DocketNumber： 03-98-00022-CV
Filed Date： 8/26/1999
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 2/1/2016
MHMR Services for the Concho Valley a/k/a Concho Valley Center for Human Advancement, in its Capacity as an Unincorporated Association, its Capacity as a Mental Retardation Authority, and as a Purported Community MHMR Center; James Young; Joe Finn; Karen Sheppard; John Brubaker; The Texas Council of Community Mental Health Mental Retardation Centers, Inc.; Spencer McClure; Texas Council Risk Management Fund; Board of Trustees of the Texas Council Risk Management Fund, as Trustee of the Liability Trust Account, the Property Trust Account, and the Workers' Compensation Trust Account; Brain Crews; JI Specialty Services, Inc.; Central Plains Center for MHMR and Substance Abuse; Richard Hall; Hector Cantu; James Coffey; Ruby Guttierez; Sheirran Hughes; Brenda Morris; Jacqueline Shannon; Roger Sidener; Hale County; Tom Green County; and City of San Angelo, Appellees
This case involves the expansive legislative scheme for providing mental health and mental retardation services to the citizens of Texas. The Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation ("TDMHMR") and other governmental entities operating under its direction shoulder the responsibility of providing the administration and delivery of mental health and mental retardation services to the public. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 531.001-615.002 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999). A key element in the statutory scheme is the establishment of mental health and mental retardation community centers, which provide the needed services to mentally disabled persons at a local level under the supervision of TDMHMR. These community centers are created by local governmental entities such as counties, municipalities, or hospital districts, or a combination of entities joining together. See id. § 534.001. Community centers are, by statutory definition, "an agency of the state, a governmental unit, and a unit of local government." Id.
Also key in the statutory scheme is the creation of Mental Health or Mental Retardation Authorities ("MRAs"). MRAs are selected by TDMHMR and contract directly with the agency. It is the duty of the MRA to ensure that the statutorily mandated services are provided in its designated service area and to oversee state-funded community-based services. See id. §§ 534.052-.070. MRAs, in turn, work with community centers, as well as private entity providers of mental retardation and mental health services. Each MRA acts as the referral center for MHMR services in its service area.
At all times relevant to this suit, CRS was a for-profit provider of residential facilities and services to mentally retarded persons. Concho Valley was both a community center and a designated MRA.
Although CRS asserted numerous claims against the various appellees, the crux of CRS's complaint is that Concho Valley and several of its employees allegedly blocked potential clients' access to CRS's residential facilities. CRS alleges that Concho Valley conspired with the City of San Angelo and Tom Green County--the local governmental creators of Concho Valley--to limit CRS's business; alternatively, CRS argues that the City of San Angelo and Tom Green County are vicariously liable for Concho's conduct. CRS also sought an injunction prohibiting Concho Valley from being a member of the Texas Council, a nonprofit corporation made up of community centers from all around Texas. The remaining appellees are asserted to be either directly liable for their participation in the conspiracy and other fraudulent acts, or derivatively liable due to their association with Concho Valley or the Texas Council.
CRS presents sixteen issues for this Court's review. The first complains generally that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment disposing of all of its causes of action against all appellees. (2) Issue two concerns the trial court's denial of CRS's request for injunctive relief. Issues three through six assert error related to the trial court's refusal to grant a default judgment against Tom Green County. Issue seven concerns CRS's antitrust cause of action. The eighth issue asserts generally that the trial court erred in dismissing the claims against Hale County. Issue nine addresses CRS's claims brought under the Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA"). (3) The tenth and eleventh issues concern federal claims for violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") (4) and "section 1983." (5) Issue twelve complains of the trial court's disposal of various common-law claims. Issue thirteen asserts error related to the dismissal of CRS's statutory claims grounded in the Persons with Mental Retardation Act of 1977. (6) Issue fourteen generally contends that the trial court erred in disposing of the vicarious liability claims against Central Plains. The final two issues complain of procedural rulings by the trial court.
Antitrust Liability
CRS asserted claims under the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983 ("Antitrust Act" or "Texas Act") (7) against Concho Valley; Concho Valley employees Finn, Sheppard, and Young; Tom Green County; the Texas Council; McClure (Council director); and Central Plains, a community center and member of the Council. CRS argues that the named appellees violated the Antitrust Act by conspiring to restrict the access of potential clients from CRS's services. The appellees respond that their conduct is "immunized from antitrust liability by exemptions derived directly from the Texas Antitrust Act and from federal laws incorporated by the Act." We agree.
The purpose of the Antitrust Act is to promote economic competition in commerce in Texas. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 15.04 (West 1987). As such, the restraint of trade or commerce is made unlawful. See id. § 15.05(a). The 1983 Act was meant to be a major reform and modernization of Texas antitrust law and is modeled after the federal Sherman Antitrust Act and Clayton Act. See Caller-Times Publishing Co. v. Triad Communications, Inc., 826 S.W.2d 576, 579-80 (Tex. 1992). The Texas Act explicitly states that its provisions "shall be construed . . . in harmony with federal judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes . . . ." Bus. & Com. Code § 15.04. It is to one of these federal judicial interpretations that we now turn.
Since 1943, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting federal antitrust statutes, has recognized that antitrust laws do not apply to anti-competitive restraints imposed "as an act of government." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943). Parker involved a marketing program adopted pursuant to the California Agricultural Prorate Act governing the 1940 California raisin crop. Brown, a producer of raisins, complained that the program violated the Sherman Act. The Court rejected this contention, relying on principles of federalism and state sovereignty, holding that the Sherman Act should be interpreted as a prohibition on individual, not "state action." Id. at 352. Because the program was not the product of a private agreement or combination by others in restraint of trade, it did not violate the Sherman Act. Id. at 351. The Court stated: "The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate program made no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit." Id. at 352. Because the Texas Act specifically adopts federal judicial interpretation of federal antitrust law, we are bound to apply the Parker state action exemption to the Texas Act. See Bus. & Com. Code § 15.04.
Texas has chosen to regulate the health and welfare of its mentally challenged citizens through a comprehensive statutory scheme, rather than leaving the availability of services to the marketplace. We believe this regulation fits squarely within the Parker exemption for an "act of government by the State as sovereign." See City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978) (discussing the Parker exemption); see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 370 (1991) (confirming Sherman Act does not apply to anti-competitive restraints imposed by states as an act of government). As in Parker, Texas has not entered into a contract or agreement with an individual to establish a monopoly and is not engaged in a conspiracy to restrain for-profit entities from providing services to mentally challenged persons. Rather, the state has decided to pursue a policy of replacing competition with regulation.
The statutory scheme charges TDMHMR with governing the state policies concerning mentally disabled persons. In turn, local community centers are created to carry out the state's policies, with extensive oversight by TDMHMR. By definition, community centers are agencies of the state. See Health & Safety Code § 534.001. As state agencies engaging in acts of government by the state, these centers enjoy antitrust immunity under the state-action exemption. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 360-62 (1977); Benton, Benton & Benton v. Louisiana Pub. Facilities Auth., 897 F.2d 198, 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1990). (8) We conclude that the Parker state-action exception is applicable to statutorily created state agency community centers such as Concho Valley and Central Plains.
In addition, the Texas Act includes its own state-action exemption. Section 15.05 of the Antitrust Act specifically exempts "actions required or affirmatively approved by any statute of this state . . . or by a regulatory agency of this state . . . acting under . . . statutory authority vesting the agency with such power." See Bus. & Com. Code § 15.05(g). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court properly granted a take-nothing summary judgment against CRS on its antitrust claims against Concho Valley and Central Plains.
Furthermore, the individuals Finn, Sheppard, and Young, as employees of Concho Valley, also enjoy the benefits of the Parker state-action exemption. The state-action doctrine applies equally to the officers and agents of the governmental body who participate in the challenged conduct. See Foley v. Alabama State Bar, 648 F.2d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389). We hold the trial court did not err in disposing of CRS's antitrust claims against these individuals.
Similarly, the Texas Council and its director McClure enjoy the benefits of the Parker state-action doctrine. State-action immunity extends to private persons and entities taking a role in implementing state policy. See Benton, 897 F.2d at 204. The controversy in Benton involved a state agency's policy of always using the same law firm as bond counsel. Attorneys from a law firm not selected sued both the agency and the chosen private attorneys, alleging antitrust violations. The court found that not only was the agency protected by the state-action exemption, the private attorneys selected to perform services for the public agency were also shielded by the doctrine. See id.
In the instant case, the summary judgment evidence shows that the Texas Council is created and governed by its community center membership for the sole purpose of performing services for the centers in their endeavors to provide services to mentally challenged Texans. Accordingly, the Texas Council and its agent McClure are entitled to the state-action exemption. We hold that the trial court did not err in disposing of CRS's antitrust claims against Texas Council and McClure.
Finally, CRS asserted antitrust claims against Tom Green County. Because the County is also exempt from antitrust liability, this claim fails. The federal Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 expressly immunizes all local governmental entities from antitrust liability under the Clayton Act. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 34-36 (West 1997). Counties are included in the definition of "local government." Id. § 34. As noted previously, the purpose of the Texas Act was to drastically reform Texas antitrust law to mirror federal antitrust law. See Caller-Times, 826 S.W.2d at 579-80. The legislature explicitly adopted federal judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust statutes, and further provided that nothing in the Antitrust Act should be "construed to prohibit activities that are exempt from the operation of the federal antitrust laws." See Bus. & Com. Code §§ 15.04, 15.05(g). We believe these expressions of the legislature incorporate the local government exemption for counties contained in the Local Government Antitrust Act. Further, as previously noted, the Texas Act also includes its own state-action exemption, which we conclude is expansive enough to cover the County's participation in the anti-competitive scheme. See id. § 15.05(g). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in dismissing CRS's antitrust claims against Tom Green County.
Lawfully Formed Community Centers
As will be made clear later in this opinion, CRS's causes of action for DTPA violations, RICO violations, and common-law torts are premised on its assertion that Concho Valley and Central Plains are not legally constituted community centers and thus are not governmental entities entitled to sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we turn to the threshold issue of the community centers' legitimacy.
1. Failure for Lack of Contract
Concho Valley and Central Plains were established in June 1966 and July 1967, respectively, pursuant to article 3 of the Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act ("MHMRA") as enacted in 1965. See Act of April 5, 1965, 59th Leg., R.S., ch. 67, § 1, 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws 165, 171 (since repealed and codified as amended at Health & Safety Code Title VII). Section 3.01 of the MHMRA, as it existed at the community centers' creation, provided:
One or more cities, counties, hospital districts, school districts, rehabilitation districts, state-supported institutions of higher education, and state-supported medical schools, or any combination of these, may cooperate, negotiate, and contract with each other through their governing bodies to establish and operate a community center.
Id.
It is undisputed that the creating entities of Concho Valley and Central Plains did not enter into written contracts to establish the two community centers. CRS urges this Court to read the above-quoted language to require a written contract as a prerequisite to the valid establishment of the community centers. We decline to do so.
We read section 3.01, as written in 1965, to allow the joint creation and operation of a community center by cooperation, negotiation, or contract between local governmental entities. Clearly, the legislature meant to authorize the creation of community centers by means of contract. It appears that the legislature may have anticipated these local entities were likely to enter into contracts when forming joint community centers. However, there is nothing to indicate that the entities were required to form a written contract, or that the failure to do so would invalidate the legal existence of a jointly formed community center. (9)
Even assuming, however, that the version of section 3.01 applicable in 1967 could somehow be construed to require a contract in the formation of a community center, the record shows that in 1967 the creating entities of Central Plains did enter into a written agreement governing the selection of trustees for the center. In November 1989, the sponsoring local government creators of Concho Valley adopted written procedures setting forth, among other things, the selection of trustees, as required by the version of section 3.01 applicable in 1989. See Act of June 20, 1987, 70th Leg., R.S., ch. 956, § 3.01, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 3194, 3211 (since repealed and codified as amended at Health & Safety Code Title VII). Therefore, at the time the present lawsuit was filed, and only months following the date CRS alleges Concho Valley's offending conduct began, both centers had written contracts in place.
We decline to invalidate Concho Valley and Central Plains' 30-year history as legally created community centers for lack of written contracts at their inception.
2. Failure as Incorporated Entity
CRS next argues that because Central Plains was incorporated from 1969 to 1996 as a nonprofit corporation, it cannot be a valid community center. Basically, CRS contends that because governmental entities may not legally fund a corporation, and because the sponsoring governmental entities provide Central Plains with funding, Central Plains must not be a community center.
We are unpersuaded by this argument. Central Plains was incorporated pursuant to the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act. (10) The summary-judgment evidence shows that Central Plains exercises only public functions for public purposes under the control of the State. Contrary to CRS's assertions, Central Plains is governed by a board of trustees appointed by the participating local governmental entities creating the community center. Nothing in the statute authorizing the creation of community centers indicates that a center may not be a nonprofit corporation properly formed under the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act. We fail to see how Central Plains' nonprofit corporate status strips it of its identity as a governmental entity.
We reject CRS's contention that Concho Valley and Central Plains are not valid community centers. Having so held, we turn to those causes of action asserted by CRS turning on the premise that the centers are invalid, and thus not governmental entities entitled to sovereign immunity.
RICO Claims
CRS contends in its tenth issue that the trial court erred in disposing of its cause of action asserting RICO violations. As conceded by CRS in its brief to this Court, however, its RICO claims fail if this Court finds Concho Valley and Central Plains are legitimate community centers entitled to sovereign immunity from these claims. Moreover, CRS's RICO claims against appellees other than Concho Valley and Central Plains are premised on their alleged improper holding out of the community centers as legitimate. Because we reject CRS's contention that the centers are illegitimate, the RICO claims against all appellees fail accordingly. We hold that the trial court did not err in rendering judgment that CRS take nothing by its RICO cause of action.
Common-law Tort Claims
CRS next challenges the trial court's rejection of its common-law tort claims against all appellees, including claims of fraud, negligence, and tortious interference with contract. CRS's challenge fails for two reasons.
First, CRS provides no authority or argument to this Court that sovereign immunity has been waived; accordingly, CRS has failed to present anything for us to review, and the judgment should be affirmed on this ground alone. See Rodriguez v. Morgan, 584 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). To the extent CRS asserts that sovereign immunity has been waived due to Concho Valley's and Central Plains' not being valid community centers, and therefore not governmental units, we have rejected this argument, as discussed above.
Second, appellees asserted grounds for summary judgment before the trial court that are not addressed by CRS on appeal. In granting summary judgment against CRS on this claim, the trial court did not specify the basis for its ruling; thus, the summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground presented in appellees' motion. See Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. 1996). If summary judgment may have been granted on a ground not challenged, failure to address each theory that might support the trial court's rendition of summary judgment requires an affirmance. See, e.g., Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14, 23 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1992, writ denied), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 828 (1993). Because CRS failed to assign error to all bases upon which the appellees moved for summary judgment on its common-law tort claims, complaint on appeal has been waived.
We hold that the trial court did not err in granting appellees a take-nothing judgment on CRS's common-law tort causes of action.
DTPA Claims
In its ninth issue presented, CRS asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing its DTPA claims against all appellees because they are not shielded by sovereign immunity. We disagree. To the extent CRS contends that the appellees do not enjoy sovereign immunity because Central Plains and Concho Valley are "imposter" community centers, we have previously rejected this contention. Although CRS presents additional creative arguments as to why the DTPA waives sovereign immunity, none are viable. We hold there was no error.
Section 1983
In its eleventh issue, CRS complains that the trial court erred in dismissing its "section 1983" cause of action. See 42 U.S.C.A § 1983 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999). In granting summary judgment against CRS on this claim, the trial court did not specify the basis for its ruling; thus, the summary judgment may be affirmed on any ground presented in appellees' motion. See Cincinnati Life, 927 S.W.2d at 625. Because CRS failed to assign error to all bases upon which the appellees moved for summary judgment on its section 1983 claims, complaint on appeal has been waived.
Injunction
CRS sought to enjoin Concho Valley from membership in the Texas Council, a nonprofit corporation created by community centers from throughout the state in a joint effort to effectuate the centers' responsibilities to mentally challenged Texans. CRS claims that Concho Valley lacks statutory authority to be a dues-paying member of a corporation such as the Council, and that Concho Valley's membership violates that portion of article 3, section 52 of the Texas Constitution prohibiting public entities from holding stock in a corporation. See Tex. Const. art. III, § 52.
Concho Valley counters that CRS lacks standing to seek an injunction to void its membership in the Council. CRS argues it has standing because it pays ad valorem taxes on five residential properties to Tom Green County and the City of San Angelo, which, in turn, fund Concho Valley. Alternatively, CRS argues it has standing as a citizen with a peculiar interest adversely affected by the actions of Concho Valley.
We agree with CRS that, generally speaking, a taxpaying citizen has standing to seek an injunction to enjoin public officials from the illegal expenditure of public funds. See, e.g., Lara v. Williams, 986 S.W.2d 310, 314-15 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1999, pet. filed) (citing Osborne v. Keith, 177 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. 1944); Hoffman v. Davis, 100 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. 1937)). However, CRS does not seek to enjoin an expenditure by Tom Green County or the City of San Angelo to Concho Valley, or Concho Valley's expenditure to the Council in the form of membership dues. Rather, CRS seeks to enjoin Concho Valley from remaining a member of the Council. Because CRS has not properly placed itself within the parameters of taxpayer standing, CRS's taxpayer status cannot in itself provide it with the necessary standing to maintain its request for injunction.
CRS argues alternatively that it has standing to seek injunctive relief as a citizen with a special interest adversely affected by Concho's membership in the Texas Council. The general rule is that standing to bring suit depends upon some interest peculiar to the person individually, and not as a member of the general public. See, e.g., Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984). More specifically, a person has standing to sue if:
(1) he has sustained, or is immediately in danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the wrongful act of which he complains; (2) there is a direct relationship between the alleged injury and the claim to be adjudicated; (3) the plaintiff has a personal stake in the controversy; (4) the challenged action has caused the plaintiff some injury in fact, either economic, recreational, environmental, or otherwise; or (5) the plaintiff is an appropriate party to assert the public interest in the matter as well as his own interest.
Lake Medina Conservation Soc'y, Inc./Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Counties WCID No. 1 v. Texas Natural Resource Conservation Comm'n, 980 S.W.2d 511, 515 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, pet. denied) (emphasis added); see also Amerada Hess Corp. v. Garza, 973 S.W.2d 667, 680 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1996, no writ); Billy B., Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 717 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
CRS concedes that following the rendition of the final summary judgment in this case, it sold its licenses by which it had been authorized to provide residential services to mentally retarded persons. CRS asserts that it nevertheless maintains standing to seek an injunction because it leases real property to a company that currently operates residential service centers on that property. In effect, CRS contends that, because it has a financial stake in the profitability of its lessee, who in turn is allegedly affected by Concho Valley's membership in the Council, it maintains an interest adversely affected by Concho Valley's actions.
We conclude that the lessor/lessee relationship between CRS and its tenant does not create the special interest needed to support standing. Assuming Concho Valley's membership in the Council is improper, CRS, as landlord, has not sustained, and is not in danger of sustaining, a direct injury as a result of the membership. Further, the relationship between the possible injury to CRS and the allegedly improper membership of Concho Valley in Council is attenuated, at best. We certainly cannot say the relationship is direct. Finally, CRS has no personal stake in Concho Valley's membership, and CRS can point to no injury in fact resulting from the membership.
Accordingly, we hold that CRS lacks standing to enjoin Concho Valley's membership in the Texas Council. Because lack of standing is a ground for dismissal rather than a take-nothing judgment on the merits, see Alexander v. City of Greenville, 585 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the proper course for this Court is to vacate the portion of the summary judgment ordering that CRS take nothing by its request for injunctive relief, and to render judgment dismissing that portion of the cause in its entirety.
Persons with Mental Retardation Act
In its thirteenth issue presented, CRS urges this Court to find error in the trial court's disposal of its claims under the Persons with Mental Retardation Act ("PMRA"). See Health & Safety Code §§ 591.001-.025 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999). We decline.
The PMRA creates a statutory cause of action to redress violations of the rights of mentally retarded persons. See id. § 591.022. However, the right to sue is expressly limited to the person injured, the injured party's parent or guardian, or next friend. Id. § 591.022(d). CRS argues that it is a "person injured" and is therefore entitled to maintain suit. This precise contention has been advanced and rejected previously in Develo-Cepts, Inc. v. City of Galveston, 668 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ) (PMRA "clearly restricts recovery to mentally retarded persons and to those entitled to bring suit in their behalf"). CRS's conclusory statement that Develo-Cepts is erroneous is not persuasive.
Because CRS had no right to sue under the PMRA, the trial court properly granted summary judgment disposing of this claim.
Claims Against Hale County
All of CRS's claims against Hale County are derivative in nature. CRS asserts that because Hale County participated in the creation, controlling, and funding of Central Plains, it is vicariously liable for the wrongdoings and liabilities of Central Plains. Because we have concluded that Central Plains is not liable under any theory advanced by CRS, there can be no vicarious liability imputed to Hale County. We hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment for Hale County.
Interlocutory Default Judgment
CRS complains in issues three through six that the trial court erred in: (1) refusing to sign an interlocutory default judgment against Tom Green County after such judgment was rendered on the record in open court; (2) holding a "show cause" hearing on whether the court should sign an interlocutory default judgment against Tom Green County; (3) applying an improper legal test at the "show cause" hearing; and (4) making findings of fact at the "show cause" hearing.
As a prerequisite to presenting an argument for appellate review, the record must show that the complaint was first made to the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). CRS failed to complain to the trial court regarding the default judgment issues presented, and failed to obtain a ruling on any complaint; therefore, CRS has not preserved error for appellate review. See id.
Even if CRS had preserved error, and assuming CRS is correct that the trial court orally rendered an interlocutory default judgment, CRS's complaints are still without merit. The trial court had broad, virtually unlimited discretion to vacate an interlocutory order prior to its rendition of a final judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b; Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993) (trial court has continuing power over interlocutory orders and may set them aside at any time before final judgment is entered). We find no error.
Procedural Rulings
In its final two issues presented, CRS complains of procedural rulings made in connection with the granting of summary judgment. By a scheduling order dated June 6, 1997, the trial court set deadlines after which the parties would not be permitted to file summary judgment argument or evidence. That order gave CRS until July 11, 1997, to complete summary judgment filings, and gave appellees until July 18, 1997. Appellees filed additional summary judgment argument and evidence on July 18. CRS filed an omnibus motion requesting the trial court to grant it leave to reply to the newly filed argument and evidence. The motion was denied. CRS asserts that the June 6 order improperly allowed appellees (as movants) the "last word" and that the trial court erred in denying its omnibus motion.
The record does not show that CRS complained to the trial court about the June 6 order or secured a ruling on any complaint; therefore, the point is waived. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1. Furthermore, CRS provides no authority to this Court to support its assertion that it was error to allow movants the "last word." Error was therefore waived. See, e.g., March v. Wallace, 924 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Tex. App.--Austin 1996, no writ). Even if CRS's contention had not been waived, we would still find it to be without merit. The order did not preclude CRS from responding to any additional summary judgment argument or evidence presented by appellees; rather, it required CRS to seek leave of court before doing so. We do not find an abuse of discretion in the filing of the scheduling order.
As to the denial of the omnibus motion, while the trial court did deny the motion's general request for additional time to respond, the court granted CRS leave to file the only evidence specifically identified by CRS as necessary to respond to appellee's July 18 filing. The remainder of the omnibus motion, in essence, was simply a request for a continuance for more time to gather potentially responsive evidence. The granting or denial of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See State v. Crank, 666 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. 1984). The denial of a motion for continuance will not be disturbed unless the record shows a clear abuse of discretion. See id. Given the extended time frame within which the parties filed and responded to motions for summary judgment; the numerous motions for continuance that had previously been granted in this case; and the fact that CRS was granted leave to file the evidence it contends was responsive to appellee's July 18 filing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by generally denying CRS's omnibus motion.
We hold that CRS lacks standing to seek to enjoin Concho Valley from future membership in the Texas Council; accordingly, we vacate that portion of the trial court's final summary judgment that CRS take nothing by its request for injunctive relief and render judgment dismissing that claim. Having found all remaining issues presented by CRS to be without merit, we affirm the summary judgment in all other respects.
J. Woodfin Jones, Justice
Before Justices Jones, Kidd and Patterson
Affirmed in Part; Vacated and Dismissed in Part
Filed: August 26, 1999
Do Not Publish
1. There are 23 named appellees in this appeal, generally referred to collectively as appellees. As necessary, we will refer to appellees individually by name.
2. The trial court rendered the following orders: (1) summary judgment for Tom Green County dated May 28, 1996, disposing of all claims against the county; (2) summary judgment for Concho Valley, Young, Finn, Sheppard, Texas Council, McClure, and Central Plains dated October 29, 1996, disposing of all claims arising under the Texas Free Enterprise Antitrust Act; (3) summary judgment for Hale County dated September 15, 1995, disposing of all claims against the County; and (4) final summary judgment dated December 19, 1997, disposing of all claims against all defendants.
3. See Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.46 (West 1987 & Supp. 1999).
4. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (West 1984 & Supp. 1999).
5. 6. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. §§ 591.001-.025 (West 1992 & Supp. 1999).
7. Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §§ 15.01-.52 (West 1987 & Supp. 1999).
8. This is to be contrasted with municipalities, which are not themselves sovereign, and
therefore carry a higher burden to demonstrate that their anti-competitive actions are authorized
by the state pursuant to the state's policy to replace competition with regulation. See 9. 10. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1396--1.01-11.01 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999).
been waived, we would still find it to be without merit. The order did not preclude CRS from responding to any additional summary judgment argument or evidence presented by appellees; rather, it required CRS to seek leave of court before doing so. We do not find an abuse of discretion in the filing of the scheduling order.
As to the denial of the omnibus motion, while the trial court did deny the motion's general request for additional time to respond, the court granted CRS leave to file the only evidence specifically identified by CRS as necessary to respond to appellee's July 18 filing. The remainder of the omnibus motion, in essence, was simply a request for a continuance for more time to gather potentially responsive evidence. The granting or denial of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. See State v. Crank, 666 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tex. 1984). The denial of a motion for continuance will not be disturbed unless the record shows a clear abuse of discretion. See id. Given the extended time frame within which the parties filed and responded to motions for summary judgment; the numerous motions for continuance that had previously been granted in this case; and the fact that CRS was granted leave to file the evidence it contends was responsive to appellee's July 18 filing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by generally denying CRS's omnibus motion.
We hold that CRS lacks standing to seek to enjoin Concho Valley from future membership in the Texas Coun
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