Creative Chateau, LLC v. the City of Houston

Opinion issued January 12, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-21-00327-CV
———————————
CREATIVE CHATEAU, LLC, Appellant
V.
THE CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellee
On Appeal from the 215th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2019-44108
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Creative Chateau, LLC (Creative Chateau) appeals the trial court’s
order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, the City of Houston (the
City) on its suit for injunctive relief to enforce deed restrictions. In four issues,
Creative Chateau contends the trial court erred in (1) granting the City’s motion for
summary judgment because Creative Chateau presented evidence raising a genuine
issue of material fact on its affirmative defenses of abandonment and waiver, and
the City failed to negate as a matter of law a single element of Creative Chateau’s
affirmative defenses, (2) sustaining the City’s evidentiary objections and excluding
Creative Chateau’s summary judgment evidence while refusing to rule on Creative
Chateau’s evidentiary objections and admitting all of the City’s summary judgment
evidence, (3) entering a permanent injunction without evidence that Creative
Chateau substantially violated the deed restrictions, and (4) denying Creative
Chateau’s motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence and changed
circumstances. We affirm.
Background
A. Factual History
Westhaven Estates, Section Two is a subdivision located in Houston, Texas.
The properties within the subdivision are subject to certain deed restrictions set forth
in the Amended and Restated Restrictions for Westhaven Estates, Section Two (the
deed restrictions). The deed restrictions, which became effective on January 1, 1994,
renew automatically every ten years.
In June 2017, Patrick Stuckwish and his wife, Jessica Ruggles, formed
Creative Chateau, a limited liability company, “to operate a venue for photoshoots
and small, intimate gatherings.” Stuckwish and Ruggles are the Managing Members
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and Directors of the company. In February 2018, Creative Chateau purchased Tract
319 in Block Twelve of the Westhaven Estates, Section Two subdivision (the
Property), commonly known as 6104 San Felipe Street, Houston, Texas 77057. After
completing the purchase, Creative Chateau began operating its business at the
Property.
The deed restrictions limit the use of the Property and all of the other lots in
the Westhaven Estates, Section Two subdivision. Section 53.1 provides:
Permitted Uses. The following uses shall be the only uses permitted on
the Lots:
a. Habitation by one Family per Dwelling;
b. Community Home; and
c. Home Occupation provided that:
1. No person other than a resident of the Dwelling
shall be engaged or employed in the Home
Occupation at the site;
2. There shall be no visible storage or display of
occupational materials or products;
3. There shall be no exterior evidence of the
conduct of a Home Occupation. A Home
Occupation shall be conducted only within the
Dwelling, garage or aide’s quarters, and no
Home Occupation shall be conducted outside of
a structure;
....
5. The conduct of any Home Occupation shall not
increase the amount of traffic in the Subdivision
and shall not reduce or render unusable the
3
areas which are provided for off-street parking
as required by Chapter 26 of the Code of
Ordinances. No additional parking shall be
provided for the Home Occupation.
Section 53.2(a) expressly prohibits any property within Westhaven Estates, Section
Two from being used for any purpose “not specifically permitted in Paragraph 53.1.”
In 2018, the City received a citizen complaint alleging that the Property
located at 6104 San Felipe was being used for a commercial purpose in violation of
the deed restrictions. Upon investigation, the City discovered that Creative Chateau
was operating a business at the Property.
On November 9, 2018, the City sent a letter to Creative Chateau, addressed to
Stuckwish and Ruggles, and its registered agent stating that it had received a
complaint that the Property was “being used for commercial purposes” in violation
of the deed restrictions. The letter advised Stuckwish and Ruggles that they should
ensure the Property “complies with all applicable deed restrictions by immediately
ceasing all commercial activity” on the Property. The City further notified Stuckwish
and Ruggles that failure to comply within fifteen days “may result in further legal
action to enjoin the commercial use” of the Property. Stuckwish and counsel for the
City subsequently exchanged emails regarding the deed restrictions and Creative
Chateau’s alleged violations but the matter remained unresolved. Creative Chateau
continued its operations at the Property.
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B. Procedural History
On June 27, 2019, the City sued Creative Chateau asserting a claim for
injunctive relief based on Creative Chateau’s alleged violations of the deed
restrictions. The City sought a permanent injunction requiring Creative Chateau to
comply with the deed restrictions’ use provisions and to cease operation of the
business on the Property as well as civil penalties as permitted by the Texas Local
Government Code and the City’s Code of Ordinances.
Creative Chateau answered and asserted a general denial and the affirmative
defenses of waiver, estoppel, and laches. Creative Chateau further asserted that the
deed restrictions had been abandoned and were unenforceable. Stuckwish, acting on
behalf of Creative Chateau, signed, filed, and served the answer on the City’s
counsel.
The City moved for summary judgment on its claim for injunctive relief
against Creative Chateau. It argued that the Property was subject to deed restrictions
that limit the use of the premises, Creative Chateau was in violation of the applicable
deed restrictions, and Creative Chateau had notice of its deed restriction violations.
The City attached to its motion a copy of the Amended and Restated Restrictions for
Westhaven Estates, Section Two, the affidavit of El Grecio Gregory, a City
investigator, copies of magazine articles highlighting Creative Chateau’s business,
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pages from Creative Chateau’s website, numerous photographs of the Property, and
the notarized affidavits of several nearby residents.
Creative Chateau filed its summary judgment response, which was signed by
Stuckwish, arguing that the deed restrictions had been previously abandoned,
waived, and were unenforceable and objecting to the majority of the City’s summary
judgment evidence as inadmissible. Creative Chateau attached to its response
Stuckwish’s unsworn declaration, pages from the websites of other businesses
purportedly operating in the subdivision, and photographs depicting other alleged
violations of the deed restrictions. The parties thereafter filed replies and sur-replies.
The City also objected to Creative Chateau’s summary judgment evidence.
In its reply, the City argued that Creative Chateau had failed to proffer any
evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact regarding its violations of the deed
restrictions, its affirmative defenses of waiver and abandonment failed as a matter
of law, and its objections to the City’s summary judgment evidence were baseless.
The City also objected to Creative Chateau’s summary judgment evidence.
Creative Chateau asserted in its sur-reply in opposition to the City’s summary
judgment motion that the City’s objections to Creative Chateau’s summary judgment
evidence were baseless and the City’s reply to Creative Chateau’s affirmative
defenses were meritless and unsupported by the evidence. It urged the trial court to
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sustain its objections to the City’s summary judgment evidence, overrule the City’s
objections, and deny the City’s summary judgment motion.
On April 19, 2021, the trial court granted the City’s motion for summary
judgment and entered a permanent injunction against Creative Chateau enjoining it
from operating its business at the Property in violation of the deed restrictions.
Approximately one month after entry of the permanent injunction, Daniel W.
Jackson and Daniel J. Gierut of the Jackson Law Firm filed a notice of appearance
as counsel of record for Creative Chateau. That same day, Creative Chateau filed a
request for ruling and entry of order on its objections to the City’s summary
judgment evidence.
Creative Chateau also moved for a new trial and to vacate the permanent
injunction. It argued that (1) a majority of the Westhaven Estates, Section Two
property owners had approved an amendment to the deed restrictions allowing
Creative Chateau to operate its business within the subdivision, and the amendment
constituted a changed circumstance that destroyed the purpose of the permanent
injunction, (2) the newly discovered evidence necessitated a new trial, and (3) the
City had failed to establish its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Creative
Chateau requested that the trial court dissolve the permanent injunction, vacate its
April 19, 2021 judgment, and grant a new trial.
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The City responded to Creative Chateau’s motion for new trial arguing that
the documents proffered by Creative Chateau as constituting changed circumstances
and/or newly discovered evidence failed to satisfy the requirements of either theory,
and the purported amendment was invalid.
In its reply, Creative Chateau argued that (1) the number of property owners
within the subdivision who had approved the amendment to the deed restrictions to
allow Creative Chateau to operate its business exceeded the minimum number
required, (2) the City’s evidence offered in response to the motion for new trial was
unavailing, (3) newly discovered evidence necessitated a new trial, and (4) Creative
Chateau had fully complied with the injunction.
Following a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying Creative
Chateau’s motion for new trial and to vacate permanent injunction on June 3, 2021.
This appeal followed.
Summary Judgment Evidence
In its first issue, Creative Chateau contends that the trial court erred in granting
the City’s motion for summary judgment because Creative Chateau presented
summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on its
affirmative defenses of abandonment and waiver, and the City failed to negate as a
matter of law a single element of Creative Chateau’s affirmative defenses. In its
second issue, Creative Chateau argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the
8
City’s evidentiary objections and excluding Creative Chateau’s summary judgment
evidence while refusing to rule on Creative Chateau’s evidentiary objections and
admitting all of the City’s summary judgment evidence.
In response, the City argues that the trial court properly disregarded Creative
Chateau’s summary judgment evidence in support of its affirmative defenses
because Creative Chateau was not represented by counsel until after the trial court
entered its final judgment. The City argues that the trial court also properly denied
all of Creative Chateau’s objections after final judgment because they were untimely
and were waived.
A. Standard of Review
In a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant bears the burden
to establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the trial court should
grant judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); KPMG Peat Marwick v.
Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. 1999). The movant
must negate at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff’s causes of action
or establish each element of an affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez,
941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). We take as true all evidence favorable to the
nonmovant and indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the
nonmovant’s favor. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex.
2005) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.
9
2003)). We review a trial court’s order granting summary judgment de novo.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010).
B. Analysis
Creative Chateau argues that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment because it presented evidence raising fact issues on its affirmative defenses
of abandonment and waiver. The City asserts that the trial court properly disregarded
Creative Chateau’s evidence, as well as its objections to the City’s evidence, because
Creative Chateau was not represented by counsel until after final judgment.
Legal entities, such as corporations or limited liability companies, generally
may appear in a district or county court only through a licensed
attorney. See Kunstoplast of Am., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., USA, 937 S.W.2d
455, 456 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Sherman v. Boston, 486 S.W.3d 88, 95 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied). “A legal entity that attempts to
thwart this rule does so at its peril.” Altech Controls Corp. v. Malone, No. 14-17-
00737-CV, 2019 WL 3562633, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 6,
2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Sherman, 486 S.W.3d at 95); Rabb Int’l, Inc. v.
SHL Thai Food Serv., LLC, 346 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2011, no pet.). A non-attorney may perform certain ministerial acts for a limited
liability company, such as depositing cash with a clerk in lieu of a cost bond. See
Kunstoplast, 937 S.W.2d at 456. A company’s response to a motion for summary
10
judgment, however, is not a ministerial act and must be made through an attorney.
See J & A Coating, LLC v. PPG Indus., Inc., No. 05-20-00382-CV, 2021 WL
972899, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 16, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing
Computize, Inc. v. NHS Commc’ns Grp., Inc., 992 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1999, no pet.)); see also McClane v. New Caney Apartments, 416 S.W.3d
115, 120–21 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, no pet.) (noting presentation of claim at
trial was not ministerial act and therefore corporation could not be represented in
county court by its non-attorney property manager on its claim for forcible detainer).
Allowing a non-attorney to present a company’s claim would permit the unlicensed
practice of law.1 Sherman, 486 S.W.3d at 95. Evidence presented by a non-attorney
on behalf of a business entity is substantively defective and is incompetent and
cannot be considered under any circumstances. J & A Coating, LLC, 2021 WL
972899, at *3 (citing McLane, 416 S.W.3d at 121; Sherman, 486 S.W.3d at 96); see
also Hydroscience Techs., Inc. v. Hydroscience, Inc., 401 S.W.3d 783, 793 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (“Substantive defects are never waived because the
1
“According to Texas law, only a licensed attorney is allowed to represent other
parties.” Trust v. Jellison, No. 03-19-00590-CV, No. 03-20-00048-CV, 2021 WL
1725949, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[A] person
may not practice law in this state unless the person is a member of the state bar.”
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.102(a). “[T]he ‘practice of law’ means the preparation of a
pleading or other document incident to an action or special proceeding or the
management of the action or proceeding on behalf of a client before a judge in court
. . . .” Id. § 81.101(a).
11
evidence is incompetent and cannot be considered under any circumstances.”).
Stated differently, a non-attorney’s attempt to appear for a limited liability company
has no legal effect, and any evidence presented by the non-attorney cannot be
considered. See Sherman, 486 S.W.3d at 96 (“Because Boston is not an attorney, his
presentation had no legal effect, thereby rendering the evidence legally insufficient
to support a judgment in favor of Mr. Day Rents.”); see also McClane, 416 S.W.3d
at 121 (“We hold that the [non-attorney’s] presentation of the claim in the county
court of law had no legal effect. That is, her testimony under the circumstances is
legally insufficient evidence to support the judgment.”).
Stuckwish, Creative Chateau’s managing member, is not an attorney licensed
in Texas. Nevertheless, Stuckwish signed the following pleadings, motions, and
discovery on behalf of Creative Chateau: (1) Defendant’s Original Answer and
Requests for Disclosure, (2) Defendant’s Demand for Trial by Jury and Notice of
Payment of Fee, (3) Defendant’s Objections and Responses to Plaintiff’s Requests
for Admissions, (4) Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, (5) Proposed Order on Objections to Summary Judgment Evidence, (6)
Proposed Order Denying Summary Judgment, and (7) Defendant’s Sur-Reply in
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In doing so, Stuckwish
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.101(a);
Altech Controls, 2019 WL 3562633, at *7.
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In its reply brief, Creative Chateau argues that the City never objected to
Creative Chateau’s failure to be represented by an attorney, moved to strike Creative
Chateau’s pleadings or affirmative defenses, or otherwise raised any concerns in the
trial court regarding Creative Chateau’s representation. It reasons that, by failing to
do so, the City “opportunistically facilitated the unauthorized practice of law.”
Creative Chateau also asserts that nothing in the record shows that the trial court’s
ruling was based on Creative Chateau’s failure to be represented by an attorney and
the court issued no finding as to whether Creative Chateau was or was not
represented by an attorney.
We find the Dallas Court of Appeals’ decision in J & A Coating instructive.
In that case, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment against the defendant on its
claims for money had and received and unjust enrichment. See 2021 WL 972899, at
*1. The defendant filed a summary judgment response signed by its non-attorney
owner. See id. The plaintiff moved to strike the response because it was not signed
by a licensed attorney but the trial court did not grant the motion to strike. 2 See id.2
In its order, the trial court stated that it considered “the motion, the reply brief, the
arguments of counsel, and the applicable legal authority,” but it did not state it
considered the defendant’s response. J & A Coating, LLC v. PPG Indus., Inc., No.
05-20-00382-CV, 2021 WL 972899, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 16, 2021, no
pet) (mem. op.). The trial court added a footnote after the words “legal authority”
stating, “Defendant J & A Coating, L.L.C. is not represented by an attorney and,
consequently, this Court has not considered the response filed on Defendant[’]s
behalf by its owner.” Id.13
at 2. The trial court subsequently granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment and the defendant appealed. See id. at *1.
Citing evidence attached to its summary judgment response, the defendant
argued that the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment motion because
it had presented evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on the plaintiff’s
claims. See id. at *2. The defendant further argued that the plaintiff had waived the
defendant’s failure to be represented by an attorney because the trial court did not
expressly rule on the plaintiff’s motion to strike the response. See id. at *3. The court
disagreed, stating:
J & A cites no authority holding that a trial court must consider a
business entity’s non-attorney legal filings absent a sustained objection
from the opposing party. Such a rule might apply if the failure to be
represented by counsel were merely a formal defect. But evidence that
is substantively defective is incompetent and cannot be considered
under any circumstances. Evidence presented by a non-attorney on
behalf of a business entity is incompetent and cannot be considered.
Therefore, J & A’s response to the motion for summary judgment and
the evidence attached to it were substantively defective and could not
be considered by the trial court regardless of whether PPG objected
and obtained a ruling on its objection.
Id. at *3 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Creative Chateau’s summary judgment response and evidence is likewise
incompetent and cannot be considered, regardless of whether the City objected to
Creative Chateau’s failure to be represented by counsel or whether the record reflects
that the trial court made a finding as to its representation. See id.; Sherman, 486
14
S.W.3d at 95–96 (concluding non-attorney’s attempt to appear for corporation or
present case on its behalf had “no legal effect”); Hydroscience Techs., 401 S.W.3d
at 793 (“Substantive defects are never waived because the evidence is incompetent
and cannot be considered under any circumstances.”).
Creative Chateau argues that the trial court also erred in refusing to rule on its
evidentiary objections and admitting all of the City’s summary judgment evidence.
This argument fares no better. Creative Chateau asserted its evidentiary objections
to the City’s summary judgment evidence in its summary judgment response which
was signed by Stuckwish. Because its summary judgment response is incompetent,
cannot be considered, and has “no legal effect,” it follows that the evidentiary
objections couched within the pleading can likewise not be considered. See J & A
Coating, 2021 WL 972899, at *2–3; Sherman, 486 S.W.3d at 95–96.
Further, Creative Chateau’s post-judgment request, acting through its counsel,
that the trial court rule on Creative Chateau’s objections to the City’s summary
judgment evidence was properly disregarded by the trial court. As Stuckwish’s
filings had no legal effect and could not be considered when they were filed, Creative
Chateau did not timely object to the City’s evidence. Having failed to do so, its
objections were waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). The trial court properly
disregarded Creative Chateau’s summary judgment response and evidence and its
objections to the City’s evidence. See J & A Coating, 2021 WL 972899, at *2–3;
15
Sherman, 486 S.W.3d at 95–96. We overrule Creative Chateau’s first and second
issues.
Permanent Injunction
In its third issue, Creative Chateau contends that the trial court erred in
entering a permanent injunction without evidence that Creative Chateau
substantially violated the deed restrictions. The City argues that it established as a
matter of law that Creative Chateau committed an ongoing, distinct, and substantial
violation of the deed restrictions.
To be entitled to a permanent injunction, an applicant must generally plead
and prove: (1) a wrongful act, (2) imminent harm, (3) irreparable injury, and (4) no
adequate remedy at law. Jordan v. Landry’s Seafood Rest., Inc., 89 S.W.3d 737, 742
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). When, as here, a party seeks a
permanent injunction to enforce a restrictive covenant, it is not required to show
proof of irreparable injury. BSG–Spencer Highway Joint Venture, G.P. v. Muniba
Enters., Inc., No. 01-15-01109-CV, 2017 WL 3261365, at *10 n.3 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 1, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Jim Rutherford Invs.,
Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass’n, 25 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)). Further, an act that violates a statute or city
ordinance may be enjoined without a showing that the legal remedy is
inadequate. See Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 210 (Tex. 2002); San
16
Miguel v. City of Windcrest, 40 S.W.3d 104, 108 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000,
no pet.); Schleuter v. City of Fort Worth, 947 S.W.2d 920, 932 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1997, pet. denied). The City is authorized to enforce, by suit for injunction,
certain restrictive covenants that affect subdivisions within the city limits. See TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 54.012, 212.153; Hous., Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 10, art.
XV, § 10-552.
Breaches of restrictive covenants have long been analyzed in terms of
whether, and to what degree, they interfere with the benefit the framers intended.
See McGinty v. W. Airport Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 14-98-00884-CV, 2001 WL
197397, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 1, 2001, no pet.); see also
Cowling v. Colligan, 312 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex. 1958) (analyzing change of
conditions in terms of whether it is no longer possible to secure in substantial degree
benefits sought to be realized through covenant). Breaches must distinctly or
substantially violate a restriction to warrant injunction. See, e.g., Tien Tao Ass’n v.
Kingsbridge Park Cmty. Ass’n, 953 S.W.2d 525, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (holding party must substantially violate deed restriction before
trial court may issue permanent injunction).
The City presented evidence showing that the Property is a residential address
located within the Westhaven Estates, Section Two subdivision. The properties
within the subdivision are subject to certain deed restrictions, as set forth in the
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Amended and Restated Restrictions for Westhaven Estates, Section Two. Section
53.1 of the deed restrictions limits the use of the Property and all of the other lots in
the subdivision:
Permitted Uses. The following uses shall be the only uses permitted on
the Lots:
a. Habitation by one Family per Dwelling;
b. Community Home; and
c. Home Occupation provided that:
1. No person other than a resident of the
Dwelling shall be engaged or employed in the
Home Occupation at the site;
2. There shall be no visible storage or display of
occupational materials or products;
3. There shall be no exterior evidence of the
conduct of a Home Occupation. A Home
Occupation shall be conducted only within
the Dwelling, garage or aide’s quarters, and
no Home Occupation shall be conducted
outside of a structure;
....
6. The conduct of any Home Occupation shall not
increase the amount of traffic in the Subdivision
and shall not reduce or render unusable the
areas which are provided for off-street parking
as required by Chapter 26 of the Code of
Ordinances. No additional parking shall be
provided for the Home Occupation.
Section 53.2(a) expressly prohibits any property within Westhaven Estates, Section
Two from being used for any purpose “not specifically permitted in Paragraph 53.1.”
18
The City’s evidence established that from November 9, 2018, when Creative
Chateau received the City’s letter regarding its deed restriction violations, until the
trial court entered final judgment on April 21, 2021, Creative Chateau was operating
a business at the Property and the Property was not being used as a residence. While
the restrictions allow for limited home occupation, Creative Chateau’s operations
exceeded that scope. The City’s summary judgment evidence showed that Creative
Chateau advertised the Property as a commercial event venue on the internet and in
print publications. The City’s investigator, Gregory, stated in his affidavit that he
observed activity at the Property that was consistent with the operation of a wedding,
workshop, and event venue business. The activity included multiple vehicles parking
at the Property at both the front and back entrances, vehicles arriving at and leaving
the Property to drop off and pick up event attendees, attendees parking their vehicles
in the subdivision on both San Felipe and nearby Potomac Street, guests arriving at
and departing from events hosted at the Property, valet service for certain large
events, and the use of the nearby Briargrove Elementary parking lot for events with
high attendance. The City attached Gregory’s photographs of the Property taken
between November 2018 and February 2020 illustrating the activity. Gregory stated
that the activity resulted in increased traffic and parking issues in the subdivision.
The City’s evidence also included numerous affidavits from nearby residents of the
subdivision, concerned about the commercial activity, that described multiple events
19
taking place at the Property consistent with the operation of a wedding, workshop,
and event venue business at the Property. The affidavits corroborated Gregory’s
observations.
The City’s evidence established that Creative Chateau did not use the Property
as a residence but instead operated its business on the Property. The evidence
showed that operation of Creative Chateau’s business resulted in increased traffic
and parking issues in the subdivision and surrounding area. The evidence further
demonstrates that despite being notified by the City in November 2018 of its
violations of the deed restrictions, Creative Chateau continued operating its business
until the trial court entered judgment and a permanent injunction in April 2021
enjoining it from operating its business at the Property in violation of the deed
restrictions. Creative Chateau’s violations harmed the other property owners by
preventing them from being able to realize the full benefit of their properties and the
rights that come with living in a subdivision that is subject to deed restrictions. See
Gunnels v. N. Woodland Hills Cmty. Ass’n, 563 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ) (“It is a well[-]known fact that restrictions
enhance the value of the subdivision property and form an inducement for purchasers
to buy lots within the subdivision.”). Creative Chateau’s business operations at the
Property constituted distinct and substantial ongoing violations of the deed
restrictions. The trial court properly granted summary judgment on the City’s claim
20
for permanent injunctive relief. See Jim Rutherford Invs., 25 S.W.3d at 849 (noting
substantial violation of deed restrictions—even without proof of irreparable harm to
neighborhood—is sufficient to justify permanent injunction). We overrule Creative
Chateau’s third issue.
Motion for New Trial
In its fourth issue, Creative Chateau contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying its motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence
and changed circumstances, and that the permanent injunction was no longer
necessary or proper after the deed restrictions were amended. The City argues that
Creative Chateau’s evidence was not newly discovered but rather newly created and
therefore could not serve as the basis for a new trial. It also argues that the trial court
was within its discretion to decide conflicting evidence and determine that Creative
Chateau’s purported amendment did not show a change in circumstances that would
justify dissolving the permanent injunction.
A party seeking a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence must
show that (1) new evidence has been discovered since trial, (2) the failure to discover
the evidence prior to trial was not because of lack of due diligence, (3) the evidence
is not cumulative, and (4) the evidence is so material that it probably would produce
a different result if a new trial were granted. Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d
807, 809 (Tex. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d
21715 (Tex. 2003); Lofton v. Dyer, No. 01-07-00184-CV, 2008 WL 2058219, at *2
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 15, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.). We review
a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. Downer v.
Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985). Every
reasonable presumption will be made in favor of a trial court’s order refusing a new
trial. Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809–10. Whether a motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence will be granted or refused generally is a matter left to the sound
discretion of the trial court. In re A.G.C., 279 S.W.3d 441, 454 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (citing Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809).
On May 19, 2021, Creative Chateau, then represented by counsel, filed a
verified motion for new trial and to vacate permanent injunction based on “newly
discovered evidence.” It argued that the deed restrictions had been amended after
the final judgment and that the amendments expressly permitted Creative Chateau
to continue operating its business at the Property as it had previously done.3 Creative
3
Creative Chateau points to a “Consent and Approval of Second Amendment to
Amended and Restated Restrictions for Westhaven Estates Section Two” that it
claims a majority of property owners approved in late April or early May 2021.
Amended Section 53.1 now provides, in pertinent part, that the following use is
permitted on the Lots:
....
d. The operation of The Creative Chateau on Tract 319 in Block 12 of
the Subdivision, commonly known as 6104 San Felipe Street, Houston,
Texas 77057 (the “Site”). As long as the Site is owned by The Creative
Chateau, LLC (“TCC”), TCC shall be permitted to operate its existing
business at the Site in the same manner as it has since 2018 so long as
22
Chateau argues in its brief that “[b]ecause the Deed Restrictions were not amended
until after entry of the April 19, 2021 Judgment and Permanent Injunction, the
Amended Deed Restrictions clearly did not exist before trial and were,
unquestionably, discovered after trial.” We disagree.
“[E]vidence not in existence prior to judgment cannot support a new trial.”
Banker v. Banker, 517 S.W.3d 863, 878 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi—Edinburg
2017, pet. denied) (concluding defendant’s motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence was better termed “new evidence” given that evidence
was created by developments after trial); see also In re C.Y.C., No. 14-11-00341-
CV, 2012 WL 3223674, at *19 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 9, 2012, pet.
denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that mother’s evidence supporting motion for new
trial was not in existence at time of trial court’s final order and therefore “this
evidence does not satisfy the burden that must be met to obtain a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence”); Sifuentes v. Tex. Emps.’ Ins. Ass’n, 754
S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ) (concluding that defendant’s
motion for new trial was based on “new evidence rather than newly discovered
evidence” and therefore evidence could not form basis for new trial). Because the
TCC uses the Site for its existing purposes, including meetings,
photography sessions, videography, and hosting intimate events of 75
persons or less.
23
purported amendments to the deed restrictions did not exist prior to judgment, they
cannot serve as the basis for new trial. See Sifuentes, 754 S.W.2d at 787.
In its motion for new trial, Creative Chateau also characterized the amendment
as a change in circumstance that required the trial court to dissolve the permanent
injunction. This argument is equally unavailing.
“Changed circumstances are conditions that altered the status quo existing
after the injunction was granted or that made the injunction unnecessary or
improper.” In re Guardianship of Stokley, No. 05-10-01660-CV, 2011 WL 4600428,
at *3 (Tex. App.––Dallas Oct. 6, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); Schuring v. Fosters Mill
Vill. Cmty. Ass’n, 396 S.W.3d 73, 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet.
denied) (“Modification of an injunction may be appropriate when changed
circumstances render an injunction unnecessary or improper.”). An enjoined party
bears the burden of showing changed circumstances and “[a]bsent changed
circumstances, a trial court lacks the authority to modify a final, permanent
injunction.” Schuring, 396 S.W.3d at 76. A trial court does not abuse its discretion
when it bases its decision on conflicting evidence. Id. at 77–78 (noting that trial court
was not required to accept defendants’ allegations because other evidence in record
and presumptions supported implied findings to contrary and affirming trial court’s
denial of motion to dissolve injunction); see also Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859,
862 (Tex. 1978); Clark v. Randalls Food, 317 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. App.—
24
Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.); Palladian Bldg. Co. v. Nortex Found. Designs,
Inc., 165 S.W.3d 430, 433–34 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.). Further, an
abuse of discretion does not occur as long as some evidence of substantive and
probative character exists to support the trial court’s decision. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d
at 211.
In its motion, Creative Chateau asserted that “a majority of the Westhaven
Estates, Section Two property owners approved the [] amendment to the deed
restrictions.” It attached to its motion a copy of the amendment accompanied by the
signatures of a number of property owners who had been presented with a petition
in support of the amendment and who Creative Chateau claimed had approved the
amendment. In its response, the City argued that the purported deed restriction
amendment was not lawfully obtained and attached evidence including affidavits
from residents showing that (1) some of the signatures were obtained by
misrepresenting what the petition was intended to accomplish, (2) on one occasion,
one of the persons obtaining signatures identified herself as Jessica Ruggles, one of
Creative Chateau’s Managing Members and Directors, (3) one of the signatures was
a forgery, (4) Stuckwish notarized the forged signature, and (5) Stuckwish notarized
several signatures without witnessing the person’s signature and without obtaining
25
the required identification.4 We also note that the trial court was aware that
Stuckwish had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by representing Creative
Chateau through the numerous documents he signed and filed during the underlying
proceedings.
The trial court could consider all of this evidence in evaluating Creative’s
Chateau’s evidence in support of its motion for new trial. Because the trial court
based its decision on conflicting evidence and there was evidence in the record that
reasonably supported its decision, it did not abuse its discretion in denying Creative
Chateau’s motion for new trial. See Davis, 571 S.W.2d at 862; Clark, 317 S.W.3d at
356. We overrule Creative Chateau’s fourth issue.
Any pending motions are dismissed as moot.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Amparo Guerra
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Hightower, and Guerra.
4
A person who notarizes a forged signature, notarizes people who were not present,
and notarizes signatures on a matter in which he had a pecuniary interest violates
his ethical and legal obligations under the Notary Public Act. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T
CODE. § 406.009(d)(5) (providing that notarizing signature when person is not
present at the time is “good cause” for revoking notary commission).
26