Roy Leslie Crayton v. State

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-15-00038-CR
Roy Leslie Crayton, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW OF BURNET COUNTY
NO. M29921, HONORABLE W.R. SAVAGE, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Roy Leslie Crayton appeals from a conviction for the class A misdemeanor offense
of interference with an emergency request for assistance. See Tex. Penal Code § 42.062. In his only
issue, Crayton contends that the evidence at trial was legally insufficient to support his conviction.
Crayton argues that the State failed to prove the existence of an “emergency,” because the
complainant, William Martin, was not, and did not reasonably believe himself to be, in fear of
imminent assault. We will affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
BACKGROUND
At trial, Officer Robert Chrane of the Granite Shoals Police Department testified that
at approximately 10 a.m. on May 23, 2013, he was dispatched to the Living Word Ministry Men’s
Restoration Home to meet with a tenant, William Martin, about a dispute Martin was having with
his landlord. Crayton, who was Martin’s landlord, was not present at that time. Officer Chrane
informed Martin of his legal rights as a tenant and explained the eviction process to him
before leaving.
At 11 a.m. Officer Chrane was again dispatched to the residence, in response to a
possible disturbance. Officer Chrane met Crayton outside of the residence. Officer Chrane testified
that Crayton, visibly upset, informed him that he had been involved in an argument with Martin over
the terms of a contract all tenants of the restoration home were required to sign, and that Martin had
threatened him with a knife. During his interview with Crayton, Officer Chrane was informed over
the radio that his backup deputy had encountered Martin a few blocks from the restoration home.
Officer Chrane left to speak with Martin.
Martin testified that Crayton had returned to the restoration home after having been
notified that Martin had spoken to police that morning. Martin testified that Crayton had appeared
upset, began “hollering,” and used his belly to push him, cornering Martin in Martin’s bedroom.
Crayton had attempted to provoke Martin, taunting, “You want to call the cops on me? Let’s have
you do something. Go ahead and hit me.” According to Martin, when a pastor at the restoration
home attempted to deter Crayton, Martin slipped past him and walked quickly to the living room,
telling Crayton as he passed that he was going to call the police. As Martin was placing the call,
Martin continued, Crayton took the receiver from his hand and pulled the phone from the wall,
breaking the cord at the plug. Martin testified that Crayton had declared, “You’re not using my
phone to call the cops.” Martin then left the restoration home and headed toward the police station.
He had walked several blocks when an officer stopped him and asked to speak with him. Martin
testified that he did not threaten Crayton with a knife during the confrontation.
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Crayton contradicted the whole of Martin’s testimony, denying that the “entire event”
occurred and testifying that he had never pushed Martin with his belly. Crayton testified that he did
not pull the phone from the wall, but rather that Martin had stormed out of the restoration home
without asking to use a phone. Crayton testified that he called the police on his cell phone after
Martin left.
The jury found Crayton guilty of interfering with an emergency telephone call. The
trial court assessed punishment at twelve months’ imprisonment and a $4,000 fine. The trial court
suspended the sentence and placed Crayton on community supervision for fifteen months. This
appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an
appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine
whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, any rational trier of fact could
have found the defendant guilty of all of the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013); Jessop v. State, 368 S.W.3d 653, 662 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.). Evidence may
be legally insufficient when the record contains “no evidence of an essential element, merely a
modicum of evidence of one element, or if it conclusively establishes a reasonable doubt.” Britain
v. State, 412 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
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DISCUSSION
In his only issue, Crayton challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting
his conviction under section 42.062 of the Texas Penal Code. Under section 42.062, an individual
commits an offense if the individual “knowingly prevents or interferes with another individual’s
ability to place an emergency call.” Tex. Penal Code § 42.062(a). An “emergency” is defined in the
statute as:
a condition or circumstance in which any individual is or is
reasonably believed by the individual making a call or requesting
assistance to be in fear of imminent assault or in which property is or
is reasonably believed by the individual making the call or requesting
assistance to be in imminent danger of damage or destruction.
Id. § 42.062(d). Harm is “imminent” if it is “immediately going to happen.” In re J.A.G.,
No. 03-05-00004-CV, 2006 WL 1126194, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 28, 2006, no pet.) (mem.
op.); see also Stefanoff v. State, 78 S.W.3d 496, 500-01 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref’d).
Crayton contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding that
Martin’s call to 911 was an “emergency call” because there is no evidence suggesting that Martin
was, or reasonably believed himself to be, “in fear of imminent assault.” In support of his argument,
Crayton underscores Martin’s testimony at trial, in which Martin repeatedly asserted that he felt no
fear during the interaction. For example, Martin testified, “I don’t take intimidation at all. Push me,
I push harder.” Martin also testified that he has “never been” scared of any man.
Crayton, in emphasizing what he portrays as Martin’s lack of fear, fails to
acknowledge that an “emergency” also exists under section 46.062 when property damage is
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imminent or the individual making the emergency call reasonably believes that property damage is
imminent. See Tex. Penal Code § 42.062(d). The jury charge, tracking the statutory language,
instructed the jury on both the assault and property components of the definition of “emergency.”
Where “alternate manners and means of committing an offense are submitted to the jury,” it may
return a general verdict if the evidence “supports a conviction under any one of them.” Marinos
v. State, 186 S.W.3d 167, 175 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d). Therefore, even if Martin was
not “in fear of imminent assault,” we must, nevertheless, affirm his conviction if the evidence
presented to the jury is legally sufficient to support a finding that property was, or was reasonably
believed by Martin to be, in imminent danger of damage or destruction.
At trial, Martin testified that when he attempted to call 911, Crayton pulled the phone
from the wall, breaking the phone’s cord at the plug, and stated, “You’re not using my phone to call
the cops.” Although Crayton disputed Martin’s account of these events, the jury is the sole judge
of the credibility and weight of witness testimony, and we presume that the jury resolved the conflict
in favor of the guilty verdict. See Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Given
Martin’s testimony that the phone was damaged as he attempted to call 911, the jury could
reasonably find that property was in imminent danger of damage or destruction. See Armstrong
v. State, No. 03-10-00046-CR, 2011 WL 1466856, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 14, 2011, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that jury could reasonably find that property
damage was imminent where undisputed evidence showed that phone was destroyed when
complainant attempted to call police). In addition, Martin testified that Crayton, “a fairly large man,”
had violently pushed Martin into a corner using his belly. At the time, Crayton was “very upset” and
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had “come in hollering.” From this evidence, suggesting that Crayton was severely agitated during
the interaction, a jury could reasonably find that Martin had reasonably believed property damage
or destruction was imminent when he attempted to call 911. See id. (concluding that jury could
reasonably find that complainant reasonably believed property damage was imminent given evidence
that defendant was “highly agitated”).
From the record before us, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support a
finding that an “emergency” existed under section 42.062. We therefore overrule Crayton’s only
issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment of conviction.
______________________________
Scott K. Field, Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Pemberton and Field
Affirmed
Filed: November 20, 2015
Do Not Publish
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