in the Interest of V.T.E., a Child

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-17-00310-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF V.T.E., A CHILD
From the County Court at Law
Ellis County, Texas
Trial Court No. 93469CCL
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Samantha D. appeals from a judgment that terminated the parent-child
relationship between her and her child, V.T.E. 1 After hearing all the evidence, the trial
court found by clear and convincing evidence that Samantha (1) knowingly placed or
knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the
child, (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged
in conduct that endangers the child, (3) constructively abandoned the child who has been
in the custody of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than six
months, (4) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically
1The trial court also terminated the parental rights of V.T.E.’s father; however, he is not a party to this
appeal.
established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return of the child, and (5) used a
controlled substance in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the child. TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (b) (1) (D) (E) (N) (O) (P) (West Supp. 2017). The trial court
further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the best interest
of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (b) (2) (West Supp. 2017). We affirm.
Facts
On March 25, 2016, Samantha gave birth to V.T.E. while she was in Texas visiting
her mother. V.T.E tested positive at birth for marijuana, and Samantha admitted to using
marijuana during the majority of her pregnancy. Medical providers determined that
V.T.E. was affected by maternal substance abuse. V.T.E. failed her newborn hearing
screening and had notable congenital malformations at birth. V.T.E. was placed in foster
care when she was four days-old. Samantha returned to California; however, she agreed
to participate in the services outlined in the temporary order issued by the trial court.
Standard of Review
In five issues Samantha argues that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s findings on each of the grounds for termination.
Only one predicate act under section 161.001 (b) (1) is necessary to support a judgment of
termination in addition to the required finding that termination is in the child's best
interest. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex.2003). In conducting a legal sufficiency
review in a parental termination case:
[A] court should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed
a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. To give appropriate
In the Interest of V.T.E. Page 2
deference to the factfinder's conclusion and the role of a court conducting a
legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable
to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the
factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable
factfinder could do so. A corollary to this requirement is that a court should
disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved
or found to be incredible. This does not mean that a court must disregard
all evidence that does not support the finding. Disregarding undisputed
facts that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether
there is clear and convincing evidence.
In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex.2005) (per curiam) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d
256, 266 (Tex.2002)) (emphasis in J.P.B.).
In a factual sufficiency review,
[A] court of appeals must give due consideration to evidence that the
factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing.... [T]he
inquiry must be "whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's
allegations." A court of appeals should consider whether disputed
evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that
disputed evidence in favor of its finding. If, in light of the entire record, the
disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in
favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably
have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually
insufficient.
In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266-67 (Tex.2002) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25
(Tex.2002)) (internal footnotes omitted) (alterations added).
Failure to Comply With the Provisions of a Court Order
In the fourth issue, Samantha complains that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that she failed to comply with the
provisions of a court order. Section 161.001 (b) (1) (O) (West Supp. 2017) of the Texas
In the Interest of V.T.E. Page 3
Family Code provides that the court may order termination of the parent-child
relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has:
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically
established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the
child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing
conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for
not less than nine months as a result of the child's removal from the parent
under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child
Samantha does not challenge that V.T.E. has been in the permanent or temporary
managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not
less than nine months as a result of the child's removal from the parent under Chapter
262 for the abuse or neglect of the child. Therefore we will turn to whether Samantha
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the
actions necessary for her to obtain the return of V.T.E.
Crystal Butcher, a caseworker with the Texas Department of Family and Protective
Services, testified that Samantha failed to comply with the following court ordered
services:
 Pay monthly child support
 Pay monthly medical support
 Not to possess, sell, distribute, utilize, consume or ingest alcohol or illegal
drugs or controlled substances
 Maintain full-time employment
 Refrain from engaging in criminal activity
 Keep the Department informed of any changes in her address or telephone
number
 Provide copies of her tax returns and bank statements for the past two years
and current pay stubs
 Submit medical history report forms to the Department
 Provide family medical history
 Attend and complete American Sign Language classes and demonstrate the
sign language in her visitation with V.T.E.
In the Interest of V.T.E. Page 4
 Provide proof of completion of a twelve-step program through NA
 Attend regular visits with V.T.E.
 Maintain contact with her assigned caseworker
Butcher testified that Samantha testified positive for methamphetamines on more than
one occasion and that she also tested positive for marijuana and alcohol. Butcher stated
that Samantha did not exercise her visitation with V.T.E. for the first four months of
V.T.E’s life and then she missed her scheduled visitation in August 2016, December 2016,
and February 2017. Samantha has not attended visitation with V.T.E. since March 2017.
V.T.E. is deaf and sign language is her only access to language. Samantha did not attend
sign language classes and demonstrate sign language during her visitation with V.T.E.
Samantha is dependent on her paramour for support and has not demonstrated proof of
full-time employment. Samantha sent Butcher a text message indicating that the
Department expected too much, and Butcher has not had contact with Samantha since
April 2017.
Samantha argues that she substantially complied with the provisions of the court
order. Ground O does not quantify any particular number of provisions of the family
service plan that a parent must not achieve in order for the parental rights to be
terminated or the degree of a parent's conduct that will be deemed to be a failure to
achieve a particular requirement of the plan. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(O)
(West Supp. 2017); In Interest of B.H.R., No. 06-17-00081-CV, 2017 WL 5150852, *5 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana, November 7, 2017, no pet.). The record shows that Samantha did not
comply with numerous provisions of the court order. Accordingly, we find that the trial
court's determination that Samantha failed to comply with the requirements of the family
In the Interest of V.T.E. Page 5
service plan is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence, and we overrule
the fourth point of error. Because we find that evidence is legally and factually sufficient
to support the trial court’s finding of a predicate act pursuant to Section 161.001 (b) (1)
(O), we need not reach the first, second, third, and fifth issues.
Best Interest
In the sixth issue, Samantha complains that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interest of
V.T.E. In determining the best interest of a child, a number of factors have been
considered, including (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of
the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now
and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the
programs available to assist these individuals; (6) the plans for the child by these
individuals; (7) the stability of the home; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may
indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for
the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex.1976); In re
S.L., 421 S.W.3d 34, 38 (Tex.App.-Waco 2013, no pet.). The Holley factors focus on the best
interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent. In re S.L., 421 S.W.3d at 38. The
goal of establishing a stable permanent home for a child is a compelling state interest. Id.
The need for permanence is a paramount consideration for a child's present and future
physical and emotional needs. Id.
V.T.E. is not able to express her desires; however, the record shows that her
emotional and physical needs are being met in her current placement. V.T.E. has special
In the Interest of V.T.E. Page 6
medical needs and requires extensive therapy and medical services. The record shows
that Samantha had another daughter with special needs who is now deceased and that
Samantha failed to provide necessary medical care for that child. Samantha has not
learned sign language to be able to communicate with V.T.E. Samantha has not
maintained stable housing or employment to be able to care for V.T.E. Samantha
continues to have issues with substance abuse. Samantha did not attend the trial
terminating her parental rights to V.T.E. and has not had contact with the Department
since April 2017. We find that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support
the trial court’s finding that termination is in the best interest of the children. We overrule
the sixth issue on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AL SCOGGINS
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed February 28, 2018
[CV06]
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