Michael Alvin Lloyd v. State

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-15-00435-CR
NO. 02-15-00436-CR
NO. 02-15-00437-CR
MICHAEL ALVIN LLOYD APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NOS. 1401032D, 1404399D, 1404400D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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In each case, Appellant Michael Alvin Lloyd pled guilty to aggravated
robbery with a deadly weapon, and the trial court convicted him and sentenced
him to sixteen years’ confinement, with the sentences to run concurrently.
Appellant timely appealed.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel avers that, in
his professional opinion, these appeals are frivolous. Counsel’s brief and motion
meet the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744–45, 87 S. Ct.
1396, 1400 (1967), by presenting a professional evaluation of each appellate
record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See Stafford
v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510–11 & n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel (1) notified Appellant of his
motion to withdraw; (2) provided him a copy of both the motion and brief;
(3) informed him of his right to file a pro se response; (4) informed him of his pro
se right to seek discretionary review should this court hold the appeals frivolous;
and (5) took concrete measures to facilitate his review of the appellate record in
each case. See 436 S.W.3d 313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This court
afforded Appellant the opportunity to file a response on his own behalf, but he did
not do so. The State likewise declined to file a brief.
After an appellant’s court-appointed counsel files a motion to withdraw on
the ground that an appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this
court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record to see if
there is any arguable ground that may be raised on his behalf. See Stafford,
813 S.W.2d at 511. Only then may we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
2
Because Appellant entered open pleas of guilty, our independent review
for potential error is limited to potential jurisdictional defects, the voluntariness of
his pleas, error that is not independent of and supports the judgments of guilt,
and error occurring after entry of the guilty pleas. See Monreal v. State,
99 S.W.3d 615, 619–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Faisst v. State,
98 S.W.3d 226, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief and the appellate record in
each case. We agree with counsel that these appeals are wholly frivolous and
without merit; we find nothing in the appellate records that arguably might
support these appeals. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d 684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, deny
Appellant’s motion to appoint new counsel, and affirm the trial court’s judgments.
PER CURIAM
PANEL: PITTMAN, WALKER, and MEIER, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: March 30, 2017
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