: the benefi ts of having paternity established; the availability of
paternity establishment and child support services; and the legal consequences of, the rights and responsib ilities
of, and the alternative to signing this Acknowledgment.
• No other Acknowledgment of Paternity form naming another man as the biological father of this child has been .filed.
• There is no court order naming another man as tb.e biological father oftbis child.
• A genetic t.est hes not determined that another man is the biological father of this child.
Fill one circle by the correct statement from EACH oftbc following:
© Tn~'TC h!!.n2! been genetic testing of the man listed 0 Genetic testing has determined that the man listo.'Cl above is the
a hove to detcmJine if he is the biological father of this child. 0 r biological father of this chi ld.
© The mother was not mnrried to someone other than tht: O The mother ID!1 mnrried to someone other than the biological
biological fotho.f at the time of the child's birth or within father at the time of the child's birth or during the 300 days
300 days prior to the child's date of birth, or there is n court or before the child's birth or during the first two ycurs 1)r ihc child's
order that states that the man the mother wns married 10 is life, a man continuously Jived with the child and represented the
not the father of the child, and during the first two yearn of child as h is own; and that man has completed the Denial of
the child's life, no man wntinuously lived with the child Paternity below or has a Denial of Paternity filed with the Vital
and represented the child ns his own. StAtistic.• Unit.
~ C?, Mi:t,,i_, O ~I CY 16 £ -3-JO
Full Signature of Biologicallf<'illcr dote elate
*'* '\' ** "** *" • *'* .... '** • ** *** ** • ** ••• ** * '** *** ** * *1t "'** *• * *• *** '** .,..1' "''** ** * "* ....
*•* ...... * ** *** 11( 'fir
Denial of Paternity (only rcqoircd if •mother:!!'.!!! 1n>tricd to someone oohcr than the biological fodocr or if, during the f binh sociol security n1~ Presumed l'mher'• addre.<.'; city State Y.ip code
• •
Tc.xas Ckp~rtmc:nl of State Hcal1h Scrviccs
Vital Sta1is1ks Uoil
VS· IS?.I M Revised 9/2005
RMR000106
Este es un documento legal. Finnar este documento legal le otorga ciertos derechos y responsabilidades. Firmar este documento
es voluntario. Debe consultar un abogado si tiene preocupaciones sobre la firma de este documento legal. Si no tiene la seguridad
de que el hombre que se menciona en este Rcconocimiento es el papa biol6gico del nifio*, no debe firmar este documento. Usted
quizas desee pedir una prueba genetica. El papa biol6gico que firma este Reconocimiento se convierte en el papa legal del
nifio cuando se presenta este documento ante la Oficina de Estadisticas Vitales de Texas del Departamento Estatal de
Servicios de Salud (Department of State Health Services, Texas Vital Statistics). Este documento requiere que una persona
certificada por la Procuraduria General para administrar el Reconocimiento de Paternidad escriba un C6digo de Entidad en el !ado
derecho al pie de la pagina.
Beneficios, Derechos y Responsabilidades de la Paternidad
El establecer la patemidad facilita que un nifio reciba beneficios tales como Seguro Social, beneficios de las fuerzas armadas y de
veteranos, cobertura de seguro medico y seguro de vida, al igual que una herencia.
Segun las leyes estatales ambos padres tienen derechos y deberes patemales. Cualquiera de los dos padres tiene derecho a intentar
obtener la custodia principal de! nifio. Un padre que no vive con el nifio puede tener derecho a las visitas ya mantener una
relaci6n con el niiio, ya sea si los dos padres estiin de acuerdo o si lo ordena la carte. Este reconocimiento tiene el mismo efecto
que una orden de la corte que establece la paternidad. Al firmar este Reconocimiento a usted se le puede ordenar que pague
manutenci6n de nifios y manutenci6n medica.
Se puede llenar este documento antes del nacimiento del nifio, en el momento del nacimiento o en cualquier momenta despues del
nacimiento. Si este documento se firma antes del nacimiento de! nifio, queda vigente para cualquier nifio que nazca dentro de un
lapso de 300 dfas despues de la fecha en que se firm6. Cuando este Reconocimiento se presenta correctamente ante la Oficina de
Estadfsticas Vitales de Texas (Texas Vital Statistics) crea una relaci6n padre e hijo entre el hombre y el niiio. Se requiere el
establecimiento de patemidad para que el padre de un nifio aparezca en el acta de nacimiento.
Se pueden obtener los servicios de manutenci6n de nifios a traves de la Divisi6n de la Procuraduria General para la
Manutenci6n de Ninos o contratando a un abogado.
Negaci6n de Paternidad
Si la mama de un nifio esta casada con un hombre que no es el papa biol6gico al momento de! nacimiento o se convierte en mama
antes de que t:ranscurran 300 dfas de termiriar el matrimonio, se presume que el (ex) esposo es el padre legal. Para llenar este
documento para un nifio que tiene un presunto padre, el presunto padre debe negar la paternidad llenando la secci6n de Negaci6n
de Patemidad. La mama debe estar de acuerdo en que el presunto padre no es el papa biol6gico firmando tambien la secci6n de
negaci6n. La secci6n de reconocimiento tambien debe ser completada por el papa biol6gico y la mama o de lo contrario no se
aceptara la negaci6n. Al presentar este documento se determina legalmente que el presunto padre no es el papa del nifio y su deber
legal de mantener al nifio termina. Asimismo, su derecho legal de tener custodia o visitas con el niiio desaparece.
Cambia de Opinion
Si una de las partes de este documento cambia de opinion sobre el reconocimiento o negaci6n de patemidad, el/ella pueda entablar
una demanda para rescindir el documento. Esto se tiene que hacer dentro de Los sesenta (60) dfas despues de que este documento
legal fue presentado ante la Oficina de Estadisticas Vitales o antes de la primera audiencia en el procedimiento que tiene que ver
con el niiio, incluyendo la manutenci6n de nifios: Lo que ocurra primero. Si se cambia de opinion cuando ya pasaron los sesenta
(60) dfas o la fecha de la primera audiencia, se debera entablar una demanda para desafiar el documento. Durante la demanda se
debera probar fraude, coacci6n o error material de los hechos al firmar el formulario. La demanda se debe entablar dentro de los
cuatro (4) afios desde haber presentado el documento.
Si una de las partes es menor de edad
Si una de las partes a este documento es menor de edad en la fecha en que fue firmado, la fecha requerida para desafiar el
documento debe ser antes de que transcurran cuatro (4) afios de que la persona se convirti6 en adulto.
Todas las partes deben recibir notificaci6n oral de la informaci6n aquf mencionada antes de llenar el Reconocimiento de
Paternidad. Usted puede recibir notificaci6n oral de la informaci6n llamando al 1-866-255-2006 y eligiendo la opci6n l, "A viso de
Derechos y Responsabilidades como Padre".
Si tiene alguna pregunta puede Hamar al Programa de Oportunidad en la Patemidad al 1-866-255-2006.
*Nota del traductor: Para prop6sitos de esta traducci6n el termino "nifio" puede indicar tanto un nifio como una nifia.
RMR 000107
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RMR 000109
. PURI OF ROOtl E COUNTY, .l\RKANS/\S
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PLAINTI FF
DEFENDANT
.DECREE OF DIVORCE-·-·-· ···· - - ·
NOW, on this 2nd day of February, 1978, comes on fo.r h~ar\ll9: tQe · il~P~!! .s tyle~
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cause, and same i.s submit t ed upon the ora 1 testimony of.: pJ.a:jn_t,,iffr:;~.~?,.J..~:t~p;``~;.J~n.;``·./":;l~
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her behalf, the official file , s tatement of counsel and o ther ·mat;t~li:f~9)j,cjkitb;i;rJ
bofoco tho ''"'t• from •11 of whi the .defe11di1nt be and he hereby is di recte.d to return
·:~L:``i``ee::~oxes: of. her
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personal items, which she left
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RMR 000111
REVENUE PROCESSING DIVISION
FLAG
TP#· c
RMR 000112
.,
August 12, 20 I 0
Dear Susan Combs,
My family and I are in desperate need of your help, encouragement, and advice. Our
story is somewhat unbelievable, and it seems that it will be an ongoing nightmare if we
do not receive some cooperation from our state governments, and federal if necessary. I
pray that you will read this letter with compassion and sincerity, for we no longer know
what to do to resolve this dilemma between two state governments, that involves two
very innocent children.
I will try to make this as simply stated as possible; even though the timeline covers more
than three decades:
In 1975, I married Steven Charles P~in our hometown of Harrison,
Arkansas. I was sixteen years old o. . . . . _ w ben I gave birth to our daughter,
We agreed to a divorce in 1978 and a court order was set for
child support for Although the marriage was dissolved, our relationship had not
ended. I gave birth to Steven's son, n Due to the
fact that we were not married at the time, there was no court order for child support for
- - I was only nineteen when - w a s born, and I had no idea how important a
~er would be in the legal system of2010.
Steven moved to the state of Texas to make a new start, and I remained in Arkansas with
the two children. Then, in 1983 Steven was arrested. falsely accused, and ultimately
wrongfully imprisoned in the state of Texas until the latter part of 2008. He has been
exonerated, he is being monetarily compensated, and his life is moving forward. His
story is accessible via the internet.
However, what you do not see in the press/news/internet are the two children's stories.
As I stated earlier, a child support order was and is in effect f o - b u t I never
petitioned the courts for an order fo~ I contacted the state of Texas to see if
there was any kind of fund for children of prisoners, to no avail. I opened child support
cases with the Department of Child Support Enforcemeot in Arkansas, for both children.
There was oothing they couJd do for these children but to wait unti1 he was released. 1
was to stay in touch with their office to keep the children's cases open. I did keep their
cases open until they reached the ages of 18, and then I just gave up hope that they would
ever see their Father outside of those prison walls.
Miraculously he, with the help of DNA testing, the Innocence Project and many others
RMR000113
too numerous to mention, was released
In speaking with the Office of Child Support Enforcement of Arkansas, I have learned
that somewhere around 1998, their office went to a new computerized registry, and due to
the fact that both children were over 18, their cases did not get included in the registry.
As I understand it, the state of Texas uses the office of the Attorney General to collect and
disburse child support payments. Whereas, the state of Arkansas has its own division of
Child Support Enforcement and is not under the administration of the Attorney General.
So, l have been unsuccessful with Texas and Arkansas at working together to solve this
dilemma.
I have written to and have spoke with a judiciary member, Leonard Higgins of the
comptroller's office for the state of Texas. He states that the state of Texas will not
consider paying the child support that is due to these two children without a court order
for child support, as well as an actively open case with the Office of Child Support. Keep
in mind that these two "children" are no"9an-ears old. Of course there is not an
open case!
I will go on to say that this Mr. Leonard Higgins with the comptroller's office in Texas,
bas been rude, with no empathy or assistance. He even stated that "Ifyou are looking for
a source of income, you might get it from Steven, he bas plenty!" This type of response
has not been typical of any of the many people that I have spoken to in both Texas and
Arkansas, most have been empathetic and willing to do what they can. I have enclosed a
copy of the letter that I sent to Mr. Higgins stating the amount that I had calculated to be
due to these children.
I am not looking for an income. I am now 51 years old and a retired teacher. I am not
wealthy but I am very comfortable. I am remarried and I have 4 children andl5
grandchildren. This money from child support/state of Texas is not for me. It is for two
children who did without so much and did absolutely nothing to deserve this neglect
Along with the shame and humiliation, the teasing, and the loneliness of having to do
witlwut their Falher, who was uJtimate1y wrongfully found guilty ofa terribJe crime.
Lives are being mended, relationships restored, and now that their Father is on the other
side of the bars and razor wire, and in a new light, these children still cannot get a "'break
or ray ofjustice"'.
I refuse to sue their Father for Child Support. This is an error on the part of the state of
T exas. If I work with the State of Arkansas, that is what they do; ..Enforce".
As J bring this letter to a close, I pray that what you hold in your hands will not be tossed
aside. But that you will look to the list of names to which this letter will be delivered and
contact just one that you know and work together to help these children. Will you be the
one to help or will you say ..This is someone else's problem''?
RMR 000114
Enclosures
Cc:
President Barack Obama
First Lady Michelle Obama
Vice President Joe Biden
The Honorable George W. Bush
Laura Bush
The Honorable George H.W. Bush
Barbara Bush
The Honorable Wm. J. Clinton
Sec. of State Hillary Clinton
Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi
The Honorable Jimmy Carter
Rosalynn Carter
Senator Kit Bond (MO)
Senator Claire McCaskill (MO)
Congressman Roy Blunt (MO)
Governor Rick Perry (TIC)
Attorney General Greg Abbott (TX)
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison (TX)
Senator John Comyn (TX)
Congressman John Boozman (AR)
Senator Mark Pryor (AR)
Senator Blanche Lincoln (AR)
Governor Mike Beebe (AR)
Bruce Campbell (AR)
Representative Kay Hopper (AR)
Representative John Burris (AR)
Senator Randy Laverty (AR)
Senator John Key (AR)
RMR 000115
Representative Roy Ragland (AR)
Chief Justice Jim Hannah (AR)
Justice Don Corbin {AR)
Justice Robert Brown (AR)
Justice Ron Sheffield (AR)
Justice Jim Gunter (AR)
Justice Paul Danielson (AR)
Justice Elana Wills (AR)
Hon. John Putman (AR)
Hon. Gary Isbell (AR)
Hon. Shawn Womack (AR)
Hon. Gordon Webb (AR)
U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services/Admin. For Children & Families
Office of Child Support Enforcement: Administrator Dan McDonald (AR)
Oprah Winfrey
Dr. Phil McGraw
RMR 000116
May 3, 2010
State ofTexas Comptroller
Judiciary Section
Attn: Leonard Higgins
P.O. Box 13528
Austin, TX 78711-3528
Re: Steven Chartes Phillips
SSN:-
To Whom it may Concern,
This document Is my effort to detail the events and a time period that have created a child
support payment that is severely in a state of arrears, and owed by the state ofTexas.
Beginning with the years otlll and - two children were born to Steven and !llvseff. (see
two attached documents) Our marriage ended In 1978 (see the attached divorce decree).
Our second child was born in , out of wedlock. The divorce decree acknowledges one child
for a child support orde
Here, I must acknowledge and point out that there Is no child support order for the second
child. Steven and I were not at odds with each other prior to his incarceration, so he just paid
to me cash that I might need. We had no reason to believe that he would soon be In prison for
the rest of the childs young life.
When the children were ages 6 and 3, their father, Steven Chartes Phillips wa_s wrongfully
incarcerated for twenty-six years in the state of Texas. He was found innocent due to DNA
testing and released In late 2008.
During that time, both the state of Texas and the state of Arkansas, in reference to child
support, were unable to assist with child support for prisoners. However, child support cases
were opened with the Child Support Enforcement Unit of Arkansas for both children. A total of
$220 was paid In 1997 on one case. (see attached payment history documents) This amount
will show as a ~uctlon within my calculations as to what is due.
Once the children became 18, I had given up hope. The children wol"!dered if the nightmare
would be over and their father would ever be free. Please, keep !" mind this incarceration
covers a span of 26 long years. So, I did not keep receipts, medical bill receipts, dental bills,
pharmacy bills, health insurance costs, education, etc. I did not keep the child support cases
open, I did not petition the courts to increase child support order to keep up with the changing
1
RMR 000117
,.
economy (there wasn't any child support).
Furthermore, and definately the most frustrating issue of all ls that I did not have an order of
child support set up before Steven became entangled in the terrible web of the Texas prison
system. Both our hands were tied. Thank God he never gave up on proving his innocence.
My sincere effort has been put Into arriving at a reasonable amount owed. and that it reflects a
modest amount owed to these children by the state of Texas, accruing during the period of tme
that their father was wrongfully imprisoned. ·
Originally, I had attempted to arrive at a total by multiplying a dollar amount for each child. I
now realize that the most common way to come to a more suitable amount ls to look at the
amount paid each month for two children. I have looked at child support charts that go back as
far as 1990.
I realize that the child support for - a t e s that only $100 per month was ordered
to be paid. Steven was In the mil~years old, and I thought $100 a month was a
lot of money.
So, what I have done is this, I begin with the year 1982 and end with the year 1997. 1997 being
the year that the second child turned 18. Every third year I increase the amount of child
support, as I would have done had I had the opportunity to go before a judge and ask for an
alteration In the payment because of Steven's increased earnings, cost of living adjustments,
etc.
1982-1985 is 3 years 36 months @ $500 per month = $18,000 (two children)
1985~1988 is 3 years 36 months @ $650 per month = $23,400 (two children)
1988-1992 Is 3 years 36 months @ $800 per month = $28,800 (two children)
1992-1994 is 2 years 24 months @ $900 per month = $21,600 (two children)
1994-1997 is 3 years 36 months @ $575 per month = $20.700 (one child)
$ 112,500 sub- total
1997 payments made total $220 - 220
$112,280 total due
As I stated earlier, I did not keep 15 years worth of receipts or bills, etc. but one could etlmate
that over that period of time one could expect to spend approximately $8,000 per child on
health care, dental and orthodontia·.
At last, that brings the final total to $128,280.
My greatest hope is that you will not hesitate. This money is for two very special young adults
who did not deserve to be so wronfully deprived of the financial and emotional support of their
father. These children are still •counting on me• to •see it through•, and I am counting on you
to take positive action with this letter and the attached documents.
Please, feel free to contact me at any time.
2
RMR 000118
' I '
Thanking you in Advance,
Cheryl Sue Macumber
3
RMR 000119
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RMR 000120
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TEXAS COMPT RO LLE R IJ( PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
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August 23, 2010
Ms. Cheryl Sue Macumber
c PY
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.
Re: Steven Phillips Wrongful Imprisonment Claim
Dear Ms . Macumber:
Our office is in receipt of your lelter dated August 12, 20 10, addressed to Ms. Combs. It has bee1l
referred to the Judiciary Section for response on behalf of the agency. In your letter, you request
assistance with obtnining compensation for child support incurred during the wrongful
imprisonment of Mr. Steven Phillips.
Under Section l03.052(a)(2), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Co ievt.. /w Utr"2-
/Jrt/4-'??-K,' If ``F £1-1 C~x /t()Ylf3" r
/l/ 0 ~7PI-- 762 S.W.2d 667, 669-670 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, no
pct.); Wallace County Water Control and Improvement v. Abendorth,
142 Tex. 320, 322-23 (Tex. 1944).
furthermore, the Comptroller is statutorily obligated to make annuity payments under
Chapter 103 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and the Comptroller's statutory authority to
withhold payments is also governed by the Government Code. The Comptroller's authority to withhold
payments does not include the authority to withhold payment in response to a private child support lien.
Tex. Gov't Code Ann.§ 403.055.
However, based on the contents of your letter, it appears that your client is seeking payment for
past-due child support from Steven Phillips, who receives compensation for time spent wrongfully
imprisoned pursuant to Chapter 103 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Please be advised
that in addition to annuities paid to wrongfully imprisoned individuals, Chapter 103 also provides a
mechanism for the payment of certain child support obligations. Section 103.052(a)(2) permits payment
to be made by the Comptroller to the state disbursement unit for distribution to a child support obligee
for child support that became due and interest on child support arreagcs that accrued during the time the
wrongfully imprisoned individual was in prison.
POST OFHO: Box 12548, AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711-2548 TEL: (512)463-2100 wrn: WWW.TEXASATTORNEYGENERAL.GOV
An Equal Employme/lf Opportunity Employer· Pril//ei/ 011 Recydetl Paper
RMR 000146
Steven Sinkin
Sinkin Law Firm
.June 3, 20.13
Page 2
To be able to make such payments, the Comptroller must receive sufficient information, such as
the information required by Section 103.05l(a)(6), to accurately detennine the amount of compensation
owed to a child support obligee. Once the Comptroller verifies that amount with the child support
service provider of the state from which the divorce decree was issued, the Comptroller is able to issue a
lump-sum payment pursuant to Section 103.052(c). Section 103.052(c), requires that any compensation
for child support payments that Mr. Phillips is owed, be paid on his behalf to the state disbursement unit
for distribution to the obligee under the child support order.
Feel free to contact me if you would like to discuss this procedure in greater detail.
Sincerely,
~12~
Erika R. Sams, Assistant Attorney General
Financial Litigation, Tax, and Charitable Trusts
Division
Telephone: 512-475-2952
Facsimile: 512-477-2348
Erika.Sams@texasattorneygeneral.gov
Attorney for Susan Combs, Comptroller of Public
Accounts.for the State o.fTexas
ERS:lje
Cc: Client
POST OFFICE Box 12548, A llSTIN, TEXAS 78711-2548 TEL: (512)463-2100 WEB: WWW .TEXASA'ITOl!Nl•:YGENEl!AI..(;()y
!111 Eq1111/ Employment Opportunity Employer· Printed 011 Recycled Paper
RMR 000147
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uonr1a Kay 1Vl£K1nney
District Clerk Bexar County
FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET
Date: JULY 2, 2013
IA1t I Al llF"'l I\ r-"'"''.11. r-..-..-
v.
1 1..1"\Urv-\ CJ..JVVf-\KU;:)
Fax#: 512-477-2348
From: ROSANNE MEDELLIN
District Clerk's Office
Recording Department
Tel: (210) 335-2577 Fax #: (210) 335-0536
Page 1 of 5 including coversheet
Comments: ORDER ON CASE#2013~CI-08709
This Information in this facslm!le Is privileged and confidential and intended only for the use of the above named recipient, their
agent or someone designated by recipient to represent recipient. Dissemination. distribution or copying of this/these dowm~nts is
pror11b1teci without perm1ss1on or me recipient. Ir you have received this transmission In error, please notify sender at above Tel
number and please retLJrn this miss-received transmission to the address below via the U.S. Postal Service.
Paul Elizondo Tower, 101 W. Nueva, Suite 217, San Antonio, Texas 78205
www.bexar.org/ de
RMR 000148
H8tJ\13S3Cl
No. :w1:H..:1-os109
l n the Interest § In the District Court
§
§ 438'h Judicial District
§
§ Bexar County, Texas
Order· Regtstering Judgment Uuder UIFSA aud on Arrears
On June 28, 2013, came on to be heard this c3se all matters of law and fact were submitted
to.the Court. The Court finds it has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this case. All
perSons enticied to notice were properly notified. A record of the argumonts and evidence was made.
The Court finds that on or about May 30, 2013, Steven Phillips was duly and properly served
with process in this cause, that the return has beoo on file for over ten (I 0) days, tht1t Steven Phillips .
has not answered and has wholly made default.
The Court finds that on or about May30, 2013, Steven Phillips was served via certified mail,
return receipt requested, and regular mail the Notice of Applicntion for Judicial Writ of Withholding.
A verified morion to stay was not filed within ten days by Steven Phillips.
. 1T IS ORDERED that the "Decree of DivoJce" issued by the Chancery Court of Boone
County, Arkansas on Febr0ary 7, 1978 and filed in this cause be and is registered and is a fi nal
judgment of this Court und.er the provisions of the lh1ifonn Interstate Family Support Act.
n lS ORDERED that Cheryl Macumber is granted and rendered an order for child support
o.rrearages, including accrued interest again~! Steven Philljps In the amount of $304,861.74 as of
June 28th, 20 \ 3, the date ofrendition of this judgment, such judgment bearing interest at I0 percent
interest compounded :mnually until the date the judgment is pajd, and is rendered on June 28, 2013.
Attorney's Fees
r 1· 18 OROE llED that a judgment for attom~y' s fees of$30,400.00 is taxed as costs against
90/G0 3:)'Vd
Steven Phiiiips, and Stever• Phillips i:s ORDERED to pioted of rapo in Dallas, TX and sentenced to
30 years in prison. He was later exonerated on October 1, 2008. As a part ofhls compensation
by the Stare ofTexas for those years lost due to no fault of his own, he receives child snpport
compensation benefits.
5. On May 22, 2013, Ms. Macumber filed a petition to register the 1978 Arkansas judgment
iii Texas. Citation was issued, sen;ed via certified mail and Mr. Phillips do not answer. This
Court signed a no-answer default judgment on June 28, 2013. Mr. Phillips now files this
Motion for New t rlaL
6. Respondent attaches affidavits to this rn.otion as Exhibits A-B to establish facts not
1:1pparent from the record and incorporates them by reference.
C. Service of Citation Was Defective
7. ·If~a comt signs a default judgment against a respondent who was not properly served, the
respondent is deprived of due process. See Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc.,
485 U.S. 80, 86-
87 (198.8); LBL Oil Co. v. Int '/ Power Servs., inc.,
777 S.W.2d 390, 390-91(Tex.1989).
· 8. Defects in citation are fatal and a no-answer default judgment cannot stand without strict
compliance of the rule.s of citation. Primate Consrr.. Inc. v. Silver,
884 S.W.2d 151, 1.52 (Tex.
1994).
9. Texas 'Rule of Civil Procedure 99(b)(l I) requires that the citation contain the address of
RMR 000154
08-06- 1 13 14: 54 FROM- Bx Co T-026 P0003/0007 F-029
the court clerk. The citation in this case does not contain the address of the court clerk. This
is a futal d ilnle·tautt judgment be overturned and a new trial
had.
l 0. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 99(b)(7) requires the citation $how the naines of the
par_ti~s. The citation did not correctly name the petitioner. The citation lists the petitioner as
Cheri S. Phillips and the petitioner's correct name is Cheryl Maccuruber.
D. Mistake or Accident
1L When a respondent does not file an answer because of a mistake or an accident, the
court should set aside the default judgment and grant a new trial if the respondent can meet the
reqt:iirements of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc.,
133 S.W.2d 124j 126 (Tex. 1939).
Craddock requires the respondent to do all of the following:
a. Demonstrate that the failute to file an answer was not intentional or the result of
conscious indifference, but was a mistake or an accident. Dolgencorp of Tex.,
Inc. v. Lerma,
288 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex. 2009); In re R.R.•
209 S.W.3d 112,
114 (fex. 2006); Estate of Pollack v. McMurrey,
858 S.W.2d 388, 391 (Tex.
1993);
Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126.
b. Set up a. meritorious defense.
Dolgencorp, 288 S.W.3d at 927; In re
lLR., 209
S.W.3d at 114; Ivy v. Carrell,
407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966);
Craddock~ 133
S.W.2d at 126. Respondent must allege facts that constitute a defense to
petitioner's cause of action and must support the allegations with affidavits or
other evidence that set up, not prove, a prima :facie defense.
Dolgencorp, 288
S.W.3d at 928; Estate
ofPollack. 858 S.W.2d at 392;
Ivy, 407 S.W.2d at 214.
c. Demonstrate that granting a new trial will not cause delay or otherwise injure
petitioner.
Dolgencorp, 288 S.W.3d at 925; In ~e
R.R., 209 S.W.3d at 114-15;
Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126.
12. The court should grant a new trial because respondent's failure to answer was not
intentional, but was accidental. Mr. Phillips received the certified mail from the court clerk but
set it aside, never opened it, and it became :mixed up with and lost among other legal paperwork
from other cases. Mr. Phillips di~ uot believe that he was being served with a lawsuit.
13. A1so, Mr. Phillips did not have reason to believe he was being sued because he had been
in talks with the Attorney General and the Texas Comptroller's Office about his outstanding
child support and believed it would be handled through the Attorney General's Office. Jn re
R.R.• 209 S.W.3d at 115 (Respondent failed to answer a termination suit because she had been
in conract with CPS concerning her child. This negated conscious indifference.). Had Mr.
Phllli ps known he was being sued he would have answered and appeared.
14. The court should grant a new trial because respondent has the following meritorious
defenses.
RMR 000155
08-06-'1 3 14:54 FROM - B~Co T-0 26 P0004/0007 F-029
a. The attorney fees awarded in tWs case are neither necessary nor rensonable. This Court
- - - - ----awa:rded1hei>etitimrer..n ltmney OWi' $30,000 in attorney fees, I he record lS void of auy
action taken by the petitioner other tJ1an filing a petition for registration and filing a default
judgment. This does not support an award that large.
b~ Becaw;c Mr. Phillips was wrongfully .incarcerated, this is a case of first impression and
precedent of this natlll•e should not be made without full considex"atlon by the Court.
c. The Petitioner filed this suit under UlFSA outside of the statute of limitations period.
The Petitioner wishes to enforce a child support otder by registering it under UlFSA. UlFSA
§ l59.604(b) of the Texas Family Code stat.es that the statute of limitations for a petition for
arrell!ases by registration of a child support order is the longer of Texas law or the issuing
state: 'fhls order was issued by Arkansas, which has a 5-year statute of limitations (see Ark.
Rev. S~t. Ann.§ 9-14-236 (2010)), and Texas has a 10-year statute of limitations. Tex:. Fam.
Code §i l 57.005(b). The Texas limitati011s period applies. This suit must be filed on or before
the child turns 28.
· The Arkansas order was issued in 1978 nnd name`` the child of the maniage.
Therefore the latest conceivable date tWs suit 9ould be---~ 2006. This suit was not
filed witil 2013. This suit was filed outside the statute of HmU.ations period. Limitation~ is a
meritorious defense.
14. the court should grant a new trial because a new trial will not cause delay or otherwise
injure petitioner. Respondent is ready for trial and willing to reimburse petitioner for all
. reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the default judgment.
E. Prayer
IS. Respondent prays this Court set this Motion for a hearing. Respondent further pr-ays
that i11 the interest of j ustlce and fairness> the court to grant a new trial.
Respectfully Submitted,
STICKELS AND ASSOCIATES, P.C.
7/2
Tim Robinson, J.D.
SBN 24069040
770 N. Fielder Rd.
Arlington, TX 76012
Phone: 817-479-9282
Fax: 817-622-8071
ti..tn.robinson@stickelslaw.com
RMR000156
OB-06- 1 13 14: 54 FROM- Bx Co T-02~ P0005/0007 F-029
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
. I hei·eby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoillg Motion was served by
facsimile to all known counsel record on the -2.!?/- day of~ 2013.
' r-?fo
Tim Robinson
RMR 000157
OB-06-'13 14:54 FRO M- BxCo T-026 P0006/0007 F-029
'f-~1-t? /
·'·. ~ :) .'·
NCP Name:: STEYEN PHILLIPS
+-``--P~1:nrn....-~-f"1:lmwn:-.llT.ll'"'77.m'lJrR
. . 0
•. ~ ~!.
. ~ ``·;t. 'e
I
I ~ '9". 'eY. (° f,/!
f . ;Q " ;,.(.: ('\ tf;>
IN THB INTEREST OF ; § IN THE 43gTH JU 1§1:.~ay;ocytJrf(ICTION
\
3. This Court has continuingjurlsdic~ion of the children the subject of this suit becaust-ofprior proceedings.
ClllLDREN
4. The following chllc;I is the sabj~ct of this suit:
Name ·f Sn DOB Birthplace
'i' p -
HARRISON, AR
No property, other than personal effects, ls owned by any child the subject of this suit.
' PERSONS ENTITLED TO NOTICE
5. The mother of tho child is cikRYL MACUMBER. The ATTORNEY OENBRAL will serve CHERYL.
. MACJMBER with this pleading, by an~ through her attomey of record, pursuant to Rule 21a, Texas Rules of Civil
Procedur.111.
6. The father of the child is STEYEN PHILLIPS. The AlTO~EY GENERAL will serve STEVEN PHILLIPS with
thi8 pleading) by ~nd through his attorney of record, pursuant to Rule 2la, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
. PRAYER
The ATTORNBY GENERAL prays that tho Court grnnt nil relief requested herein. TI1e ATTORNBY
_JENERAL'prays for general relief. ,
,~
~ .......
1 Document scanned as
filed.
RMR 000158
OB-06- 13 14:54
1
FRO~- BxCo T-026 P0007/0007 F-029
Respectfully submjtted,
Greg Abbott
Attorney General of Texas
Daniel T. Hodge 1
First Assistant Attorney General
~
Randolph V. Gonzalez - SBN: 08131200
-
Melissa Ramos Munoz- S:SN: 00786186
Attorney of Record
Child Support Division
C!ffLD SUPPORT UNIT 0201
J460 NORTHEAST PARKWAY
SAN ANTONIO TX 78218
Telephone No. 210-804·6416:
Fax No. 2.10-930~3625 ·
CERTlFICATE OF Sl!;RVlCE
l oertify~at
true.and correcfcopy of the foregoing has been served on the below listed parties or their
representatives su tto te 2 la, T.~xas Rules of Civil Procedure, on the 2911' day of July, 2013.
. ~
RANDOLPH V. GONZALEZ ;;
Attorney ofRecord
Party; Attorney for Party:
CHERYL MACVMBBR STEPHEN A SINKlN
Sinkin Law Fittn
105 W. Woodlawn Avenue
San Antonio, TX 78212
STEVEN PHILLIPS TIM ROBlNSON
Stickels and Associates, P.C.
770 N. FieldE:r Rd.
Arlington, TX 76012
RMR 000159
S U S A N
TEXAS COMPTROLLER oj PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
C 0 M B S P.O . Box 13528 • AUSTIN. TX 78711·3528
September 10, 2013
Mr. Steven C. Phillips
Dear Mr. Phillips:
In 2009, the Comptroller approved your application for wrongful imprisonment compensation filed under
Chapter 103 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code ("the Tim Cole Act"). In addition to
compensation for time spent wrongfully imprisoned, the Tim Cole Act also provides compensation to
wrongfully imprisoned individuals for child support payments owed by the person on whose imprisonment
the claim is based that became due and interest on child support arrearages that accrued during the time
served in prison but were not paid. As a part of your 2009 application, you sought compensation for child
support owed to Ms..Cheryl Macumb~r.
In 2009, the Comptroller was unable to satisfy your claim for Ms. Macumber's child support because the
Comptroller did not have sufficient information to detennine the amount owed. In addition, Section
103.052(c) requires that child support payments under the Tim Cole Act be made through the state
disbursement unit, and the Arkansas state disbursement unit was unwilling to accept Ms. Macumber's
payment because they had no records of child support owed. Now, in light of new information and the
registration of the child support order in Texas, which permits the Texas state disbursement unit to distribute
the payment to Ms. Macumber, the Comptroller can satisfy your administrative claim and pay to Ms.
Macumber, via the Texas state disbursement unit, amounts payable under Section 103.052(a)(2) of the Tim
Cole Act.
The Comptroller has determined that $18,593.23 is payable under Section i03.052(a)(2) of the Tim Cole Act
to Ms. Macumber. The attached spreadsheet details the calculation of this amount. The payment will be
paid on your behalf in a Jump-sum payment to the Texas state disbursement unit for distribution to Ms.
Macumber. Please be advised that this amount of $18,593.23 in past due child support and interest (which
includes all interest that is due) is the proper amount of child support that has been calculated in accordance
with appropriate Jaw, and is the only amount that the Comptroller is statutorily authorized to pay. Any other
amounts ordered to be paid by you to Ms. Macumber are your obligation to pay or dispute.
Pursuant to Section 103 .051(d) of the T im Cole Act, you have 30 days in which you may file an application
to cure. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact the Comptroller's Judiciary
Section by e-mail at Jeonard.higgins @cpa.state.tx .us or by phone at 1-800-531 -5441, extension 6-6100.
s~
LValdif~t-
Compuoller's Judiciary Section
cc: Tim Robinson
RMR000160
PHILLIPS-MACUMBER-Child Supp Cale (final)
monthly EOM Principal EOM EOM EOM
support principal that accrues interest interest arrears
balance interest accrual balance total NOTES:
$100.00 $0.00 $100.00 Payment Due Date• 14th of month
$200.00 $0.00 $200.00
$300.00 $0.00 $300.00
$400.00 $0.00 $400.00
$500.00 $0.00 $500.00
$600.00 $0.00 $600.00
$700.00 $0.00 $700.00
$800.00 $0.00 $800.00
$900.00 $0.00 $900.00
$1,000.00 $0.00 $1,000.00
$1,100.00 $0.00 $1,100.00
$1,200.00 $0.00 $1,200.00
$1,300.00 $0.00 $1,300.00
$1,400.00 $0.00 $1,400.00
$1,500.00 $0.00 $1,500.00
$1,600.00 $0.00 $1,600.00
$1,700.00 $0.00 $1,700.00
$1,800.00 $0.00 $1,800.00
$1,900.00 $0.00 $1,900.00
$2,000.00 $0.00 $2,000.00
$2,100.00 $0.00 $2,100.00
$2,200.00 $0.00 $2,200.00
$2,300.00 $0.00 $2,300.00
$2,400.00 $0.00 $2,400.00
$2,500.00 $0.00 $2,500.00
$2,600.00 $0.00 $2,600.00
$2,700.00 $0.00 $2,700.00
$2,800.00 $0.00 $2,800.00
$2,900.00 $0.00 $2,900.00
$3,000.00 $0.00 $3,000.00
$3,100.00 $0.00 $3,100.00
$3,200.00 $0.00 $3,200.00
$3,300.00 so.co $3,300.00
$3,400.00 $0.00 $3,400.00
$3,500.00 $0.00 $3,500.00
$3,600.00 $0.00 $3,600.00
$3,700.00 $0.00 $3,700.00
$3,800.00 $0.00 $3,800.00
$3,900.00 $0.00 $3,900.00
$4,000.00 $0.00 $4,000.00
$4,100.00 $0.00 $4,100.00
$4,200.00 $0.00 $4,200.00
$4,300.00 $0.00 $4,300.00
$4,400.00 $0.00 $4,400.00
$4,500.00 $0.00 $4,500.00
$4,600.00 $0.00 $4,600.00
$4,700.00 $0.00 $4,700.00
$4,800.00 $0.00 $4,800.00
$4,900.00 $0.00 $4,900.00
$5,000.00 $0.00 $5,000.00
$5,100.00 $0.00 $5,100.00
$5,200.00 $0.00 $5,200.00
$5,300.00 $0.00 $5,300.00
$5,400.00 $0.00 $5,400.00
$5,500.00 $0.00 $5,500.00
$5,600.00 $0.00 $5,600.00
$5,700.00 $0.00 $5,700.00
$5,800.00 $0.00 $5,800.00
$5,900.00 $0.00 $5,900.00
$6,000.00 $0.00 $6,000.00
$6,100.00 $0.00 $6,100.00
$6,200.00 $0.00 $6,200.00
$6,300.00 $0.00 $6,300.00
$6,400.00 $0.00 $6,400.00
$6,500.00 $0.00 $6,500.00
$6,600.00 $0.00 $6,600.00
$6,700.00 $0.00 $6,700.00
$6,800.00 $0.00 $6,800.00
$6,900.00 $0.00 $5,900.00
OAG Confldentlal 9/9/2013 Page 1
RMR 000161
PHILLIPS-MACUMBER--Child Supp Cale - (final)
$7,000.00 $0.00 $7,000.00
$7,100.00 $0.00 $7,100.00
$7,200.00 $0.00 $7,200.00
$7,300.00 so.oo $7,300.00
$7,400.00 so.oo $7,400.00
$7,500.00 $0.00 $7,500.00
$7,600.00 so.oo $7,600.00 Unless otherwise indicated,
$7,700.00 $0.00 $7, 700.00 EOM interest entry for each line
$7,800.00 $0.00 $7,800.00 represents interest accruals from
$7,900.00 $0.00 $7,900.00 15th of previous month through
$8,000.00 $0.00 $8,000.00 date in Column A.
$8,100.00 $0.00 $8,100.00
$8,200.00 s100.oo·' $0.00 $8,200.00
$8,300.00 $0.83 $8,300.83 one month's interest on 3/14 accrual
$8,400.00 $2.50 $8,402.50 one month's interest on 3/14 and 4/14
$8,500.00 $400.00 $5.00 $8,505.00 etc.
$8,600.00 $500.00 $8.33 $8,608.33
$8,700.00 $600.00 $12.50 $8,712.50
$8,800.00 $700.00" $17.50 $8,817.50
$8,900.00 $800.00 $23.33 $8,923.33
$9,000.00 $30.00 $9,030.00
$9,100.00 $37.50 $9,137.50
$9,200.00 $45.83 $9,245.83
$9,300.00 $55.00 $9,355.00
$9,400.00 $65.00 $9,465.00
$9,500.00 $75.83 $9,575.83
$9,600.00 $87.50 $9,687.50
$9,700.00 $1,600.00 $100.00 $9,800.00
$9,800.00 $1,700.00 $113.33 $9,913.33
$9,900.00 $1,800.00 $127.50 $10,027.50
$10,000.00 $1,900.00 $142.50 $10,142.50
$10,100.00 $2.000.00 $158.33 $10,258.33
$10,200.00 $2,100.00 $175.00 $10,375.00
$10,300.00 $2,200.00 $192.50 $10,492.50
$10,400.00 $2,300.00 $210.83 $10,610.83
$10,500.00 $2,400.00 $230.00 $10,730.00
$10,600.00 $2,500.00 $250.00 $10,850.00
$10,700.00 $2,600.00 $270.83 $10,970.83
$10,800.00 $2,700.00 $292.50 $11,092.50
$10,900.00 $2,800.00 $315.00 $11,215.00
$11,000.00 $338.33 $11,338.33
$11,100.00 $362.50 $11,462.50
$11,200.00 $387.50 $11,587.50
$11,300.00 $413.33 $11,713.33
$11,400.00 $440.00 $11,840.00
$11,500.00 $467.50 $11,967.50
$11,600.00 $495.83 $12,095.83
$11,700.00 $525.00 $12,225.00
$11,800.00 $555.00 $12,355.00
$11,900.00 $585.83 $12,485.83
$12,000.00 $617.50 $12,617.50
$12,100.00 $650.00 $12,750.00
$12,200.00 $683.33 $12,883.33
$12,300.00 $717.50 $13,017.50
$12,400.00 $752.50 $13,152.50
$12,500.00 $788.33 $13,288.33
$12,600.00 $825.00 $13,425.00
$12,700.00 $862.50 $13,562.50
$12,800.00 $900.83 $13,700.83
$12,900.00 $940.00 $13,840.00
$13,000.00 $980.00 $13,980.00
$13,100.00 $1,020.83 $14,120.83
$13,200.00 $1,062.50 $14,262.50
$13,300.00 $1,105.00 $14,405.00
$13,400.00 $1,148.33 $14,548.33
$13,500.00 $1,192.50 $14,692.50
$13,600.00 $1,237.50 $14,837.50
$13,700.00 $1,283.33 $14,983.33
$13,800.00 $1,330.00 $15,130.00
OAG COnfldentlal 9/9/2013 Page 2
RMR 000162
PHILLIPS-MACUM8 £11-Chlld Stralur of :Juhli.c J\cnnnde
U.Mftl lll'1"fJ9la u, au ,,...._.,NO.
0'18U 0001 901 - 1 1 IMCIOltUU 901
NYJNI Am.ICY• IU-40......l QINll.._LU • STAB ~
12 9.5 9 69 2 3
,., D81CTUJt naw P1Vl -....om T9!I DGUM1 tia.a... n
... Ul10e
TO TX STATE DISPUISfREJIT UNIT
NCPtSTEVEM CHARL!S PHILLIPS ID
CP• CltUYL MCUMle:I
PO IDlC 65'417
SAfll ANTOMJD, TX 7&265-9417
Special Collections SOU
PO Box 659417
San Antonio, TX 78265-9417
RMR 000164
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT
September 26, 2013
The Honorable Gloria Saldana Via Federal Express Overnight
438 111 Civil District Com1
100 Dolorosa, 211d Floor
San Antonio, Texas 78205
Re: Cheri S. Phillips v. Steven C. Phillips, Cause No. 2013CI08709
Dear Judge Saldana:
The Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas ("the Comptroller") hereby
advises the Court of a recent action taken by the Comptroller related to the issue of child support
and ce11ain arrearnges owed by Steven Phillips to Cheryl Macumber, the parties in the above-
referenced lawsuit. On September 10, 2013, the Comptroller granted Mr. Phillips' application for
child support payments and interest under the "Tim Cole Act." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code § 103.052(a)(2).
The Tim Cole Act gives the Comptroller the duty and the concomitant discretion to
determine the amount of compensation owed to the applicant for time spent wrongfully
imprisoned. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 103.051(b). Compensation includes "child support
payments owed by the person on whose imprisonment the claim is based that became due and
interest on child support arrearages that accrued during the time served in prison but were not
paid." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 103.052(a)(2). Review of the Comptroller's decision is
only available by mandamus to the Texas Supreme Court. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code§ 103.051(e).
The Comptroller determined that Mr. Phillips is entitled to child support compensation in
the total amount of $18,593 .23. This sum represents the amount of child support arrearages and
interest that accrued during Mr. Phillips' time spent in prison from June 4, 1982 to October 23,
1996 and again from May 14, 1997 to December 28, 2007. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code § 103.052(a)(2). To determine the amount owed under section 103.052(a)(2), the
Comptroller applied the relevant Arkansas laws that govern child support obligations, arrearages,
and interest. Tex. Fam. Code § 159.604. On September 11, 2013, the Comptroller issued a
warrant for $18,593.23 to the Texas state disbursement unit, as required by section l 03.052(c) of
the Tim Cole Act, to be distributed to Ms. Macumber.
Pos·1 OFFICE Box 125'18, AlJ!-iTJN, TEXAS 78711-2548 Tl::L (S12) 1!6)·2100 WEB WWW TEX.ASATTOHNEYGENERAL GOV
An ]·,'qua! J·:mployment Opporlm11ty Fmployer l'riuted w1 Necycled Fapc:1
RMR 000165
The Honorable Gloria Saldana
438111 Civil District Court
September 26, 2013
Page 2
Counsel for Mr. Phillips and Ms. Macumber made the Comptroller aware of the default
judgment in the above:...referenced lawsuit in which Mr. Phillips was ordered to pay $304,861.74
in child support arrearages, including accrued interest, to Ms. Macumber. Because the
Comptroller in fulfilling her statutory duty under the Tim Cole Act has determined the amount
due for child support obligations, arrearages, and interest, the Comptroller wanted to advise all
interested paiiies and the Court that the amount of $18,593.23 has been paid and is the only
8amount the Comptroller is statutorily authorized to pay.
The Comptroller is unaware of the precise calculation underlying the default judgment of
$304,861.74, other than the unchallenged representation by Ms. Macumber. This amount, if
properly due and owing, cannot, as explained above, be recovered under the Tim Cole Act.
Accordingly, any amounts ordered to be paid by Mr. Phillips under the Order Registering
Judgment under UIFSA on Anears, signed by this Court on June 28, 2013, are solely Mr.
Phillips' obligation.
For the Court's information, Mr. Phillips' monthly annuity payment for his time spent
wrongfully imprisoned is not subject to garnishment. Pursuant to the Order for Turnover Relief,
signed by this Court on July 30, 2013, those monthly payments are currently being sent to Tim
Robinson, counsel for Mr. Phillips.
Respectfully,
/' ' V.J
'lt.A/'fn-, fl. ,/~t'rvv·)
Erika R. Sams, Assistant Attorney General
Financial Litigation, Tax, and Charitable Trusts
Division
Telephone: 512-475-2952
Facsimile: 512-477-2348
Erika.Sams@texasattorneygeneral.gov
CC: Client
Steven Sinkin
Tim Robinson
P 0 ST 0 FF 1CE B 0 X. I ZS CJI ~
• ..,, / _J
CLAIMANT'S CERTIFICATION
1._ Steven Phillips ~ , do hereby certify that rhe amount requested is due and payable
pursuant to Chapter 103 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and I will immediately notify the Comptroller's Judiciary Section in writing
of an chan es or conditions which will di uar this ent.
Claimant Signature Date
````~ ``~ e . (J , 10 o ·1 I3
817-408-9777
Address/City/Slate/zip code
6204 Sherbert Drive North Richland Hills, TX
76180
I approve this request for payment and to the best of my knowledge this request for payment is true and correct This payment
· JOrnplies w ith Chapter 103 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
Approved by· Oate
sign i..
here'
RMR 000168
08- 2 4 - 2013 2:59 PM 16786 160181 1 8173834 832 Pg 2/9
Texas Department of Criminal Justice
Brad Livin9$ton
Executive Olrecror
September 15, 2009
Steven Charles Phillips
RE: Phillips, Steven Charles
Dear M!. Stone,
The files of this Agency have been reviewed en offender Stever. Charles Phillips,
pursuant to your request.
Offender Phillips was received into TDCJ custody on 2-22-1983 from Dallas County on eight 10-year
sentences, two-30-year sentences, and a 40-year sentence. Offender Phillips is charged with Aggravated
Assault (4cts.), Burglary of a Habitation (3cts.), Indecency W/Child, Aggravated Rape, and Aggravated
Sexual Abuse (2cts.) by the 2041h and 194th Judicial District Courts, under cause numbers
F&Z-82743-NKQ, F82-79130-JKQ, F82-86748-NKQ, F82-6&990-JKQ, F82-77699-QKQ,
F82-8705 l-JKQ, F82-79140..JKQ, FS.2-86866-NXNKQ, F82-77700-QKQ, F82-77162-NKMKQ,
F82-17161-N.KM. Offender Phllips is charged for offenses occurring on 5-15-1 982, 4-22-1982, and
5-14-1982, with sentencing ·on 6-1 1-1984, 8-24-1983, and 8-27-1 982. Offender Phillips was released
from TDCJ custody on 12-28-2007 on mandatory supervision.
On I0-27-2008 the Court of Criminal Appeals issued mandates on cause numbers F82-79 140-JKQ,
F82-86862008 WL 4417288 aggravated sexual abuse causes, sentenced to forty and thirty
Only the W estlaw citation is currently available. years' imprisonment, indecency with a child, sentenced to ten
years' imprisonment, burglary of a habitation, sentenced to
UNDER TX R RAP RULE 77-3, UNPUBLlSHED thirty years' imprisonment, and aggravated rape, sentenced
OPINIONS MAY NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY. to ten years' imprisonment. The Fifth Court of Appeals
affirmed his convictions for one of the aggravated sexual
OPINION abuse cases and the burglary of a habitation. Phillips v. State,
Do Not Publish No. 05-83-1058-CR (Tex.App.-Dallas, delivered October 26,
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. 1984) and Phillips v. State, No. 05-82-0I260-CR (Tex.App.-
Dallas, delivered January 4, 1984). Applicant pleaded guilty
Ex parte Steven Charles PHILLIPS, Applicant.
to the other causes and no appeal was taken from those.
Nos. AP-76010, AP-76013, AP-76011,
Applicant contends that he has newly discovered evidence
AP-76014, AP-76012. I Oct. 1, 2008.
that he is actually innocent of these offenses. The trial court
On Applications for Writs of Habeas Corpus, Cause Nos. has determined that no rational jury would have convicted
F82-77700-Q; F82-77162-Q; F82-79140-Q; F82-86866-Q, Applicant in light of the new evidence, which was previously
In the 204th District Court from Dallas County and Cause unavailable to Applicant. The evidence, obtained pursuant to
No. F82-77161-M, In the 194th District Court from Dallas post-conviction DNA testing and investigation, indicates that
County. it was another individual, and not Applicant, who committed
at least one of these offenses. Applicant is entitled to relief. Ex
Attorneys and Law Firms parte Elizondo,
947 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).
Robert Udashen, for Steven Charles Phillips.
Reliefis granted. The judgments in Cause Nos. F82-77700-Q;
F82-77162-Q; F82-79140-Q and F82-86866-Q in the 204th
Opinion
District Court of Dallas County and Cause No. F82-77161-M
in the l 94th District Court of Dallas County are set aside, and
OPINION Applicant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Dallas
County to answer the charges against him.
PERCURIAM.
* 1 Pursuant to the provisions of Article I 1.07 of the Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the clerk of the trial of Criminal Justice-Correctional Institutions Division and
court transmitted to this Court these applications for writs Parole Division.
of habeas corpus. Ex parte Young,
418 S.W.2d 824,
End of Document © 2013 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original US. Government Works.
'
:
-. _,. '.··
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RMR 000170
RMR 000171
No. 2013-Cl·08709
- : .... ;;-:--_t· "'
Jn the I ntcrest § In th e Di``_ictG<>.u_r;t:,:~.
§ ".,I . ' ,.)(°'
.~u~,i~i·~\~.isf\:i·~·' :>:~: '~
0
§ 438'
§ ,, · ·-: " .... ·· . . •• , r;
Minor C hild § Bexai-'1Jo'11nt:y~ -fcxis .: `` u
,
.. ..·; : ..~", --::-\ ..· ..\``
Order Registering Judgment Under UlFSA and on Ar rears .,h -·.. --·"· ,.$
' . '{-,.... :\. •:-.:·:·~·~59"
On June 28, 2013, came on to be heard this case all matters of law and fact were submitted
to the Court . The Court finds it has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of this case. All
persons entitled to notice were properly noti fied. A record of the arguments and evidence was made.
The Court finds that on or about May 30, 2013, Steven Phillips was duly ar:d properly served
with process in this cause, that the return has been on fi le for over ten (I 0) days, that Steven Phillips
has not answered and has wholly made default.
The Court finds that on or about May30, 201 3, Steven Phillips was served via certi fied mail,
return receipt requested, and regu lar mail the Noti ce of Application for Judicial Writ of Withholding.
A veri fied motion to stay was not fi led within ten days by Steven Phillips.
~/'' IT IS 0 RD ERED that the "Decree of Divorce" issued by the Chancery Court of Boone
2 County, Arkansas on February 7, I 978 and filed in this cause be and is registered and is a final
8
/ judgment of this Cou11 under the provisions of the Unifonn Interstate Family Support Act.
~
(:)
l IT IS ORDERED that C h eryl Macum ber is granted and rendered an order for child support
3
v arrcarages, including accrue-S~.-
';~r•.x
----=---
November 2 1, 2013
Mr. Tim Robinson
Attorney at Law
6204 Sherbert Drive
North Richland Hills, Texas 76180
RE: Steven Phillips Wrongful Imprisonment Child Support Claim - Application to Cure
Dear Mr. Robinson:
The Comptroller has completed the review of the application to cure that you submitted on
behalf of your client, Mr. Steven Phillips. The application to cure was submitted on October 11,
2013, pursuant to Section 103.051(d) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.§§ 103.001-.154 ("the Tim Cole Act"). After careful
consideration of the application to cure, the supporting documentation including the Order
Registering Judgment under UIFSA and on Arrears issued by the 438th Judicial District Court of
1
Bexar County on June 28, 2013 and the schedule of child support arrearages, and contemplation
of the tenns and provisions of the Tim Cole Act, the Comptroller stands by the determination
conveyed in our letter to Mr. Phillips dated September 10, 2013.
The Tim Cole Act gives the Comptroller the duty and the concomitant discretion to determine
the amount of compensation owed to the applicant for time spent wrongfully imprisoned. 2
Compensation includes "child support payments owed by the person on whose imprisonment the
claim is based that became due and interesl on child support arrearages lhat accrued during the
time served in prison but were not paid."3
The Comptroller determined that Mr. Phillips is entitled to child support compensation in the
total amount of $18,593.23 payable to Ms. Macumber. This sum represents the amount of child
support arrearages and interest that accrued during Mr. Phillips's time spent in prison from June
4
4, 1982 to October 23, 1996 and again from May 14. 1997 to December28, 2007. The amount
of child support arrearages and interest lhat accrued is based on the Decree of Divorce, signed on
February 7, 1978, in Boone County, Arkansas. The Decree of Divorce ordered Mr. ~o
- d support to Ms. Macumber for the support of their child-
- who was born on o determine the amount owed
1
Please note that the Order Registering Judgment does not address the amount payable under the Tim Cole Act
because it is directed to the total amount of child support allegedly owed by Mr. Phillips to Ms. Macumber.
2
See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ I 03.05 l(b).
3
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § l03.052(aX2).
4
See
id.
RMR 000187
Mr. Tim Robinson
November21, 2013
Page2
under Section 103.052(a)(2) of the Tim Cole Act, the Comptroller applied the relevant Arkansas
laws that govern child support obligations, arrearages, and interest. 5 To calculate the amount of
child support arrearages and interest that accrned, the Comptroller first determined that: (1) Mr.
Phillips'. obli ation to pay current child support payments terminated bg operation of law upon
the date should have graduated from high school, May of 1994; (2) none of Mr.
Phillips s c i support payments that became due prior to March 7, l 989 accrued interest, and
all of Mr. Phillips's child support payments that became due after March 7, 1989 accrued interest
at the statutory rate of ten percent (10%) per annum; 7 (3) the ten percent (10%) interest rate in
this case should be calculated as simple inter~rest on child support arrearages
9
stopped accruing when - turned 23 on-
Based upon these principles and applicable law, the Comptroller determined that Mr. Phillips
was entitled to child support compensation in the total amount of $18,593.23 payable to Ms.
Macumber. Therefore, on September 11, 2013, the Comptroller issued a warrant for $18,593.23
to the Texas state disbursement unit, as required by Section 103 .052(c) of the Tim Cole Act, to
be distributed to Ms. Macumber. The amount of $18,593.23 in past due child support and
interest is the proper amount of child support that was calculated in accordance with Arkansas
law, and is the only amoW1t that the Comptroller is statutorily authorized to pay. Any other
amounts ordered to be paid by Mr. Phillips to Ms. Macumber are his obligation to pay or dispute.
Rather than the $ 1.8,593.23 in child support arrearages and interest determined to be payable
w1der Section l03.052(a)(2) of the Tim Cole Act, Mr. Phillips's application to cure seeks from
the Comptroller child support arrearages and interest totaling over $304,739.57. This
$304,739.57 amoW1t appears to be determined based on a chart of alleged child support
arrearages and interest submitted by Ms. Macumber to the Bexar County District Court to
procure an "Order Registering Judgment under UIFSA on Arrears," signed on June 28, 2013 in
Cause No. 2013-CI-08709 in the 438th Judicial District Court of Bexar County. The chart is
labeled "Child Support Paymnets [sic] Monthly Principal and Interest - Compounded Monthly."
The calculation in this chart is incorrect because: ( 1) it compounds the interest when a simple
interest rate is required; (2) it begins interest accrual prior to March 7, 1989, the effective date of
Act 383 of Arkansas, 1989 Regular Session, which authorized the accrual of interest on child
support arre~t continues to calculate interest accruals beyond
birthday on - in contravention of Ark. Code. Ann.§ 9-14-236.
s See Tex. Fam. Code § 159.604.
6
See Ark. Code. Ann.§ 9-14-327; Ward v. Doss, '.36 1 Ark.153, Fn. l (2005); Mixon v. Mixon,
65 Ark. App. 240
( 1999); James v. James,
52 Ark. App. 29 ( l 996).
7
See Ark. Act 383 of 1989, Regular Session; Ark. Code. Ann. § l 6-65-1 14; Chism v. Phelps,
228 Ark. 936. 939
( 1958).
8
See First Nat'/ Bank in Mena v. Nowlin,
509 F.2d 872, 875-76 (81h Cir. 1975); see also In re SW Boston Norel
Venture, LLC,
479 B.R. 2 10, 224-25 (B.A.P. I" Cir. 2012); RFF Family P'ship. LP v. Link Dev., LLC.
2013 WL
450150, *8 (D.Mass. 2013); Grandoe Corp. v. Gander Mountain Co.,
2013 WL 3353927, *23 (D. Minn. 2013):
Barbosa v. Jastrzab,
2010 WL 2666947, *4-5 (N.D.N.Y. 2010): Imperial Casualty and hulemnity Co.. v. Bellini,
947 A.2d 886, 894-95 (R.I. 2008); Edwards v. Campbell,
369 S.C. 572, 577-79 (2006).
9
See Ark. Code. Ann.§ 9-14-236.
RMR000188
Mr. Tim Robinson
November 21, 2013
Page 3
Consequently, the Comptroller is unable to approve Mr. Phillips's application to cure, and stands
by the determination conveyed in our letter to Mr. Phillips dated September 10, 2013. If you
have any questions or need additional information, please contact the Comptroller's Judiciary
Section by e-mail at leonard.higgins@cpa.state.tx.us or by phone at 1-800-531-5441, extension
6-6100.
Leonard Higgins
Comptroller's Judiciary Section
RMR 000189
GLENN REGAR TEXAS COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS
January 7, 2015
Dear Mr. Phillips:
In 2009, the Comptroller approved your application for wrongful imprisonment
compensation filed under Chapter 103 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
("the Tim Cole Act"). In addition to compensation for time spent wrongfully imprisoned,
the Tim Cole Act also provides compensation to wrongfully imprisoned individuals for
child support payments owed by the person on whose imprisonment the claim is based
that became due and interest on child support arrearages that accrued during the time
served in prison but were not paid. As a part of your 2009 application, you sought
compensation for child support owed to Ms. Cheryl Macumber.
In 2009, the Comptroller was unable to satisfy your claim for Ms. Macumber' s child
support because the Comptroller did not have sufficient information to determine the
amount owed. In addition, Section 103.052(c) requires that child support payments under
the Tim Cole Act be made through the state disbursement unit, and the Arkansas state
disbursement unit was unwilling to accept Ms. Macumber's payment because they had no
records of child support owed. In 2013, in light of new information and the registration
of the child support order in Texas, which permits the Texas state disbursement unit to
distribute the payment to Ms. Macumber, the Comptroller determined that $18,593.23
was payable under Section 103.052(a)(2) of the Tim Cole Act to Ms. Macumber. This
payment was paid on your behalf in a lump-sum payment to the Texas state disbursement
unit for distribution to Ms. Macumber.
In determining the $18,593.23 payment amount, the Comptroller included a calculation
of simple interest of 10% per annum on all payments that became due after March 7,
1989, based on Arkansas Code section 9-14-233, which became effective on March 7,
1989 and provides that all child support that becomes due and remains unpaid shall
accrue 10% interest per annum. Now, after a subsequent review of the relevant law, the
Comptroller has determined that an additional payment of interest is appropriate.
Arkansas common law and constitution provide for the recovery of 6% simple interest on
payments that became due between June 4, 1982 and December 31, 1987, and Arkansas
Code section 9-12-309(c), which became effective at midnight December 31, 1987,
provides for the recovery of 10% simple interest on payments that became due between
January 1, 1988 and January l, 1999. As a result, the Comptroller has determined that a
total of $25,125.69 is payable under Section 103.052(a)(2) of the Tim Cole Act to Ms.
Comptrol ler. Texas.Gov
Mr. Steven C . Phillips
January 7, 2015
Page Two
Macumber. The attached spreadsheet details the calculation of this amount. Because the
Comptroller has already paid $18,593.23, an additional payment of $6,532.46 has been
made, for a total payment of $25,125.69.
The additional payment of $6,532.46 was paid on your behalf in a lump-sum payment to
the Texas state disbursement unit for distribution to Ms. Macumber. Please be advised
that the new total of $25,125.69 in past due child support and interest (which includes all
interest that is due) is the proper amount of child support that has been calculated in
accordance with appropriate law, and is the only amount that the Comptroller is
statutorily authorized to pay. Any other amounts ordered to be paid by you to Ms.
Macumber are your obligation to pay or dispute.
If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact the
Comptroller's Judiciary Section by e-mail at leonard.higgins@cpa.state.tx.us or by phone
at 1-800-531-5441, extension 6-6100.
Leonard Higgins
Comptroller's Judiciary Section
cc: Matthew F. Wymer
Comptrol ler.Texas.Gov RMR 00019 1
Phillips ‐ Macumber ‐ Child Support Calculation
monthly EOM EOM EOM EOM
support principal 10% int. 6% int. arrears total
date obligation payment balance balance balance NOTES:
06/04/82 EOM = "end of month"
06/14/82 $100.00 $100.00 $0.00 Payment Due Date = 14th of month
07/14/82 $100.00 $200.00 $0.00
08/14/82 $100.00 $300.00 $0.00 $0.50 $300.50 Unless otherwise indicated,
09/14/82 $100.00 $400.00 $0.00 $1.50 $401.50 EOM interest entry for each line
10/14/82 $100.00 $500.00 $0.00 $3.00 $503.00 represents interest accruals from
11/14/82 $100.00 $600.00 $0.00 $5.00 $605.00 15th of previous month through
12/14/82 $100.00 $700.00 $0.00 $7.50 $707.50 date in first column.
01/14/83 $100.00 $800.00 $0.00 $10.50 $810.50
02/14/83 $100.00 $900.00 $0.00 $14.00 $914.00
03/14/83 $100.00 $1,000.00 $0.00 $18.00 $1,018.00
04/14/83 $100.00 $1,100.00 $0.00 $22.50 $1,122.50
05/14/83 $100.00 $1,200.00 $0.00 $27.50 $1,227.50
06/14/83 $100.00 $1,300.00 $0.00 $33.00 $1,333.00
07/14/83 $100.00 $1,400.00 $0.00 $39.00 $1,439.00
08/14/83 $100.00 $1,500.00 $0.00 $45.50 $1,545.50
09/14/83 $100.00 $1,600.00 $0.00 $52.50 $1,652.50
10/14/83 $100.00 $1,700.00 $0.00 $60.00 $1,760.00
11/14/83 $100.00 $1,800.00 $0.00 $68.00 $1,868.00
12/14/83 $100.00 $1,900.00 $0.00 $76.50 $1,976.50
01/14/84 $100.00 $2,000.00 $0.00 $85.50 $2,085.50
02/14/84 $100.00 $2,100.00 $0.00 $95.00 $2,195.00
03/14/84 $100.00 $2,200.00 $0.00 $105.00 $2,305.00
04/14/84 $100.00 $2,300.00 $0.00 $115.50 $2,415.50
05/14/84 $100.00 $2,400.00 $0.00 $126.50 $2,526.50
06/14/84 $100.00 $2,500.00 $0.00 $138.00 $2,638.00
07/14/84 $100.00 $2,600.00 $0.00 $150.00 $2,750.00
08/14/84 $100.00 $2,700.00 $0.00 $162.50 $2,862.50
09/14/84 $100.00 $2,800.00 $0.00 $175.50 $2,975.50
10/14/84 $100.00 $2,900.00 $0.00 $189.00 $3,089.00
11/14/84 $100.00 $3,000.00 $0.00 $203.00 $3,203.00
12/14/84 $100.00 $3,100.00 $0.00 $217.50 $3,317.50
01/14/85 $100.00 $3,200.00 $0.00 $232.50 $3,432.50
02/14/85 $100.00 $3,300.00 $0.00 $248.00 $3,548.00
03/14/85 $100.00 $3,400.00 $0.00 $264.00 $3,664.00
04/14/85 $100.00 $3,500.00 $0.00 $280.50 $3,780.50
05/14/85 $100.00 $3,600.00 $0.00 $297.50 $3,897.50
06/14/85 $100.00 $3,700.00 $0.00 $315.00 $4,015.00
07/14/85 $100.00 $3,800.00 $0.00 $333.00 $4,133.00
08/14/85 $100.00 $3,900.00 $0.00 $351.50 $4,251.50
09/14/85 $100.00 $4,000.00 $0.00 $370.50 $4,370.50
10/14/85 $100.00 $4,100.00 $0.00 $390.00 $4,490.00
11/14/85 $100.00 $4,200.00 $0.00 $410.00 $4,610.00
12/14/85 $100.00 $4,300.00 $0.00 $430.50 $4,730.50
01/14/86 $100.00 $4,400.00 $0.00 $451.50 $4,851.50
02/14/86 $100.00 $4,500.00 $0.00 $473.00 $4,973.00
03/14/86 $100.00 $4,600.00 $0.00 $495.00 $5,095.00
04/14/86 $100.00 $4,700.00 $0.00 $517.50 $5,217.50
05/14/86 $100.00 $4,800.00 $0.00 $540.50 $5,340.50
06/14/86 $100.00 $4,900.00 $0.00 $564.00 $5,464.00
07/14/86 $100.00 $5,000.00 $0.00 $588.00 $5,588.00
08/14/86 $100.00 $5,100.00 $0.00 $612.50 $5,712.50
09/14/86 $100.00 $5,200.00 $0.00 $637.50 $5,837.50
10/14/86 $100.00 $5,300.00 $0.00 $663.00 $5,963.00
11/14/86 $100.00 $5,400.00 $0.00 $689.00 $6,089.00
12/14/86 $100.00 $5,500.00 $0.00 $715.50 $6,215.50
Page 1 RMR 000192
Phillips ‐ Macumber ‐ Child Support Calculation
01/14/87 $100.00 $5,600.00 $0.00 $742.50 $6,342.50
02/14/87 $100.00 $5,700.00 $0.00 $770.00 $6,470.00
03/14/87 $100.00 $5,800.00 $0.00 $798.00 $6,598.00
04/14/87 $100.00 $5,900.00 $0.00 $826.50 $6,726.50
05/14/87 $100.00 $6,000.00 $0.00 $855.50 $6,855.50
06/14/87 $100.00 $6,100.00 $0.00 $885.00 $6,985.00
07/14/87 $100.00 $6,200.00 $0.00 $915.00 $7,115.00
08/14/87 $100.00 $6,300.00 $0.00 $945.50 $7,245.50
09/14/87 $100.00 $6,400.00 $0.00 $976.50 $7,376.50
10/14/87 $100.00 $6,500.00 $0.00 $1,008.00 $7,508.00
11/14/87 $100.00 $6,600.00 $0.00 $1,040.00 $7,640.00
12/14/87 $100.00 $6,700.00 $0.00 $1,072.50 $7,772.50
01/14/88 $100.00 $6,800.00 $0.00 $1,105.50 $7,905.50 Ark. Code § 9‐12‐309 takes effect
02/14/88 $100.00 $6,900.00 $0.83 $1,138.50 $8,039.33
03/14/88 $100.00 $7,000.00 $2.50 $1,171.50 $8,174.00
04/14/88 $100.00 $7,100.00 $5.00 $1,204.50 $8,309.50
05/14/88 $100.00 $7,200.00 $8.33 $1,237.50 $8,445.83
06/14/88 $100.00 $7,300.00 $12.50 $1,270.50 $8,583.00
07/14/88 $100.00 $7,400.00 $17.50 $1,303.50 $8,721.00
08/14/88 $100.00 $7,500.00 $23.33 $1,336.50 $8,859.83
09/14/88 $100.00 $7,600.00 $30.00 $1,369.50 $8,999.50
10/14/88 $100.00 $7,700.00 $37.50 $1,402.50 $9,140.00
11/14/88 $100.00 $7,800.00 $45.83 $1,435.50 $9,281.33
12/14/88 $100.00 $7,900.00 $55.00 $1,468.50 $9,423.50
01/14/89 $100.00 $8,000.00 $65.00 $1,501.50 $9,566.50
02/14/89 $100.00 $8,100.00 $75.83 $1,534.50 $9,710.33
03/14/89 $100.00 $8,200.00 $11.67 $1,567.50 $9,779.17
04/14/89 $100.00 $8,300.00 $24.17 $1,600.50 $9,924.67
05/14/89 $100.00 $8,400.00 $37.50 $1,633.50 $10,071.00
06/14/89 $100.00 $8,500.00 $51.67 $1,666.50 $10,218.17
07/14/89 $100.00 $8,600.00 $66.67 $1,699.50 $10,366.17
08/14/89 $100.00 $8,700.00 $82.50 $1,732.50 $10,515.00
09/14/89 $100.00 $8,800.00 $99.17 $1,765.50 $10,664.67
10/14/89 $100.00 $8,900.00 $116.67 $1,798.50 $10,815.17
11/14/89 $100.00 $9,000.00 $135.00 $1,831.50 $10,966.50
12/14/89 $100.00 $9,100.00 $154.17 $1,864.50 $11,118.67
01/14/90 $100.00 $9,200.00 $174.17 $1,897.50 $11,271.67
02/14/90 $100.00 $9,300.00 $195.00 $1,930.50 $11,425.50
03/14/90 $100.00 $9,400.00 $216.67 $1,963.50 $11,580.17
04/14/90 $100.00 $9,500.00 $239.17 $1,996.50 $11,735.67
05/14/90 $100.00 $9,600.00 $262.50 $2,029.50 $11,892.00
06/14/90 $100.00 $9,700.00 $286.67 $2,062.50 $12,049.17
07/14/90 $100.00 $9,800.00 $311.67 $2,095.50 $12,207.17
08/14/90 $100.00 $9,900.00 $337.50 $2,128.50 $12,366.00
09/14/90 $100.00 $10,000.00 $364.17 $2,161.50 $12,525.67
10/14/90 $100.00 $10,100.00 $391.67 $2,194.50 $12,686.17
11/14/90 $100.00 $10,200.00 $420.00 $2,227.50 $12,847.50
12/14/90 $100.00 $10,300.00 $449.17 $2,260.50 $13,009.67
01/14/91 $100.00 $10,400.00 $479.17 $2,293.50 $13,172.67
02/14/91 $100.00 $10,500.00 $510.00 $2,326.50 $13,336.50
03/14/91 $100.00 $10,600.00 $541.67 $2,359.50 $13,501.17
04/14/91 $100.00 $10,700.00 $574.17 $2,392.50 $13,666.67
05/14/91 $100.00 $10,800.00 $607.50 $2,425.50 $13,833.00
06/14/91 $100.00 $10,900.00 $641.67 $2,458.50 $14,000.17
07/14/91 $100.00 $11,000.00 $676.67 $2,491.50 $14,168.17
08/14/91 $100.00 $11,100.00 $712.50 $2,524.50 $14,337.00
09/14/91 $100.00 $11,200.00 $749.17 $2,557.50 $14,506.67
10/14/91 $100.00 $11,300.00 $786.67 $2,590.50 $14,677.17
11/14/91 $100.00 $11,400.00 $825.00 $2,623.50 $14,848.50
12/14/91 $100.00 $11,500.00 $864.17 $2,656.50 $15,020.67
Page 2 RMR 000193
Phillips ‐ Macumber ‐ Child Support Calculation
01/14/92 $100.00 $11,600.00 $904.17 $2,689.50 $15,193.67
02/14/92 $100.00 $11,700.00 $945.00 $2,722.50 $15,367.50
03/14/92 $100.00 $11,800.00 $986.67 $2,755.50 $15,542.17
04/14/92 $100.00 $11,900.00 $1,029.17 $2,788.50 $15,717.67
05/14/92 $100.00 $12,000.00 $1,072.50 $2,821.50 $15,894.00
06/14/92 $100.00 $12,100.00 $1,116.67 $2,854.50 $16,071.17
07/14/92 $100.00 $12,200.00 $1,161.67 $2,887.50 $16,249.17
08/14/92 $100.00 $12,300.00 $1,207.50 $2,920.50 $16,428.00
09/14/92 $100.00 $12,400.00 $1,254.17 $2,953.50 $16,607.67
10/14/92 $100.00 $12,500.00 $1,301.67 $2,986.50 $16,788.17
11/14/92 $100.00 $12,600.00 $1,350.00 $3,019.50 $16,969.50
12/14/92 $100.00 $12,700.00 $1,399.17 $3,052.50 $17,151.67
01/14/93 $100.00 $12,800.00 $1,449.17 $3,085.50 $17,334.67
02/14/93 $100.00 $12,900.00 $1,500.00 $3,118.50 $17,518.50
03/14/93 $100.00 $13,000.00 $1,551.67 $3,151.50 $17,703.17
04/14/93 $100.00 $13,100.00 $1,604.17 $3,184.50 $17,888.67
05/14/93 $100.00 $13,200.00 $1,657.50 $3,217.50 $18,075.00
06/14/93 $100.00 $13,300.00 $1,711.67 $3,250.50 $18,262.17
07/14/93 $100.00 $13,400.00 $1,766.67 $3,283.50 $18,450.17
08/14/93 $100.00 $13,500.00 $1,822.50 $3,316.50 $18,639.00
09/14/93 $100.00 $13,600.00 $1,879.17 $3,349.50 $18,828.67
10/14/93 $100.00 $13,700.00 $1,936.67 $3,382.50 $19,019.17
11/14/93 $100.00 $13,800.00 $1,995.00 $3,415.50 $19,210.50
12/14/93 $100.00 $13,900.00 $2,054.17 $3,448.50 $19,402.67
01/14/94 $100.00 $14,000.00 $2,114.17 $3,481.50 $19,595.67
02/14/94 $100.00 $14,100.00 $2,175.00 $3,514.50 $19,789.50
03/14/94 $100.00 $14,200.00 $2,236.67 $3,547.50 $19,984.17
04/14/94 $100.00 $14,300.00 $2,299.17 $3,580.50 $20,179.67
05/14/94 $100.00 $14,400.00 $2,362.50 $3,613.50 $20,376.00 H.S. Graduation
06/14/94 $14,400.00 $2,426.67 $3,646.50 $20,473.17
07/14/94 $14,400.00 $2,490.83 $3,679.50 $20,570.33
08/14/94 $14,400.00 $2,555.00 $3,712.50 $20,667.50
09/14/94 $14,400.00 $2,619.17 $3,745.50 $20,764.67
10/14/94 $14,400.00 $2,683.33 $3,778.50 $20,861.83
11/14/94 $14,400.00 $2,747.50 $3,811.50 $20,959.00
12/14/94 $14,400.00 $2,811.67 $3,844.50 $21,056.17
01/14/95 $14,400.00 $2,875.83 $3,877.50 $21,153.33
02/14/95 $14,400.00 $2,940.00 $3,910.50 $21,250.50
03/14/95 $14,400.00 $3,004.17 $3,943.50 $21,347.67
04/14/95 $14,400.00 $3,068.33 $3,976.50 $21,444.83
05/14/95 $14,400.00 $3,132.50 $4,009.50 $21,542.00
06/14/95 $14,400.00 $3,196.67 $4,042.50 $21,639.17
07/14/95 $14,400.00 $3,260.83 $4,075.50 $21,736.33
08/14/95 $14,400.00 $3,325.00 $4,108.50 $21,833.50
09/14/95 $14,400.00 $3,389.17 $4,141.50 $21,930.67
10/14/95 $14,400.00 $3,453.33 $4,174.50 $22,027.83
11/14/95 $14,400.00 $3,517.50 $4,207.50 $22,125.00
12/14/95 $14,400.00 $3,581.67 $4,240.50 $22,222.17
01/14/96 $14,400.00 $3,645.83 $4,273.50 $22,319.33
02/14/96 $14,400.00 $3,710.00 $4,306.50 $22,416.50
03/14/96 $14,400.00 $3,774.17 $4,339.50 $22,513.67
04/14/96 $14,400.00 $3,838.33 $4,372.50 $22,610.83
05/14/96 $14,400.00 $3,902.50 $4,405.50 $22,708.00
06/14/96 $14,400.00 $3,966.67 $4,438.50 $22,805.17
07/14/96 $14,400.00 $4,030.83 $4,471.50 $22,902.33
08/14/96 $14,400.00 $4,095.00 $4,504.50 $22,999.50
09/14/96 $14,400.00 $4,159.17 $4,537.50 $23,096.67
10/14/96 $14,400.00 $4,223.33 $4,570.50 $23,193.83
5/96 ‐10/23/96 $4,241.96 $4,580.08 $23,222.04 interest for 9 days (10/15 to 10/23)
RELEASED ON PAROLE ON 23RD
Page 3 RMR 000194
Phillips ‐ Macumber ‐ Child Support Calculation
4/96 ‐ 11/14/96 $14,400.00 $45.54 $23.42 $68.96 interest for 22 days (10/24 to 11/14)
12/14/96 $14,400.00 $109.70 $56.42 $166.12 No amounts between 10/23/96
01/14/97 $14,400.00 $173.87 $89.42 $263.29 and 5/13/97 count towards CPA total.
02/14/97 $14,400.00 $238.04 $122.42 $360.46 2 payments of $110 apply to this time.
03/14/97 $14,400.00 $302.20 $155.42 $457.62
3/xx/1997 $110.00 $14,400.00 $192.20 During this period out of prison,
04/14/97 $14,400.00 $256.37 $188.42 $444.79 Phillips owes $427.69.
4/xx/97 $110.00 $14,400.00 $146.37
05/13/97 $14,400.00 $208.40 $219.29 $427.69 interest for 29 days
TAKEN INTO CUSTODY ON 14TH
05/14/97 $14,400.00 $4,244.10 $4,581.15 $23,225.25 interest for 1 day (5/14)
06/14/97 $14,400.00 $4,306.13 $4,614.15 $23,320.27
07/14/97 $14,400.00 $4,370.30 $4,647.15 $23,417.44
08/14/97 $14,400.00 $4,434.46 $4,680.15 $23,514.61
09/14/97 $14,400.00 $4,498.63 $4,713.15 $23,611.77
10/14/97 $14,400.00 $4,562.80 $4,746.15 $23,708.94
11/14/97 $14,400.00 $4,626.96 $4,779.15 $23,806.11
12/14/97 $14,400.00 $4,691.13 $4,812.15 $23,903.27
01/14/98 $14,400.00 $4,755.30 $4,845.15 $24,000.44
02/14/98 $14,400.00 $4,819.46 $4,878.15 $24,097.61
03/14/98 $14,400.00 $4,883.63 $4,911.15 $24,194.77
04/14/98 $14,400.00 $4,947.80 $4,944.15 $24,291.94
05/14/98 $14,400.00 $5,011.96 $4,977.15 $24,389.11
06/14/98 $14,400.00 $5,076.13 $5,010.15 $24,486.27
07/14/98 $14,400.00 $5,140.30 $5,043.15 $24,583.44
08/14/98 $14,400.00 $5,204.46 $5,076.15 $24,680.61
09/14/98 $14,400.00 $5,268.63 $5,109.15 $24,777.77
10/14/98 $14,400.00 $5,332.80 $5,142.15 $24,874.94
11/14/98 $14,400.00 $5,396.96 $5,175.15 $24,972.11
12/14/98 $14,400.00 $5,461.13 $5,208.15 $25,069.27
$14,400.00 $5,498.39 $5,227.31 $25,125.69 interest accrual for 18 days
TOTAL Tim Cole Act Amount Owed
Page 4 RMR 000195
'Cfiexae '1Iontptro1ur of 'ublic J\ccounh~
``NO.
010615 0001 902 tl"50157 7>0000C677Jt 001
PAVDll MECY : SU-465-4561 a..TRDU.ER - STATE FUCM. 132252074
PAY ...nr.46
TO TX STATE DISPURSatENT UNIT
NCP•STEVEJI CHARLES PHILLIPS ID
CP• CHERYL MACUMBER
PO IOX 659417
SAN ANTONIO, TX 71265-9417
VOID AFTH
OIVJl/2017
- - - - - - - • - • •• - • .... r • • • • • • - • ..-•--• • • • • • - • - - • • • .-- •• • • •
...
TX SC11e Disbursement Unit
NCP:~ Charles Phillips ~
PO Box 659417
San Amooio, Texas 78265-9417
RMR000196