DocketNumber： 07-04-00495-CR
Filed Date： 2/16/2006
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/7/2015
Before REAVIS and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a plea of not guilty, appellant Alvie Dale Ward was convicted by a jury of forgery and sentenced to one year confinement. Presenting three issues, appellant contends his trial counsel's representation was ineffective and he is entitled to a new trial because counsel (1) did not speak with potential alibi witnesses before trial, (2) did not call potential alibi witnesses that were at the courthouse and were willing and available to testify, and (3) did not subpoena two alibi witnesses that were willing and available to testify. We affirm.
Appellant was charged with passing an unauthorized check at a Pak-A-Sak convenience store in Amarillo. Upon discovering the check was a forgery, the store clerk provided police with a physical description of the culprit and the license plate number of the vehicle he was driving. (1) Police identified the vehicle as belonging to appellant's son-in-law who lived with appellant. When presented with a photo lineup, the clerk identified appellant as the person who gave her the check. When contacted by police, appellant denied any knowledge of the incident and provided detectives with a handwriting sample. The sample was inconclusive.
At trial, appellant testified he could not have passed the unauthorized check because, at the time of the offense, he was working in Dalhart where he had contracted to install flooring. In support of his argument, he produced a receipt for two motel rooms in Dalhart where he claimed he stayed along with his three brothers. None of the men were called to testify at appellant's trial. Following his conviction, appellant filed a motion for new trial claiming that, because trial counsel did not call any alibi witnesses to testify to appellant's whereabouts, material evidence was not presented to the jury for consideration.
At a hearing on the motion, testimony revealed that several family members, including appellant's brothers, were present outside the courtroom and were willing to testify, but were told by counsel that they needed to leave. Two additional witnesses, the owner of the motel and his employer's bookkeeper, testified they were never contacted by counsel in connection with the case. Appellant's trial counsel also testified at the hearing. At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court denied appellant's motion. Appellant subsequently filed a notice of appeal. Because appellant's issues are factually similar, we will consider them together.
A claim of ineffectiveness is reviewed under the standard set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Under Strickland, a defendant must establish that (1) counsel's performance was deficient (i.e., fell below an objective standard of reasonableness), and (2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different, a reasonable probability being a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex.Cr.App. 2003); Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986). In other words, a defendant must demonstrate the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002).
The adequacy of defense counsel's assistance is based upon the totality of the representation rather than by isolated acts or omissions of trial counsel. Id. Although the constitutional right to counsel ensures the right to reasonably effective counsel, it does not guarantee errorless counsel whose competency or accuracy of representation is to be judged by hindsight. Ex Parte Kunkle, 852 S.W.2d 499, 505 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993); Ingham v. State, 679 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984). Appellate review of trial counsel's representation is highly deferential and presumes that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable and professional representation. Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002); Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex.Cr.App. 2001). Also, a claim of ineffectiveness must be firmly founded in the record. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Cr.App. 1999).
Here, the record indicates appellant's trial counsel visited with several of appellant's family members that were available to testify but, after consulting with appellant, made a determination not to call them as witnesses because "[t]hey either had criminal histories . . . or their stories conflicted in one way or another with [appellant's]." He also testified that his associate made several unsuccessful attempts to contact someone at the motel, but he ultimately concluded that the witness was unnecessary and that the receipt would be sufficient proof. The bookkeeper's testimony revealed she had no personal knowledge of appellant's whereabouts other than the fact that he picked up his paycheck the day after the charged offense. Furthermore, when questioned specifically regarding his failure to call certain witnesses in this case, trial counsel testified that it was part of his overall trial strategy.
Applying the appropriate standard of review and considering the strong presumption in favor of reasonable and professional representation, we conclude counsel's performance in this case was not deficient and did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Appellant's issues are overruled.
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Don H. Reavis
Justice
Do not publish.
1. The clerk noted the vehicle's license plate number on the face of the check when it was received.
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NO. 07-10-0258-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL A
DECEMBER 17, 2010
______________________________
MANUEL ORTIZ MALDONADO, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 47TH DISTRICT COURT OF RANDALL COUNTY;
NO. 18,800-A; HONORABLE DAN SCHAAP, JUDGE[1]
_______________________________
Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
OPINION
This is an appeal from an order denying Manuel Ortiz Maldonados contest of a withdrawal notification issued pursuant to section 501.014(e) of the Texas Government Code. Finding the trial court erred in not correcting the withdrawal notification at issue, we reverse and render.
Background
On June 13, 2007, Appellant, Manuel Ortiz Maldonado, was convicted of indecency with a child.[2] Appellant's punishment was assessed at five years confinement and a fine of $1,500. The summary portion of the judgment entered by the trial court reflects "Costs: $____," while the narrative portion of the judgment orders that "the State of Texas do have and recover of [Appellant] all court costs in this prosecution expended for which let execution issue." The dollar amount and statutory basis of the court costs was not otherwise specified in the written judgment. Appellant did not seek a direct review of that judgment.
On May 4, 2010, the Randall County District Clerk prepared a Bill of Costs reflecting an amount due of $2,241.50, which sum included the $1,500 fine, $400 in court-appointed attorney's fees, and $341.50 in miscellaneous court costs. Almost three years after the judgment was entered, using the original underlying criminal cause number, the trial court signed a document entitled Order to Withdraw Funds[3] directing the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to withdraw the sum of $2,241.50 from Appellant's "Inmate Trust Account."[4] On June 24, 2010, Appellant filed a motion contesting the withdrawal notification, contending that his "due process rights" were being violated by this collection process. On or before June 28, 2010, by handwritten notation upon the Clerk's notification to the trial court of the filing of Appellant's motion, the trial court denied the request sua sponte. Appellant now appeals that denial.
Appealable Order
In Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2008), the Texas Supreme Court held that a withdrawal notification directing prison officials to withdraw money from an inmate account pursuant to § 501.014(e) is a civil matter[5] akin to a garnishment action or an action to obtain a turnover order. Harrell, 286 S.W.3d at 317-19. Discussing the due process accorded to the appellant, the Court balanced the three factors discussed in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), and found that Harrell had "already received some measure of due process." Harrell, 286 S.W.3d at 320. In determining whether Harrell was accorded constitutional due process, the Court concluded that because Harrell had received notice of the withdrawal (a copy of the withdrawal notification) and an opportunity to contest the dollar amount and statutory basis of the withdrawal (a motion to rescind or modify the withdrawal notification),[6] he received all that due process required. Id. at 321. The Court added that neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard need occur before the issuance of a withdrawal notification. Id. This Court has interpreted Harrell as saying that due process requires that an inmate have an opportunity to contest the dollar amount and statutory basis of the withdrawal by way of a motion to modify, correct, or rescind the withdrawal notification. Snelson v. State, No. 07-10-0259-CV, 2010 Tex.App. LEXIS 9016, at *5-6 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Nov. 10, 2010, no pet. h.); Bryant v. State, No. 07-10-0358-CV, 2010 Tex.App. LEXIS 8059, at *4-5 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Oct. 5, 2010, no pet.); Williams v. State, 322 S.W.3d 301 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 2010, no pet.). The trial court's disposition of such a motion creates an appealable order. See Ramirez v. State, 318 S.W.3d 906, 908 (Tex.App.--Waco 2010, no pet.) (holding that "only when [the withdrawal notification is] properly challenged and denied relief is there an order that is final from which the inmate can appeal").
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision whether to deny a motion contesting a withdrawal notification under an abuse of discretion standard. See Canty v. State, No. 12-08-00257-CV, 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 2715, at *3-4, (Tex.App.-Tyler April 15, 2009, no pet.) (holding that a trial court's decision to hold a civil expunction proceeding is subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts "without reference to any guiding rules and principles." Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 315 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Tex. 2010) (quoting Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985); Howell v. State, 175 S.W.3d 786, 792 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). Furthermore, a trial court abuses its discretion if "it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law." Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985).
Court Costs
A certified bill of costs imposes an obligation upon a criminal defendant to pay court costs, irrespective of whether or not that bill is incorporated by reference into the written judgment. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 103.001 and 103.003 (West 2006); See also Tex. Gov't Code Ann., §§ 102.001 - 103.033. (West 2006 and Supp. 2010). Where court costs are imposed as a matter of legislative directive, they do not need to be included in the oral pronouncement of sentence or the written judgment in order to be imposed upon a convicted defendant. See Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009) (holding that because legislatively mandated court costs are not punitive, they did not have to be included in the oral pronouncement of sentence as a precondition to their inclusion in the trial court's written judgment); Smith v. State, No. 07-09-0009-CR, 2010 Tex.App. LEXIS 3846, at *21 (Tex.App.--Amarillo May 20, 2010, pet. ref'd) (holding that a precise dollar amount of court costs did not have to be specified in the oral pronouncement of sentence or the written judgment as a precondition to their inclusion in the clerk's bill of costs).
Court-Appointed Attorney's Fees
Pursuant to article 26.05(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, if a trial court determines that a defendant has financial resources that enable him to repay, in whole or in part, the costs of legal services provided by a court-appointed attorney, the court has authority to order a convicted defendant to pay "as court costs the amount that it finds the defendant is able to pay." See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.05(g) (West Supp. 2010). Without record evidence demonstrating a defendant's financial resources to offset the costs of legal services, a trial court errs if it orders reimbursement of court-appointed attorney's fees. Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010). Unless a material change in a criminal defendant's financial resources is established by competent legal evidence, once that defendant has been found to be indigent, he is presumed to remain indigent for the remainder of the proceedings. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.04(p) (West Supp. 2010); Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 557.
Analysis
As noted, the Bill of Costs in the record includes $400 in court-appointed attorney's fees, but the record does not contain a determination or finding that Appellant had any financial resources or was "able to pay" any amount of attorney's fees. What the record does reflect is that, at the time the original judgment of conviction was entered, Appellant was indigent and qualified for court-appointed counsel. Accordingly, we must presume that on June 10, 2010, when the trial court signed the withdrawal notification, Appellant's financial status had not changed. Just as a trial court errs by ordering reimbursement of court-appointed attorney's fees without record evidence demonstrating the defendant has an ability to repay the fees, see Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 557, we find the trial court here abused its discretion by summarily denying Appellant's challenge to the withdrawal notification authorizing withdrawal of funds from his inmate account to reimburse attorney's fees in the absence of a judicial finding required by article 26.05(g).
Conclusion
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order denying Appellant's motion to contest and we render judgment granting the motion to contest, thereby directing the entry of an Amended Withdrawal Notification Pursuant to Section 501.014(e), deleting the attorney's fees of $400. We further order that a copy of the Amended Withdrawal Notification be delivered to the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
Patrick A. Pirtle Justice
[1]Hon. Abe Lopez, Retired Judge sitting by assignment in the 47th District Court of Randall County, Texas. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 75.002(a)(3) (West 2005).
[2]See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1) (West Supp. 2010). An offense under subsection (a)(1) of § 21.11 is a felony of the second degree, punishable by imprisonment for any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2 years, and by a fine not to exceed $10,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (West Supp. 2010).
[3]This document is not an "order" in the traditional sense of a court order, judgment, or decree issued after notice and hearing in either a civil or criminal proceeding. The controlling statute, Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 501.014(e) (West Supp. 2010), describes the process as a "notification by a court" directing prison officials to withdraw sums from an inmate's account, in accordance with a schedule of priorities set by the statute, for the payment of "any amount the inmate is ordered to pay by order of the court." See id. at § 501.014(e)(1)-(6). See also Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315, 316, n.1 (Tex. 2009). This document is more akin to a judgment nisi. A judgment nisi, commonly used in bond forfeiture proceedings, is a provisional judgment entered when an accused fails to appear for trial. A judgment nisi triggers the issuance of a capias and it serves as notice of the institution of a bond forfeiture proceeding. It is not final or absolute, but may become final. See Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp. v. State, 273 S.W.3d 157, 163 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). Nisi means "unless," so a judgment nisi is valid unless a party takes action causing it to be withdrawn. Id. Similarly, a withdrawal notification issued pursuant to § 501.014(e), triggers a withdrawal from an inmate's account, serves as notice of the collection proceeding, and continues to operate unless the inmate takes action causing the notification to be withdrawn. Therefore, rather than refer to that document as an order, we prefer to use the term "withdrawal notification" to avoid confusion with an underlying court order or judgment ordering the payment of a sum falling within at least one of the six priority categories listed in the statute.
[4]Several courts, including this Court, have referred to these inmate accounts as "trust" accounts. The term "trust" has been removed from their statutory references. Act of May 11, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 212, § 2.01 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 918, 958, amended by, Act of May 17, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 326, §1, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 1235, 1236 (current version at Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 501.014 (West Supp. 2010)). Accordingly, they are simply inmate accounts.
[5]See Johnson v. Tenth Judicial District Court of Appeals at Waco, 280 S.W.3d 866, 869 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) (holding that orders directing withdrawal of funds from inmate trust accounts are not a criminal matter).
[6]The trial court denied Harrell's Motion to Rescind. See Harrell v. State, Nos. 07-06-0469-CR, 07-06-0470-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6416, at *2 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Aug. 13, 2007), rev'd, 286 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2008).