Kris Edward Rau v. State

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-15-00208-CR
KRIS EDWARD RAU APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 271ST DISTRICT COURT OF WISE COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. CR17812
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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A jury convicted Appellant Kris Edward Rau of murder and assessed his
punishment at confinement for life and a $10,000 fine. The trial court sentenced
him accordingly. In seven issues, Appellant contends that the evidence is
insufficient to support his murder conviction and complains about the admission
of testimony of a jailhouse informant, a witness’s reference to a polygrapher, and
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
the prosecutor’s argument at punishment. Because we hold that the evidence is
sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction and that the trial court did not
reversibly err, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background Facts
A. Lianne Was a Single Mother of Two Adult Children and Owned
Real Property in Texas and Florida.
When she died on April 14, 2014, single mother Lianne Murray had two
grown children, Allisyn Ramirez and Daniel Murray, was a grandmother of a
young boy, and was eagerly awaiting the birth of her second grandson in May.
Her father had committed suicide in April 2009 by shooting himself, and her
mother had passed away a short time later, suffering from dementia and
estranged from Lianne. Lianne and her sister, Robin White, had never gotten
along and had quarreled over their parents’ estate.
Lianne had two homes: (1) a house and plant nursery on a thirteen-acre
tract on Pine Island, Florida that she had inherited from her parents and (2) forty-
five acres in Wise County, Texas on which sat a steel building containing a
garage and house.
B. Lianne Met Appellant Online and Soon Moved in with Him.
At the end of August 2013, Lianne was living in Pine Island, Florida and
met Appellant on Match.com. Shortly thereafter, Lianne moved into the house
Appellant rented in Fort Myers, Florida. She and Appellant’s sister, Kelly Rau,
became friends, but Lianne’s children did not care for Appellant, and he knew it.
2
C. Lianne Returned to Texas, and Appellant Moved in with Her.
In late 2013, as was her custom, Lianne returned to Texas temporarily to
work as a home healthcare nurse for a local agency, supplementing her income
from the nursery. At the time of her death, Lianne was working full-time five
nights a week in a home caring for a severely handicapped child and working
extra shifts in other homes when possible. Lianne also remained actively
involved in the daily running of the nursery in Florida even while she was in
Texas, and she stayed in constant contact with Allisyn, who worked at the
nursery along with her husband and Daniel.
Appellant visited Lianne in Texas in December 2013 and spent much of his
time and money improving the Wise County property. Around Christmas, Lianne
told her children that she was going to permanently live in Texas and Appellant
was going to move to Texas to live with her.
Appellant quit his job in Florida and cashed in his retirement account. He
moved in with Lianne on February 14, 2014.
D. Appellant Quit His Job in Texas after One Week, Improved
Lianne’s Rustic Property, and Rapidly Depleted His Retirement
Proceeds.
On February 28, 2014, Appellant started working as a welder in nearby
Bridgeport, Texas. A week later, he received his retirement proceeds in the
amount of $32,374.36 and quit his welding job. He deposited approximately
$29,000 in two separate accounts at a local bank.
3
Appellant put a lot of labor and money into Lianne’s Texas property:
mowing; trimming trees; building a 1,000-foot, four-board fence; and making
other repairs and improvements. He gave Lianne around $6,000 to help her pay
debts, including her son Daniel’s expenses, which Appellant greatly resented.
Appellant also bought a tractor, a tiller, and a mower.2 On the day of Lianne’s
death, Appellant only had about $800 left in his two bank accounts.
E. Lianne Planned to Return to Florida in May 2014 and Bring
Daniel Back to Texas to Live with Her.
Lianne planned to fly to Florida when Allisyn’s second child was born in
May 2014 and then drive back to Texas with Daniel, who would live with
Appellant and Lianne temporarily while finding his own place and before
beginning classes at the University of North Texas in the fall. On Saturday, April
12, 2014, Lianne texted Allisyn that she would soon be able to purchase her
plane ticket to Florida. That same night, Lianne also told the mother of one of
her patients that she would soon return to Florida.
F. Appellant and Lianne Fought, She Died from a Gunshot Wound,
and He Drove from Texas to His Sister Kelly’s Home in Lee
County, Florida.
On Sunday, April 13, 2014, the couple had a physically violent argument,
and Lianne told Appellant to leave her home or she would call the police. The
next day, April 14, 2014, sometime after Lianne returned from working her
2
Lianne insisted that her name be included on the invoice and check for
those items.
4
overnight shift, she died in the front yard of her Wise County home from a
gunshot wound to her throat.
After Lianne’s death but on the same day, Appellant left her Wise County
home and drove to the home of his sister, Kelly, in Lee County, Florida. On the
way, he disposed of his Glock .40 semiautomatic pistol.
G. Lee County, Florida and Wise County, Texas Law Enforcement
Officers Interviewed Appellant, and the Wise County Sheriff’s
Office Investigated Lianne’s Death.
When Appellant arrived at Kelly’s home on April 15, 2014, he told her
about Lianne’s death, and she called 911 while he was in the shower.
At trial, Detective Jaime Nolan of the Lee County, Florida Sheriff’s Office
testified that on April 15, 2014, he and Detective Robert Patton responded to
Kelly’s 911 call and then brought Appellant to their office for an interview.
Joshua Reynolds, an investigator for the Wise County, Texas Sheriff’s Office,
began an investigation on April 15, 2014 after receiving information from the Lee
County, Florida Sheriff’s Office that a possible homicide had taken place in Wise
County.
Investigator Reynolds visited Lianne’s Wise County property and
discovered her body wrapped in a blanket and plastic and lying in the garage.
She had been shot under her chin, on the left side of her neck. After finding
Lianne’s body, Reynolds traveled to Florida to interview Appellant. Appellant
was interviewed on two separate days by Detectives Nolan and Patton, and
Investigator Reynolds also interviewed him on the second day.
5
H. Despite His Assertion That Lianne Shot Herself, Appellant Was
Arrested, Indicted for Murder, and Jailed.
Appellant, who, by his own timeline, left Lianne’s Wise County home less
than an hour after finding her dead and drove straight to Lee County, Florida,
stated in his interviews with law enforcement that Lianne had committed suicide
by shooting herself with his pistol.
A Wise County grand jury indicted Appellant for murder on June 26, 2014,
and he was confined in the Wise County jail pending his trial.
I. Appellant Confessed to a Jailhouse Informant.
One of Appellant’s cellmates, William Wayne Cox, told law enforcement
(and later the jury) that Appellant had confessed to murdering Lianne.
II. The Evidence Is Sufficient to Support Appellant’s Murder Conviction.
In his first two issues, Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient
to support his conviction for murder. Specifically, in his first issue, he contends
that the evidence is insufficient to prove the essential elements of murder, and in
his second issue, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he
acted with the requisite mental state.
A. Standard of Review
In our due-process review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
even improperly admitted evidence, to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
6
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979);
Jenkins v. State, 493 S.W.3d 583, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Moff v. State,
131 S.W.3d 485, 489–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). This standard gives full play to
the responsibility of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh
the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate
facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 599.
The trier of fact is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the
evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (West 1979); Blea v. State,
483 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Thus, when performing an
evidentiary sufficiency review, we may not re-evaluate the weight and credibility
of the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. See
Montgomery v. State, 369 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Instead, we
determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the
cumulative force of the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 198 (2015). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any
conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. Id. at
448–49; see Blea, 483 S.W.3d at 33.
The standard of review is the same for direct and circumstantial evidence
cases; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing
guilt. Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 599. Although motive and opportunity are not
elements of a criminal offense, they can be circumstances that are indicative of
7
guilt and therefore may be properly considered in an evidentiary sufficiency
review. Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Evidence of flight, of threatening a witness, and of concealing or destroying
evidence is also circumstantial evidence of guilt. Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895,
905 n.11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (flight); Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50–
51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (concealing evidence); Johnson v. State, 425 S.W.3d
344, 346 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (threatening witness).
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to show intent, and faced
with a record that supports conflicting inferences, we “must presume—even if it
does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact resolved any
such conflict in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.”
Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We must review
circumstantial evidence of intent with the same scrutiny as evidence of other
elements of an offense. Thornton v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289, 304 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014).
B. Elements of Murder
The indictment charged that Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused
Lianne’s death by shooting her with a firearm or, alternatively, acting with intent
to cause Lianne serious bodily injury, he committed an act clearly dangerous to
human life that caused her death by shooting her with a firearm. See Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (2) (West 2011).
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C. Theories of the Case
For the majority of his interviews with law enforcement, Appellant’s theory
was that Lianne had committed suicide. When Investigator Reynolds indicated to
him that forensics did not support suicide, Appellant raised his voice and said
that the neighbors or Lianne’s children could have shot her. The State’s theory
was that Appellant killed Lianne soon after she arrived home from work,
attempted to give himself an alibi by running several errands in different locales
near the home, and destroyed or hid evidence to hide his culpability and promote
his suicide story.
D. The Evidence
Thirty-one people testified during the guilt-innocence phase of trial, and the
trial court admitted almost 300 exhibits. Appellant exercised his right not to
testify, but his recorded interviews with law enforcement were admitted and
played for the jury.
1. Chronology of Key Events
a. April 13, 2014: Appellant and Lianne Fight and She
Tells Him to Leave.
Appellant acknowledged in his interviews with law enforcement that he and
Lianne, whom he described as his girlfriend of six months, had a physical
altercation on Sunday, April 13, 2014, the night before her death. He claimed
that she had attacked him. He then pushed her backwards against a wall and
grabbed her—hard enough to leave bruises the next day—“trying to hold [her] so
9
[he could] talk to [her]” or “trying to get [her] to stop swinging and whaling at
[him].” When he let go, Lianne kicked him in the testicles and went outside.
Appellant’s sister Kelly testified that Appellant discussed the fight with her
after Lianne’s death. Kelly’s account differed slightly from her brother’s. She
testified that Appellant told her that after Lianne kicked him in the scrotum, he
“held her down on the ground . . . because she had said she was done and she
didn’t stop.”
After their fight, Lianne called Appellant a “wife-beater” and left early for
her regular overnight nursing shift. He reported that they spoke and texted
multiple times Sunday night, and cell phone records show that eight calls were
made that night from his phone to hers, beginning at 8:02 p.m. In addition, she
texted him a message demanding that he leave her house or she would call the
police.
b. April 14, 2014: Lianne Is Killed.
i. Morning: Lianne Returns from Work and
Appellant’s Errands Begin.
Appellant initially told the Florida detectives that by the time Lianne
returned home from work around 9:00 or 9:10 a.m. on Monday, April 14, 2014,
she was still mad at him, but she wanted a hug and no longer wanted him to
leave. Appellant stated that she told him that she was going to take a
tranquilizer, she did take it as far as he knew, and then she showered and went
to sleep.
10
In his second interview with law enforcement, Appellant remembered
running some errands on the morning of April 14, 2014, after Lianne went to
sleep. He told the Florida detectives that he went to:
 his bank in Lake Worth, Texas and closed his savings account;
 a Verizon store, about a mile away from the bank, where he paid his
cell phone bill;
 a manufacturing business with a big banner seeking job applicants;
and
 a motor sports business to buy an off-road vehicle permit.
ii. Mid-Afternoon: Appellant Answers Allisyn’s
Call to Lianne and Lianne Is “Wobbly.”
Appellant initially reported that he arrived back home around 1:30 p.m.
because at 2:00 p.m., he answered on the house phone via Bluetooth a call from
Allisyn to Lianne’s cell phone. Allisyn testified that she called her mother at
1:54 p.m. and for the first time ever, Appellant answered Lianne’s phone. He
whispered, “[O]h, hey, sweetie, your mom’s asleep. You’ll have to call her later.”
Allisyn testified that Lianne worked nights, so her sleeping during the day would
not have been unusual.
Lisa Upton, a telecommunications analyst with the Texas Department of
Public Safety (DPS), testified at trial that she performs cell phone mapping.
Upton claimed that none of the many calls placed to Lianne’s cell phone on April
14, 2014 after the 1:54 p.m. call hit a tower. Upton explained that when calls go
to voice mail, a tower is not hit. Further, she testified that calls go to voice mail
11
when the phone is turned off, not answered, or destroyed or when its battery is
dead.
Changing his initial story that he returned home around 1:30 p.m.,
Appellant stated later in his interviews that he must have arrived home closer to
12:30 p.m. because he was there when Lianne woke up at 1:00 p.m. to use the
bathroom. Appellant said that he asked Lianne at that time if she had a postage
stamp, but she did not acknowledge him and went back to bed.
According to Appellant, Lianne got up again at 3:00 p.m., told him she was
going back to bed, and again went in the bathroom. Appellant speculated that
she might have taken another pill because she was “wobbly” and “her motor
skills seemed funny” when she left the bathroom. Appellant said that she made a
cup of coffee and went back to bed.
iii. Late Afternoon: Appellant Runs More
Errands, Lianne Allegedly Acts Woozy and
“Pill-Drunk,” and Lianne Is Killed.
Appellant told law enforcement that while Lianne was sleeping, he went to
get gas sometime after 3:00 p.m. and arrived back at the house sometime
around 4:00 p.m. He reported that Lianne was awake and moving around at that
time.
(a) Lianne’s Behavior is “Weird” When
Appellant Returns from Second Errand
Trip.
Appellant stated that after his return:
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 Lianne was “weird-acting,” “spiteful,” “almost like a drunk but from
pills,” “ornery,” and “angry”;
 She was “kind of pale,” “woozy,” and “a little bit pill-drunk”;
 She was not crying but seemed “blah”;
 She got a cup of coffee;
 She put on her sweats, slippers, and a multicolored shirt;
 She carried her boots to the front porch and sat in a chair;
 She refused his second request for a postage stamp, so he told her
he was going to town; and
 She asked him to also pick up dog food for their three dogs in town.
Even though he thought she was “pill-drunk,” Appellant did not check Lianne’s
pupils or invite her to go with him.
(b) Appellant Leaves Lianne’s Home a Third
Time to Purchase Forty Pounds of Dog
Food and a Single Postage Stamp.
Appellant told the Florida detectives that he left home a third time about
4:15 p.m. At 4:23 p.m., he called McKinley Farms Tractor Sales, from which the
tractor had been purchased. Store employees had recently hauled the tractor
back to the store for repairs. Appellant spoke to salesman Roger McKinley and
said, “I have a situation. I need to just sell the tractor back to you or have you
sell it for me and give me $6,500.”
Appellant told the Florida detectives that around 4:45 p.m., he was at the
post office in Bridgeport, about sixteen miles from Lianne’s home, where he
bought a single stamp with cash. Initially, he could not remember if a man or
13
woman waited on him. In his second interview, Appellant recalled that a man
waited on him and that he paid a dollar for the stamp and received change back.
Appellant said that after leaving the post office, he traveled about four
miles to Brookshire’s grocery store, where he bought a forty-pound bag of Purina
dog food for approximately forty dollars including tax. While he did not initially
remember how he paid, in his second interview he remembered that a woman
had waited on him and that he had paid with his debit card and received cash
back. Appellant stated that the post office and the grocery store were about five
to ten minutes apart. The Brookshire’s video shows him leaving the parking lot at
4:43 p.m.
Law enforcement did not believe that Appellant returned to Lianne’s house
after getting gas and before going to the post office in Bridgeport. Investigator
Jack McGuinn of the Wise County District Attorney’s Office testified there was
not enough time for Appellant to do so, based on the time that he got gas and the
time that his cell phone hit or pinged the Lake Bridgeport tower. Appellant got
gas at 4:01 p.m. at the Salt Creek Grocery store 9.2 miles southeast of Lianne’s
house. He made the call to the tractor store at 4:23 p.m.; that call pinged the
Lake Bridgeport tower. McGuinn testified that it would have taken Appellant
about twenty-three minutes to get from the Salt Creek Grocery store to a place
where the call could ping that tower and thirty-six minutes to get to the same
place if after leaving the store, he first drove past Lianne’s house without
stopping. But, Investigator McGuinn admitted that he could not pinpoint the
14
exact location of Appellant’s cell phone at the time of the call. Investigator
McGuinn also explained that if Appellant did not return to the house after getting
gas and before going to the post office, he never had the interactions with Lianne
in which she was “woozy,” “pill-drunk,” “blah,” and “weird-acting.” Instead,
Investigator McGuinn concluded that Appellant made up this scenario to support
his suicide story.
(c) Appellant Returns to Lianne’s House
from Bridgeport and Sees Lianne’s
Body Lying in the Yard.
Appellant told the Florida detectives that he arrived home about 5:25 p.m.
and discovered Lianne’s body lying in the front yard. It takes about twenty-three
minutes to get to Lianne’s house from Brookshire’s, so Investigator McGuinn
estimated at trial that Appellant would have been back at the house around
5:15 p.m.3 In fact, Appellant’s cell phone received a call at 5:16 p.m., and cell
phone mapping evidence indicated that he was at or very near Lianne’s house at
that time.
iv. Early Evening: Appellant Takes Action After
Lianne’s Death and Leaves for Florida.
Appellant estimated that he probably left for Florida about thirty to forty-five
minutes after he returned to Lianne’s house, but he also stated that he left at
“probably 6:30 p.m.” Regardless, he said that he left for Florida while it was still
3
Investigator McGuinn admitted that he had relied on Google for his timing
conclusions and that different variables could affect how long it takes to get from
one location to another.
15
daylight.
(a) Appellant Prepares for the Trip.
Appellant told the Florida detectives that during the time period after he
found Lianne’s body and before he left for Florida he:
 cried and thought about killing himself;
 hosed down the area where he found Lianne’s body;
 wrapped her in a comforter and plastic;
 dragged her to the garage;
 hitched a trailer to his pickup;
 loaded a Polaris Ranger utility vehicle and mower on the trailer and
strapped them in;
 fed and watered the dogs;
 wrote a note to explain what had happened;
 left the note in his sock drawer;
 got a duffle bag out;
 retrieved the holster for his pistol;
 packed some clothes and several boxes of shells for his .308 rifle;
 changed the jeans and sweatshirt he wore when he discovered
Lianne’s body because he was going on a trip, and swapped his
boots for tennis shoes;
 packed an ice chest with yogurt, mints, drinks, and other snacks;
and
 put his .308 rifle in the floor board of the pickup and the pistol and its
holster in the center console of his pickup (because he thought he
might still kill himself).
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A note drafted by Appellant and found under the socks in his drawer by
Wise County law enforcement stated:
 the couple had been arguing for weeks;
 Lianne had been working nights;
 she was thousands of dollars behind on bills;
 Appellant helped her by paying several thousand dollars toward her
bills;
 the previous week, Lianne told Appellant that she needed help
dealing with her father’s suicide;
 she sent Appellant to town for dog food and to get a postage stamp;
 Appellant “C[a]me Home and Lian[n]e shot Her self with [his pistol] in
front Yard”;
 he wrapped Lianne’s body up and put it in the barn;
 he “Loaded Some of [his] Personal P[ossessions] and Titles to Take
to [his] family in [Florida]”;
 he did “not want to Live after finding The One [he] Love[d] shot
Herself with [his pistol];” and
 Lianne was mentally unstable.
(b) Appellant Drives to Florida.
Appellant told the Florida detectives that he drove to Kelly’s house in Fort
Myers, Florida only stopping to get gas and to make brief rest stops. He did not
remember where he stopped along the way but stated that he had carried $300,
withdrawn $200 from an ATM at a gas station near Tyler, and bought gas on the
trip using cash or his check card. Evidence showed that he got gas in Lindale,
Texas at 9:02 p.m.
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Investigator McGuinn testified that the minimum time it would take
somebody to travel from Lianne’s Wise County home to Lindale was three hours
and fifteen minutes, which meant that Appellant had to have left Lianne’s house
by 5:45 p.m. Based on McGuinn’s conclusion—borne out by the cell phone
evidence—Appellant returned to Lianne’s house from completing his errands
around 5:15 p.m. McGuinn testified that Appellant could not have done all the
things he claimed to have done during the thirty minutes he was at Lianne’s
home. McGuinn surmised that this was further evidence that Lianne was dead
before Appellant even went to get gas on the afternoon of April 14, 2014.4
Like Investigator McGuinn, Lee County Detective Nolan testified that he
did not believe that Appellant could have completed all the tasks he said he did in
the short amount of time that he said elapsed after he found the body and before
he left for Florida.
c. Appellant Arrives at Kelly’s House on April 15, 2014.
Appellant estimated that it took him twenty-three or twenty-four hours to
reach Kelly’s house on April 15, 2014 but admitted that it is usually a twenty-hour
drive from Texas to Florida. He arrived at Kelly’s home in the afternoon and told
her what had happened, and she called 911 while he was in the shower. The
4
However, Investigator McGuinn conceded on cross-examination that he
did not know how much time the tasks took, how fast Appellant drove, or where
exactly the cell calls were made from.
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Florida detectives arrived, and Appellant’s first interview with law enforcement
began that evening.
d. Appellant Later Explains Why He Drove to Florida
After He Found Lianne’s Body.
Appellant told law enforcement that he fled to Florida because he did not
know anyone in Texas and he also wanted to heal his relationship with his sister
Kelly and her husband, Charlie, by giving his rifle and ammunition to Charlie.
Appellant further stated that he wanted to tell his family what had happened to
Lianne in person. During Kelly’s testimony, the State played a recording of a call
between Appellant and his mother in which Appellant complained that Kelly had
not given him time to hide the rifle he brought back from Texas before calling
911.
2. The Crime Scene
a. The Body
In his interviews with the Florida detectives, Appellant stated that when he
arrived home and saw Lianne’s body on the ground:
 she was flat;
 she was wearing her outdoor clothes;
 her legs were parted a little;
 her eyes were open;
 the bullet hole was in her neck;
 there was “so much blood on her face”;
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 “heavy blood” pooled by the back of her head;
 blood was “everywhere”;
 “blood had gurgled out of her mouth”; and
 blood “oozed out of her mouth.”
Appellant further described the blood as being around the back of Lianne’s neck
and her neck area.
Appellant told the Florida detectives that he knew that Lianne was dead
and that she looked like she had been dead for fifteen to twenty minutes. He
also said that she was “bluish green yellow.” Appellant’s sister Kelly testified that
he told her Lianne’s hands were “like [a] bluish-purple color.”
Appellant also stated in his interviews that Lianne smelled bad and “of a
dead person.” Upon further questioning, he clarified that it was not a rotten smell
because she had not been dead several days but maybe it was the smell of
blood.
Detective Nolan challenged Appellant’s account of finding the body,
testifying that he had never seen a body dead for fifteen to thirty minutes that
was bluish-green or yellow and that such a body would not yet smell of
decomposition.
Appellant described Lianne’s hands as lying on her left upper chest.
Detective Nolan and Texas Ranger Ron Pettigrew both testified that a decedent’s
hands resting up near her shoulder would be inconsistent with the previous
suicides they had seen. Investigator Reynolds testified that when he found
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Lianne’s body in her garage, one hand was up near her chest, but the other
hand, the right hand, was straight down her right side.
b. Location of the Pistol
Appellant variously claimed that he found his pistol “right by” Lianne’s
body, “by her hands,” to the left of her chest, “pretty close” to her neck, and on
her upper left chest area near her hands. He could not remember how the pistol
was positioned. Detective Nolan testified that the pistol could not have landed
where Appellant said he found it. Ranger Pettigrew testified that a
semiautomatic, like Appellant’s pistol, would usually jam after a suicide; that the
recoil of the gun and its spring going back would move the gun down, and that a
pistol being found with the decedent’s hands on their shoulder would be
inconsistent with suicide scenes that he had observed.
c. Lianne’s Car
Investigator Reynolds and Ranger Pettigrew testified that Lianne’s purse,
work materials, and packed lunch bag were found inside her unlocked car, “like
she just stepped out of the vehicle with everything else left inside.” Ranger
Pettigrew also said that it did not appear that she had taken anything into the
house, but he admitted that he did not know if she normally left her purse in the
car.
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3. Appellant’s Tampering with the Scene
a. Touching Lianne’s Hands
Appellant stated in his interviews with law enforcement that after finding
the body, he picked up Lianne’s hands and held them. They were limp. He
described her hands as being neither hot nor cold. Later, he stated that she was
cold, and Kelly testified that he told her that when he grabbed Lianne’s hands
they were cold.
Appellant originally told the Florida detectives that he did not think that any
of her blood got on him because he saw no blood on Lianne’s hands or her arms.
In speaking with Wise County Investigator Reynolds, he said that he did not
remember blood being on her hands, his hands, or the pistol. Further, even
though he told Detective Nolan that there was no blood on Lianne’s hands, he
later said that he might have cleaned her hands but never touched her face.
Rather, he offered that Lianne’s dogs might have licked her face. In contrast to
Appellant’s story, his sister Kelly testified that Appellant had told her that he had
blood on his hands from picking up the pistol.
b. Moving, Wrapping, and Concealing the Body
Appellant told the Florida detectives that Lianne’s puppy was near her
body and in the pool of blood when he found the body and Lianne’s two older
dogs also came up to the body soon after he found it. Appellant claimed that he
had nowhere to put the dogs to keep them away from the body because he and
22
Lianne allowed them to go in and out of the barn at will. He did not dispute that
pens were on the property, but he claimed they were puppy pens, not dog pens.
After finding the body, Appellant grabbed Lianne’s comforter from the
couch inside the house and rolled her up in it. He told the Florida detectives that
he did it because the dogs wanted to get “in the mess.” Later he stated that he
was trying to protect the body from the dogs. Appellant explained to the Florida
detectives that blood soaked through the comforter, and the dogs were still
sniffing around it, so he wrapped plastic sheeting from the garage around the
body. Elsewhere in the interview, Appellant said that he “scooted” the body onto
the comforter, he did not remember whether he rolled the body in it, he might
have rolled the body in the plastic but did not remember, and he “just did it.”
Appellant said that he did not consider what wrapping would do to the body and
did not know if the body sustained any injuries when he rolled it up.
Appellant dragged Lianne’s body by the feet into the garage and put it
beside a four-wheeled, off-road vehicle. He stated that he left the garage door
open so the dogs could get in to eat, but he later stated that he closed the roll-up
garage door. Appellant explained that he did not move Lianne’s body into the
house because her adult children would inherit it and would be traumatized if her
body were in the house.
Appellant said that after he moved Lianne’s body “out of the way,” he
rinsed some of the “thick, red blood from where her head was laying” and maybe
a piece of her skull away with the water hose.
23
Investigator Reynolds testified that despite Appellant’s statement in his
interviews that the dogs had been getting into Lianne’s blood, no bloody dog
prints were found anywhere on the scene, and no blood was found on any of the
dogs.
Investigator Reynolds also testified that when he unwrapped the body, it
was wet, which is not normal, Lianne’s hair had been slicked back, and it
appeared that her face had been wiped off.5 She appeared to have an injury on
the right side of the top of her head under her hair. Her clothes were stained with
blood and some other kind of liquid.
c. Rinsing the Blood from the Ground
At the scene, Investigator Reynolds also located a grassy area that tested
positive for blood adjacent to the porch, but he testified that the whole crime
scene had been sprayed with water and the blood had been washed away.
Detective Nolan testified that it is important to see the blood pattern when
investigating a suspicious death, but it was not possible here because Appellant
destroyed that evidence.
5
Investigator Reynolds admitted that his report had initially said that her
hair was wet with blood but stated that he later clarified in the report that it was
wet with water.
24
d. The Pistol, Bullet, and Shell Casing
i. Picking Up and Disposing of the Pistol
Appellant told the Florida detectives that he picked up his pistol to kill
himself but was afraid that his family would think that he had also killed Lianne.
Initially, he told the Florida detectives that he did not examine the pistol or notice
how many bullets were left in it when he picked it up. He also stated that before
he left the house, he might have popped a different “clip” in the pistol from the
gun case inside Lianne’s house but he did not remember. When speaking with
Wise County Investigator Reynolds, however, Appellant stated that the pistol was
ready to fire when he grabbed it. Appellant told law enforcement that he was
afraid to call 911 from the scene because Lianne had been killed with his pistol
and because he had touched the pistol, leaving fingerprints, when he picked it up
with the intention of killing himself.
Appellant told the Florida detectives that after dark on his trip to Florida, he
had thrown his pistol and its holster off a bridge on Interstate 10 somewhere in
Mississippi, but he did not know which body of water, could not otherwise
pinpoint the location, and doubted that he could remember it. Further, Appellant
had not called or texted anyone on the trip from Texas to Florida. He admitted
that he received a call or text on the trip but stated that he had no idea where he
was or whether it was received before or after he threw the pistol off the bridge.
Kelly said Appellant told her that on his way to her home in Florida, he stopped
25
on a bridge somewhere between Alabama and Louisiana around 2:00 a.m. and
threw away the pistol.
Detective Nolan noted that Appellant had gestured in his interview that he
had thrown the loaded pistol out the passenger window of his truck with his right
hand. According to Nolan, “It just didn’t make sense.” Appellant was unable to
recall where that location was in relation to where he stopped for gas, but he
could recall “little nuances that didn’t mean anything” like the cost of his racing
boots. Accordingly, Detective Nolan believed Appellant was lying.
ii. The Bullet
Investigator Reynolds discovered the bullet that killed Lianne lying almost
seventeen feet away from the grassy area that tested positive for blood. He
testified that the location where he found the bullet would have been consistent
with Lianne lying on the ground after she was shot through the throat. Reynolds
again emphasized that “the whole place [had been] sprayed down with water,”
and no genetic material was found on the bullet.
From receipts found in the gun cabinet at Lianne’s house and a recorded
jailhouse call between Appellant and Kelly, Investigators Reynolds and McGuinn
located the company from which Appellant had purchased his pistol and its
custom barrel. They then bought identical pieces and had ballistics testing
26
conducted on the bullet. Kevin Callahan, a DPS firearms and tool mark
examiner, testified that the custom barrel was capable of firing the bullet.6
iii. The Missing Spent Casing
Appellant told the Florida detectives that he did not look for the spent shell
casing after finding Lianne’s body. Investigator Reynolds brought a metal
detector and an ATF dog to Lianne’s Wise County property to search for the shell
casing. He did locate shell casings, but not for the pistol. Ranger Pettigrew
testified that the K9 dog who searched Lianne’s property for the spent casing sat
down in the grassy area that tested positive for blood, signaling that gunpowder
had been there, but the spent shell casing was never located.
e. Appellant’s Clothing and Lianne’s Cell Phone
i. Appellant’s Clothes
In addition to the missing pistol and casing, none of the clothing Appellant
wore at the Brookshire’s grocery store on April 14, 2014, except his hat, was
recovered by law enforcement. Appellant told law enforcement that he had
changed clothes and exchanged his boots for tennis shoes before he left for
Florida, and that those items were still in Lianne’s house in Texas. After
Appellant was placed in jail, Lianne’s son Daniel and their family friend Ron
LoFranco put all Appellant’s personal items that he left at Lianne’s Wise County
6
To conclude that a bullet was definitely fired from a firearm, the examiner
would need the actual barrel the bullet was fired from. However, that was not
possible here because Appellant disposed of the pistol.
27
house in the attic, and Investigator McGuinn had examined all of them. He
testified that the clothes and shoes Appellant wore April 14, 2014 were not found.
McGuinn repeatedly denied at trial that the Brookshire’s video showed that
Appellant was wearing boots and stated that “once [the video] was freeze framed
and blown up, it . . . looks more consistent with tennis shoes,” implying that
Appellant killed Lianne and changed shoes before he went to Brookshire’s. At
trial, the Brookshire’s video was admitted into evidence and played for the jury,
and the jury also viewed the blown-up pictures of the video frames.
ii. Lianne’s Cell Phone
Appellant mentioned in his interviews that Lianne had pictures on her cell
phone. Police dive teams searched both ponds on Lianne’s property, but her cell
phone was never found. After the police released the scene, Daniel and
LoFranco searched the house and the premises for Lianne’s cell phone. They
found her .357 magnum handgun in a drawer behind some clothes but did not
find her cell phone.
Appellant’s mental health expert, Randall Price, agreed that Appellant
could have been motivated to dispose of Lianne’s cell phone if she had taken
photographs of bruises or red marks and confronted Appellant with the pictures.
Family friend LoFranco testified that after he returned to Florida from helping
Daniel deal with the details of Lianne’s death in Texas, Kelly told him that
Appellant had thrown Lianne’s cell phone in the river along with his pistol.
28
LoFranco reported the information to the prosecutor about a year after Lianne’s
death.
Investigator Reynolds testified that of the people with access to Lianne’s
home and property, the person who had the motive and opportunity to get rid of
the cell phone, the shell casing, and the clothes Appellant was wearing when
Lianne died was Appellant.
In addition, William Wayne Cox, Appellant’s former cellmate, testified that
Appellant told him in the summer of 2014 that he had taken Lianne’s cell phone
along with his pistol, a rifle, and a briefcase of cash when he left Lianne’s house
for Florida.
f. The Briefcase
The State’s evidence showed a discrepancy between Appellant’s
documented retirement proceeds, $32,374.36, and the amount of retirement
proceeds Appellant told Investigator Reynolds he received, $29,000, which
matched Appellant’s deposits in two separate accounts in Texas. Investigator
Reynolds implied that Appellant was likely carrying the difference in those two
amounts, more than $3,000, in the briefcase when he fled to Florida.7
4. Lianne’s Right-Handedness
Appellant was evasive during the interviews with law enforcement when
asked whether Lianne was right- or left-handed. He told the Florida detectives
7
Kelly testified that the briefcase did not contain any money but did contain
Appellant’s important papers.
29
that he thought Lianne was ambidextrous and that he did not pay attention to
which hand she used when they shot guns for fun. He also thought that she
might write using her right hand and he did not know which hand she used to
hold her cell phone when making calls.
When Detective Nolan asked Appellant if Lianne was left-handed or right-
handed, Appellant did not answer the question but instead stated that “she had
both hands on the gun” when shooting targets. Detective Nolan also said that
when he asked the question, Appellant grabbed hold of Nolan’s hands to show
him where Lianne’s hands were instead of answering the question.
Regarding Appellant’s statement that he could not remember which hand
Lianne used to hold her cell phone, Detective Nolan testified,
These are visual observations that we make on a daily basis. . . .
He’s been in a relationship with her for six months. That is
something that . . . he should know . . . . The way that she holds a
frying p[an]. You’re going to—if you’re right-handed, you’re going
to—majority of the time gonna hold it with your right hand. When I’m
asking if she’s right-handed, he was unable to answer that question.
Detective Nolan also opined that Appellant should know “how [Lianne would]
hold a gun.” Nolan testified that even though Appellant “said at one point [that]
she did hold [the handgun] with two hands [when] shooting into the pond, . . . he
never answered if she ever picked the . . . handgun up with the right or left hand.”
Nolan further clarified that Appellant did not answer which hand Lianne used to
pull the trigger when he saw her shoot targets.
30
In contrast to Appellant, Lianne’s children and the medical examiner all
testified that Lianne was right-handed.
5. Manner of Lianne’s Death
a. Medical Examiner Testified Suicide Was Not Likely.
Dr. Emily Ogden, a medical examiner at the Southwestern Institute of
Forensic Sciences, performed the autopsy of Lianne’s body. At trial, Ogden
discussed State’s Exhibit 97, which shows the entry wound on the left side of
Lianne’s chin where the neck pivots and soot around the wound.
i. Lianne Was Shot at Close Range.
Dr. Ogden testified that the distance between the soot and the entry wound
on the body led her to conclude that it was not a contact wound but a close-range
wound, meaning that the barrel end of the firearm was anywhere from two to
twelve inches away from Lianne’s neck when she was shot. On cross-
examination, Dr. Ogden admitted that the range in this case was much more
likely to be two or three inches.8
Dr. Ogden testified that nearly 100% of suicides are classified as contact
wounds. In the approximately one hundred suicide autopsies she had performed
by Appellant’s trial, the only ones in which the wounds were not contact wounds
involved shotguns or “some sort of cloth” between the skin and the weapon,
8
Investigator McGuinn testified that the custom barrel added four and a half
inches to the length of Appellant’s pistol, making the pistol thirteen and a half
inches from the end of the custom barrel to the end of the pistol grip.
31
producing no soot on the body. On cross-examination, she testified that the soot
pattern around a wound is bigger the further away the weapon is from the body.
She also testified that searing of the skin, as depicted in a photo defense counsel
showed her, occurs in a close-range shot because the end of the muzzle is so
close to the entry. Dr. Ogden further testified that the soot pattern on Lianne’s
neck, which was generally the same size all the way around the wound, indicates
that the shot was not fired at an angle but was a fairly straight shot.
The exit wound was on the right side of Lianne’s scalp. Dr. Ogden could
not determine with any certainty whether Lianne was lying down, sitting, or
standing when she was shot.
ii. The Bullet Had a Left-to-Right Trajectory.
Dr. Ogden stated that in addition to the close range of the shot, the
trajectory from left to right also made it less likely that Lianne committed suicide
because she was right-handed. Ogden stated that it was very uncommon for a
person to use her nondominant hand to commit suicide. A right-handed person
would usually have a right-to-left trajectory with a contact wound at the right
temple. While Dr. Ogden conceded on cross-examination that “under the chin
and upward” is a method of shooting oneself and that it is plausible that the pistol
was upside down when it was fired, she explained that statistically she would still
expect the range to be contact or near contact so the shooter would not miss.
32
iii. Only Appellant’s Report that Lianne Killed
Herself Led to the Classification of
Undetermined Death on the Autopsy Report.
Dr. Ogden stated that absent Appellant’s story of how Lianne died, her
death would have been ruled a homicide. Instead, the autopsy report classified
the death as undetermined. On cross-examination, Dr. Ogden admitted that she
had doubts about, and did not know, how Lianne’s death occurred.
b. Law Enforcement Also Believed That Lianne’s
Wound and the Trajectory Did Not Support Suicide.
Like Dr. Ogden, Investigator Reynolds testified that Lianne’s wound was
not consistent with suicide because the bullet traveled from left to right, and
Lianne was right-handed. He therefore testified that it was very unlikely that
Lianne could have shot herself. Similarly, Ranger Pettigrew testified that he had
been involved with “25 to 30” suicide investigations and that of those involving a
gun, the wounds had all been “contact wounds” and he could not recall any
involving a pistol shooting underneath the chin. He stated that “[g]enerally
they’re in the mouth or to the temple.”
Detective Nolan testified that if Lianne had held a semiautomatic pistol
upside down, against her body, and pulled the trigger with her thumbs—a theory
espoused by the defense—there would probably be an abrasion on her hand and
a black mark on, and maybe a snag of, her clothing. Investigator McGuinn
likewise testified that it is easier for a person to sustain an unintended injury
when shooting a semiautomatic pistol rather than a revolver if the weapon is not
33
held properly “[b]ecause the gas from the discharge of the round being fired
causes the slide to move towards the rear of the gun, therefore ejecting the shell
plus seating the next round.” Absent a bruise on her right buttock, no abrasions
were found on Lianne’s body nor was there any damage to her clothing.
6. Appellant’s Incriminating Statements to Former Cellmates
a. Informant William Cox
Informant Cox testified that he had been in the Wise County jail for sixteen
months and that he had been the cellmate of Appellant during part of that time.
Cox was in jail because he had five felony charges pending. He was already on
parole and had four prior felony convictions. Because of his record, he was
facing the possibility of confinement for a period in the range of 25 to 99 years or
life. He testified that he had not been offered any deal by the State to testify
against Appellant and had not asked for one, but he was hoping to get a twenty-
five-year sentence. Cox stated that he informed on Appellant because “all of the
important women” in his life, including his mother, his sister, and his sister-in-law,
had “been beaten and abused” and it “just [ate] on [him] that somebody can
supposedly love somebody and then beat them or take their life. It’s just wrong.”
In the summer of 2014, Informant Cox told his retained counsel that he
wanted to talk to law enforcement about what Appellant had told him, and he did
so on July 2, 2014, almost a year before Appellant’s trial. Cox did not tell his
cellmates why he was going to talk to law enforcement. Ultimately, he spoke to
Investigator Reynolds and Ranger Pettigrew. Cox testified that Appellant talked
34
extensively to him about his case and that Appellant also discussed his case with
three other cellmates.
i. Informant Cox Reported that Appellant
Confessed to Murdering Lianne.
Appellant initially told Informant Cox that he had been arrested for killing
his girlfriend but she had committed suicide. Later, according to Cox, Appellant
was “mad and was just argumentative and just distraught” after a jailhouse
telephone call with his sister Kelly, which apparently provoked him to relate what
had happened to Lianne. Appellant told Cox that he had been arguing with his
girlfriend about money. Cox testified that Appellant said:
[S]he had inherited money and . . . he didn’t like the way that she
had handled it[.] . . . [S]he was running the business that she
inherited down the drain taking care of her kids who weren’t working
and wouldn’t get a job.
....
. . . He was tired of . . . her supporting her two kids,
specifically her son. She was spending all her money on her son’s
computer, her son’s pickup, [and] her son’s cell phone[,] and [her
son] wouldn’t get a job and . . . he was going back and forth to
school and not paying for any of the gas.
Informant Cox also testified that Appellant told him that he had come home
from the post office, and his girlfriend had threatened to kill herself. Appellant
“had just told her, ‘Bitch, I’ll do it for you,’ and he shot her.” Another time, Cox
testified, Appellant said that “he had killed the whiny, sniveling bitch and he
would do it again.”
Cox further said that Appellant told him:
35
 Appellant’s girlfriend had been “on dope” and was “doped up”;
 the shooting occurred near Bridgeport;
 Appellant used his pistol;
 Appellant wrapped his girlfriend’s body up and put her in a garage or
barn;
 Appellant wrote a note stating that he was thinking about killing
himself and that he was going to Florida to tell the family what
happened;
 Appellant loaded a flatbed trailer with a Polaris and mower;
 Appellant took his girlfriend’s cell phone, his pistol and rifle, and a
briefcase of cash;
 Appellant left for Florida;
 Appellant threw the pistol into the ocean “because he was
considering committing suicide”;
 “they called and reported it” because Appellant did not think he could
be convicted since he thought it looked like a suicide; and
 Appellant “had purchased a special barrel for [the pistol] for target
practice, and he was afraid that the ballistics on the barrel would be
taken and the ballistics would match the bullet.”
Cox testified that Appellant “went back and forth” from saying he had killed
Lianne to saying that she had committed suicide. In addition, Cox testified that
after learning that Cox had incriminated him, Appellant threatened him through
another inmate.
ii. Informant Cox’s Testimony was Sufficiently
Corroborated.
Ranger Pettigrew testified that Informant Cox disclosed specific
corroborating facts in his interview with law enforcement that he could have
36
obtained only from Appellant—such as where the death occurred, where the
wound was, and that the cell phone was disposed of—and facts that law
enforcement did not know about before that interview—like the briefcase of cash
Appellant took to Florida.
Investigator McGuinn testified that Cox’s statement was turned over to the
defense soon after he gave it, and a month later, Cox was moved out of
Appellant’s cell. McGuinn then interviewed other inmates who had been housed
with Appellant. Every inmate or former inmate McGuinn interviewed stated that it
was possible for conversations to be held in the cell while other inmates were
sleeping. McGuinn admitted that one of them, Dallas Tate, said that he never
heard Appellant talk about his case while he was in the cell with Appellant and he
thought Cox was lying. But, McGuinn said that Tate admitted that Appellant and
Cox could have had conversations while Tate was asleep. Finally, McGuinn
admitted that he did not interview everyone who was Appellant’s cellmate when a
conversation between Appellant and Cox could have occurred.
Another inmate, Carl William Lackey, testified that he was currently in jail
for a drug-related offense, he knew Cox, and Cox told him he was going to get
his charges dropped by informing on someone else.
b. Tyler Chapman
Another former cellmate of Appellant’s, Tyler Chapman, testified that in
July 2014, he was arrested for aggravated robbery, that he had pled guilty to a
lesser charge, and that he was on deferred adjudication community supervision
37
as a result of that plea. He also testified that he had not been offered anything
for his testimony. Chapman knew that Appellant had been charged with murder
because it “got talked about several times.” Chapman testified that within two or
three minutes of a new inmate walking into the cell, Appellant “boasted out that
he was in there for murder.” Chapman explained that Appellant “said it . . . with a
. . . smirk and kind of in a mocking way, kind of like he was downplaying it, like it
was kind of funny,” and was laughing at the time.
Chapman said that Appellant told him:
 Appellant’s girlfriend’s father had committed suicide five years before
her death, “and he implied that that would make it more believable
that she actually would have killed herself also”;
 “all that matters is that it looks like she killed herself”;
 the medical report was in his favor;
 Cox would not be believed because of his extensive record and
“they would think he’s just trying to get off the hook with his current
charge that he was in there for”;
 Cox was lying in the statement against Appellant;
 “lying is what will get you killed”; and
 Cox was lucky that he had been moved to a different cell.
7. Lianne’s Mental State
a. The Defense’s Portrayal
With almost perfect consistency in his interviews with law enforcement,
Appellant insisted that Lianne killed herself. Of all the witnesses, only Appellant
indicated that Lianne was mentally unstable when she died. He described her as
38
suffering from menopause and a hormonal imbalance. He said she was moody
and could be violent—“a little time bomb” who could get “devilish mad, . . . scary
mad.” Appellant theorized that Lianne had killed herself because of her father’s
suicide, her feud with her sister, her mother’s disowning her before her death,
and the pills that he said she took on the day of her death. Appellant admitted
that he did not find a suicide note from Lianne and told the Florida detectives that
she never threatened to kill herself or him. Rather, he theorized that she used
his gun to hurt him.
Although Appellant named Lianne’s alleged drug use as a factor in her
death, the toxicology report completed during the autopsy indicated that Lianne
had not taken any type of controlled substance and had no alcohol in her system.
Kelly joined her brother in testifying about Lianne’s stressors that could
have led to suicide, but Kelly also admitted that she might have told the police
that she was surprised that Lianne would have killed herself because she thought
Lianne was more stable than that. Kelly also said that Lianne never told her that
she wanted to kill herself.
Robin White, Lianne’s estranged sister, testified for the defense. Robin
testified that her family had a history of depression but she did not know if Lianne
suffered from depression. Robin reported that Lianne had been hospitalized in a
psychiatric ward for about a week in 1979, when she was sixteen years old,
because she was burning herself. Robin admitted that she had not been around
Lianne for any extended length of time since 2009, but stated that Lianne had an
39
“excitable, grandiose personality” with severe mood swings. Robin also testified,
though, that Lianne had a strong personality, was physically strong, and would
have fought back if attacked.
Dr. Price, a clinical and forensic psychologist, testified for the defense as
an expert witness. He stated that he “did find [some] evidence of risk factors for
suicide in the case of Lianne,” based on his review of the evidence and an
approximate ninety-minute telephone conversation with Robin. As risk factors,
Dr. Price pointed to:
 Lianne’s age and gender;
 her “anxiety, in the form of sleep deprivation”;
 her early hospitalization for burning herself;
 Appellant’s report of her mood fluctuations;
 Lianne’s family history of depression and suicide;
 Lianne’s financial stress; and
 Lianne’s relationship issues with Appellant and her family.
On cross-examination, Price testified that he never interviewed Appellant
or Lianne’s children.
Ranger Pettigrew testified that of all the people he spoke to in this case
and whose interviews he reviewed, only Appellant described Lianne as mentally
40
unstable, depressed or suicidal, unable to control her anger, or having abused
drugs or alcohol.9
b. The State’s Portrayal
The prosecution sought to portray Lianne as mentally and emotionally
tough and looking forward to the future.
i. Lianne Was Strong.
In a voice mail Lianne left Appellant six weeks before her death, she
threatened to end the relationship—not kill herself—because of his controlling
behavior.
Lianne’s daughter Allisyn testified that she and her mother spoke every
day. Allisyn described Lianne as a “determined,” “independent, [and] strong
woman.” Lianne’s close friends Vivian Lewis and Randall Mark Brown echoed
Allisyn’s assessment of her mother as strong.
Allisyn testified that her mother would fight for herself and walk away if
there were problems in a relationship and that she would not tolerate abuse.
Indeed, Lianne had left Daniel’s father after he kicked her in the stomach when
she was six months pregnant with Daniel. Allisyn firmly believed that her mother
would have fought an attacker to the death.
9
He admitted that he did not speak to Robin or review her interview.
41
ii. Lianne Would Not Consider Suicide.
Allisyn admitted that her maternal grandfather’s suicide had been very
traumatic for Lianne. But, Allisyn also testified that she and Lianne had
discussed how neither woman would commit suicide due to the suffering their
children would endure. Lianne’s close friends Ron LoFranco and Vivian Lewis
confirmed that Lianne had been angry about her father’s suicide and had said
that she would “never do [that] to [her] kids.”
iii. Lianne Was Focused on the Future.
Allisyn and Lianne’s friends testified that Lianne was looking forward to the
future. Nine days before her death, on April 5, 2014, Lianne sent Allisyn, who
was eight months pregnant, a text saying, “I’m taking care of a one-year-old baby
girl, I see all the baby stuff and think of you and I’ll be there soon” and asking
Allisyn when she should come to Florida for her new grandchild’s birth. The last
text Lianne sent Allisyn, which was sent April 12, 2014, indicated that Lianne was
working an extra shift to buy her plane ticket to Florida.
Roxanne Martin, from Azle, Texas near Lianne’s Wise County home,
testified that Lianne worked an extra overnight shift ending on April 13, 2014 at
8:00 a.m. in Martin’s home caring for her disabled son. Martin testified that
Lianne told her that she was moving to Florida, was very happy, and “didn’t
appear to have any problems that night at all.”
42
iv. Lianne’s Stress Level Was Normal and She
Was Not Depressed.
Allisyn testified that her mother had no mental health history, was not
depressed, and was never suicidal. However, Allisyn admitted that a defense
exhibit showed that Lianne was diagnosed with anxiety the month before she met
Appellant and that she had suffered from insomnia for a long time.
Allisyn testified that financial stress was normal for Lianne except during
the nursery’s busy season but that her financial situation had improved by the
time she died. Daniel and Lianne’s friends likewise testified that Lianne’s
finances had stabilized.
v. The State’s Expert Found No Credible
Evidence that Lianne Would Have
Contemplated Killing Herself.
The State’s mental health expert, David Sabine, a clinical psychologist in
private practice in Wichita Falls who also has an expertise in forensic
psychology, testified that only Lianne’s age (fifty-one) provided any risk of
suicide, so she would have been at a low risk had she been formally evaluated.
He also testified that having a family member who has committed suicide is just
one risk factor and is worth only a normal weight. Dr. Sabine conceded that
sleep deprivation could be a risk factor for suicide for persons “extremely
compromised” by lack of sleep. On the other hand, he also testified that a
person’s reducing her credit card debt and expressing hope for the future would
“decrease the likelihood that the person . . . is contemplating suicide.” Sabine
43
further testified that from his review of the evidence, “[i]t appeared in the things
that [Lianne] wrote that she was planning assertively and with [a] considerable
amount of . . . excitement and anticipation” and that he “did not see much at all
that suggested [that Lianne was] someone who would be the kind of person who
would have completed suicide.” Finally, Dr. Sabine said that “[t]he only
suggestion of [Lianne’s] instability came from [Appellant].”10
8. Appellant’s Mental State
a. Appellant Had Motive to Kill.
The State’s theory was that Appellant had killed Lianne sometime on April
14, 2014 after she arrived home from work because she had told him to leave the
night before. Kelly agreed on cross-examination that the level of animosity
between her brother and Lianne was suddenly much higher on the night of April
13 and that Appellant would have been very upset if Lianne had told him to leave
or threatened to call the police. Dr. Price buttressed the State’s theory by
admitting on cross-examination that Lianne’s telling Appellant to leave or that she
was going to call the police could be considered a motive for murder.
b. Appellant Impugned Lianne’s Character.
Law enforcement thought Appellant was lying in his interviews. Detective
Nolan said that generally in his experience, “[i]t . . . throws out a flag when” a
10
Sabine admitted on cross-examination that he had not been told there
was a family history of depression and that he had not known about Lianne’s stay
in a psychiatric ward when she was sixteen years old before the day he testified.
44
person is asked a specific question but “go[es] off on a tangent and talk[s] about
something completely different, especially when they start justifying or enforcing
their character and demolishing the other person’s character.” Appellant did this
repeatedly in his interviews.
For example, Nolan told the jury that in his interview of Appellant,
 Appellant showed very little love for Lianne;
 From the way Appellant explained it, his relationship with Lianne was
one-sided, where he provided for her but she was “just mean and
rude”;
 Appellant was trying to portray Lianne as “a ticking time bomb” with
“anger issues” and “outrages of violence” and “himself as [her] white
knight”;
 Appellant described Lianne as “verbally aggressive” without
indicating whether his response was aggressive;
 Appellant’s description of the couple’s interaction the morning after
their fight “didn’t sound right. You have the hostile confrontation the
day before, the hostile texts throughout the night where he has to
call up and make sure that everything is okay between them, and
then the next day she’s all sweetness and like wanting to hug and
kiss”;
 Appellant did not seem upset in describing the crime scene and was
“[v]ery, very descriptive of [Lianne’s] injuries”;
 Appellant did not show that he missed Lianne; and
 Appellant “blamed [Lianne for her death] immediately.”
Similarly, Investigator Reynolds testified that while Appellant got emotional
at times during their videotaped exchange, he shed no tears.
45
c. Appellant Behaved Like a Criminal When He
Discovered the Body and Showed No Concern that
an Intruder Might Be Involved.
Ranger Pettigrew was immediately suspicious of Appellant’s account of
what he did when he found Lianne’s body. Pettigrew testified:
The actions that [Appellant] took with . . . the body,
predominantly somebody came home, found somebody dead, the
first thing that struck me was he never went inside to see if she was
possibly killed by another person. He . . . never talked about fearing
for his safety. He never called 911, if somebody would have
murdered her. He never checked the scene. He had no self-
preservation whatsoever.
From his statement, he immediately deduced that it was
suicide and . . . set about securing the body, wrapping up the body,
hiding it, or secreting it, washing down the scene, taking the gun and
other evidence from the location with him as he fled.
E. Analysis of the Evidence
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold that
the jury could have properly found beyond a reasonable doubt that Lianne’s
threatening to call the police and telling Appellant to leave her property—after all
the time and money he had spent improving it—led Appellant to intentionally or
knowingly kill her with his pistol, to attempt to create an alibi, and to lie to law
enforcement about the timing and cause of her death. The jury could have
properly determined that discrepancies within his statements and evidence that
he hid the body, destroyed the crime scene, disposed of both the pistol and
Lianne’s cell phone, and fled the scene also point to his guilt. We therefore hold
that the evidence is sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction for murder, and
46
thus overrule his first and second issues. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319,
99 S. Ct. at 2789; Jenkins, 493 S.W.3d at 599.
III. Testimony of Informant Cox
In Appellant’s third and fourth issues, he challenges the trial court’s
admission of Informant Cox’s testimony over his rule 403 objection. Rule 403 of
the rules of evidence allows the trial court to “exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Tex. R. Evid. 403. In
conducting a rule 403 analysis, a court must balance the probative force of the
evidence and the proponent’s need for it against any tendency that evidence may
have to lead the jury to resolve an issue on an incorrect ground “or [to] distract
the jury from the main issues.” Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006). The court must also evaluate how much time the proponent
would need to develop the evidence, whether the evidence is repetitive of
evidence already admitted, and whether the jury is able to fairly consider the
evidence. Id. at 641–42.
We review a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Weatherred v. State, 15 S.W.3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A
trial court does not abuse its discretion when its decision to exclude the evidence
is within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Montgomery v. State,
810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g).
47
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Not Conducting a Balancing Test
on the Record Before Admitting Informant Cox’s Testimony.
In his third issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to
conduct an adequate balancing test on the record after Appellant objected to
Informant Cox’s testimony.
Here, Appellant filed a pretrial motion objecting to Cox’s testimony and
requested the trial court to conduct a balancing test under rule of evidence
403 before allowing him to testify. The State filed a response setting out the
facts it anticipated that Informant Cox would testify to as well as corroborating
evidence that it expected to be admitted at trial. Before Cox testified at trial, the
trial court held a hearing on the motion outside the presence of the jury. The trial
court denied the motion. The prosecutor asked the trial judge, “just for appellate
purposes,” to “state on the record” that he had conducted the balancing test. The
trial judge replied, “No. I—that’s—they will figure that, Counsel.”
The trial court was correct. The law does not require the trial court to
conduct the balancing test on the record or to state its findings and conclusions
based on the test, Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 195 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997), nor does the law require that the trial court state on the record that it has
conducted a balancing test, Reyes v. State, 480 S.W.3d 70, 77 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2016, pet. ref’d). When the trial court rules on an objection under rule 403,
we presume that it has engaged in the required balancing test, Williams,
958 S.W.2d at 195; Sanders v. State, 422 S.W.3d 809, 816 n.8 (Tex. App.—Fort
48
Worth 2014, pet. ref’d), absent evidence showing that the trial court did not
perform the test. Rojas v. State, 986 S.W.2d 241, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998);
Distefano v. State, No. 14-14-00375-CR, 2016 WL 514232, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 9, 2016, pet. ref’d).
As for Appellant’s contention that his objection “required the trial court to
consider the circumstances surrounding the alleged jailhouse confession in light
of the corroboration evidence” in performing the balancing test, he offers no legal
support for such a requirement and no evidence that the trial court did not do so.
We overrule Appellant’s third issue.
B. The Trial Court’s Admission of Informant Cox’s Testimony Is
Not Reversible Error.
In his fourth issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by admitting Informant Cox’s testimony. However, a trial court’s
erroneous admission of evidence will not require reversal when other such
evidence was received without objection, either before or after the complained-of
ruling. Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 302 n.29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert.
denied, 562 U.S. 1142 (2011); Lane v State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2004). This rule applies whether the other evidence was introduced by the
defendant or the State. Leday v. State, 983 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App.
1998). An exception to this rule occurs when a defendant offers evidence
identical to that to which he earlier objected to rebut, destroy, or explain the
previously admitted evidence. Id. at 718–19; Rogers v. State, 853 S.W.2d 29,
49
35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Finally, we review a trial court’s evidentiary ruling
based on what was before the court when it made its ruling. Willover v. State,
70 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Calton v. State, No. 2-04-228-CR,
2005 WL 3082202, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 17, 2005, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication).
Before the trial court held the hearing on Appellant’s rule 403 objection to
Informant Cox’s testimony, Dr. Emily Ogden testified without objection on cross-
examination that she spoke with Investigator McGuinn and the prosecutor on
July 30, 2014, and that they showed her a video of Informant Cox reporting that
Appellant confessed to murdering Lianne. Accordingly, even if the trial court
abused its discretion by admitting Cox’s testimony over Appellant’s rule
403 objection, which we do not hold, such error would not have been reversible.
See Mayfield v. State, Nos. 2-05-00386-CR, 2-05-00387-CR, 2007 WL 938697,
at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 29, 2007, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (holding Mayfield failed to preserve error regarding
some of a challenged witness’s testimony because other witnesses testified to
the same subject matter before the trial court granted a running objection to the
challenged witness’s testimony); cf. Roderick v. State, 494 S.W.3d 868,
881 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (holding the defendant failed
to preserve error in the admission of the State’s evidence of prior convictions by
offering the evidence first); Johnson v. State, 981 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (same). We overrule Appellant’s fourth issue.
50
IV. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Appellant’s
Motion for Mistrial after Ranger Pettigrew Referred to a Polygrapher.
In his fifth issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred by failing to
grant a mistrial after Ranger Pettigrew referred to a “nonexistent polygraph
examination” in his direct testimony. Within this issue, Appellant also complains
about the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury to disregard Ranger Pettigrew’s
comment about the polygrapher. However, Appellant did not request such an
instruction.
Specifically, when Ranger Pettigrew was being questioned, the following
occurred:
Q. Okay. And I don’t know if you did or did not have the
opportunity to watch at least Detective Patton’s portion of the second
interview as it was being conducted.
A. I believe—I believe we were waiting with the
polygrapher and—
[Defense Counsel]: Objection, your Honor. May we
approach?
THE COURT: Yes.
(At the bench, off the record)
Later, after another bench conference, defense counsel put the following
on the record outside the jury’s presence:
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, this is just a matter we discussed at the
bench. When Ron Pettigrew, the Texas
Ranger, was testifying, he made a reference to
a polygrapher, and I approached and objected
and you sustained the objection. And I moved
for mistrial because I believed that that
portrayed to the jury that he had probably
51
taken a polygraph and failed, which is not true.
And therefore, I request[ed] a mistrial on that
basis. And you said you were going to carry it
along, and I just wanted that on the record.
THE COURT: I’ve carried it.
....
THE COURT: And to make the record complete on the
conversation, the State did ask for—or
suggest an instruction to the jury to disregard,
which I disregarded that because in my
opinion, under the circumstances, it would
have called greater attention to it than it
already had. That’s enough about that.
The trial court then denied the request for mistrial after the jury verdict.
The traditional and preferred procedure for preserving error is to (1) object,
(2) request an instruction to disregard, and (3) move for a mistrial. Young v.
State, 137 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). While a prompt motion for
mistrial without the first two steps may preserve error on a complaint, reversal will
not be required if a ruling on an objection or request for instruction to disregard
would have cured the harm flowing from the prejudicial event. Id. at 70–72; see
Unkart v. State, 400 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (holding that solely
moving for mistrial will preserve error if timely objection or instruction to disregard
would not have cured the harm flowing from the improper comment); Brewer v.
State, 367 S.W.3d 251, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“The appellant did not
request a curative instruction before moving for a mistrial—a choice that forfeited
52
appellate relief for [prejudice] that could have been cured by such an instruction.”
(citation omitted)).
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert.
denied, 564 U.S. 1020 (2011). We uphold the ruling if it lies within the zone of
reasonable disagreement. Id. In determining whether the trial court abused its
discretion by denying the mistrial, we balance three factors: (1) the severity of the
misconduct or prejudicial effect; (2) curative measures; and (3) the certainty of
the conviction absent the misconduct. Hawkins v. State, 135 S.W.3d 72,
77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 259 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1070 (1999). In polygraph cases, we may
also consider whether the party through whom the evidence was elicited showed
bad faith in putting the evidence before the jury and whether the polygraph
evidence strengthened the State’s case. Reed v. State, 497 S.W.3d 633,
639 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.); Martines v. State, 371 S.W.3d 232,
251 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
It has long been recognized that because of their inherent unreliability and
tendency to be unduly persuasive, the results of a polygraph examination are not
admissible in Texas for any purpose. Nethery v. State, 692 S.W.2d 686,
700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1110 (1986); Reed,
497 S.W.3d at 639. Generally, however, it has likewise been recognized that an
instruction to disregard is sufficient to cure any prejudice when a polygraph is
53
merely mentioned nonresponsively by a witness and results, if any, are not
disclosed. Richardson v. State, 624 S.W.2d 912, 914–15 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1981); Roper v. State, 375 S.W.2d 454, 456–57 (Tex. Crim. App.
1964).
In this case, because Appellant did not request the instruction, he has
forfeited his complaint about its absence. See Brewer, 367 S.W.3d at 253; see
also Williams v. State, No. 12-01-00311-CR, 2003 WL 1883474, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Tyler Apr. 16, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(holding appellant failed to preserve error when, after his objection to polygraph
evidence was sustained, he asked for mistrial instead of instruction to disregard
and did not renew his request for mistrial after trial court instructed jury to
disregard upon State’s suggestion).
Certainly there are instances where an instruction to disregard will not cure
the prejudice of polygraph evidence and the absence of an instruction will not
forfeit the appellant’s complaint about the trial court’s denial of a mistrial. See,
e.g., Kugler v. State, 902 S.W.2d 594, 596 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995,
pet. ref’d) (explaining that despite the instruction to disregard, the repetition of
evidence that defendant refused a polygraph heightened its persuasive effect in
a case in which the complainant was the only witness who could identify him as
her attacker). This is not the case here because the record indicates that Ranger
Pettigrew mentioned the polygrapher inadvertently and did in no way disclose or
allude to test results. When a witness gives a nonresponsive answer that
54
mentions a polygraph test but does not mention the results of the test, there is no
error in denying a mistrial. Martines, 371 S.W.3d at 251; Barker v. State,
740 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no pet.). We
therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Appellant’s motion for mistrial, and we overrule his fifth issue.
V. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Denying a Mistrial at
Punishment Based on the Prosecutor’s Argument That There Was No
Difference Between a Sixty-Year Sentence and a Life Sentence.
In his sixth and seventh issues, Appellant contends that the trial court
erred and abused its discretion by not granting a mistrial based on the
prosecutor’s argument at the punishment phase implying that there was no
difference between assessing a sixty-year sentence and assessing a life
sentence.
After the close of evidence at the punishment phase but before the parties’
arguments, the trial court instructed the jury as follows regarding parole:
It is also possible that the length of time for which the
Defendant will be imprisoned might be reduced by the award of
parole.
Under the law applicable in this case, if the Defendant is
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for
parole until the actual time served equals one-half of the sentence
imposed or 30 years, whichever is less, without the consideration of
any good conduct time he may earn. Eligibility for parole does not
guarantee that parole will be granted.
....
You may consider the existence of the parole law and good
conduct time. However, you are not to consider the extent to which
good conduct time may be awarded to or forfeited by this particular
55
Defendant. You are not to consider the manner in which the parole
law may be applied to this particular Defendant.
During the State’s closing argument at the punishment phase, the
prosecutor argued:
You know, that charge that the Judge just read to you is your guide,
and there’s two parts of punishment. There’s the time and there’s
the fine. I’m going to talk to you about each just real quick.
One, on the time, a person sentenced to murder becomes
eligible for parole only after they’ve served half of their sentence, or
30 years, whichever is less. Basically what that means, 60 years to
life, as far as parole goes, is the same thing, a person becomes
eligible. So anything you give over 60 years is just a statement as to
how serious—
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I object to this. This is going
beyond what the charge says about parole.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[The State]: It’s just a statement as to how serious you think
this crime is. . . . And we are going to be asking you for the
maximum, life in the penitentiary and a $10,000 fine.
Appellant did not request a mistrial in the trial court and does not argue
here that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial sua
sponte. See Morris v. State, 565 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (holding the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by not granting a mistrial sua sponte after
sustaining an objection to the prosecutor’s argument that the defendant was
receiving illegal income). In the interest of justice, we will construe these two
issues as complaints about the trial court’s overruling of Appellant’s objection to
the prosecutor’s argument.
56
To be permissible, the State’s jury argument must fall within one of the
following four general areas: (1) summation of the evidence; (2) reasonable
deduction from the evidence; (3) answer to argument of opposing counsel; or
(4) plea for law enforcement. Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 94–95 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 829 (1993); Alejandro v. State, 493 S.W.2d
230, 231 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). When a prosecutor accurately restates or
explains the law on parole eligibility given in the charge without providing
information beyond the charge, such argument is proper. Taylor v. State,
233 S.W.3d 356, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (majority op.); id. at 360 (Womack,
J., concurring); Waters v. State, 330 S.W.3d 368, 372–75 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2010, pet. ref’d). Encouraging the jury to speculate about when or whether a
defendant could be granted parole is not proper. Taylor, 233 S.W.3d at
360 (Womack, J., concurring); Waters, 330 S.W.3d at 374.
Here, the prosecutor accurately restated the law on parole as it applies to
those convicted of murder and as it was given in the jury charge. See Tex. Gov’t
Code Ann. § 508.145(d) (West Supp. 2016) (providing generally that an inmate
serving a sentence for offenses described by article 42A.054(a) of the code of
criminal procedure is not eligible for release on parole until his actual calendar
time served equals one-half of the sentence or thirty calendar years, whichever is
less); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42A.054(a)(2) (West Supp. 2016) (listing
murder). At the same time, the prosecutor made a proper plea for law
enforcement. See Waters, 330 S.W.3d at 375. The prosecutor did not travel
57
outside the bounds of the charge to encourage the jury to speculate on matters
not properly before it (such as when or whether Appellant might be granted
parole) in assessing punishment. See Taylor, 233 S.W.3d at 360 (Womack, J.,
concurring); Waters, 330 S.W.3d at 374. We therefore hold that the argument
was proper, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling
Appellant’s objection. We overrule his sixth and seventh issues.
VI. Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant’s seven issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Mark T. Pittman
MARK T. PITTMAN
JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and PITTMAN, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 6, 2017
58