in the Interest of P.R. and A.R.

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-21-00091-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF P.R. AND A.R.
_______________________________________________________ ______________
On Appeal from the 317th District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. F-237,227
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Mother and Father appeal from an order terminating their parental rights to
their two children, P.R. and A.R. 1 The trial court found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that statutory grounds exist for termination of Mother and Father’s
parental rights and that termination of their parental rights would be in the best
interest of the children. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P), (2).
Mother and Father’s appointed counsel submitted a separate brief for each of
them in which counsel contends that there are no meritorious issues for appeal and
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We refer to the appellants as “Mother” and “Father” and their children by their
initials to protect their identities. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
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that the appeal is frivolous. 2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In the
Interest of L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.)
(holding that Anders procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases). The
briefs present counsel’s professional evaluation of the record and explains why no
arguable grounds exist to overturn the trial court’s judgment in either case. Their
appellate counsel represented to the Court that he gave Mother and Father copies of
the brief that was filed, notified both parents of their right to file a pro se brief, and
provided them a copy of the appellate record. The Court notified Mother and Father
of their right to file a pro se response and the deadline for doing so. The Court’s
records show that neither parent filed a response.
We have independently evaluated the appellate record and counsel’s briefs.
See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744); Bledsoe
v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d
618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). Based on our review of the record, we
conclude that no arguable grounds exist to support an appeal from the trial court's
judgment, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See
Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28 (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating
in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record
2
Mother and Father were in a relationship at the time this appeal was filed and
have the same court appointed attorney on appeal.
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for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d at 619.
Therefore, we find it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief
this appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother and Father’s parental
rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by their court-appointed appellate
counsel because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all
appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27
(Tex. 2016). Should Mother and Father decide to pursue an appeal to the Supreme
Court of Texas, counsel’s obligations to Mother and Father can be met “by filing a
petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M.,
520 S.W.3d at 27–28.
AFFIRMED.
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CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on August 11, 2021
Opinion Delivered August 26, 2021
Before Golemon, CJ, Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
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