Parking Company of America Valet, Inc. and Parking Company of America Love Field, Inc. v. Bradley Ryan Fellman

Reverse in part, render in part, vacate in part, and affirm in part; Opinion Filed
July 31, 2019.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-17-01277-CV
PARKING COMPANY OF AMERICA VALET, INC. AND PARKING COMPANY OF
AMERICA LOVE FIELD, INC., Appellants
V.
BRADLEY RYAN FELLMAN, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-16-01273-C
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Molberg, and Carlyle
Opinion by Justice Myers
Parking Company of America Valet, Inc. and Parking Company of America Love Field,
Inc. appeal the trial court’s judgment in favor of Bradley Ryan Fellman on his suit for damages.
Fellman sued appellants after their employee, a valet parking attendant, crashed Fellman’s car.
Fellman sued appellants for breach of the bailment contract and for violations of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer Protection Act (DTPA). See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 17.41–.63. Appellants bring three issues on appeal contending the trial court erred by (1)
denying appellants’ motion to strike Fellman’s expert witness who testified to the diminution in
value of the car as a result of the accident; (2) granting Fellman’s motion for summary judgment
on his claim for breach of contract; and (3) rendering judgment for Fellman on his claim under the
DTPA. We reverse the trial court’s judgment in part and vacate the award of treble damages under
the DTPA, vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest, otherwise
affirm the judgment, and remand the case to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney’s
fees and prejudgment interest.
BACKGROUND
Appellants operate a valet parking service at Love Field Airport in Dallas. Fellman, an
attorney, owned a limited-edition 2004 MX-5 Mazdaspeed Miata. Fellman had made over $11,000
worth of upgrades to the car.
On August 24, 2015, Fellman drove his car to Love Field Airport and left it with appellants
to be valet parked. At that time, the car was undamaged. The parking attendant gave Fellman the
customer’s portion of a claim ticket. The lot for valet-parked cars was next to the location where
drivers leave the cars with the parking attendants. The parking attendant, Adrian Miranda, did not
drive the car directly to the lot but instead went on a joyride, driving Fellman’s car around the
airport. While doing so, Miranda collided with a concrete pillar, damaging the front and right front
corner of the car. Miranda filled in the retained portion of the claim ticket to show, falsely, that
the damage he caused was present when Fellman left the car to be valet parked.
When Fellman returned to pick up his car, he was told his car was damaged. Fellman spoke
to the manager, Kevin Fanning, and explained that the car was not damaged when he left it with
appellants. Fanning did not believe Fellman, and Fanning showed Fellman the claim ticket
showing the car was damaged when Fellman left the car with appellants. Fanning accused Fellman
of making a fraudulent claim. Fellman asked Fanning to check the security video to see if it
showed what happened.
When Fanning viewed the security video, he saw the car was undamaged when Fellman
left it with Miranda and that Miranda drove it beyond the area appellants used for parking cars.
–2–
Fanning called Fellman and told him the accident was appellants’ fault and that appellants would
pay all expenses including the towing fee, cost of repairs, and car-rental charges.
In October 2015, the repairs to Fellman’s car were completed. Fellman sent Fanning an
e-mail with the information about paying for the repairs, but appellants did not pay them.
Fellman’s auto insurer paid the repair shop for the cost of the repairs minus the amount of the
deductible, and Fellman paid the repair shop the amount of his insurance deductible. In late
October 2015, Fellman sent appellants a demand letter for payment of the damages, insisting
appellants pay $9,233.79 to Fellman’s insurer for the towing fee, the repairs, and the rental-car
charges paid by the insurer. Fellman also demanded payment to him of $4,422.85 for his uninsured
expenses consisting of his insurance deductible of $422.85, $3,000 for 10 hours of his time spent
dealing with the repairs, and $1,000 for diminution in value to the car as a result of the accident.
Fanning told Fellman that appellants would pay for the diminution in value if Fellman got a written
appraisal. Fanning told Fellman that appellants would not pay Fellman for his time. The next
month, Fellman sent Fanning a written appraisal setting forth the diminution in value to the car as
a result of the accident. Appellants did not pay Fellman or his insurer.
In March 2016, Fellman filed suit against appellants, alleging they breached a contract for
bailment of Fellman’s car and that they violated the DTPA. The next month, appellants paid
Fellman’s insurer $9,233.79 for the towing fee, cost of the insured repairs, and the rental-car
charges. Appellants did not pay Fellman for his insurance deductible, the diminished value of the
car, or his lost time. Fellman moved for summary judgment on his claim for breach of contract,
which the trial court granted, awarding Fellman “$2,975 for the diminution in value to Plaintiff’s
car.”
The parties tried Fellman’s claim for violations of the DTPA to the trial court. The court
concluded that appellants violated the DTPA and that Fellman’s damages under the DTPA were
–3–
$13,906.64. 1 The court also awarded Fellman additional damages under the DTPA of $25,813.28.
See BUS. & COM. § 17.50(b)(1). The court offset the award of damages by the $9,233.79 appellants
had paid Fellman’s insurer. The court also awarded Fellman prejudgment interest of $2,263.49
and attorneys’ fees of $137,000 through trial as well as additional fees for appeal.
EXPERT WITNESS ON DIMINISHMENT OF VALUE
In their first issue, appellants contend the trial court erred by denying appellants’ motion
to exclude the testimony of Monica Fisher, Fellman’s expert witness on the car’s inherent
diminution in value. Appellants argue Fisher’s testimony and expert report should have been
excluded because (1) she signed reports and affidavits that reached different conclusions
concerning the diminution in value; (2) for comparable values, Fisher used advertised prices for
cars at dealerships instead of the prices at which the cars actually sold; (3) Fellman sold the car
before trial, and the sales price of the car established its true market value; (4) Fisher failed to
account for hail damage to the car; and (5) Fisher’s use of Carfax reports was inconsistent.
We review a trial court’s rulings on objections to summary judgment evidence, including
whether expert testimony is reliable, for an abuse of discretion. Whirlpool Corp. v. Camacho, 298
S.W.3d 631, 638 (Tex. 2009). “An expert witness may testify regarding ‘scientific, technical, or
other specialized’ matters if the expert is qualified and if the expert’s opinion is relevant and based
on a reliable foundation.” Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2010)
(quoting Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 578 (Tex. 2009); TEX. R. EVID. 702).
“Conclusory or speculative opinion testimony is not relevant evidence because it does not tend to
make the existence of material facts more probable or less probable.” Whirlpool, 298 S.W.3d at
637. “When the expert’s underlying scientific technique or principle is unreliable, the expert’s
1
Fellman’s damages consisted of $6,072.33 for repairs to the car, $3,001.46 for rental-car charges, $160 for towing, $2,975 for the car’s
diminished value, $275 for the cost of the diminished-value appraisal, $422.85 for Fellman’s insurance deductible, and $1,000 for Fellman’s lost
time.
–4–
opinion is no more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation and is inadmissible.” Wiggs
v. All Saints Health Sys., 124 S.W.3d 407, 410 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied). “[A]
party may assert on appeal that unreliable scientific evidence or expert testimony is not only
inadmissible, but also that its unreliability makes it legally insufficient to support a verdict.”
Moreno v. Ingram, 454 S.W.3d 186, 189 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.).
Different Conclusions in the Two Reports
Appellants assert that because Fisher issued two reports that reached different conclusions
concerning the car’s diminution in value due to the accident, her testimony is unreliable. We
disagree.
In the November 6, 2015 original report, Fisher stated the car was worth $9,374 before the
accident and $6,562 after being repaired resulting in a diminution in value of $2,812. In the
February 28, 2017 amended report, Fisher stated the car was worth $14,875 before the accident
and $11,900 after being repaired resulting in a diminution in value of $2,975. Fisher explained
the difference between the two reports. In the first report, she did not include the value added to
the car by Fellman’s upgrades before the accident costing $11,003.25, including an upgraded turbo
system, radiator, clutch, and exhaust system. The first report also did not include the diminution
in value from hail damage in 2011.
In her first report and affidavit, Fisher stated the car’s value as of the date of the accident
was $9,374. She determined the diminution in value due to the history of repairs to the car was
thirty percent, $2,812. This appraisal did not include the increase in value due to the upgrades
Fellman had made to the car, and the appraisal did not include the decrease in value due to the
2011 hail damage. Fisher testified in her second affidavit that she issued the second report “to
account for the May 2011 hail damage and consideration of the more than $11,000 worth of
performance parts and upgrades he installed.” In the second report, Fisher increased the car’s
–5–
value by fifty percent of the cost of the upgrades of the car, $5,501, which made the car’s value
without damage on the day of the accident $14,874. Fisher stated the total diminishment in value
from all damage repairs was thirty percent. She stated that the hail damage reduced the car’s value
by ten percent. That left twenty percent of the value diminishment due to the accident in this case.
Twenty percent of $14,874, rounded off, is $2,975.
Appellants argue that Fisher’s testimony that the upgrades were not included in the first
report “is simply not true.” They point to the fact that Fellman sent Fisher invoices for the upgrades
before she prepared the first report. However, regardless of whether Fellman sent the invoices and
whether Fisher received them, nothing in the record shows they were included in the first report.
Appellants also argue, “Even if one accepts Fisher’s ‘conservative’ assertion that the
upgrades were worth 50% of their installation cost on the date of pre-loss valuation, the value of
the Vehicle should have only increased by approximately $2,800, not $5,500.” The upgrades cost
$11,023.25; fifty percent of that amount, rounded off, is $5,501. Appellants do not explain why
Fisher’s valuation of the upgrades was unreliable.
Appellants also argue that Fisher’s reports with the two different sets of values and Fisher’s
affidavits with those numbers, each swearing it was true and correct, irreparably damaged her
credibility and made her conclusions unreliable. Appellants cite no authority for this position.
Appellants do not explain why the second report combined with Fisher’s second affidavit
explaining the need to change the valuations in the first report is unreliable.
Appellants also argue Fisher’s testimony was unreliable because she did not personally
inspect the car. Fisher resides in Oregon, and the car was in Texas. Fellman sent Fisher pictures
of the car and, they discussed the condition of the car. She testified that the pictures and the
discussion allowed her to determine the value of the car without personally inspecting it. Fisher’s
–6–
appraisal included a description of the car’s condition. Appellants do not assert that this
description was inaccurate.
We conclude appellants have failed to show Fisher’s testimony was unreliable because she
issued two reports with different valuations.
Using Advertised Listing Price Instead of Actual Sale Price for Comparable Value
Appellants argue Fisher’s report is unreliable because her reports used as comparable
values the advertised prices for similar cars at car dealerships. Fisher did not use the sales prices
for those cars, and she testified she did not know at what prices the cars sold. Fisher testified that
she used the advertised prices from car dealerships listed on websites like Cars.com and
Autotrader. She testified that the auto dealers’ listed prices on those websites were the most
available and reliable.
“Market value is defined as the price property would bring when it is offered for sale by
one who desires, but is not obligated to sell, and is bought by one who is under no necessity of
buying it.” Exxon Corp. v. Middleton, 613 S.W.3d 240, 246 (Tex. 1981). “Market value may be
calculated by using comparable sales.” Id.
Appellants cite numerous cases involving real property or natural gas where courts have
stated that a seller’s asking price or a buyer’s offering price does not prove the market value of
real property or natural gas. See Houston Unlimited, Inc. Metal Processing v. Mel Acres Ranch,
443 S.W.3d 820, 831 (Tex. 2014) (diminished value of real property due to pollution); Exxon, 613
S.W.2d at 246–47 (comparable sales of natural gas); Hanks v. Gulf, C. & S. Ry. Co., 320 S.W.2d
333, 336 (Tex. 1959) (“an unaccepted offer to purchase is not competent evidence upon the issue
of market value of the land”); Lee v. Lee, 47 S.W.3d 767, 785 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2001, pet. denied) (“Texas courts have long held that unaccepted offers to purchase property are
no evidence of market value of property.”). This case does not involve natural gas, real estate, or
–7–
other market where the sales price of comparable property is readily determinable. Instead, this
case involves the market value of a used car. Appellants do not explain, and no evidence shows,
there is any resource showing the sales prices of used cars. Fisher testified she used the prices
dealers advertised on certain websites because they were the “truly factual number.”
The record also shows Fisher did not rely solely on the advertised prices of the comparable
cars to determine the value of Fellman’s car. She testified she also considered the make and model
of the car, the mileage and condition of the car, the upgrades, and the type and extent of damage
the car suffered.
Appellants also criticize Fellman’s appraisal for not limiting the comparable cars to the
county where the damage occurred, Dallas County. Fisher testified she tries to use comparable
cars as close to the owner as possible, but when a car is rare, the search for comparable cars may
require searching farther. Fisher’s reports used comparable cars located in Alabama and
Connecticut. Appellants presented no evidence of a closer car that could have been used as a
comparable car. Considering the rarity of the Fellman’s limited-edition 2004 Mazdaspeed Miata,
the fact that Fisher looked outside Dallas County for comparable vehicles does not make her
appraisal unreliable.
Sales Price of Fellman’s Car
Before trial, and about a year after the accident, Fellman sold the car to a buyer in Georgia
for $8,500. Appellants contend that figure should constitute the post-accident market value for
determining diminished value. Fisher testified that the post-accident sale price of a car is irrelevant
to determining its “inherent diminished value,” which is what her appraisal determined.
Fisher stated in her report and testified in her deposition that inherent diminished value is
the loss in value of an automobile following a collision and repair of the damage. This
diminishment in value is due to the stigma buyers attach to cars that have been in accidents. Fisher
–8–
testified, “[T]he diminished value is at the time of the loss. It doesn’t matter what you sell the
vehicle for.” She testified this stigma also affects rare cars because structural damage makes the
car less collectible.
Appellants also argue the value of a car can only go down, so its post-accident value should
be greater than the $8,500 the car sold for a year after the accident. However, the car was not in
the same condition when it was sold as it was before the accident; the evidence showed it was in
better condition. Between the accident and the sale, Fellman spent about $1,000 upgrading the
car’s brakes, and he put new tires on the car shortly before he sold it.
Appellants have not shown Fisher’s report was unreliable because it did not use the sales
price of the car.
Hail Damage
Appellants also argue that Fisher failed to account for the hail damage to the car. Fisher’s
report did account for the hail damage—she determined it reduced the car’s value by ten percent.
Appellants argue the diminution in value from the hail damage should have been twenty percent,
the same as the collision damage. On appeal, appellants assert Fisher picked ten percent at random.
Nothing in the record shows she picked ten percent at random. Fisher explained in her deposition,
“Hail damage relative to a collision, in general, brings less—lot less stigma.” This statement
explains the difference in diminution in value of ten percent for hail damage and twenty percent
for collision damage.
Carfax Reports
Appellants also argue Fisher’s testimony was unreliable because of conflicting information
about Fisher’s use of Carfax reports:2 “[A]lthough Fisher alleges that she does not believe a
2
As the Amarillo Court of Appeals explained, “CARFAX is a nationwide reporting system whereby a purchaser can review the ownership
and operational history of a vehicle.” Webb v. Upshaw, No. 07-15-00401-CV, 2016 WL 2990512, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo May 20, 2016,
no pet.).
–9–
vehicle’s Carfax to be reliable, [Fisher’s] Reports reference Carfax reports more than once, and
communications from Fisher to Plaintiff prior to her deposition include her request to see the
Vehicle’s Carfax.”
In the section of her report discussing disclosure of damage, Fisher stated, “[M]any times
consumers and dealers will run a CarFax and/or Wreck Check to verify a clean damage report.”
In the section of the report discussing “the factors potential buyers may consider important if they
know the vehicle has been in such an accident,” Fisher stated, “The vehicles with such autobody
damage, or which have been in an accident, are ‘branded’ as having the potential for problems,
and though not reflected on the ‘title’ to the vehicle, are commonly reported by such private
enterprises as ‘CarFax’ and Wreck-Check.” Before her deposition, Fisher asked Fellman to
provide her with a copy of the Carfax report. Fisher explained during her deposition that she asked
Fellman to send her a copy of the Carfax report so she could respond to any questions that might
be raised about it during her deposition. She also stated that she does not use Carfax reports in her
appraisals because they are unreliable. She stated Carfax reports often omit damage or repairs that
occurred or they list damage or repairs that did not occur.
Fisher’s statements about Carfax reports are not inconsistent. Fisher’s reports state that
potential buyers use a Carfax report to learn if a car has been damaged in an accident because
Carfax reports may list the damage. In her deposition, she stated she does not use Carfax reports
because they can be unreliable, but she asked Fellman to provide her with a copy of the Carfax
report in case she was asked about it during her deposition. None of these statements indicate that
her testimony concerning diminution of value was unreliable.
We conclude appellants have not shown the trial court abused its discretion by denying
appellants’ motion to exclude Fisher’s testimony. We overrule appellants’ first issue.
–10–
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In their second issue, appellants contend the trial court erred by granting Fellman’s motion
for summary judgment. The standard for reviewing a traditional summary judgment is well
established. See McAfee, Inc. v. Agilysys, Inc., 316 S.W.3d 820, 825 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no
pet.). The movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that
it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). In deciding whether a disputed
material fact issue exists precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the nonmovant will
be taken as true. In re Estate of Berry, 280 S.W.3d 478, 480 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.).
Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the nonmovant and any doubts resolved
in its favor. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005). We review a summary
judgment de novo to determine whether a party’s right to prevail is established as a matter of law.
Dickey v. Club Corp., 12 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied).
Appellants argue summary judgment was improper because Fisher’s testimony and reports
raised genuine issues of material fact. Appellants assert that because Fisher’s first and second
reports and affidavits came to different conclusions concerning the car’s diminution in value due
to the accident, summary judgment was improper. We disagree.
Fisher explained that her analysis in the first report and affidavit failed to consider the
effect of the hail damage and equipment upgrades to her determination of the car’s diminution in
value. Her second report corrected those omissions. Appellants do not cite any case holding that
an amendment to an expert’s report to add omitted data that changes the report’s conclusion raises
a genuine issue of material fact.
Appellants cite Kirkwood v. PrimaCare, Inc., No. 05-97-01934-CV, 2000 WL 124675
(Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 3, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication). In that case, the issue
was whether the physician who treated the plaintiff at PrimaCare was PrimaCare’s employee.
–11–
During his deposition, the physician stated he was an “ex-employee” of PrimaCare and that he
“worked for PrimaCare Medical Centers. The physician later signed an affidavit stating he “was
not an employee of PrimaCare, Inc.,” his agreement “was with Affiliated Primary Care Physicians,
P.A.,” and that he “did work at PrimaCare-provided facilities, but not for PrimaCare.” We
concluded that conflicting inferences about the physician’s employment could be drawn from his
deposition and affidavit, and a fact issue existed whether he was an employee of PrimaCare when
the patient was treated. Id. at *4. Fisher’s reports, affidavits, and deposition show no such direct
contradictions. Instead, they show the results in her first report were based on incomplete data and
that the second report used the complete data in the calculations of diminution of value.
Appellants also cite Randall v. Dallas Power & Light, 752 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1988) (per
curiam). In that case, Randall was in an accident caused by Dallas Power & Light’s (DPL’s) truck.
DPL’s claims agent met with Randall, and DPL paid Randall some money. Randall later sued
DPL, and DPL moved for summary judgment on the basis of accord and satisfaction. Randall
testified in his affidavit that the claims agent offered to compensate him for his losses to that point
and that “DPL would take care of any future problems.” Id. at 5. Randall later testified in his
deposition “that he could not remember any representations being made by the claims agent
regarding future damages or expenses.” Id. The trial court granted DPL’s motion for summary
judgment. The supreme court reversed, concluding that conflicting inferences could be drawn
from the affidavit and deposition, and DPL did not meet its burden of showing there was no
genuine issue of material fact. Id. In this case, however, Fellman’s later testimony and reports
established that her earlier report and affidavit were based on incomplete data, which she corrected
in her amended report. This case does not involve a contradiction such as that present in Randall.
Appellants also cite Westchester Enterprises, L.P. v. Grand Homes, Inc., No. 05-98-01829-
CV, 2001 WL 953237 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 23, 2001, pet. denied) (not designated for
–12–
publication). The issues in that case included whether a geotechnical engineer working on a
residential-housing development “had a duty to raise the dangers of erosion with the Developer.”
Id. at *4. The engineer moved for summary judgment asserting he had no such duty. The
nonmovants presented evidence of an article written by the engineer that “directly contradict[ed]
[the engineer’s] affidavit and [his company’s] position in its motion for summary judgment and
its brief on appeal.” Id. at *6. We concluded the engineer did not conclusively establish he had
no duty to recognize the erosion danger. Id. This case, however, does not involve directly
contradictory statements. Instead, Fisher’s first report was based on incomplete date, and the
second report uses the complete data to reach the conclusions regarding diminution of value.
The fact that Fisher’s first and second reports had different conclusions regarding the
diminution of value from the crash does not raise a fact question. Fisher explained that the first
report did not include the data concerning the upgrades and the hail damage and that the second
report corrected that omission. Appellants provide no authority holding that a fact issue is created
barring summary judgment when a movant’s expert report omits facts that are corrected in an
amended report.
Appellants also argue that the sale price of the car when Fellman sold it after the accident
was evidence raising a fact question concerning diminution of value. Appellants cite no authority
in support of this position. Fisher testified that inherent diminution in value is the stigma a
potential buyer attaches to a car that has been in a collision and that the actual price the car sells
for is not relevant. Also, the car was not in the same or reduced condition from the time of the
collision. The evidence showed the car, even though it had more miles and was a year older, had
new tires and about one thousand dollars’ worth of upgraded brakes. Therefore, the car’s sales
price did not raise a genuine issue of material fact.
–13–
We conclude appellants have not shown the trial court erred by granting Fellman’s motion
for summary judgment. We overrule appellants’ second issue.
DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES–CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
In their third issue, appellants contend the trial court erred by finding appellants violated
the DTPA. The DTPA’s purposes are “to protect consumers against false, misleading, and
deceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide
efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.” BUS. & COM. § 17.44(a). We
liberally construe and apply the Act to promote these purposes. Id.
A consumer may bring suit for the defendant’s use of a false, misleading, or deceptive act
or practice under section 17.46 that the consumer relies on to the consumer’s detriment. Id. §
17.50(a)(1). A consumer may also bring suit for “any unconscionable action or course of action.”
Id. § 17.50(a)(3). A prevailing consumer may recover economic damages. If the trier of fact finds
the defendant acted knowingly, the consumer may also recover mental anguish damages and up to
three times the amount of the economic damages. If the trier of fact finds the defendant acted
intentionally, the defendant may recover mental anguish damages and up to three times the amount
of both the mental anguish and economic damages. Id. A prevailing consumer must be awarded
court costs and reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees. Id. § 17.50(d).
In this case, Fellman alleged appellants violated section 17.46(b)(2), (7), and (24), which
state:
[T]he term “false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices” includes, but is not
limited to, the following acts: . . .
(2) causing confusion or misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval,
or certification of goods or services; . . .
(7) representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or
grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another; . . .
(24) failing to disclose information concerning goods or services which was known
at the time of the transaction if such failure to disclose such information was
–14–
intended to induce the consumer into a transaction into which the consumer would
not have entered had the information been disclosed . . . .
Fellman also alleged appellants’ actions were unconscionable and that appellants acted knowingly
or intentionally.
The trial court found appellants made the following implied representations:
a. They [appellants] would park his car in the valet parking lot and not take his car
outside of the valet parking lot including on unauthorized joyrides;
b. They would take reasonable care of the car; and
c. They would not use the portion of the blue ticket stub that has a “DAMAGE
NOTED ON ENTRANCE” diagram (which is never shown to, or reviewed with,
customers when they drop off their cars) as a deceptive ploy to accuse Plaintiff of
making a fraudulent claim.
The trial court found appellants “engaged in a false, misleading, and/or deceptive act or practice
by breaching these implied representations with respect to Plaintiff’s car,” that Fellman “relied
on” appellants’ representations to his detriment, and that appellants’ breach of these implied
representations was a producing cause of all of Fellman’s damages. These findings indicate the
trial court determined appellants violated section 17.46(b)(7). The trial court also found that
Miranda’s joyride was “an unconscionable action that violated the DTPA, and producing cause of
all of the damages.” The trial court also found Miranda’s joyride was an “intentional or knowingly
deceptive and unconscionable action,” and the court awarded Fellman three times the amount of
his economic damages.
Findings of fact in an appeal from a nonjury trial carry the same weight as a jury verdict
and are reviewed under the same standards that are applied in reviewing evidence to support a
jury’s verdict. Shaw v. County of Dallas, 251 S.W.3d 165, 169 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet.
denied). In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding, we view the
evidence in the light favorable to the fact finder’s finding, indulging every reasonable inference
supporting it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). We “must credit
–15–
favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable
jurors could not.” Id. at 827. The ultimate test is whether the evidence allows reasonable and fair-
minded people to reach the finding under review. See id. Anything more than a scintilla of
evidence is legally sufficient to support a challenged finding. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v.
Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). In a factual sufficiency review,
we view all the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the finding only if the finding is so contrary
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence such that the finding is clearly wrong and unjust. Cain
v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Morris v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 334
S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).
Implied Representations
Appellants argue that there were no representations under section 17.46(b)(7). Appellants
assert their nonverbal conduct could not constitute a representation under section 17.46(b)(7).
Appellants cite two cases, Red Roof Inns, Inc. v. Jolly, No. 14-10-00344-CV, 2011 WL 6288147
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 15, 2011, no pet.), and Alaniz v. Sirius Int’l Ins. Corp., No.
7:14-CV-215, 2014 WL 6982338 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2014), aff’d, 626 F. App’x 73 (5th Cir. 2015).
The portion of Red Roof Inns appellants (and Fellman) cite discussing section 17.46(b)(7)
is not part of the majority opinion because the other two panel members declined to join that part
of the opinion. See Red Roof Inns, 2011 WL 6288147, at *9 (Jamison, J. concurring), *12
(McCally, J., dissenting). However, as the court stated, “[a]ll of the justices on this panel agree
that an actionable representation under the DTPA may be implied solely based upon conduct.” Id.
at *3.
In Alaniz, the federal district court stated, “However, Plaintiff admitted that he never had
any contact with Defendant at all, for any reason. Therefore, since Defendant did not
have any written or oral communications with Plaintiff, it is factually impossible that Defendant
–16–
made false representations.” Alaniz, 2014 WL 2982338, at *4 (footnote omitted). Nothing in the
opinion indicates the court considered the possibility that a representation could be implied. The
opinion does not state that a representation cannot be implied.
This Court has held that implied representations may be actionable under the DTPA. See
Chambless v. Barry Robinson Farm Supply, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 598, 602 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (“We hold that, absent any representations (oral or written) to the contrary,
by displaying the tractor with the clevis on it, Robinson represented that the clevis would be
included in the sale of the tractor.”). We are bound by our prior holdings. See Chakrabarty v.
Ganguly, 573 S.W.3d 413, 415 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, no pet.) (en banc). To the extent
appellants argue implied representations are not actionable under the DTPA, we reject that
argument.
Appellants assert they made no implied representations under the DTPA and that no
evidence supports the trial court’s finding of implied representations.. We review the record to
determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that appellants made
the implied representations.3
Fanning testified:
Q. It’s implied there that the valet’s job is to take good care of the car while the
customer is away from the car, right?
3
In Red Roof Inns, Justice Frost proposed a test for determination of an implied representation under section 17.46(b)(7):
[T]his court should not imply a representation based upon a party's conduct unless that representation was clearly
contemplated by the party charged with making it. A representation should be implied from conduct only when, under the
circumstances at the time the party engaged in that conduct, the only reasonable interpretation of that conduct is that the party
meant to convey the representation in question.
....
To qualify as an implied representation, the representation must be so obvious that it did not need to be stated. More
importantly, there must be one and only one thing that the implied representation reasonably could mean. The law will not
imply a representation when a party is said to have represented one thing by its conduct and the same action or conduct
reasonably could be construed to have a different meaning.
Red Roof Inns, 2011 WL 6288147 at *4, *5. Although Justice Frost (now Chief Justice Frost) was the author of the majority opinion, the other two
Justices did not join that section of her opinion.
–17–
A. Again, that is correct.
Q. And that doesn’t include driving it in any unauthorized fashion, does it, sir?
A. Right.
....
Q. . . . If Mr. Fellman’s expectation is that his car is only going to be driven as
absolutely necessary to preserve and protect it and park it safely, that’s his
expectation. That’s also the expectation of your company, right?
A. Correct.
This testimony supports the trial court’s findings that appellants impliedly represented they “would
park his car in the valet parking lot and not take his car outside of the valet parking lot including
on unauthorized joyrides;” and that they “would take reasonable care of the car.” Appellants do
not challenge the trial court’s finding that the breach of these implied representations was a
producing cause of all of Fellman’s damages. These findings supported the trial court’s rendition
of judgment for Fellman under the DTPA.4
Treble Damages
Appellants also contend the trial court erred by awarding treble damages to Fellman.
Section 17.50(b) provides that a prevailing consumer may recover up to three times the
amount of economic damages “[i]f the trier of fact finds that the conduct of the defendant was
committed knowingly” or intentionally. The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
state, “Because Miranda’s decision to take Plaintiff’s car on a joyride, outside the valet service
area, was an intentional and knowingly deceptive act and unconscionable action that violated
DTPA § 17.50(a)(3) and (b)(1), Plaintiff is awarded an additional $25,813.28 (double the actual
4
Appellants also argued there was no evidence to support the trial court’s finding that appellants violated their representation that they would
not use the part of the claim ticket retained by appellants to accuse Fellman of making a fraudulent claim. They argue there could not be an implied
representation concerning the part of the claim ticket not given to Fellman because Fellman was unaware of the existence of that part of the claim
ticket. Because we have determined the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of other actions violating the DTPA, we need not address this
argument.
–18–
economic damages).” The trial court also found that Miranda was in the course and scope of his
employment with appellants “at all relevant times.”
The trial court’s award of treble damages was based on Miranda’s conduct of taking the
car on a joyride. Appellants assert they are not vicariously liable for Miranda’s violation of the
DTPA. We interpret their argument as asserting no evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Miranda was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he crashed the car.
“[A]n employer is liable for its employee’s tort only when the tortious act falls within the
scope of the employee’s general authority in furtherance of the employer’s business and for the
accomplishment of the object for which the employee was hired.” Minyard Food Stores, Inc. v.
Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2002) (citing Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Van Cleave, 468
S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. 1971)). The employee’s acts “must be of the same general nature as [the
conduct] authorized or incidental to the conduct authorized” to be within the scope of employment.
Id. (quoting Smith v. M Sys. Food Stores, Inc., 297 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1957)). Accordingly,
“if an employee deviates from the performance of his duties for his own purposes, the employer is
not responsible for what occurs during that deviation.” Id. In the context of employer liability for
an employee’s negligent driving, an employee driving on a personal errand is not in the course and
scope of his employment. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 756–
57 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (employee delivering tires to company who crashed while driving to
convenience store to purchase cigarettes was not in course and scope of employment); Drooker v.
Saeilo Motors, 756 S.W.2d 394, 397 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied)
(employee driving employer’s delivery vehicle to his home for lunch at time of crash was not in
course and scope of employment).
Appellants argue Miranda was not acting in the course and scope of his employment when
he crashed the car. The testimony showed appellants authorized Miranda to drive the car from
–19–
where Fellman left it to a parking place in one of appellants’ parking lots. Fanning testified
Miranda drove the car past the last of appellants’ parking lots and kept going until he crashed the
car into a concrete pillar. Nothing in the record shows Miranda’s failure to drive the car directly
to a parking place was anything other than a joyride in Fellman’s limited-edition, upgraded sports
car. That joyride was not within the same general nature as the conduct authorized by appellants,
nor was it incidental to the authorized conduct. The joyride was not in furtherance of appellants’
business, nor was it “for the accomplishment of the object for which [Miranda] was hired.” See
Minyard Food Stores, 80 S.W.3d at 577. Instead, Miranda’s joyride was a deviation “from the
performance of his duties for his own purposes.” Id. Appellants “are not responsible for what
occurs during that deviation.” Id. We conclude no evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Miranda was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he crashed the car. Therefore,
the trial court erred by imposing liability on appellants for Miranda’s “intentional and knowingly
deceptive act and unconscionable action.”
We sustain appellants’ third issue to the extent the judgment awarded Fellman treble
damages, and we otherwise overrule the issue.
Attorneys’ Fees
Section 17.50(d) provides, “Each consumer who prevails shall be awarded court costs and
reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees.” BUS. & COM. § 17.50(d). The trial court awarded
Fellman $137,000 for his attorneys’ fees through trial as well as additional amounts for appeal.
Our disposition of appellants’ third issue reduces the award of Fellman’s damages from $30,486.13
to $4,672.85. 5 The supreme court has held that “unless an appellate court is ‘reasonably certain
that the jury was not significantly influenced by the erroneous amount of damages it considered,’
5
These damages consist of the diminished value of the car ($2,975), the cost of the diminished-value appraisal ($275), Fellman’s insurance
deductible ($422.85), and Fellman’s lost time ($1,000). It is also the trial court’s finding of Fellman’s total actual damages, $13,906.64, offset by
appellants’ $9,233.79 payment to Fellman’s insurer.
–20–
the issue of attorney’s fees should be retried if the damages awarded are reduced on appeal.”
Young v. Qualls, 223 S.W.3d 312, 314 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting Barker v. Eckman, 213
S.W.3d 306, 314 (Tex. 2006)). This rule also applies when the trial court determines the award of
attorneys’ fees. See id. In this case, we have reduced the award of damages to less than one-sixth
the amount awarded by the trial court. In this situation, “we cannot be reasonably certain that the
trial court was not significantly affected by the error. Therefore, the case must be remanded to the
trial court for a new trial on attorney’s fees.” Id. (citation omitted) (two-thirds reduction of
damages required vacating and remanding award of attorney’s fees).
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s judgment in part. We vacate the award of treble damages, and
we render judgment that Fellman recover damages of $4,672.85. Having modified the award of
damages, we vacate the award of prejudgment interest. See Lee v. Lee, 411 S.W.3d 95, 115–16
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). We also vacate the trial court’s award of attorneys’
fees. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the amount of
Fellman’s reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees and the amount of prejudgment interest. In all
other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Lana Myers/
LANA MYERS
JUSTICE
171277F.P05
–21–
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
PARKING COMPANY OF AMERICA On Appeal from the County Court at Law
VALET, INC. AND PARKING No. 3, Dallas County, Texas
COMPANY OF AMERICA LOVE FIELD, Trial Court Cause No. CC-16-01273-C.
INC., Appellant Opinion delivered by Justice Myers.
Justices Molberg and Carlyle participating.
No. 05-17-01277-CV V.
BRADLEY RYAN FELLMAN, Appellee
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
REVERSED in part. The trial court’s award of treble damages is VACATED, and judgment is
RENDERED that appellee Bradley Ryan Fellman recover damages of $4,672.85 from
appellants Parking Company of America Valet, Inc. and Parking Company of America Love
Field, Inc., jointly and severally. The trial court’s award of attorney’s fees is VACATED. The
trial court’s award of prejudgment interest is VACATED. This cause is REMANDED to the
trial court for determination of appellee Bradley Ryan Fellman’s reasonable and necessary
attorneys’ fees and prejudgment interest. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.
Judgment entered this 31st day of July, 2019.
–22–