Opinion issued April 19, 2012

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-11-00548-CV

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Dick Deguerin, Jerry Legard, Barbara G. Hazard, Eddie Van Dyke, Ron Stegemoller, Chuck J. Walters, and Todd Poehlmann, Appellants

V.

Washington County Appraisal District and Washington County Appraisal Review Board, Appellees

On Appeal from the 335th District Court

Washington County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 34157

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants, Dick DeGuerin, Jerry Legard, Barbara G. Hazard, Eddie Van Dyke, Ron Stegemoller, Chuck J. Walters, and Todd Poehlmann, appeal the trial court’s judgment determining that certain property was taxable to them.  In one issue on appeal, appellants argue the trial court erred by determining that they held an interest in the properties that would subject them to taxation.  Appellees, Washington County Appraisal District and Washington County Appraisal Review Board, argue Walters and Poehlmann lack standing to challenge the tax assessment.

We affirm.

Background

In 2008, the Appraisal District sent appellants tax assessments for private airplane hangars located at the City of Brenham Municipal Airport.  Appellants protested the assessments.  The Review Board determined the appraisals were correct.  Appellants brought an action for judicial review before the trial court.  The case was submitted to the trial court on stipulated facts.  The trial court determined that the hangars were taxable to the plaintiffs.  Appellants brought this appeal.

The Stipulation of Facts submitted to the trial court provides as follows:

1.       Plaintiffs are individuals residing in Harris County, Texas and Washington County, Texas.

2.       Defendant Washington County Appraisal District (“WCAD”), is a political subdivision of the State, authorized to appraise property for property tax purposes by Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 6.01(c).  Defendant Washington County Appraisal Review Board (“ARB”), is a quasi-judicial body authorized to determine taxpayer protests pursuant to Tex. Tax Code Ann. §§ 6.41 & 41.01.

3.       The property involved in this suit consists of T-Hangar units located at City of Brenham Municipal Airport.  The Plaintiffs each lease a tract of land at the Airport upon which the hangars are located.  See Exhibits “A-1” through “A-4.”  The hangars are affixed to the land.  Plaintiffs use the hangars for storage of their private aircraft.

4.       Plaintiffs generally acquired their interest in the hangars through “bills of sale.”  See Exhibits “B-1” through “B-2.”

5.       In 2008, WCAD determined that the airport hangars were taxable.  WCAD further determined that Plaintiffs owned a taxable interest in the hangars.  WCAD notified Plaintiffs of this determination by delivering to each Plaintiff a notice of appraised value.  See Exhibit “C.”

6.       Plaintiffs DeGuerin, Hazard, Legard, Stegermoller, and Van Dyke timely protested WCAD’s 2008 notices of appraised value determination by filing protests with the ARB.  See Exhibit “D.”

7.       The ARB held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ (DeGuerin, Hazard, Legard, Stegermoller, and Van Dyke) protests, and determined that the hangars were taxable, and that Plaintiffs were the owners.  See Exhibit “E.”

8.       This cause is a timely appeal from the Orders issued by the ARB on such 2008 protests.

Standing

In their brief on the merits, the Appraisal District and the Review Board argue that Walters and Poehlmann lack standing to challenge the tax assessment because they failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.

A. Standard of Review

Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction, and we review it under the same standard as subject-matter jurisdiction generally.  Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993).  “That standard requires the pleader to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Id.  When, as here, standing is raised for the first time on appeal, we must construe the petition in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and if necessary, review the entire record to determine if any evidence supports standing.  Id. 

Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law.  Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004).

B. Analysis

The Tax Code procedures for adjudicating a property-tax valuation protest are the exclusive remedies available to property owners.  See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 42.09(a) (Vernon 2008).  A property owner’s failure to pursue administrative review of the initial valuation before the appraisal review board “deprives the courts of jurisdiction to decide most matters relating to ad valorem taxes.”  Cameron Appraisal Dist. v. Rourk, 194 S.W.3d 501, 502 (Tex. 2006).

The Appraisal District and the Review Board argue, “There is no evidence in the record that Appellants Walters and Poehlmann timely protested WCAD’s decision to tax their hangars.” We agree, though we disagree that this requires their dismissal on appeal.

All the plaintiffs, including Walters and Poehlmann, filed a single petition.  That petition alleges:

In June of 2008, the Plaintiffs all filed their respective Notice of Protest seeking a hearing before the Washington County Appraisal Review Board (“WCARB”).  A hearing was held before the WCARB on July 17, 2008.  On July 28, 2008 the WCARB issued Final Orders Determining Protest in each of the respective protests thereby upholding the inclusion of the individual T-Hangar units in the tax rolls of Washington County, Texas and the assessment of ad valorem taxes against the Plaintiffs.  All conditions precedent to Plaintiffs’ right of judicial review of the WCARB’s decision having been performed or having occurred, Plaintiffs are entitled to a trial de novo of the WCARBS’s orders.

We hold that this is sufficient allegation of facts to affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause.  See Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.

The Appraisal District and the Review Board did not file a plea to the jurisdiction or in any other way challenge Walters’s and Poehlmann’s standing to bring suit before the trial court. The only evidence regarding standing in the record is contained in the Stipulation of Facts and accompanying documents.  The Stipulation of Facts asserts:

6.       Plaintiffs DeGuerin, Hazard, Legard, Stegermoller, and Van Dyke timely protested WCAD’s 2008 notices of appraised value determination by filing protests with the [Review Board] . . . .

7.       The [Review Board] held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ (DeGuerin, Hazard, Legard, Stegermoller, and Van Dyke) protests, and determined that the hangars were taxable, and that Plaintiffs were the owners . . . .

8.       This cause is a timely appeal from the Orders issued by the [Review Board] on such 2008 protests.

The accompanying documents verify that those named plaintiffs filed protests with the Review Board and that the Review Board made determinations for those plaintiffs.

As the Appraisal District and the Review Board argue, the record is completely silent about whether Walters and Poehlmann timely protested their tax assessments, obtained a determination from the Review Board, and timely filed an appeal to the district court. All this establishes, however, is that there is nothing to contradict the plaintiffs’ petition, which alleged that all plaintiffs, including Walters and Poehlmann did each of those things.  Because we must take the pleadings as true and construe them in favor of the pleader, the silence in the record as to Walters’s and Poehlmann’s standing has not deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. See CenterPoint Energy Entex v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex., 213 S.W.3d 364, 368 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (holding appellate court must take pleadings as true and construe them in favor of pleader in determining standing); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 (holding appellate court must construe pleading in light most favorable to pleader).

We hold that the record does not establish that Walters and Poehlmann lack standing to challenge their tax assessments.

Taxation of Improvements

In their sole issue on appeal, appellants argue the trial court erred by determining that they held an interest in the properties that would subject them to taxation.

A. Standard of Review

The parties filed an agreed stipulation of facts with the trial court and submitted the case for decision under rule 263 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.  Tex. R. Civ. P. 263.  A case submitted to the trial court upon an agreed stipulation of facts under rule 263 is in the nature of a special verdict and “is a request by the litigants for judgment in accordance with the applicable law.”  Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Transamerica Container Leasing Inc., 920 S.W.2d 678, 680 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).  “The trial court and the reviewing court may not, unless provided otherwise in the agreed statement, find any facts not conforming to the agreed statement.”  State Bar of Texas v. Faubion, 821 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied). The court’s judgment must declare only the law necessarily arising from the stipulated facts.  Transamerica, 920 S.W.2d at 680. The question on appeal is limited to the issue of the correctness of the trial court’s application of the law to the admitted facts.  Id.  This is a question of law, and, accordingly, our review is de novo.  Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist. v. Tex. Gas Transmission Corp., 105 S.W.3d 88, 91 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

B. Analysis

As summarized by appellants in oral argument, appellants argue that they do not own any interest in the hangars and, therefore, cannot be assessed taxes on the hangars.

The relevant portion of the Stipulation of Facts provides:

3.       The property involved in this suit consists of T-Hangar units located at City of Brenham Municipal Airport.  The Plaintiffs each lease a tract of land at the Airport upon which the hangars are located.  See Exhibits “A-1” through “A-4.”  The hangars are affixed to the land.  Plaintiffs use the hangars for storage of their private aircraft.

4.       Plaintiffs generally acquired their interest in the hangars through “bills of sale.”  See Exhibits “B-1” through “B-2.”

Assuming without deciding—as argued by appellants—that the lease agreement includes all of the improvements, including the hangar, this does not mean that the accompanying bills of sale are without effect.  The bills of sale convey fee simple in the hangar improvements.  A leasehold is less than fee simple. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Jagee Corp., 812 S.W.2d 49, 53 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, writ denied).  Regardless of what portion of fee simple in the hangars was conveyed in the leases, the remainder was conveyed in the bills of sale.  See Hall v. Prof’l Leasing Assocs., 550 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, no writ) (holding lease is merged when lessee acquires title to reversion). Accordingly, the appellants own the hangars.

As the parties acknowledge, the Tax Code contemplates that separate entities can own separate interests in land and improvements.  See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.04 (Vernon 2008).  Those entities can each be taxed on their separate interests.  See id.  Our state constitution requires that “[a]ll occupation taxes shall be equal and uniform upon the same class of subjects within the limits of the authority levying the tax; but the legislature may, by general laws, exempt from taxation public property used for public purposes . . . .”  Tex. Const. art. VIII, § 2.  Because the hangars are owned by private entities and, accordingly, are not public property, whatever exemption may have applied to the City of Brenham does not extend to appellants.

At oral argument, appellants argued that the bills of sale were, in fact, assignments of a leasehold interest in the hangars.  While the fourth stipulation of fact puts the term “bills of sale” in quotes, the two bills of sale included as attached exhibits refer clearly to the sale of the hangars, not a lease.  There is no mention of monthly lease payments.  There is no mention of a term of any lease.  There is no mention of any matter typically attendant to a lease. Accordingly, there is no evidence in the stipulations of fact or the attached exhibits to support appellants’ claim that the bills of sale were anything other than sales of fee simple interests in the hangars subject to any listed encumbrances.

We overrule appellants’ sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                      Laura Carter Higley

                                                                      Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Brown.