In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-06-00606-CV

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WALTER F. CROWDER, TRUSTEE OF THE ANN L. CROWDER ESTATE TRUST, Appellant

V.

ANN L. CROWDER ESTATE TRUST, JOHN C. CROWDER, RONALD LEE CROWDER, AND JAMES C. CROWDER, JR., Appellees

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On Appeal from the 405th District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 05-CV-0488

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Walter F. Crowder, trustee of the Ann L. Crowder Estate Trust, appeals from a summary judgment rendered in favor of appellees, the Ann L. Crowder Estate Trust, John C. Crowder, Ronald Lee Crowder, and James C. Crowder, Jr. (collectively, the Trust), on Crowder's claims against the Trust arising from his service as trustee. In two issues, Crowder contends that the trial court erred by granting the Trust's motion for summary judgment and failing to grant Crowder's motion for partial summary judgment. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Ann L. Crowder died in 1986. Her last will and testament created the Ann L. Crowder Estate Trust and named James C. Crowder, Sr. the original trustee. Appellant, Walter F. Crowder (Crowder) became the trustee in 2003 after three beneficiaries, John, Ronald, and James Jr., accused James C. Crowder, Sr. and his wife, Betty Payne Crowder, of financial improprieties. In June 2005, the Trust sued Crowder, James C. Crowder Sr., Betty Payne Crowder, and James Crowder Funeral Homes, Inc. to recover funds they claimed that James Sr. and his wife had misappropriated. The parties reached a mediated settlement agreement, by which all parties released any and all claims that in any way arose from, connected with, or related to facts giving rise to the agreement, including any that were statutory or contractual in nature. Crowder signed the agreement as follows: "Walter F. Crowder, Individually and as Trustee of the Ann L. Crowder Estate Trust."

Several months later, Crowder sued the Trust, seeking reimbursement of costs spent investigating the financial improprieties. His live pleadings assert the following claims: (1) breach of contract, (2) quantum meruit, (3) promissory estoppel, (4) right of reimbursement pursuant to section 114.063(a) of the Property Code, (5) statutory lien pursuant to section 114.063(b) of the Property Code, (6) constructive trust, (7) a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction, (8) the appointment of a receiver, and (9) attorney's fees.

In January 2006, the Trust filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, claiming that it was entitled to prevail as a matter of law on all of Crowder's claims. Crowder filed a motion for partial summary judgment with respect to his claims for reimbursement, breach of contract, and attorney's fees. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(a), (b). The trial court signed an order denying Crowder's motion and then signed an order granting the Trust's motion. Neither order stated the grounds on which the trial court relied.

Standard of Review

We review summary judgments de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). In conducting our review, we must indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant, take all evidence favorable to the nonmovant as true, and resolve any doubts in favor of the nonmovant. Id. A defendant who moves for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims must conclusively disprove at least one element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action. Little v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 148 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. 2004). A defendant who moves for summary judgment on an affirmative defense must establish the defense as a matter of law. Long Distance Int'l, Inc. v. Telefonos de Mex., 49 S.W.3d 347, 350-51 (Tex. 2001).   

When, as here, a summary judgment does not specify the grounds on which it was granted, the appealing party must demonstrate that none of the proposed grounds is sufficient to support the judgment. Rogers v. Ricane Enters., 772 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. 1989); Tilotta v. Goodall, 752 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied). Conversely, we will affirm the judgment if any one of the theories advanced in the motion is meritorious. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex. 2004).   

Summary Judgment for the Trust Crowder's first point of error challenges the summary judgment rendered in favor of the Trust on all of his claims. The Trust moved for summary judgment on the grounds that, by signing the settlement agreement, Crowder released all claims the Trust could assert, including attorney's fees, and statutory or contractual claims stemming from facts giving rise to or connected with the earlier lawsuit that resulted in the agreement.   

To be afforded the protection of a release, the releasing instrument must specifically name or identify the party seeking protection. McMillen v. Klingensmith, 467 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. 1971). A party may properly assert the affirmative defense of release provided the releasing instrument refers to that party by name or with such descriptive particularity that his or her identity or connection with the event giving rise to the release is not in doubt. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420 (Tex. 1984). Because Texas law treats releases like contracts, we interpret releases like any other contract. See Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1990); Stroop v. N. County Mut. Ins. Co., 133 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2004, pet. denied).

A. Whether the Settlement Agreement Sufficiently Identified Crowder

Crowder contends that summary judgment was improper because the Trust did not establish that the settlement agreement applied to him in his capacity as trustee. An individual acting in an official or representative capacity is, in law, a distinctly separate individual from the same person acting as an individual. See Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 870 (Tex. 1995); Elizondo v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 974 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, no pet.). Crowder argues that the settlement agreement named him as an individual only and not in his capacity as trustee.

The settlement agreement does not differentiate between Crowder as an individual and as a trustee except in a single paragraph in which James Sr. agreed to indemnify the settling parties, including Crowder in his capacity as trustee. Nonetheless, the signature block of the settlement agreement identifies Crowder as "Walter F. Crowder, Individually and as Trustee of the Ann L. Crowder Estate Trust." Thus, Crowder signed the settlement agreement in both capacities. In compliance with McMillen, the signature block of the agreement identified Crowder and connected him to the released claims, both individually and in his capacity as trustee. See Suttles v. Thomas Bearden Co., 152 S.W.3d 607, 612 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (concluding that identifying company within signature block of promissory note was sufficient to satisfy requirement of identification, despite lack of reference to company within body of note).

We therefore hold that the settlement agreement sufficiently identified appellant in his capacity as trustee.

B. Whether Crowder Released his Claims by the Settlement Agreement

Having determined that the settlement agreement sufficiently identified Crowder in his capacity as trustee, we address whether the agreement incorporated appellant's claims.

To release a claim effectively, an instrument must refer to the claim. Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931, 938 (Tex. 1991). By the language of the settlement agreement, Crowder released any claims arising from, or in any way connected to the previous lawsuit, including statutory or contractual claims, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. ⁽¹⁾ Crowder's claims arise from costs associated with auditing and investigating the financial improprieties alleged in the prior litigation and costs incurred while acting in his position as trustee. The broad language of the release portion of the settlement agreement also encompasses Crowder's claims for reimbursement and attorney's fees on both statutory and contractual grounds, as well as his claim for injunctive relief.

We hold that Trust established, as a matter of law, its affirmative defense that the release portion of the settlement agreement encompassed and thus barred Crowder's claims. Accordingly, the Trust was entitled to prevail on this contention.

We overrule Crowder's first point of error. ⁽²⁾

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Sherry Radack Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and Bland.

1.

The Agreement states:

Except as otherwise specifically provided for herein, John, Ron, James Jr., James Sr., Betty, Walt, and the Funeral Home, each on his, her, or its own behalf and on behalf of all persons claiming by, through or under him, her, or it, hereby release, acquit, forever discharge, and covenant not to sue any of the others or their respective agents and attorneys, heirs, legal representatives, successors, and assigns from and with respect to any and all claims, demands, losses, damages, liabilities, actions, and causes of action of any kind and nature whatsoever (whether at law or in equity, whether known or unknown, whether asserted or not in any pending or future litigation or whether fixed or contingent) that in any way arise from, are or will be connected with, or relate to any dealings or stated facts existing on or before the effective date of this Agreement including without limitation those for specific performance, injunctive relief, actual, punitive, special, statutory, or other damages regardless of whether any entitlement to such damages is alleged to be contractual, tortious, or statutory in nature, and those for other or further relief connected in any manner with any claims, including without limitation interest, attorney's fees, and costs of litigation.

2. In his second issue, Crowder argued that the trial court erred by not rendering partial summary judgment in his favor on his claims of reimbursement, breach of contract, and attorney's fees. Review of this issue is precluded by our holding that the release portion of the settlement agreement bars all of Crowder's claims as a matter of law.