William Ray Rust v. the State of Texas

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-22-00116-CR
WILLIAM RAY RUST,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 278th District Court
Walker County, Texas
Trial Court No. 29289
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found William Ray Rust guilty of the felony offense of failure to register as
a sex offender. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 62.055(a); 62.102(a), (b)(2). Specifically,
Rust was charged with and convicted of failing to report an intended change of address
within seven days of the intended change. Id. The trial court sentenced Rust to four years
in prison. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, the trial court’s
judgment is affirmed.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Rust represented himself, with standby counsel, at trial. He is represented by
counsel on appeal. In one issue on appeal, Rust contends the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction because the State did not prove, with direct evidence, that Rust
intended to change his address.
Standard of Review
The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of a
sufficiency issue as follows:
When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Villa v.
State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires
the appellate court to defer "to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that
of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a
"divide and conquer" strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all
the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not speculate
about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any
reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported
by the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume that the factfinder
resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in favor of the verdict,
and we defer to that resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the
facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the
testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and
circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so
long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is
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sufficient to support the conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809
(Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.
We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
to support a conviction by comparing it to "the elements of the offense as
defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case." Malik v.
State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically
correct jury charge is one that "accurately sets out the law, is authorized by
the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof
or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately
describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Id.; see
also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The "law
as authorized by the indictment" includes the statutory elements of the
offense and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty, 387
S.W.3d at 665.
Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Offense
Pursuant to article 62.055(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a person who is
required to register as a sex offender and who intends to change addresses, must, not
later than the seventh day before the intended change, report in person to the local law
enforcement authority designated as the person’s primary registration authority and
provide the authority and the officer with the person’s anticipated move date and new
address. Id. art. 62.055(a). A person commits an offense if the person fails to timely
report the intended change in address. See id. art. 62.102.
Evidence
Rust was registered to live at a certain address in Huntsville, Texas. In May of
2019, Rust wanted to be de-registered from the sex offender registry and became
confrontational with the sex offender registration clerk when she told Rust that she could
not help him de-register.
Rust v. State Page 3
An apartment complex owner from Loveland, Colorado noticed Rust coming and
going at the complex for a couple of days. On about October 7, 2019, he had a
conversation with Rust, informing him that if he was going to stay more than a week and
a half or two weeks, Rust would have to put down a deposit. Rust told the owner he had
only been there a few days.
The owner later learned from a tenant that Rust had some “issues” in Texas and
would not be able to stay long. The tenant was concerned enough about the “issues”
Rust had that the tenant thought the owner should talk to the police about Rust. The
owner saw Rust two or three more times and estimated that Rust was at the complex for
a week and a half from the time the owner called the police to the time Rust left.
On October 7, 2019, a detective from the Loveland Police Department in Colorado
called the registration authority in Huntsville to report he had received a tip that Rust
was living in Loveland. The detective had learned from the apartment complex owner
that Rust was a registered sex offender and had “issues” in Texas. The detective also
learned that the Loveland Police Department had previously made contact with Rust in
September of 2019 at the same complex. Officers monitored this address to see whether
Rust was coming and going from the complex. The detective obtained information on
the car Rust was driving and learned Rust’s car had been seen numerous times.
Ultimately, the detective did not charge Rust with any offense because Rust left the area
by approximately October 14, 2019.
As a result of the call from the detective, a Walker County Sheriff’s Deputy was
sent to Rust’s address to see if Rust was at the address. Rust was not at the address.
Rust v. State Page 4
Rust’s alleged roommate was at the residence and told the deputy that Rust had lived
there but had left the residence on August 19, 2019. The deputy further testified that in a
written statement, the roommate said Rust left the residence on August 1, 2019. 1 The
registration clerk was never notified that Rust was moving residences.
Rust testified that he had been in Colorado, but that Loveland was not the place
he intended to move. He wanted to move to Fort Collins, Colorado. He did not notify
anyone of his intent to move.
Application
The State alleged Rust failed to report in person and provide to the Walker County
Sheriff’s Office an intended change of his address within seven days of the intended
change. The evidence showed that Rust had left his residence by August 19, 2019, at the
latest. He was in Loveland, Colorado in September and October of 2019. He wanted to
move to Fort Collins, Colorado, and did not notify anyone of his intent to move.
CONCLUSION
The jury is the sole judge of the credibility and weight to be attached thereto,
including whether to believe all of a witnesses' testimony, portions of it, or none of it.
Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Further, direct evidence and
circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be
sufficient to uphold a conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App.
1
Rust did not object to the testimony from the deputy regarding what the roommate said or what the
roommate had written. A trier of fact is entitled to give probative value to "inadmissible hearsay admitted
without objection." TEX. R. EVID. 802; Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
Rust v. State Page 5
2015). Thus, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,
we find the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict.
Rust’s sole issue is overruled, and the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
TOM GRAY
Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Johnson, and
Justice Smith
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed January 25, 2023
Do not publish
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