Scotty Wales, Adam Stout and CAS Enterprise-Venture, VI, LLC v. Paul Ruppert, Innovative Resources Enterprises, LLC and Innovative Resources, Inc.

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
_________________
NO. 09-17-00080-CV
_________________
SCOTTY WALES, ADAM STOUT AND CAS ENTERPRISE-VENTURE,
VI, LLC, Appellants
V.
PAUL RUPPERT, INNOVATIVE RESOURCES ENTERPRISES, LLC AND
INNOVATIVE RESOURCES, INC., Appellees
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 260th District Court
Orange County, Texas
Trial Cause No. D160237-C
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants Scotty Wales, Adam Stout, and CAS Enterprise-Venture, VI, LLC
filed this interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order granting the special
appearance of Appellees, Paul Ruppert, Innovative Resources Enterprises, LLC, and
Innovative Resources, Inc. and dismissing the claims against them. We affirm.
1
I. Factual Background
Paul Ruppert is a Louisiana oil operator and economic development
consultant. Ruppert’s two companies, Innovative Resources, Inc. and Innovative
Resources Enterprises, LLC1 were both formed to do business in Louisiana
regarding oil and economic development. Garold Thibodeaux is a participant in
some of the Ruppert Defendants’ oil wells. Scotty Wales, Adam Stout, and CAS
Enterprise-Venture, VI, LLC2 each claim to have invested in one or more wells on
Ruppert family land in Acadia Parish, Louisiana.
Although consistent in some respects, the parties present largely conflicting
accounts of the operative facts underlying the suit. Wales alleges that Thibodeaux
approached him in 2007, seeking to serve as a financial advisor. Wales asserts that
Thibodeaux then approached him in 2008 regarding certain investments with
“Thibodeaux and his partner, [Ruppert.]” Wales further alleged that the Ruppert
Defendants “had a business or partnership relationship with [Thibodeaux], to solicit
investment opportunities and sell working interests in various oil wells and saltwater
1
Except when helpful to distinguish the acts of Ruppert as an individual, we
generally refer to Ruppert and his two companies collectively as the “Ruppert
Defendants.”
2
Except when helpful to distinguish the acts of any of the appellants
individually, we generally refer to Wales, Stout, and CAS Enterprise Venture, VI,
LLC collectively as “Wales.”
2
wells” and that Thibodeaux and the Ruppert Defendants met with Wales in Orange,
Texas, and “jointly marketed to [him] the investment of re-entering at least two (2)
wells . . . for the purpose of reestablishing paying quantities.” Wales entered into a
Participation Agreement in September, 2009, which required Wales to front costs
for re-entering wells in exchange for thirty percent of the royalty. Wales advanced
the estimated costs for the first well, Well No. 1, which worked as anticipated and
resulted in Wales’s receipt of substantial royalty payments. Wales contends that in
2012, he “was asked to and did advance” the costs to re-work another oil well, Well
No. 2. He further asserts that, around the same time, the Ruppert Defendants and
Thibodeaux approached him with an opportunity to invest in a third well, this one
being a saltwater well, and that he advanced money for that well also.
In the course of these dealings, Wales sold a portion of his participation
interest in Well No. 1 to Adam Stout, as an assignee. Wales contends that Stout also
purchased an assigned interest in Well No. 2 after being approached by Thibodeaux.
Wales likewise provided the production information he had received about the wells
to Craig Stickfort, who also purchased a portion of Wales’s interest in Wells No. 1
and No. 2.3
3
Wales’s Original Petition alleges that Stickfort purchased a portion of
Wales’s interest in the wells; however, the documents produced in the trial court
3
Well No. 1 went offline in 2015 and required substantial repair. It was
determined that Well No. 2 was not viable, and no income was earned on the
saltwater well. On August 5, 2016, Wales filed suit against Thibodeaux and the
Ruppert Defendants for various causes of action relating to the wells.
The Ruppert Defendants, through their pleadings and testimony from Ruppert
and Thibodeaux, provide a significantly different account of the relationship among
the parties and how the events underlying the suit unfolded. Ruppert asserts that
Thibodeaux was a long-time personal friend and a participant in some of Ruppert’s
oil wells in Louisiana, but he was never his employee or agent, and Ruppert never
directed Thibodeaux to solicit or conduct any business for him in Texas.
Thibodeaux testified that he and Wales were friends before any of these events
and that he also provided Wales with financial advice. He testified that he and Wales
were having a friendly lunch one day in Vidor, Texas, when Wales mentioned that
he needed to make more money and asked if Thibodeaux knew of any business
opportunities. Thibodeaux replied by disclosing his own intent to participate in a
business owned by a friend of his who re-enters abandoned wells in an effort to bring
them back into production. Thibodeaux testified that Wales expressed interest in
indicate that the legal purchaser was CAS Enterprise Venture VI, LLC, with Craig
Stickfort executing the documents on the entity’s behalf.
4
becoming involved himself and requested that Thibodeaux contact Ruppert in order
for Wales to discuss the business further with him and be able to participate in the
well. Thibodeaux testified that Wales knew Thibodeaux’s relationship with Ruppert
was one of friendship and that he never held himself out as a representative of the
Ruppert Defendants. Thibodeaux also testified that he made clear to Wales that his
mention of the oil wells as a business opportunity was separate from his financial
investment advice. Similarly, Ruppert testified that Thibodeaux had no authority to
enroll others in any well on Ruppert’s behalf, and Thibodeaux received no payment
or commission regarding the wells.
The Ruppert Defendants further allege that Ruppert met Stout only once,
when Stout visited the wells in Louisiana with Wales and Thibodeaux, and that it
was Wales who solicited Stout and provided Stout with production reports. Ruppert
testified that he never met Stickfort at all, although he did speak to Stickfort by
telephone. Ruppert testified that he never expressly authorized Wales to transfer any
interest in his Participation Agreement, and the terms of the agreement do not permit
such a transfer. Ruppert acknowledged that he accepted expense payments from
Stout because it ultimately did not matter to him who made payments; however, he
maintains that he never had any contract with Stickfort or Stout.
5
The Ruppert Defendants allege that Wales ultimately refused to pay certain
expenses owed under the Participation Agreement, and that it was Wales’s failure to
advance the required costs that adversely impacted the wells’ ability to operate.
After Wales filed suit in a district court in Texas, the Ruppert Defendants filed
a joint Special Appearance, arguing they did not have sufficient minimum contacts
with the state to justify a Texas court’s assertion of jurisdiction over them. Following
an evidentiary hearing, the court sustained the special appearance and dismissed the
suit against the Ruppert Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction. Wales then
filed this interlocutory appeal, asserting that the trial court erred in granting the
special appearance. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(7) (West
Supp. 2016).
II. Standard of Review
Whether a trial court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is
a question of law that we review de novo. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand,
83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). The burden of proof in a jurisdictional challenge
is a shifting one:
[T]he plaintiff bears the initial burden to plead sufficient allegations to
bring the nonresident defendant within the reach of Texas’s long-arm
statute. Once the plaintiff has pleaded sufficient jurisdictional
allegations, the defendant filing a special appearance bears the burden
to negate all bases of personal jurisdiction alleged by the plaintiff.
6
Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010) (internal
citations omitted). In resolving a defendant’s special appearance, the trial court
considers the pleadings, any stipulations between the parties, any affidavits and
attachments filed by the parties, the results of any discovery conducted, and any oral
testimony before the court. Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a(3).
In making its jurisdictional determination, the trial court may also be required
to resolve questions of jurisdictional fact. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794. We
review the trial court’s resolution of underlying factual disputes under a legal and
factual sufficiency standard, while the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are subject
to de novo review. Id. When, as in this case, a trial court does not issue explicit
findings of fact and conclusions of law, we infer all factual findings necessary to
support the trial court’s jurisdictional determination if the record contains evidence
supporting such a determination. See GJP, Inc. v. Ghosh, 251 S.W.3d 854, 870 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2008, no pet.). “However, a trial court’s implied findings are not
conclusive, and if the record on appeal contains a reporter’s record and clerk’s
record, the appellant may use the record to argue that the evidence is insufficient to
support implied findings that are relevant to the appeal.” Am. Express Centurion
Bank v. Haryanto, 491 S.W.3d 337, 342 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, no pet.). We
review a trial court’s factual findings under the same legal and factual sufficiency
7
standards applicable to a jury’s findings. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806
S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991).
III. Waiver by Live Testimony
In his first issue on appeal, Wales argues that the Ruppert Defendants waived
their objection to personal jurisdiction when, prior to securing a ruling on their
special appearance, Ruppert “appeared in person and testified in support of a fellow
defendant’s motion to transfer venue[.]” Wales asserts that Ruppert’s testimony “in
support of Thibodeaux’s motion to transfer venue” violated the due-order-of-hearing
rule that requires any motion challenging jurisdiction to be heard and determined
before a motion to transfer venue or any other plea or pleading. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
120a(2). Although Wales correctly states the law regarding the due-order-of-hearing
requirement, his argument mischaracterizes the proceedings in the trial court. The
record clearly shows that the parties were arguing the Ruppert Defendants’ special
appearance, not Thibodeaux’s motion to transfer venue, at the time that Ruppert
provided testimony. Wales’s counsel effectively acknowledged the focus of the
hearing by informing the trial court in response to Ruppert’s argument that “[t]he
issue here is what Mr. Ruppert and his businesses do here in Texas that warrants
them being brought into the state of Texas.” At the conclusion of Ruppert’s live
testimony, Wales’s counsel advised the court that he had no further questions “[o]n
8
the issue of the special appearance[.]” Finally, during one portion of Thibodeaux’s
testimony at the hearing, the court interrupted and redirected Wales’s counsel’s
cross-examination as he began to veer into evidence regarding other issues, noting
“I think we’re getting into some areas, though, that’s getting away from . . . the
special appearance.” After the evidence was concluded, the court granted the special
appearance. It was only after the special appearance was granted that Thibodeaux’s
motion to transfer venue was substantively addressed, with the following exchange:
[Defense Counsel]: The motion to transfer venue, Your Honor,
do we need to bring that up or that’s --
[Trial Court]: No.
[Defense Counsel]: Okay.
[Trial Court]: I don’t see any sense in entertaining that at this
point.
...
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I’m sorry. Before we go off the record
because I’m not clear, on the motion to transfer venue, is the Court --
the Court is not ruling on those?
[Trial Court]: I’m not going to -- no.
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: I’m just --
[Trial Court]: I’m -- okay. I’m going to deny --
[Plaintiff’s Counsel]: You’re overruling --
[Trial Court]: I’m going to deny the motion to transfer venue.
9
Accordingly, on this record, we find that Ruppert’s testimony in support of
his own special appearance did not constitute a general appearance and did not
violate the due-order-of-hearing requirement. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 120a(2), (3). We
overrule Wales’s first issue.
IV. Personal Jurisdiction
In his second issue, Wales argues that the district court erred in sustaining the
Ruppert Defendants’ special appearance because “[t]he evidentiary record
demonstrates that Appellees availed themselves to Texas’ jurisdiction.”
A Texas court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
if (1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction, and (2) the
exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state constitutional due process
guarantees. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex.
2007). Texas’s long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant who does business in Texas. Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784
S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990). Relevant to this case, Texas’s long-arm statute
provides that a nonresident does business in this state if he: (1) contracts by mail or
otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole
or in part in this state; or (2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state. See Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann § 17.042(1), (2) (West 2015). The Texas Supreme
10
Court has interpreted the statute’s broad “doing business” language to reach “as far
as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit.” BMC
Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795 (quoting U–Anchor Advert., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d
760, 762 (Tex. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978)). “Thus, the requirements
of the Texas long-arm statute are satisfied if an assertion of jurisdiction accords with
federal due-process limitations.” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575.
Federal constitutional due-process limitations for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident require first that the nonresident have established
minimum contacts with the forum state, and also that the exercise of such jurisdiction
comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. BMC Software,
83 S.W.3d at 795. Minimum contacts are deemed sufficient when the nonresident
“purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d
at 575 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). In analyzing whether
a nonresident has purposefully availed himself of the forum, we consider three
factors:
First, only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not the
unilateral activity of another party or a third person. Second, the
contacts relied upon must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous,
or attenuated. . . . Finally, the defendant must seek some benefit,
advantage or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction.
11
Id. at 575 (internal quotes and citations omitted).
A nonresident defendant’s contacts may give rise to either specific or general
jurisdiction. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795. “Specific jurisdiction is established
if the defendant’s alleged liability arises from or is related to an activity conducted
within the [state].” Id. at 796. By contrast, general jurisdiction is established when a
nonresident’s contacts with the state are so “continuous and systematic” that
personal jurisdiction is permissible regardless of whether his alleged liability arises
from or in relation to his specific contacts. PHC–Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly–Clark
Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2007).
V. Analysis
In their special appearance and supporting affidavits, the Ruppert Defendants
asserted that they are not subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas because Ruppert
is a life-long resident of Louisiana who has never lived, worked or held himself out
as a businessman in Texas; both of Ruppert’s companies were incorporated and have
their principal place of business in Louisiana; and neither he nor either of his
Louisiana corporations conducted, pursued, or directed business in the State of
Texas.
12
A. Specific Jurisdiction
In asserting that the trial court should exercise specific jurisdiction over the
Ruppert Defendants, Wales relies almost exclusively on the actions and activities of
Thibodeaux, arguing that Thibodeaux exercised apparent authority to act for the
Ruppert Defendants.
For purposes of a jurisdictional inquiry, an agent’s contacts with a forum state
may be imputed to the nonresident principal. Greenfield Energy, Inc. v. Duprey, 252
S.W.3d 721, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). However, an
agency relationship cannot be presumed; rather, it must be proven by the party
asserting such a relationship exists. Schultz v. Rural/Metro Corp. of New Mexico-
Texas, 956 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.). The
question of whether an agency relationship exists is one of fact unless the issue is
undisputed or the evidence establishes the relationship as a matter of law. Coleman
v. Klockner & Co. AG, 180 S.W.3d 577, 588 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2005, no pet.); Bhalli v. Methodist Hosp., 896 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). In this case, Ruppert unequivocally disputed
the existence of any agency relationship. Accordingly, in holding that the Ruppert
Defendants were not subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas, we must infer that the
trial court impliedly found that Thibodeaux was not acting as the Ruppert
13
Defendants’ “Texas agent,” as argued by Wales. See BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at
795 (requiring appellate courts to infer all findings of jurisdictional facts necessary
to support the trial court’s ruling).
In addition to submitting affidavits to the trial court, Ruppert and Thibodeaux
each testified at the special appearance hearing that there never existed any actual or
apparent agency relationship between them and that neither ever made any
representation of such authority to Wales or anyone else. Although this evidence is
in direct conflict with Wales’s assertions regarding Thibodeaux’s representations, it
is for the trial court to resolve such evidentiary conflicts. See McGalliard v.
Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696–97 (Tex. 1986). Thus, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the court’s ruling and indulging every reasonable inference
in support of its implied finding, we conclude that there was legally sufficient
evidence negating an agency relationship, and that the court’s implied finding was
not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See City of Keller
v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 826–27 (Tex. 2005) (describing the standards for legal
and factual sufficiency on appellate review).
Our jurisdictional analysis must focus, then, only on the contacts that Ruppert
himself had with Texas as a forum, disregarding Thibodeaux’s actions and activities.
See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980); Hoagland v. Butcher, 396 S.W.3d
14
182, 194 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (“When there are
multiple defendants, the contacts of each defendant must be analyzed
individually.”). Notably, of all of the “jurisdictional facts” Wales relies on in his
appellate brief, the only activities that Ruppert is alleged to have engaged in
personally were two or three meetings that occurred in Orange, Texas, for the parties
to sign the Participation Agreement and to discuss the wells. Ruppert acknowledged
that he came to Texas once to meet with Wales and sign the Participation Agreement,
asserting that he did so at Wales’s direct request and solely for Wales’s convenience,
as a professional courtesy. Ruppert asserts that the only other time he came to Texas
was to meet with Wales’s attorney after Wales had threatened to file suit. He also
acknowledged communicating with Wales by e-mail and accepting monetary
payments that originated in Texas, Kansas and Iowa at various times.
The fact that a nonresident defendant conducts business with a Texas resident
and communicates with the resident in furtherance of that business is insufficient,
without more, to confer specific jurisdiction. See Bryan v. Gordon, 384 S.W.3d 908,
916 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (“The fact that Appellees
conducted business with . . . a Texas resident[] is insufficient alone to confer specific
jurisdiction.”); Peredo v. M. Holland Co., 310 S.W.3d 468, 474–75 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (“[A] nonresident does not establish minimum
15
contacts simply by contracting with a Texas entity and engaging in numerous
communications, by telephone or otherwise, with people in Texas concerning the
contract.”); Weldon-Francke v. Fisher, 237 S.W.3d 789, 796 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
Moreover, in addition to sufficient minimum contacts, the imposition of
specific jurisdiction also requires that the litigation result from alleged injuries that
directly arise from or relate to the activities the nonresident has directed at the forum.
Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d
223, 228 (Tex. 1991); see also Double Eagle Resorts, Inc. v. Mott, 216 S.W.3d 890,
894 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (holding that specific jurisdiction was not
proper where plaintiff’s claim arose from conduct that occurred in another state, not
from the defendant’s purposeful, direct mail solicitation of the plaintiff in Texas).
For example, in Moki Mac, the Texas Supreme Court held that a defendant’s
promotional activities in Texas were “simply too attenuated to satisfy specific
jurisdiction’s due-process concerns” where the operative facts of the underlying case
would focus almost entirely on activities that occurred in another state, and alleged
misrepresentation claims would be considered only after, and in connection with,
the analysis of those out-of-state activities. 221 S.W.3d at 586–88. Similarly, the
wells at issue in this case were located and operated exclusively in Louisiana. All
16
records and information regarding the wells, their status, work needed, work
performed, and associated costs derive from individuals, entities, facts and data that
reside or exist in Louisiana. All witnesses to the operation and maintenance of the
wells would be in Louisiana. Accordingly, the ultimate determination of whether the
Ruppert Defendants mismanaged the wells or failed to pay appropriate royalties, or
whether any alleged representations about the wells were actionably false will
necessarily turn on consideration of events and operations occurring almost
exclusively in Louisiana. Thus, as in Moki Mac, the cause of action cannot
reasonably be said to “arise out of or relate to” Ruppert’s limited contacts with
Texas. See 221 S.W.3d at 586–88. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err
in refusing to find specific jurisdiction.
B. General Jurisdiction
Wales further argues that, even if all of Thibodeaux’s actions are ignored, the
Ruppert Defendants had systematic and continuous contact in Orange County,
Texas, for purposes of general jurisdiction. Because general jurisdiction permits a
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident for claims not directly
linked to the defendant’s contacts with the state, a general jurisdiction inquiry
requires “a ‘more demanding minimum contacts analysis,’ with a ‘substantially
higher’ threshold[.]” PHC–Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 168 (quoting CSR Ltd. v. Link,
17
925 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Tex. 1996) and 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1067.5 (2007)). Although there is no precise
formulation for the amount of contacts necessary to establish general jurisdiction, it
is clear that the requisite level is substantial. Id. at 167.
In support of his argument that general jurisdiction was proper, Wales asserts
that Ruppert’s actions in Texas included: (1) personally soliciting investments from
Texas investors from Louisiana; (2) coming to Texas to visit with Wales about the
business, provide hardcopies of information on Well No. 1, and execute the
Participation Agreement; (3) receiving payments in Texas; (4) revisiting the Texas
investors in Texas to update them on the status of their investments, provide expense
reports, and solicit further investments in Well No. 2 and the salt water well; and (5)
passing communications regarding expenses through a Texas resident. We note,
however, that many of these alleged contacts were controverted by evidence
presented by the Ruppert Defendants in the trial court, and as discussed herein, this
court is required to imply all factual findings in favor of the trial court’s judgment
that are supported by the record. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794–95. Viewing the
entire record in light of that framework, we find that there is sufficient evidence to
support implied factual findings that (1) any contacts Ruppert personally had with
Texas were primarily requested and arranged by other parties, (2) any such activities
18
were solely to accommodate Wales’s desire to invest in Ruppert’s business, the
operations of which were conducted exclusively in Louisiana, and (3) the limited
contacts Ruppert did have with Texas, as factually supported by the evidence, were
minimal or fortuitous and not grounded on any effort or desire to invoke any benefit
or protection of Texas law.4 See U–Anchor Advert., 553 S.W.2d at 763.
Moreover, the record contains no evidence that Ruppert ever had any contact
with Texas outside of those specifically related to the facts underlying this dispute.
See State of Rio De Janeiro of Federative Republic of Brazil v. Philip Morris Inc.,
143 S.W.3d 497, 504 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, pet. denied) (noting that
“[g]eneral jurisdiction is sometimes described as dispute-blind, because the contacts
with the forum state are so significant the nonresident defendant may be treated like
a resident for all purposes in any litigation.”). Given the more demanding minimum
contacts analysis than is required for specific jurisdiction, we find that Ruppert’s
limited, sporadic, and fortuitous contacts with this forum cannot be characterized as
so “constant and pervasive” that Ruppert can fairly be said to be “at home” in Texas.
4
We also note that, although Wales argues that the Participation Agreement
“does not indicate that it is to be governed by anything other than Texas law[,]”it
also does not indicate that it is to be governed by anything other than Louisiana law,
as it contains no choice of law provision. All of the Assignment documents contained
in the record, however, do contain provisions that they “will, in all respects, be
subject to, construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of Louisiana . . . .”
19
See Booth v. Kontomitras, 485 S.W.3d 461, 479–80 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016,
no pet.); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915,
924 (2011) (holding that a State may exercise general jurisdiction only where a
defendant’s affiliations with the forum are so continuous and systematic as to render
the defendant essentially “at home” there); PHC–Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 170
(holding that isolated trips to a foreign jurisdiction “fall short of the ‘continuous and
systematic contact’ the Supreme Court requires” for general jurisdiction); Nat’l
Indus. Sand Ass’n v. Gibson, 897 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. 1995) (concluding that
neither the defendant’s attendance at a meeting in Texas nor its mailings to Texas
members presented evidence of general jurisdiction); TeleVentures, Inc. v. Int’l
Game Tech., 12 S.W.3d 900, 908–10 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied)
(holding that communicating with a Texas resident during performance of contract
does not satisfy minimum contacts for jurisdictional purposes). Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in declining to exercise general jurisdiction
over the Ruppert Defendants.
VI. Conclusion
We conclude that Ruppert’s live testimony in support of the Ruppert
Defendants’ special appearance did not violate the due-order-of-hearing requirement
or otherwise waive their objection to personal jurisdiction. We further hold that there
20
is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s implied finding that Thibodeaux
was not acting as an agent of the Ruppert Defendants, and that Thibodeaux’s
contacts cannot be imputed to the Ruppert Defendants for jurisdictional purposes.
Finally, we conclude that the Ruppert Defendants’ contacts with Texas are
insufficient to support the trial court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over them.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment granting the special appearance of
the Ruppert Defendants.
AFFIRMED.
______________________________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on July 10, 2017
Opinion Delivered February 8, 2018
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
21