Randell Adams v. Kimberly McCray Adams

Opinion issued August 23, 2018
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-17-00305-CV
———————————
RANDELL ADAMS, Appellant
V.
KIMBERLY MCCRAY ADAMS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 300th District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 79412-f
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The Family Code provides multiple, nonexclusive options for enforcing an
order to pay child support.* A person enforcing a child-support order is entitled to
*
See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE § 154.124(c) (terms of agreement pertaining to
child support may be enforced by all remedies available for enforcement of a
judgment); id. § 157.001(b) (contempt); id. § 157.003 (no election of
recover reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs in addition to child-support
arrearages “if the court finds that the respondent has failed to make child support
payments.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 157.167(a). Such a fees award “may be enforced by
any means available for the enforcement of child support, including contempt.” Id.
Randell Adams failed to pay child support as ordered by the couple’s
divorce decree. Kimberly McCray Adams sought to enforce the child-support
order. She obtained a writ of execution to collect on the final judgments that arose
by operation of law when Randell failed to pay. See id. § 157.261(a). In the order
on her application for writ of execution, the trial court found that “Kimberly
Adams has a valid enforceable judgment against Randell Adams for past due child
support” and that it was “wholly unsatisfied and subject to execution.” The
constable took possession of non-exempt property and held an execution sale.
Proceeds from the sale were placed in the court’s registry, and both parties sought
disbursement of the money.
remedies); id. § 157.263 (money judgment for arrearages); id. § 157.264(a)
(money judgment for past-due or retroactive child support enforceable by
any means available for the enforcement of a judgment for debts or
collection of child support); id. §§ 157.311–.331 (perfection and foreclosure
of child support lien); id. §§ 158.001–.507 (income withholding); TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 31.002 (collection of judgment through court
proceedings); id. §§ 34.001–.076 (execution on judgments); id. §§ 61.001–
.082 (attachment); id. §§ 63.001–.008; TEX. R. CIV. P. 621 (enforcement of
judgment by execution or other process).
2
After additional litigation, including a mandamus proceeding in this court
related to Kimberly’s collection efforts, the trial court heard Kimberly’s motion for
attorney’s fees, which was based on her affidavit and a timesheet detailing her
activities and the time spent in collecting past-due child support. The court ordered
Randell to pay $30,675.00 in attorney’s fees, and he appealed.
Randell contends that the award of attorney’s fees lacks a statutory basis.
We disagree. The trial court’s finding that Kimberly had a valid enforceable
judgment against Randell for past-due child support was a finding that he failed to
pay child support. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 157.167(a). An award of attorney’s fees
was mandatory in this circumstance. See id.; Tucker v. Thomas, 419 S.W.3d 292,
300 (Tex. 2013).
The court’s award of attorney’s fees was based on the affidavit and
timesheet of Kimberly’s attorney. Randell also asserts that the evidence was
insufficient to support the award of attorney’s fees, but this argument has been
waived due to inadequate briefing. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
Randell argues at length about the validity of a child-support lien and the
writ of execution and why neither supports an award of attorney’s fees. Having
concluded that the award of attorney’s fees was mandatory under section 157.167,
Randell’s other arguments do not alter the outcome of the appeal, and therefore we
need not address them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
3
We affirm the order of the trial court. All pending motions are denied.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack, Justice Massengale, and Justice Brown.
4