Lisa D. Wall v. State

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-13-00552-CR
LISA D. WALL APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 4 OF DENTON COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. CR-2012-01008-D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. INTRODUCTION2
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2
This case was originally submitted without oral argument on Friday, May
30, 2014, before a panel consisting of Chief Justice Livingston, Justice Gardner,
and Justice Gabriel. The court, on its own motion on January 15, 2015, ordered
this case reset without oral argument on February 5, 2015; assigned this case to
a new panel, consisting of Chief Justice Livingston, Justice Walker, and Justice
Gabriel; and assigned the undersigned to author the opinion.
Appellant Lisa D. Wall appeals her conviction for driving while intoxicated.
After the trial court denied her motion to suppress evidence, Wall pleaded no
contest. The trial court assessed her punishment at 300 days’ confinement,
which the court suspended; the trial court placed Wall on community supervision
for fifteen months. Wall perfected this appeal.
In her sole issue, Wall argues that the trial court erred by denying her
motion to suppress. The State raises a cross-point, asserting that although the
trial court correctly denied Wall’s motion to suppress, the denial was proper on
an alternative ground rejected by the trial court––that the stop of Wall’s vehicle
was justified based on the arresting officer’s reasonable suspicion that Wall was
driving while intoxicated. Because we sustain Wall’s issue but also sustain the
State’s cross-point, we will affirm the trial court’s judgment.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
Officer Corey Padgett, driving his patrol unit, approached an intersection
where he observed Wall stopped at a flashing yellow light. Wall remained
stopped for several seconds, and cross-traffic, which had a flashing red light,
drove warily through the intersection when Wall did not. After a few seconds,
Wall drove through the intersection, and Officer Padgett followed her.
As Wall approached another intersection with a flashing yellow light, she
braked hard but late, coming to an almost complete stop in the middle of the
3
As set forth below, the events leading up to the stop were recorded by
Officer Padget’s dash cam video recorder; we have reviewed the video.
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intersection. Before her vehicle completely stopped, Wall accelerated through
the intersection, changed lanes, and made a U-turn. Based on Wall’s curious
driving behavior, Officer Padgett initiated a traffic stop.
When Officer Padgett began talking with Wall, he observed that her eyes
were glassy and red, her speech was slurred, and that she had a slight smell of
alcohol. Officer Padgett administered standard field sobriety tests, and Wall
displayed six clues of intoxication on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Officer
Padgett arrested Wall for driving while intoxicated, and a subsequent blood draw
revealed that Wall had a blood alcohol concentration of .16.
Wall filed a motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of Officer
Padgett’s traffic stop, arguing that Officer Padgett lacked reasonable suspicion to
stop her vehicle. At the suppression hearing, Officer Padgett testified that Wall’s
reaction to the two lights had made him suspect that she was intoxicated. He
explained that stopping at a flashing yellow light is not normal, even if it is not a
traffic violation to do so. From his training, Officer Padgett knew that intoxicated
drivers often fail to follow traffic signals, and he considered a driver’s inability to
respond properly to a flashing yellow light to be a big indicator of intoxication. In
fact, Officer Padgett had made prior DWI stops at a flashing yellow light “at that
exact area” of the road that Wall was travelling. Given Wall’s driving behavior
and the fact that it was around 2:00 a.m. on a weekend day in a neighborhood
with many bars, Officer Padgett suspected that Wall was intoxicated.
3
The trial court admitted and reviewed a video recording of the traffic stop.
After the hearing, the trial court denied Wall’s suppression motion. In its findings
of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court determined that Wall’s driving did
not give rise to reasonable suspicion that she was driving while intoxicated. But
the trial court concluded that Officer Padgett could have stopped Wall for either
of the two traffic violations that Officer Padgett had observed: Wall’s disregard of
a traffic control device and Wall’s U-turn, which the trial court considered too
wide because Wall allegedly straddled the turning lane’s white line in the turn.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own factual
review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v.
State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial
judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000),
modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).
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Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on
(1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court’s determination of those facts
was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-
of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.
Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). Concerning questions of historical fact, even when a video tape of the
stop exists, the trial court's factual determinations are entitled to almost total
deference so long as they are supported by the record. See Tucker v. State, 369
S.W.3d 179, 185 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101,
109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Concerning application-of-law-to-fact questions that
do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial
court’s rulings on those questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada
v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at
652–53.
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Tucker, 369 S.W.3d at 185; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v.
Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the trial court makes
explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those fact findings. Kelly,
204 S.W.3d at 818–19. We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo
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unless its explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also
dispositive of the legal ruling. Id. at 818. We must uphold the trial court’s ruling if
it is supported by the record and correct under any theory of law applicable to the
case even if the trial court gave the wrong reason for its ruling. State v. Stevens,
235 S.W.3d 736, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Armendariz v. State, 123 S.W.3d
401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 974 (2004).
B. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo.
Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In construing a
statute, we seek to effectuate the collective intent or purpose of the legislators
who enacted the legislation. Id. We look first to the statute’s literal text, and we
read words and phrases in context and construe them according to the rules of
grammar and common usage unless they have acquired technical or particular
meaning. Id. When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect
to its plain meaning unless to do so would lead to absurd consequences that the
legislature could not have possibly intended. Id. at 837–38.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law included the
following:
The Court finds the driving of the defendant is not reasonable
suspicion of driving while intoxicated. Caution in entering an
intersection is proper. The Defendant sat at the intersection for 26
seconds that the [sic] Officer Padgett could observe and that is not
obstructing a highway.
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But the court finds the defendant could be stopped for
disregarding the traffic control device and making a wide turn over
the white line.
....
The Court therefore denies the motion to suppress.
V. LAW ON WARRANTLESS DETENTIONS
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at
24. To suppress evidence because of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation,
the defendant bears the initial burden of producing evidence that rebuts the
presumption of proper police conduct. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672; see Young
v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 872 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1093
(2009). A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or seizure
occurred without a warrant. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672. Once the defendant
has made this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the State, which is then
required to establish that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a
warrant or was reasonable. Id. at 672–73; Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005).
To justify a brief detention for investigative purposes, the officer must be
able to articulate something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Foster v. State, 326 S.W.3d 609, 613–14 (Tex. Crim. App.
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2010) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (1968)).
Specifically, the officer must have some minimal level of objective justification for
making the stop; when the officer can “point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant [the] intrusion” on the freedom of the person being detained, an
investigative detention is reasonable. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21); see
Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Brother v.
State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). A brief intrusion is
warranted, for instance, where the officer reasonably suspects that the person
detained actually is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity.
Derischweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914; Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 257. The
reasonableness of a given detention turns on the totality of the circumstances,
which considers the public and private interests that are at stake. Brother, 166
S.W.3d at 259 n.6.
An officer has probable cause to stop and arrest a driver if he observes the
driver commit a traffic offense. State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469–70 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); see State v. Ballman, 157 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2004, pet. ref’d). Relevant here, the transportation code provides: “The
operator of a vehicle facing a flashing yellow signal may proceed through an
intersection or past the signal only with caution.” Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §
544.008(b) (West 2011). Texas law governing U-turns on a divided highway and
not at an intersection, as in this case, requires that the turn be made at a location
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where the dividing physical barrier allows and be made safely and not at the
crest of a hill or in the middle of a curve. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§
545.063(b)(1), 545.102, 545.103 (West 2011). Regarding lane compliance, a
violation for failure to maintain a single lane requires that a driver’s deviation from
a lane be made in an unsafe manner. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.060(a)
(West 2011); Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d 498, 503–04 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2008, pet. ref’d) (following cases that interpret the statute as proscribing, not just
a movement, but an unsafe movement).
V. REASONABLE SUSPICION OF DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
As detailed below, the evidence––viewed in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s finding that the evidence supported a traffic-offense stop of Wall for
disregarding a traffic control device or for making an overly wide U-turn and
viewed in the light most favorable to its finding that the evidence did not support
a reasonable suspicion that Wall was driving while intoxicated––does not support
these findings. See Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 820–21 (holding evidence viewed in
light most favorable to trial court’s ruling did not support it). In fact, the video
from Officer Padgett’s dash cam indisputably negates the trial court’s findings
that Wall committed the traffic offenses of disregarding a traffic control device
and making an overly wide turn over the white line. See Tucker, 369 S.W.3d at
185 (“If the video evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion, then the
court of appeals should reverse.”); State v. Houghton, 384 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.) (“We thus give almost total deference to the trial
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court’s factual determinations unless the video recording indisputably contradicts
the trial court’s findings.”).
Looking first to whether Wall’s reaction to the flashing yellow light
constituted a traffic violation, the transportation code simply states that a driver
facing a flashing yellow light “may” proceed with caution. See Tex. Transp. Code
Ann. § 544.008(b). Nothing in the provision proscribes stopping or excessively
decelerating at a flashing yellow light. See id. Generally, the term “may”
indicates an element of discretion rather than compulsion, which is better
communicated with words like “shall.” See, e.g., Ford v. State, 305 S.W.3d 530,
539 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (discussing difference between “may” and “must” or
“shall”). For example, in the preceding subsection of the same statute, the
transportation code states that a driver facing a flashing red signal “shall” stop.
See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.008(a) (West 2011); see also Yazdchi, 428
S.W.3d at 837 (holding that words are interpreted in context); Ford, 305 S.W.3d
at 539 (discussing consistent use of the term “may” throughout the article
relevant there). Giving the may-proceed-with-caution language of section
544.008(b) its plain meaning, Wall’s overreaction to the flashing yellow light,
although unusual, did not violate that section. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §
544.008(b). The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
finding that Wall disregarded a traffic-device, does not support this finding. See
Yazdchi, 428 S.W.3d at 837 (holding that statutes are reviewed de novo);
Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673 (de novo review of application-of-law-to-fact
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questions); Estrada, 154 S.W.3d at 607 (same); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53
(same).
Looking next to whether Wall’s U-turn constituted a traffic offense, the
video does not support the trial court’s finding that it did. Although Wall traversed
the turning lane’s white line while entering the turning lane, she did not re-cross it
prior to or during her U-turn. Wall made the U-turn at a proper opening in the
barrier and not at the crest of a hill or near a curve. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
§§ 545.063(b)(1); 545.102. No cars were near, and there is no evidence the turn
was done in an unsafe manner. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 545.103. Thus,
even assuming Wall re-crossed the right line or prolonged her transition across it,
there is no evidence that the movement was unsafe, and thus it was not a
violation. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §§ 545.060(a); Fowler, 266 S.W.3d at
503–04; see also Tex. Transp. Code Ann. §545.103 (requiring all turns and
movements be done safely). Other than the video, there was no evidence of
Wall’s U-turn, and Officer Padgett did not mention, either in his affidavit or in his
testimony, that Wall's U-turn was improperly performed. Thus, again, giving
these transportation code sections their plain meaning, no evidence exists in the
record that Wall violated them. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the trial court’s finding, does not support the trial court’s finding that Wall’s U-
turn constituted a traffic violation. See Yazdchi, 428 S.W.3d at 837 (statutes
reviewed de novo); Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673 (de novo review of application-
of-law-to-fact questions); Estrada, 154 S.W.3d at 607 (same); Johnson, 68
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S.W.3d at 652–53 (same); see also Tucker, 369 S.W.3d at 185 (holding that
appellate courts cannot uphold a finding if the video record does not support it);
Houghton, 384 S.W.3d at 446 (same).
Having determined that the traffic-offense findings and conclusions made
by the trial court in denying Wall’s motion to suppress are not supported by the
evidence, we sustain the portion of Wall’s issue challenging these findings.
We next address Wall’s alternative argument and the State’s cross-point.
Wall alternatively argues that we cannot affirm the trial court’s denial of her
motion to suppress on the ground that Officer Padgett possessed reasonable
suspicion that Wall was engaged in the criminal activity of DWI because the trial
court correctly found and concluded that he did not. The State argues that this
finding by the trial court is not supported by the evidence.
Wall’s prolonged stop at one flashing-yellow-light intersection and her
delayed application of her brakes and quick, almost complete stop in the middle
of the next flashing-yellow-light intersection were contextualized by Officer
Padgett’s testimony that he observed Wall driving at 2:00 a.m. on a weekend in a
neighborhood with bars. According to Officer Padgett, intoxicated drivers are
often confused by flashing traffic control signals, and he noted that he had made
prior DWI stops at a flashing yellow light in “that exact area” of the road that Wall
was travelling. Officer Padgett thus articulated something more than an
“inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’” Foster, 326 S.W.3d at 613–
14. Considering the totality of the circumstances, Officer Padgett possessed
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“some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop” because he
pointed to specific and articulable facts––Wall’s peculiar driving through two
flashing-yellow-light intersections, the fact that intoxicated drivers are often
confused by flashing-light intersections, the fact that Officer Padgett had made
other DWI arrests in this very location at the flashing-light intersections, the fact
that Wall was driving at 2:00 a.m. on a weekend in a location near bars—which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, provided reasonable
suspicion that Wall was engaged in criminal activity, DWI. See Id. (citing Terry,
392 U.S. at 15); see also Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914; Brother, 166 S.W.3d
at 257. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
finding that Officer Padgett did not possess reasonable suspicion to initiate a
temporary detention of Wall, does not support this finding. See State v. Kerwick,
393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“[R]easonable suspicion is a mixed
question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal.”); Amador, 221 S.W.3d at
673 (noting de novo review of application-of-law-to-fact questions); Estrada, 154
S.W.3d at 607 (same); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53 (same).
We overrule the portion of Wall’s sole issue asserting that we should not
affirm the denial of her motion to suppress on the ground that Officer Padgett
possessed reasonable suspicion to stop her. We sustain the State’s cross-point
challenging the trial court’s finding and conclusion that Officer Padgett did not
possess reasonable suspicion to initiate a temporary detention of Wall. We
affirm the trial court’s denial of Wall’s motion to suppress on this theory. See
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Stevens, 235 S.W.3d at 740 (holding that appellate courts may uphold a trial
court’s judgment under any applicable theory of law supported by the record);
Armendariz, 123 S.W.3d at 404 (same).
VI. CONCLUSION
Having determined that the trial court’s denial of Wall’s motion to suppress
was proper based on the theory that Officer Padgett possessed reasonable
suspicion to initiate a temporary detention of Wall, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Sue Walker
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; WALKER and GABRIEL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: May 7, 2015
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