Travis Ryan Crawford v. State

NUMBER 13-17-00383-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
TRAVIS RYAN CRAWFORD, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 9th District Court
of Montgomery County, Texas.
OPINION 1
Before Justices Contreras, Longoria, and Hinojosa
Opinion by Justice Hinojosa
Appellant Travis Ryan Crawford appeals from a judgment convicting him of
attempted sexual assault of a child, a third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
1 Pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas, this appeal has
been transferred to this Court from the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont, Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 73.001 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.).
§§ 15.01(a) (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.), 22.011(a)(2)(A) (West, Westlaw
through 2017 1st C.S.). 2 In accordance with the jury’s recommendation as to
punishment, the trial court sentenced Crawford to confinement for six years, suspended
his sentence, and placed him on community supervision for five years. In two issues,
Crawford seeks reversal and rendition of a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the
evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his conviction because: (1) the evidence failed
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he did an act that amounted to more than
mere preparation; and (2) the State offered no evidence that a child was the object of the
sexual assault that he purportedly attempted. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A grand jury indictment alleges, in relevant part, that on or about May 17, 2016, in
Montgomery County, Texas, Crawford “did then and there, with specific intent to commit
the offense of Sexual Assault of a Child, do an act, to-wit: travel to a prearranged
meeting location, amounting to more than mere preparation that tended to but failed to
effect the commission of the offense[.]”
At trial, Jerry Serratt, a detective with the Montgomery County Precinct 1
Constable’s Office, recounted how his investigative efforts prompted Crawford to travel
to the prearranged meeting location. Serratt is assigned to the Internet Crimes Against
Children Taskforce (ICACT), a nationwide law enforcement effort that employs proactive
investigations. Some of the proactive investigations involve Serratt posting
2 The alleged offense occurred on or about May 17, 2016. We will reference the current version
of the statutes because amendments that occurred after the date of the alleged offense do not affect our
analysis.
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advertisements on social media websites posing as, among other things, a mother
offering a minor daughter for sexual activity.
On the afternoon of May 17, 2016, Serratt posted an online advertisement on the
“personals > causal encounters” webpage on Craigslist with the title “Mother and
Daughter Trucker Team – ww4m (the woodlands)”. The advertisement, which was
admitted into evidence, stated the following:
It use [sic] again . . . . [3] we are driving into porter for the night. Mother and
daughter trucker team . . . . she [sic] young and she is my real daughter. If
you [sic] interested[,] hit me back. . . . We [sic] spending the night here at
some apartments w[h]ere the company is providing.
Soon thereafter, a response from an email address belonging to Crawford was forwarded
to the email address associated with the advertisement. Serratt, posing as “Misty
Patterson,” began emailing with Crawford. Their conversation, read to the jury by Serratt
and a printout of which was admitted into evidence, provides the following:
CRAWFORD: Hey very interested . . . 25 white 6’2” slim and DDF . .
. . I have experience with multiple . . . would love to
experience a mother/daughter team though
PATTERSON: Hey I am 32 year old female and daughter is 14 is that
cool
CRAWFORD: What do ya’ll look like?
PATTERSON: I am 5’5 125 hispanic female and daughter is 5’1 110
hispanic female
CRAWFORD: That’s hot . . . can I get a pic of you 2? I’ll send one
back.
Serratt then emailed Crawford two photographs, each depicting the torso of a clothed
3 Most of the electronic communications contain numerous ellipses and grammatical errors. Both
are repeated herein to hew as closely as possible to the original communications.
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female mannequin taken at a department store. The photograph depicting Patterson
was of a mannequin in the women’s section, while the photograph depicting Patterson’s
daughter was of a mannequin in the junior’s section. In exchange, Crawford emailed
Serratt two shirtless photographs of himself, one of which shows his face. The email
conversation continued:
CRAWFORD: Where are ya’ll at right now?
PATTERSON: in the woodlands
CRAWFORD: Have a place to play?
PATTERSON: yes[.] what do you want to do[?]
CRAWFORD: Play with you both . . . lick and suck
PATTERSON: so u just want to suck
CRAWFORD: And fuck
PATTERSON: from both of us
CRAWFORD: If that’s ok
PATTERSON: yea that cool . . . . she is 14 yo so basically protection
is a must
CRAWFORD: Sure no problem
PATTERSON: ok cool beans
CRAWFORD: What’s the address?
PATTERSON: I give u that once I know ur coming
CRAWFORD: I’m already in the woodlands . . . over near sawdust
PATTERSON: txt me at []
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The phone number Serratt texted to Crawford was to a cell phone used by Corey
Arnold, an investigator assigned to the ICACT, as part of a continuation of the proactive
investigation started by Serratt. Arnold, pretending to be Patterson, and Crawford then
texted each other regarding the logistics of their meeting. Arnold read portions of the
text messages and a printout of them was admitted into evidence. In one of his
messages, Crawford noted that he needed to “stop to get rubbers.” Patterson texted
Crawford an address where she and her daughter would be waiting. The two then texted
the following:
CRAWFORD: What are you wearing? I’m about 10 mins away
PATTERSON: We are both wearing black shorts and pink tank tops
CRAWFORD: Ok[.] And she’s okay with this?
PATTERSON: Yep she knows.
Crawford, within approximately two and half hours of having initially responded to the
Craigslist advertisement, arrived at the predetermined location. He was apprehended
by police officers with the ICACT. The officers searched Crawford, but they did not find
condoms.
A jury found Crawford guilty of attempted sexual assault of a child, a third-degree
felony, see id. §§ 15.01(a), 22.011(a)(2)(A), assessed punishment at confinement for six
years, but recommended suspending his sentence and placing him on community
supervision for five years. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Both of Crawford’s issues raise a legal sufficiency challenge.
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A. Standard of Review
When examining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider the combined
and cumulative force of all admitted evidence in the light most favorable to the conviction
to determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, any
rational trier of fact could have found each element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805,
808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). In doing so, we give deference to the responsibility of the
jury as factfinder to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw
reasonable inferences from facts. Johnson v. State, 419 S.W.3d 665, 671 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).
We measure the legal sufficiency of the evidence against the elements of the
offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Byrd v. State,
336 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is
authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof
or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the
particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). The law as authorized by the indictment must be the statutory elements of the
offense as modified by the charging instrument. See Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). That is to say, the hypothetically correct jury charge could not
simply quote the language of the statute; rather, it must track the elements of the law
specifically alleged by the indictment. Id. at 404–05.
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In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we may look at “events occurring
before, during and after the commission of the offense, and may rely on actions of the
defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act.”
Cordova v. State, 698 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Each fact need not point
directly and independently to the appellant’s guilt, as long as the cumulative force of all
the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. See Hooper v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183,
186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Barnes v. State, 876 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994); Alexander v. State, 740 S.W.2d 749, 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). Circumstantial
evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing the guilt of an actor, and
circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Guevara v. State, 152
S.W.3d 45, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
B. Applicable Law
The hypothetically correct jury charge in this case would provide that a person
commits the offense of attempted sexual assault of a child if, with the specific intent to
commit the offense of sexual assault of a child, he does an act amounting to more than
mere preparation that tends but fails to effect the commission of the intended offense.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 15.01(a). A person commits sexual assault of a child if,
regardless of whether the person knows the age of the child at the time of the offense,
the person intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ
of a child by any means or causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or penetrate the
mouth of another person, including the actor. Id. at § 22.011(a)(2)(A), (C).
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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that there is an “‘imaginary
line,’ which separates ‘mere preparatory conduct,’ which is usually non-criminal, from ‘an
act which tends to effect the commission of the offense,’ which is always criminal
conduct.” Flournoy v. State, 668 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); McCravy v.
State, 642 S.W.2d 450, 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (op. on reh’g); Sorce v. State, 736
S.W.2d 851, 857 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. ref’d). The law does not
require that every act short of actual commission of the offense be accomplished for a
defendant to be convicted of an attempted offense. Gibbons v. State, 634 S.W.2d 700,
706 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982). Where the imaginary lines are to be drawn
depends on the nature of the crime attempted and must be considered on a case-by-case
basis. Id. at 707 (“Convictions for attempted offenses under 15.01 [ ] must necessarily
be considered on a case-by-case basis.”); Adekeye v. State, 437 S.W.3d 62, 68–69 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd); Jones v. State, 229 S.W.3d 489, 497–98
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.); Sorce, 736 S.W.2d at 857. A person’s intent to
commit an offense may be established by circumstantial evidence and may be inferred
from the person’s acts, words, and conduct, as well as from the surrounding
circumstances. See Hernandez v. State, 819 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991);
Lindsey v. State, 764 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, no pet.).
C. More Than Mere Preparation
In Crawford’s first issue, he contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to
sustain his conviction because the evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that he did an act that amounted to more than mere preparation. Crawford argues
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that he “never went to the prearranged place where he supposedly was to engage in sex
with a minor, nor did he possess any condoms or lubrication to effect the sexual
encounter.” In response, the State references Brack v. State, No. 09-16-00438-CR,
2018 WL 651264, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 31, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication), in which the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for
attempted sexual assault of child. In Crawford’s reply brief, he contends that Brack does
not control our analysis and disposition because it is unpublished. He also attempts to
distinguish Brack on the ground that “the gravamen of [it] was whether the appellant’s
conduct was sufficient to establish an intent to commit the offense attempted.”
While Brack lacks precedential value, see TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7(a), it is from the
transferor court, Id. R. 41.3, and we find it persuasive. Crawford correctly notes that the
Brack court analyzed whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support a finding that
the defendant had the specific intent to commit the offense of sexual assault of a child.
WL 651264, at *3–4. But, it did more than that. It also analyzed whether the
defendant’s actions amounted to more than mere preparation, and it found sufficient
evidence in both regards. Id. Moreover, the facts in Brack are substantially similar to
those in this case. In Brack, the defendant responded to a Craigslist personal
advertisement involving a mother and minor daughter, exchanged sexually explicit
messages with a person he believed to be the minor daughter’s mother, arranged to meet
the mother and minor daughter for sexual relations, and arrived at a predetermined
location. Id. Accordingly, Crawford’s attempt to distinguish Brack is unavailing.
The indictment in this case alleges that Crawford travelled “to a prearranged
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meeting location, amounting to more than mere preparation that tended to but failed to
effect the commission of the offense,” and it does not specify that the prearranged
meeting location was the precise location where the sexual assault of a child was to occur.
Crawford responded to an online advertisement on the “personals > causal
encounters” webpage on Craigslist titled “Mother and Daughter Trucker Team – ww4m
(the woodlands)” by describing his height, build, and as being “DDF,” 4 having experience
with “multiple,” and “would love to experience a mother/daughter team though.” Both
Serratt and Arnold recounted online and text conversations, respectively, that they had
with Crawford while they pretended to be Patterson, the mother of a fourteen-year-old.
Printouts of those conversations were admitted into evidence. Crawford inquired as to
whether Patterson had a “place to play” and that he wanted to play with, “lick,” “suck,”
and “fuck” both Patterson and her fourteen-year-old daughter. He sent two shirtless
photographs of himself. Within approximately two and half hours of having initially
responded to the Craigslist advertisement, Crawford arrived at the predetermined
location.
From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Crawford intended
to engage in the sexual activity he described with Patterson and her fourteen-year-old
daughter and that Crawford’s actions amounted to more than mere preparatory conduct
to engage in the offense. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 15.01(a), 22.011(a)(2)(A); see also Brack, 2018 WL 651264, at *3–4. Crawford’s
4 According to the Urban Dictionary, “ddf” means “"Drug and Disease Free" and it “is often found
in online personals ads—especially for casual sex. See URBAN DICTIONARY, ddf, available at
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=ddf (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).
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contention that his lack of condoms and lubrication to effectuate a sexual encounter with
Patterson’s fourteen-year-old daughter renders the evidence legally insufficient is
unavailing. The jury’s province was to reconcile Crawford’s statements to Patterson
regarding condoms and his arriving at the rendezvous point without them. See Johnson,
419 S.W.3d at 671. Crawford’s first issue is overruled.
D. Involvement of Child
In Crawford’s second issue, he contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to
sustain his conviction because the State offered no evidence that a child was the object
of the sexual assault that he purportedly attempted. Crawford argues that the penal
statutes at issue require the existence of an actual child and because Patterson’s
fourteen-year-old daughter was fictitious, the evidence is legally insufficient.
In Brack, the court held that the offense of attempted sexual assault of a child, as
opposed to the offense of online solicitation of a minor, does not require evidence that the
minor actually existed. See 2018 WL 651264, at *4 (citing Ex Parte Victorick, 453
S.W.3d 5, 12 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. ref’d)). Serratt and Arnold testified that
they were part of to the ICACT, Seratt posted an online advertisement, and together both
provided the jury with the details of the advertisement and communications with Crawford.
The State was not required to prove direct communication with Patterson’s fourteen-year-
old daughter or that either Serratt or Arnold were Patterson’s fourteen-year-old daughter.
The offense charged was not online solicitation of a minor. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 33.021 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). As in Brack, we conclude that the
actual existence of Patterson’s fourteen-year-old daughter is not an element of the
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offense of attempted sexual assault. See 2018 WL 651264, at *4 (citing Victorick, 453
S.W.3d at 12. Therefore, the fact that Patterson’s daughter was fictitious does not render
the evidence insufficient. Crawford’s second issue is overruled.
III. CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
LETICIA HINOJOSA
Justice
Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
23rd day of August, 2018.
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