Dismissed and Opinion filed December 5, 2002

Dismissed and Opinion filed December 5, 2002.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-02-01099-CV

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HAROLD L. PHILLIPS and HAROLD L. PHILLIPS for ZACHARY M. PHILLIPS and KYMBERLEE V. PHILLIPS, Appellants

V.

HONORABLE SUSAN BAKER aka SUSAN BAKER OLSEN,

HONORABLE PUTNAM K. REITER, HONORABLE JANIS YARBROUGH, HONORABLE ANDREW Z. BAKER, MICHAEL J. GUARINO,

ELLA ANDERSON, VAL TIZENT aka VAL TIZENO, PHILLIP CHUPIK, KERRI FOLEY, JAN BOENING, SARAH DICKSON, OFFICER RODNEY KAHLA, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS MEDICAL BRANCH POLICE DEPT.,

THE STATE OF TEXAS, COUNTY OF GALVESTON, TEXAS, and

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS MEDICAL BRANCH AT GALVESTON, Appellees

On Appeal from the 122nd District Court

Galveston County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 00CV1004

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

This is an attempted appeal from three orders signed June 27, 2002, granting the pleas to the jurisdiction and motions for summary judgment in favor of some of the appellees in this appeal.  Specifically, our record contains an order signed June 27, 2002, granting the pleas to the jurisdiction filed by the Honorable Putnam K. Reiter and the State of Texas.  In addition, there is an order signed June 27, 2002, granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by defendants Susan Baker, Janis Yarbrough, Andrew Baker, Michael Guarino, Ella Anderson, and Val Tizeno.  Finally, the record contains an order signed June 27, 2002, granting Sarah Dickson=s motion for summary judgment.  There is nothing in the record to indicate the remaining defendants have been dismissed from the suit or had the claims against them finally resolved in any way. If there is no final judgment disposing of all parties to the suit, the orders are interlocutory. 

Generally, a Texas appellate court has jurisdiction to hear only an appeal from a final judgment.  Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Tex. 1992).  Interlocutory orders may only be appealed when provided by statute.  Stary v. DeBord, 967 S.W.2d 352, 352‑53 (Tex. 1998).  An order that grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a government unit is subject to interlocutory appeal.  See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. ' 51.014(a)(8).  To the extent that appellant may be attempting to appeal an interlocutory order granting the plea to the jurisdiction filed by the State of Texas or the County of Galveston, the notice of appeal is untimely.  Appeals from interlocutory orders are accelerated.  Tex. R. App. P. 28.1. A notice of appeal in an accelerated appeal must be filed within 20 days of the date the judgment is signed.  Here, the notice of appeal from the June 27, 2002 orders was not filed until September 30, 2002.

On November 7, 2002, notification was transmitted to all parties of the Court=s intent to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction unless appellant filed a response demonstrating that this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal.  See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).  On November 25, 2002, appellant filed a response to the Court=s order, but appellant=s response fails to demonstrate that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.  Appellant correctly points out that a leading case concerning finality of judgments is Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. 2001).  Lehmann instructs that the determination of whether a judicial decree is a final judgment must be made from its language and the record in the case.  Id. at 195.  The language of an order or judgment can make it final, even though it should have been interlocutory, if that language expressly disposes of all claims and all parties.  Id. at 200.

Appellant argues that there is language of finality in the orders in this case and that the actions of the parties and the trial court indicate that the orders are intended to be final.  We disagree. First, we find nothing in the record to demonstrate the parties or trial court intended to finally dispose of the claims against the remaining defendants and the entire case. Likewise, the record does not contain clear evidence of actions indicating final disposition.  To the contrary, the letter from the Galveston County District Clerk assigning this appeal to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals contains the following notation: AFinal Judgment signed: N/A.@

More importantly, we find the orders in this case do not demonstrate the intent to finally dispose of the entire case.  Each of the orders specifically names only the defendants who are dismissed from the case by that order.  For example, the order granting the jurisdictonal pleas filed by the Honorable Putnam K. Reiter and the State of Texas states, APlaintiffs take nothing from Defendants Honorable Putnam K. Reiter and the State of Texas.@ (emphasis supplied)  While the order further states, AThe Court denies all relief not expressly granted in this judgment,@ the Texas Supreme Court has made it clear in Lehmann that this language does not indicate that a judgment rendered without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal.  Id. at 203-04.  Such language may mean only that the relief requested in the motionCnot all the relief requested by anyone in the caseCand not granted by the order is denied.  Id. at 204.  AThe intent to finally dispose of the case must be unequivocally expressed in the words of the order itself.@ Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 200.  In this case, we hold that the intent to finally dispose of the case is not unequivocally expressed in any of the orders.

We are without jurisdiction to consider the appeal.  Accordingly, the appeal is ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Judgment rendered and Opinion filed December 5, 2002.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Brister and Justices Hudson and Fowler.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.3(b).