Opinion issued May 9, 2013.
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-12-00332-CV
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METROPOLITAN CHRISTIAN METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH,
Appellant
V.
FRANK VANN, BARNABAS INVESTORS, INC., JOHN OTTINGER, JR.,
SENIOR HOUSING SERVICES, INC., CORNERSTONE CAPITAL
ADVISORS, INC. AND GEORGE DIXON, AS THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF CECIL BROOKS, Appellees
On Appeal from the 157th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2008-41574
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Metropolitan Christian Methodist Episcopal Church appeals from the trial
court’s rendition of summary judgment in favor of appellees Frank Vann, Barnabas
Investors, Inc., John Ottinger, Jr., Senior Housing Services, Inc., and Cornerstone
Capital Advisors, Inc., and from the dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction of
George Dixon, the personal representative of the Estate of Cecil Brooks. The
Church sued the appellees for fraud, breach of contract, and several other theories
related to a plan to form an HMO for the Church to provide healthcare for its
members. The Church secured funding for the plan by mortgaging its real property
to Cornerstone Ministries, Inc., an entity related to the corporate appellees, which
is not a party to this proceeding. The trial court dismissed Dixon for want of
personal jurisdiction and rendered summary judgment in favor of the other
appellees. We affirm.
Background
A. Factual Background
Cecil Brooks and John T. Ottinger Jr. founded Cornerstone Ministries
Investment, Inc. (CMI), a for-profit company that loaned money to faith-based
businesses and institutions. Brooks and Ottinger served as employees, officers,
and directors of CMI from its founding, and—Brooks in particular—controlled
CMI and several affiliated businesses.
In 2003, Dr. Benjamin Woods of Universal Healthcare Integrated, Inc.
(UHI) approached Cecil Brooks. Woods proposed that he and UHI start an HMO
for low-income families through churches and other community organizations.
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Brooks contacted Nick Howard, the president of Senior Housing Services (SHS),
to bring SHS on as an investor. SHS provided “seed money” to UHI to explore the
HMO business. Barnabas Investors, Inc. was formed—with Howard as its
president—to be the investment company that would found and manage the HMOs
under UHI and Woods’s direction.
Later that year, CMI held a meeting in Houston to attract investors. As an
incentive for churches to invest, it represented that, in addition to church members
being able to utilize the HMO, a portion of the profits would be returned to
participating churches for enhancing various church ministries and programs.
Wallace Lockett, the Church’s pastor, orally committed the Church to participate.
The following summer, Brooks contacted Lockett to obtain the Church’s
investment. Brooks arranged for CMI to loan money for the investment to the
Church. The loan was secured by a deed of trust on real property owned by the
Church. The proceeds of the loan were invested with Barnabas. Lockett averred
that Brooks assured him that the Church would not have to make any payments on
the loan and that, after a year, i.e., in 2005, the deed of trust on the property would
be released.
Brooks utilized another of his and Ottinger’s companies, Cornerstone
Capital Advisors, Inc., to provide office and payroll functions for CMI and
Barnabas. After receiving the Church’s funds, Barnabas—acting through CCA—
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repaid SHS and UHI for their investments in Barnabas. The Church alleges that
Frank Vann, an employee of CCA and of CMI, is the person who made or
authorized the transfers to SHS and UHI.
CMI did not release the lien on the Church’s property in 2005. Instead,
CMI filed for bankruptcy. When it did, Lockett hired an attorney to protect the
Church’s interest in the real property that secured the note. Later, in an adversarial
proceeding in CMI’s bankruptcy, the Church was sued over the unpaid balance on
the note.
B. Procedural Background
The Church sued Brooks, CCA, SHS, Barnabas, Ottinger, Howard, Vann,
UHI, and Dr. Woods (and two other individuals affiliated with UHI). Brooks
passed away, and the Church substituted George B. Dixon Jr. as the personal
representative of Brooks’s estate. The only parties to this appeal are: (1) Dixon;
(2) Barnabas, CCA, SHS, and Ottinger (hereafter, collectively “Barnabas”); and
(3) Vann.
In its live pleading, the Church asserted claims for breach of contract, fraud,
violations of the Securities Act of 1933, unjust enrichment, negligence, violations
of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and violation of the Insurance Code.
Barnabas removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction,
and Dixon was served in the federal suit. While in federal court, Dixon sought
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dismissal for want of personal jurisdiction. The federal court granted Dixon’s
motion. Following Dixon’s dismissal, the federal court determined that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and remanded the case.
CMI initiated an adversarial claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, seeking the
unpaid balance of the loan to the Church. The state trial court determined that the
outcome of the adversarial proceeding would affect this case and, accordingly,
stayed this case pending the resolution of adversarial proceeding. Later, the
Church moved to lift the stay, asserting that the adversarial proceeding had
concluded with an agreed dismissal with prejudice of all claims and counterclaims
and the Church receiving a release of the lien on its property.
Barnabas moved for summary judgment. It filed a no-evidence motion,
asserting that the Church could provide no evidence of damages, an essential
element of each of it claims, because it had received a release of lien and CMI had
dismissed its claim for the loan balance with prejudice. The Church responded, but
did not provide any evidence with its response. The trial court initially granted
summary judgment for Barnabas and for Vann. Twenty-eight days later, the
Church filed a motion for reconsideration and attached evidence. The trial court
entered a new order, clarifying that the prior summary judgment did not cover
Vann and that, because it did not dispose of the claims against Vann, it was an
interlocutory order.
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Vann moved for summary judgment on both traditional and no-evidence
grounds. In the no-evidence portion of his motion, Vann identified each element
of every cause of action asserted by the Church—except for the Insurance Code
claim—and asserted the Church had no evidence of any. In his traditional motion
for summary judgment, Vann argued that the alleged Insurance Code violation was
not actionable as a matter of law. Vann also sought sanctions against the Church.
In its final order, the trial court granted Vann’s motion for summary
judgment, but expressly denied Vann’s request for sanctions. The trial court
severed the claims against the UHI defendants, and thus rendered a final judgment.
The Church appealed, challenging each of the summary judgments and the
dismissal of Dixon for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Federal Court’s Dismissal of Dixon for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
In its first and second issues, the Church contends that the federal district
court erred by dismissing Dixon for lack of personal jurisdiction and the state trial
court erred by refusing to determine that it had personal jurisdiction over Dixon.
A. The Church’s Argument
The Church argues that because the federal court determined that it had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and remanded the case, its prior
order dismissing Dixon for lack of personal jurisdiction is void. See, e.g., In re
Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. 2009) (observing
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that orders made without jurisdiction are void). The Church contends that the state
court should have determined whether it could properly exercise personal
jurisdiction over Dixon. In other words, the Church contends that a federal court
must decide subject matter jurisdiction before it can determine an issue of personal
jurisdiction.
The trial court disagreed. In its order dismissing Dixon for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the trial court found that “Judge Atlas’s order dismissing [Dixon] . . .
is not void because the Court later determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. . . . Accordingly, [the Church] is barred and estopped from re-
litigating this issue in this forum.”
B. Discussion
The United States Supreme Court has rejected the Church’s argument that
there is a “sequencing of jurisdictional issues,” mandating that subject-matter
jurisdiction be decided before personal jurisdiction. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil
Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584, 119 S. Ct. 1563, 1570 (1999). In Ruhrgas, the Supreme
Court held that a district court did not err by deciding an issue of personal
jurisdiction before determining subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 588, 119 S. Ct. at
1572. It explained, “[A] court that dismisses on . . . non-merits grounds such as
. . . personal jurisdiction, before finding subject-matter jurisdiction,” does not
violate any separation of powers principles between the federal and state judicial
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systems. Id. at 584–85, 119 S. Ct. at 1570 (quoting In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d
247, 255 (C.A.D.C. 1998)). Because the Supreme Court has rejected the Church’s
argument that subject matter jurisdiction must be decided before personal
jurisdiction, the federal court did not err in determining Dixon’s challenge to
personal jurisdiction before determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
See id. at 588, 119 S. Ct. at 1572. We conclude the federal court’s order
dismissing Dixon was not void. And because the order was not void, it was a
proper determination of the merits of the court’s personal jurisdiction over Dixon,
and should not be re-litigated. See id. at 585, 119 S. Ct. at 1571 (citing Baldwin v.
Iowa State Traveling Men’s Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 524–27, 51 S. Ct. at 517–18
(personal jurisdiction ruling has issue-preclusive effect). Accordingly, we hold
that the trial court properly refused to revisit the issue of whether personal
jurisdiction over Dixon was proper.
We overrule the Church’s first and second issues.
Summary Judgment for the Barnabas Defendants
In its third issue, the Church argues that the trial court improperly granted
Barnabas’s no-evidence summary judgment on the element of damages. 1
1
The Church’s third issue also addresses the summary judgment in favor of Vann,
discussed separately below.
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A. Arguments in Summary Judgment and on Appeal
Barnabas moved for summary judgment on the ground that the Church could
produce no evidence of damages. Specifically, Barnabas pointed out that the
Church’s only theory of damages was that its real property was encumbered by a
lien, and that the Church conceded that the lien had been released. Thus, Barnabas
asserted, the Church had no evidence of damages.
In its response, citing Texas National Bank v. Karnes, 717 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.
1986), the Church asserted it could recover both contract and tort damages—
including exemplary damages—if it could prove both a breach of contract and an
independent tort. But the Church filed no evidence to support its response.
On appeal, the Church argues that a no-evidence summary judgment was
improper for two reasons. First, the Church contends the collateral source rule
prevents Barnabas from relying on the release of the lien to establish that the
Church was not damaged. Second, the Church contends its attorney’s fees and
other costs expended in defending the adversarial claim are properly considered
actual damages in this case.
B. Law Pertaining to No-evidence Motions for Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i):
After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting
summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on the
ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a
claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of
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proof at trial. The motion must state the elements as to which there is
no evidence. The court must grant the motion unless the respondent
produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of
material fact.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). A motion for a no-evidence summary judgment is
essentially a request for a pretrial directed verdict. Imkie v. Methodist Hosp., 326
S.W.3d 339, 342 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing Mack
Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 581 (Tex. 2006)). A motion that properly
identifies an element, on which the nonmovant has the burden of proof, shifts the
burden to the nonmovant to defeat the motion by presenting evidence that raises a
genuine issue of material fact on the challenged element. Id. at 343 (citing Mack
Trucks, Inc., 206 S.W.3d at 582; Landers v. State Farm Lloyds, 257 S.W.3d 740,
744 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.)). “Absent a timely response, a
trial court must grant a no-evidence motion for summary judgment that meets the
requirements of Rule 166a(i).” Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i)). “If a
nonmovant wishes to assert that, based on the evidence in the record, a fact issues
exists to defeat a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must
timely file a response to the motion raising this issue before the trial court.” Id.
(citing Landers, 257 S.W.3d at 746); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i)).
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) provides, “Except on leave of court,
the adverse party, not later than seven days prior to the day of hearing may file
and serve opposing affidavits or other written response.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c)
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(emphasis added). “Summary judgment evidence may be filed late, but only with
leave of court.” Benchmark Bank v. Crowder, 919 S.W.2d 657, 663 (Tex. 1996),
quoted in Speck v. First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Houston, 235 S.W.3d
811, 815 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). If nothing in the record
indicates the trial court granted leave to file the summary judgment response late,
we presume that the trial court did not consider it. Speck, 235 S.W.3d at 815
(citing Benchmark Bank, 919 S.W.2d at 663; INA of Tex. v. Bryant, 686 S.W.2d
614, 615 (Tex. 1985)); see also Imkie, 326 S.W.3d at 343 (stating that under Rule
166a(c) response must be filed seven days before hearing).
A similar rule applies to pleadings. Rule 166a provides that a trial court
shall render summary judgment if the pleadings and summary judgment evidence
“on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment with
permission of the court” show the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) (emphasis added). A timely amended pleading, or an
amended pleading filed with leave of court, that adds a claim generally requires a
party moving for summary judgment to amend or supplement its motion for
summary judgment to address the claims asserted in the amended pleading. 2
Mensa-Wilmot v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 312 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
2
There are exceptions to this general rule—none of which apply to this case—such
as where the motion for summary judgment applies equally to the claims added in
the amended pleading. See Mensa-Wilmot v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 312 S.W.3d 771,
779 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
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Dist.] 2009, no pet.). An amended pleading that is filed after the summary
judgment hearing but before the trial court grants summary judgment must be filed
with leave of court. Id. (citing, inter alia, TEX R. CIV. P. 63, 166a(c)). If a party
files an amended pleading after the summary judgment hearing, without leave of
court, it should not be considered in determining the motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 779; see also Taylor v. Sunbelt Mgmt., Inc., 905 S.W.2d 743, 745
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (stating “we cannot consider
appellants’ pleadings which were admittedly filed after the motion for summary
judgment hearing”).
C. Discussion
Barnabas filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that there was no
evidence of damages, an essential element of all the claims asserted by the Church,
on October 13, 2011. The burden then shifted to the Church to produce some
evidence of damages. See Imkie, 326 S.W.3d at 343 (citing Mack Trucks, Inc., 206
S.W.3d at 582; Landers, 257 S.W.3d at 744)).
The Church responded on October 28. But its response did not assert that its
attorney’s fees in the adversarial claim constituted damages it could recover in this
suit. Nor did the Church provide evidence of the damages to its property or of its
attorney’s fees in the adversarial proceeding. The Church’s live pleading at the
time did not seek recovery of attorney’s fees in the adversarial proceeding as
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damages. The trial court heard the motion for summary judgment on November 3
and granted summary judgment on November 4.
It was not until December 2 that the Church filed a “Motion for
Reconsideration and Clarification,” asserting that Vann had been erroneously
included in the summary judgment, and, that attorney’s fees incurred in the
adversarial claim and closing costs of the loan from CMI constituted actual
damages. This response attached: (1) the closing statement for the loan from CMI
secured by the Church’s property; (2) an affidavit from the Church’s attorney
concerning fees incurred in both this suit and the adversarial proceeding in the
bankruptcy court, including billing records; (3) Lockett’s affidavit describing the
events made the basis of this suit; and (4) the transcript of Lockett’s deposition.
The Church, however, did not plead a claim for attorney’s fees incurred in the
adversarial proceeding until February 13, 2012, when it filed a supplement to its
Third Amended Original Petition.
At the time the trial court granted summary judgment in Barnabas’s favor,
the Church had not filed a response producing some evidence on the challenged
element of damages. Summary judgment was thus proper. See TEX. R. CIV. P.
166a(i) (“The court must grant the motion unless the respondent produces
summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.” (Emphasis
added.)); see Imkie, 326 S.W.3d at 343. Because the Church’s motion for
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reconsideration was filed after the hearing and after summary judgment was
granted, without leave of court, we may not consider the response or the evidence
included with the response as grounds for reversing the summary judgment. See
Speck, 235 S.W.3d at 815 (citing Benchmark Bank, 919 S.W.2d at 663); see also
Imkie, 326 S.W.3d at 343. Additionally, the Church’s supplemental pleading was
not filed by the seventh day before the summary judgment hearing; it was filed
more than three months after the trial court heard and granted the summary
judgment. Nothing in the record shows that the Church sought or received leave of
court to file a supplemental petition. We therefore cannot consider the amended
pleadings adding a damages claim for attorney’s fees incurred in the adversarial
proceeding. Mensa-Wilmot, 312 S.W.3d at 780; Taylor, 905 S.W.2d at 745.
The Church did not file a response raising a genuine fact issue on the
element of damages before the summary judgment hearing. We do not consider
the responses and evidence filed after the hearing and judgment without leave of
court in our review of the trial court’s summary judgment. Accordingly, we hold
that the trial court properly granted Barnabas’s summary judgment.
We overrule the Church’s third issue as it relates to Barnabas.
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Summary Judgment in favor of Vann
A. No-evidence Motion for Summary Judgment
In its third issue, the Church contends the trial court erred by granting
Vann’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment on the element of damages.
Vann, however, moved for summary judgment on each element of all of the
Church’s claims, except for the Church’s claim under the Insurance Code, which
we address separately below.
Where a party moves for summary judgment on multiple grounds, and the
trial court’s order granting summary judgment does not specify the ground or
grounds on which it was based, a party appealing the order must negate all possible
grounds on which the order could have been based. McCoy v. Rogers, 240 S.W.3d
267, 271 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing Star–
Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995); Ellis v. Precision Engine
Rebuilders, Inc., 68 S.W.3d 894, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no
pet.)). If summary judgment may have been rendered, properly or improperly, on a
ground not challenged on appeal, the judgment must be affirmed. Id. (citing Ellis,
68 S.W.3d at 898); see also Vawter v. Garvey, 786 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Tex. 1990)
(proscribing reversal of summary judgment without properly assigned error), cited
in McCoy, 240 S.W.3d at 271.
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Here, Vann moved for summary judgment on multiple no-evidence grounds;
Vann challenged each element of each of the Church’s claims (other than the
Insurance Code claim). The trial court granted summary judgment without
specifying the basis. On appeal, the Church has addressed only the element of
damages and has not addressed the no-evidence challenge to any of the other
elements. Accordingly, we must affirm the no-evidence summary judgment on all
claims other than the Insurance Code claim. See McCoy, 240 S.W.3d at 271.
B. Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment
In its fourth issue, the Church contends the trial court erred by granting
Vann’s traditional motion for summary judgment. Vann moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the statutory provision cited by the Church did not
create a private cause of action. Neither the Church’s response nor supplemental
response to Vann’s motion for summary judgment addresses this ground for
summary judgment or mentions the Insurance Code claim. On appeal, the Church
provides no argument or analysis concerning the Insurance Code claim, but merely
repeats the following allegation from its petition:
The Defendants have violated Chapter 843 of the Texas Insurance
Code, which states: “a person may not organize or operate a health
maintenance organization in this state, . . . without obtaining a
certificate of authority.” The Defendants never filed an application to
receive a certificate of authority from the Texas Insurance
Commission. The alleged HMO, Samaritan Community Plan of
Houston, Inc. was never created. The specific purpose of borrowing
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funds from the Plaintiff and collecting capital by Barnabas from the
sale of shares was to create the HMO.
Under Rule 166a(c), “Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by
written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as
grounds for reversal.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); see also McCoy, 240 S.W.3d at 271
(citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) and City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth.,
589 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Tex. 1979)) (“We will not consider a ground for reversal
that was not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer, or
other response to the motion for summary judgment”). Here, the only ground for
reversal the Church raises on appeal was not presented to the trial court in a written
motion, answer, or other response to the motion for summary judgment. We
therefore may not reverse on that ground. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); City of
Houston, 589 S.W.2d at 677; McCoy, 240 S.W.3d at 271.
We overrule the Church’s third and fourth issues as they relate to Vann.
Because we have overruled the Church’s third issue concerning the no-evidence
summary judgments for both Barnabas and Vann, and the Church’s fourth issue
relating to Vann and the Insurance Code claim, we affirm the trial court’s summary
judgments. Accordingly, we do not address the remainder of the Church’s fourth
issue which addresses the propriety of summary judgment for Barnabas on
traditional grounds. See Star–Telegram, Inc., 915 S.W.2d at 473; McCoy, 240
S.W.3d at 271.
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Vann’s Request for Sanctions
Vann filed a supplemental brief seeking a reversal of the trial court’s denial
of Vann’s requested sanctions against the Church’s counsel. As part of his motion
for summary judgment, Vann sought sanctions under Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code and Rule 13 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 10.001, 10.004 (West 2002) (providing
for sanctions for filing pleading for improper purpose, containing frivolous claims,
or containing allegations without likely evidentiary support); TEX. R. CIV. P. 13
(providing for sanctions for filing pleading that is not formed after reasonable
inquiry, brought in bad faith, or groundless). The trial court denied Vann’s
request.
Under Rule 25.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, any “party who
seeks to alter the trial court’s judgment . . . must file a notice of appeal.” TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.1(c). Unless a party seeking to alter a trial court’s judgment files a
notice of appeal of its own, the appellate court is not permitted to grant more
favorable relief than the trial court except for just cause. Id.; see also Brooks v.
Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 171 (Tex. 2004); Dean v. Lafayette Place
(Section One) Council of Co-Owners, Inc., 999 S.W.2d 814, 818 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet); see also Lubbock Cnty. v. Trammel’s Lubbock
Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 586 (Tex. 2002) (holding that county seeking to alter
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trial court’s partial summary judgment waived this challenge by failing to file
notice of appeal).
Vann did not file a notice of appeal. Accordingly, we cannot alter the
judgment to grant more favorable relief than the trial court granted. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 25.1(c); Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 171.
We overrule Vann’s request for sanctions.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment. All pending motions are denied as
moot.
Rebeca Huddle
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Sharp, and Huddle.
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