Joshua Ray Escobedo v. State

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-18-00688-CR
Joshua Ray Escobedo, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY
NO. CR2016-629, THE HONORABLE DIB WALDRIP, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Joshua Ray Escobedo pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver a
controlled substance in penalty group 1 (methamphetamine), between 4 and 200 grams and to
tampering with physical evidence. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(d); Tex. Penal
Code § 37.09. The district court assessed punishment for each of those offenses, both of which
were enhanced under habitual-offender provisions of the Texas Penal Code, at twenty years’
imprisonment. Tex. Penal Code § 12.42(a), (c)(1). In his two appellate issues, Escobedo
contends that the district court had a duty to withdraw sua sponte his plea of guilty and that the
court “wrongly admonishe[d]” him by not addressing the punishment range for a lesser-included
offense. We will affirm the judgments of conviction.
BACKGROUND
After conducting a traffic stop, a Comal County Sheriff’s Deputy arrested
Escobedo for driving without a valid license. Other officers arrived at the scene to assist with a
search and inventory of the vehicle. The officers’ search of the vehicle and Escobedo yielded
cash, two phones, razor blades, synthetic urine, scales, and rolling papers. An officer also found
that Escobedo’s passenger had methamphetamine in a back pocket of her pants and arrested her
for possession of a controlled substance. The officer told Escobedo that his passenger was going
to jail for “meth” and asked Escobedo, “Is there more on you? Where’s that?” Escobedo
admitted that he had more between his legs. The officer retrieved a coin purse from Escobedo’s
shorts containing small baggies of a crystal-like substance. Escobedo told the officer it was
“11 grams.” 1 While Escobedo was being booked into jail, he began shaking uncontrollably, and
his jaw was chattering. The officer recognized these physical behaviors as indicating a possible
overdose. Escobedo admitted to the officer that he had ingested a large shard of
methamphetamine as he was being stopped for the traffic violation. The officer transported
Escobedo to the hospital for treatment. Escobedo remained in the intensive care unit until he
was able to be discharged to jail.
The Texas Department of Public Safety Crime Lab analyzed the baggie from
Escobedo’s coin purse containing the largest amount of a crystal substance. Testing results
showed that the baggie weighed 6.72 grams and contained methamphetamine.
A grand jury indicted Escobedo for possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance in penalty group 1 (methamphetamine), between four and 200 grams, and one count of
1
The district court considered this conversation, recorded by the patrol car’s back-seat
videocamera, when it heard Escobedo’s motion to suppress evidence.
2
tampering with physical evidence. Under an agreement with the State, Escobedo pleaded guilty
to both offenses charged in his indictment and entered pleas of “true” to the habitual-offender
enhancement allegations set forth in his indictment for both of his charges. The State agreed to
waive its right to a jury trial and proceed to a punishment hearing before the district court.
Plea-hearing testimony
During the plea hearing, the district court admonished Escobedo about his rights,
including specific discussions as to the limitation of his right to appeal, the effect of his signature
on the plea papers, and Escobedo’s waivers of his rights to confront witnesses, to a jury trial, and
to remain silent:
The Court: As well you have a right to remain silent. But your signature
indicates your willingness to waive that right, at least to the extent
of the charges in this indictment. And the effect of that would be
that you’re admitting to all of the facts necessary to prove this case
against you. Did you understand that was the effect of your
signature?
[Escobedo]: Yes, sir.
Escobedo confirmed that he intended to proceed on his agreement with the State, that he had
sufficient time to review the plea papers with his appointed counsel before signing them, and that
he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation of him. Documents supporting Escobedo’s
prior convictions were admitted into evidence without objection. Escobedo was also questioned
about the voluntariness of his plea:
The Court: Okay. And so you understand we’re just going to reset this. We’ll
have a presentence investigation and a punishment hearing and
we’ll go from there. Anybody promise you anything other than
what we just discussed?
3
[Escobedo]: No.
The Court: Anybody threaten you in any way?
[Escobedo]: No, sir.
The Court: With that understanding then as to Count I and Count II, what are
your pleas: Guilty or not guilty?
[Escobedo]: Guilty.
The Court: Are you pleading guilty because you’re guilty?
[Escobedo]: Yes, sir.
After accepting Escobedo’s pleas and his agreement with the State, the district court reset the
case for completion of a presentence investigation before Escobedo’s punishment hearing.
Punishment-hearing testimony
At the subsequent punishment hearing, Escobedo testified that he pleaded guilty
in the case before the court, that he pleaded “true” to the enhancement allegations in his
indictment for both of his offenses, that he was on parole when he committed the possession
offense, and that he was requesting “lenience” from the court in sentencing. Escobedo also
testified that he ate some quantity of the methamphetamine and acknowledged that his plea of
guilty to tampering with physical evidence was for eating the methamphetamine. Escobedo
further testified—contrary to his prior statement on the patrol-car recording—that he possessed
only 3.4 grams of methamphetamines on the date of his encounter with law enforcement.
Escobedo denied selling or distributing methamphetamine and said that he pled
guilty so he could “have this time to -- to speak.” He complained that he had not had “an
advocate for [him]self” and that during his incarceration he “never once was given any type of
plea deal.” Escobedo then denied committing his prior offenses, denied possessing more than
4
four grams of methamphetamine, and denied tampering with evidence. He stated, “I’m taking
responsibility for having methamphetamines, for having 3.4.” Escobedo questioned the quantity
of methamphetamine reflected in the DPS lab report because the methamphetamine was not
weighed on the scene. Finally, when asked if he was guilty of the offenses as charged, Escobedo
responded, “I’m guilty of possession of – of methamphetamine, yes.”
The State requested a forty-year sentence of imprisonment, but the district court
sentenced Escobedo to twenty years for each of his charged offenses with the sentences to run
concurrently. Before pronouncing sentence, the court stated:
The Court: And the best thing for, you know, me to do in my view at this
juncture having received this testimony is to somewhat put the ball
back in your court and not give you just some minimum
expectation that you’re going to automatically get out, but where
you do need to continue to be the prodigal son and turn back
around and come back to where you know you should have
stayed. . .
[Escobedo]: Yes, sir.
The Court: ---and to earn---not just today, but tomorrow and the next day to
have to earn something to get back to your son. And with that
being said, I’m going to sentence you to 20 years TDC and remand
you to the custody of the sheriff to have that sentence carried out.
You’ll be entitled to your back credit.
[Defense counsel]: Thank you, your Honor.
[Prosecutor]: And just so the record is clear, that’s 20 years in each count?
The Court: Yes, sir.
After this pronouncement of sentence, court proceedings adjourned. This appeal followed.
5
DISCUSSION
Escobedo did not preserve complaint about court’s duty to withdraw involuntary plea
In his first issue, Escobedo contends that the district court had a duty to withdraw
sua sponte his plea of guilty based on his testimony indicating that his plea was involuntary.
This issue has two components: a complaint that the court did not withdraw the plea, and an
argument that the plea was involuntary. Escobedo failed to present either concern to the district
court.
1. Withdrawal of guilty plea
The Court of Criminal Appeals has ruled that a defendant who pleads guilty bears
the burden of seeking withdrawal of his plea when evidence inconsistent with guilt is introduced.
Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Thus, the trial court has no duty
to change the defendant’s guilty plea on its own motion. Id. (concluding that “it is reasonable to
put on such a defendant the requirement of timely seeking, in one way or another, to withdraw
the plea of guilty”). A defendant who fails to seek withdrawal of his plea of guilt “may not
complain for the first time on appeal that the trial court did not do it for him.” Id. A defendant
who fails to bring his complained-of error to the trial court’s attention waives any complaint
regarding that error. Id. at 338-39; see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (requiring party to preserve error
by timely and specific objection or motion and obtaining adverse ruling); see also Franklin v.
State, No. 05-04-01495-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7954, at *8-9 (Tex. App.—Dallas
Sept. 29, 2005, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that because
defendant did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea at any time, he could not complain on appeal
that trial court did not withdraw it for him).
6
2. Voluntariness of guilty plea
Further, the Court of Criminal Appeals has ruled that a defendant’s challenge to
the voluntariness of his guilty plea must be preserved for appellate review and cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 339 n.5 (noting that defendants must
properly preserve challenge to voluntariness of guilty plea because it does not implicate any
“fundamental” requirements identified by Supreme Court); see Lindley v. State, No. 08-08-
00149-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 2044, at *13 (Tex. App.—El Paso Mar. 24, 2010, no pet.)
(op., not designated for publication) (“[A] defendant must preserve a complaint regarding the
voluntariness of a guilty plea.”); Wilson v. State, Nos. 05-05-01100-CR, 05-05-01101-CR,
05-01102-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 5938, at *6-7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 11, 2006,
pet. ref’d) (op., not designated for publication) (concluding that defendant who claimed that his
guilty plea was not voluntary—based on his testimony at punishment hearing that weapon he had
during robbery was “a small rock instead of a brick as alleged in the indictment”—could not
raise that complaint for first time on appeal). If a defendant fails to bring an alleged error
concerning the voluntariness of his plea to the trial court’s attention, he is deemed to have
waived any complaint regarding that error. See Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 338 (noting that error
relating to voluntariness of plea is not immune to harmless-error analysis and can be waived by
failure to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1); Franklin v. State, No. 06-11-
00141-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 9060, at *3-4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Nov. 1, 2011,
pet. dism’d) (op., not designated for publication) (“Without a timely objection, motion, or
request that the trial court inquire into the voluntariness of his plea, [the defendant] forfeited his
right to complain about the voluntariness of his guilty plea.”); Franklin, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS
7
7954, at *8 (concluding that defendant challenging voluntariness of guilty plea must comply with
Rule 33.1 to properly preserve such complaint for appellate review).
Here, Escobedo did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea; he made no complaint to
the district court that his plea was involuntary; and he alleges no error in the proceedings before
the entry of his plea or when he pleaded guilty. On this record, Escobedo failed to preserve for
our review his complaints that the district court did not withdraw the plea sua sponte and that his
plea was involuntary. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Mendez, 138 S.W.3d at 350; Lindley,
2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 2044 at *15; Franklin, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 9060, at *3-4; Wilson,
2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 5938, at *6-7; Franklin, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7954, at *8.
Accordingly, we overrule Escobedo’s first issue.
District court did not “wrongly admonish” Escobedo on range of punishment
In his second issue, Escobedo contends that the district court “wrongly
admonishe[d]” him by not addressing the punishment range for a lesser-included offense,
specifically, possession of a controlled substance in an amount of less than four grams.
According to Escobedo, his testimony during the punishment phase of trial that he possessed
only 3.4 grams of methamphetamine triggered the district court’s duty to provide a different
admonishment from the one Escobedo received, which addressed only the punishment range for
the offense with which he was charged—i.e., possession of a controlled substance in an amount
greater than four grams. We disagree.
Under article 26.13(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, before accepting a
plea of guilty or no contest, a trial court must admonish a defendant of the range of punishment
attached to the offense. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 26.13(a)(1). “Substantial compliance by the
court is sufficient, unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the
8
consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court.”
Id. art. 26.13(c). The admonishments as to the “consequences of his plea” in article 26.13(a)(1)
refer to “the punishment provided by law for the offense and the punishment which could be
inflicted under his plea.” Wright v. State, 499 S.W.2d 326, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973);
see Sifuentes v. State, No. 2-06-004-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 8019, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Sept. 7, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting defendant’s
contention that his guilty plea was involuntary because trial court did not admonish him as to
punishment range for offense that he was originally charged with but rather, admonished him
only as to offense to which defendant ultimately pleaded guilty under plea agreement).
Under his plea agreement, Escobedo and the State agreed that he would plead
guilty to possession of a controlled substance in penalty group 1 between 4 and 200 grams with
intent to deliver, plead guilty to tampering with physical evidence, and plead true to the
enhancement paragraphs in his indictment that increased the applicable punishment ranges.
Escobedo initialed each page of his plea paperwork, with checked boxes specifying that he was
subject to punishment for a first-degree felony for Count I (possession of a controlled substance
with intent to deliver) and a second-degree felony for Count II (evidence tampering), and Count
II included a handwritten notation explaining that punishment was enhanced by prior conviction:
1st Degree Felony (Repeat Offender) – Imprisonment in the Institutional Division
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for Life or for any term of not more
than 99 years or less than 15 years; in addition, a fine not to exceed $10,000.
2nd Degree Felony – Imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice for any term of not more than 20 years or less
than 2 years; in addition, a fine not to exceed $10,000. This is a 3rd degree felony
enhanced to 2nd degree by prior felony conviction.
9
The district court properly admonished Escobedo at his plea hearing as to the
punishment ranges for the offenses to which Escobedo was entering his pleas of guilty:
The Court: It appears that the punishment ranges for these offenses in Count I
is a first-degree felony up to—actually, it’s a repeat offender so it’s
a minimum of 15 years up to 99 years or life and a 10,000-dollar
fine. And as enhanced in Count II, it’s up to 20 years in the
penitentiary and a 10,000-dollar fine. Do you understand that?
[Escobedo]: Yes, sir.
Also at his plea hearing, Escobedo testified that he was properly admonished and that he
understood the punishment ranges associated with the charges against him. Escobedo cites no
authority, and we have found none, holding that trial courts have a duty to admonish a defendant
as to the range of punishment for a lesser-included offense to which the defendant does not
plead—i.e., a punishment that could not be inflicted under his plea agreement. Cf. Wright,
499 S.W.2d at 327; Sifuentes, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 8019, at *4 (concluding that trial court
must admonish defendant as to “punishment attached to the offense to which he is entering a plea
before the court accepts the plea of guilty or nolo contend[e]re to that offense”).
We conclude that the district court was not required to admonish Escobedo as to
the punishment range for a lesser-included offense that was not part of the plea bargain under
which he had pleaded guilty. Accordingly, we overrule Escobedo’s second issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s judgments of conviction.
10
__________________________________________
Jeff Rose, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Triana and Smith
Affirmed
Filed: August 27, 2019
Do Not Publish
11