Feysal Ghaffari v. Empire Petroleum Partners, LLC

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-17-00164-CV
FEYSAL GHAFFARI APPELLANT
V.
EMPIRE PETROLEUM PARTNERS, APPELLEE
LLC
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FROM THE 342ND DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 342-266265-13
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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The cause below involved numerous parties, claims, counterclaims,
crossclaims, and third-party claims. One of the parties was pro se Appellant
Feysal Ghaffari in his individual capacity. Another was Arlington Valero Corp., an
entity with which Ghaffari may have some affiliation. The trial court ultimately
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
signed a final order dismissing the cause, and any pending claims, for want of
prosecution.
Ghaffari appeals, but Arlington Valero does not. Instead of complaining
about trial court rulings that were directed at him individually, in his five issues,
Ghaffari challenges orders that were directed at Arlington Valero. Because
Ghaffari is a party to this appeal in his individual capacity only, and because he
has no justiciable interest in any potential error affecting only Arlington Valero,
we will dismiss this appeal for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Dallas Convenience Stores, Inc. sued Arlington Valero for breach of a
commercial lease agreement and Nick Datoo, Shirin Datoo, and Ameen Hirani
for breach of guarantees. The Datoos answered and filed a counterclaim against
Dallas Convenience Stores and a third-party petition against Empire Petroleum.
Empire Petroleum answered the Datoos’ third-party petition; filed counterclaims
against Arlington Valero (breach of contract, conversion, and theft), Nick Datoo
(breach of guaranty, conversion, and theft), Shirin Datoo (conversion and theft),
and Hirani (conversion and theft); and filed a third-party petition and claims
against Ghaffari for conversion, theft, and tortious interference with existing
contract. Ghaffari answered Empire’s third-party petition and filed a “cross-claim”
against Dallas Convenience Stores and no claims against Empire Petroleum.
Dallas Convenience Stores ultimately reached a settlement agreement
with Arlington Valero and the Datoos, and Ghaffari settled his claim against
Dallas Convenience Stores. The trial court signed orders dismissing the claims
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between those parties and severed the dismissal orders into a separate cause.
Dallas Convenience Stores also nonsuited its claim against Hirani, which left
pending only the claims and third-party claims among Arlington Valero, the
Datoos, Empire Petroleum, Hirani, and Ghaffari.
Later, the trial court dismissed the third-party claims against Empire
Petroleum; granted an interlocutory summary judgment in favor of Empire
Petroleum and against Arlington Valero and Nick Datoo for $98,244.80; and
dismissed the remainder of the cause for want of prosecution on April 28, 2017.
At the time of the dismissal, the only claims that remained pending were Empire
Petroleum’s counterclaims against Shirin Datoo and Hirani and Empire
Petroleum’s third-party claims against Ghaffari.
Ghaffari identifies the following five issues:
Issue 1: The evidence does not support the Order of
dismissal of 4/28/2017.
Issue 2: The trial court should not have rendered judgment
against defendant for cumulative damages for concurrent causes of
actions arising out of the same acts.
Issue 3: Lacks Standing (Law). Locus standi is the term for
the ability of Empire to deliver a copy of the proof of “Something to
lose” Doctrine $0.00 Loss, after the expiration of 3/28/2012 and
refusal to refund the appellant’s $25,000.00 is not Empire lost, that
cannot be cured, make an order/judgment void. Not just voidable.
Issue 4: Empire’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by
Empire’s noncompliance with applicable statutes and other
provisions of law.
Issue 5: Empire’s claims are barred, in whole or in part, by
Empire’s noncompliance with applicable contracts and agreements.
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Ghaffari included only two paragraphs in the argument section of his brief, but
they are no more comprehensible than the issues immediately above are.
Taking Ghaffari’s first issue at face value, Empire Petroleum argues that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the cause for want of prosecution,
but it makes no sense for Ghaffari to challenge the April 28, 2017 dismissal order
in the traditional sense because he prevailed: the only claims that the trial court
dismissed by that order were Empire Petroleum’s because Ghaffari never
asserted a counterclaim against Empire Petroleum after it filed its third-party
petition against him. As he did in the trial court, Ghaffari is proceeding in this
appeal pro se. Judging by his briefing, it is apparent that he is untrained in the
law and not clearly articulating his issues. Therefore, to ascertain his actual
arguments, we will consider his brief as a whole. Cf. Perry v. Cohen, 272 S.W.3d
585, 587 (Tex. 2008) (“Appellate briefs are to be construed reasonably, yet
liberally, so that the right to appellate review is not lost by waiver.”).
Citing the trial court’s orders dismissing other parties’ third-party claims
against Empire Petroleum and granting summary judgment for Empire Petroleum
against Arlington Valero, Ghaffari states in his second issue that the trial court
“should not have rendered judgment against defendant for cumulative damages.”
In his third issue, Ghaffari contends that he was entitled to a refund of a $25,000
security deposit. In his fourth and fifth issues, Ghaffari appears to raise defenses
to Empire Petroleum’s claims. In his summary of the argument, Ghaffari states
that “the court should reverse the judgment of $98,244.80.” And in his prayer, he
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again challenges the $98,244.80 award, describing it as “unlawful.” We also note
that in one of its pleadings, Empire Petroleum explained that Ghaffari had filed a
lawsuit in Collin County “dba Arlington Valero Corporation.” In that same
pleading, Empire Petroleum stated that Arlington Valero had assigned its interest
in a motor fuel supply agreement to Ghaffari.
In light of all of the above, but for reasons that are not entirely clear to us
because of the limited record, it appears that Ghaffari is attempting to challenge
the trial court’s orders that were directed at Arlington Valero, principally, the
interlocutory summary judgment that awarded Empire Petroleum $98,244.80.
Ghaffari lacks standing to do so.
Empire Petroleum sued Ghaffari in his individual capacity, Ghaffari
asserted a claim against Dallas Convenience Stores in his individual capacity,
and he filed a notice of appeal in his individual capacity. Ghaffari is a party to
this appeal only in his individual capacity. Individual capacity differs from other
capacities:
A person who sues or is sued in his official or representative
capacity is, in contemplation of law, regarded as a person distinct
from the same person in his individual capacity and is a stranger to
his rights or liabilities as an individual. It is equally true that a person
in his individual capacity is a stranger to his rights and liabilities as a
fiduciary or in a representative capacity.
Alexander v. Todman, 361 F.2d 744, 746 (3rd Cir. 1966); Burroughs v.
Burroughs, No. 14-12-00627-CV, 2013 WL 1187461, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Mar. 21, 2013, no pet.) (majority order) (Frost, J., dissenting);
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Elizondo v. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n, 974 S.W.2d 928, 931 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). Thus, in the eyes of the law, Ghaffari in his
individual capacity is not the same person as Ghaffari in his capacity as a
representative of Arlington Valero. The question then is whether Ghaffari,
individually, may challenge orders that affected only Arlington Valero.
“Texas courts have long held that an appealing party may not complain of
errors that do not injuriously affect it or that merely affect the rights of others.”
Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 843 (Tex. 2000). The right to appeal
rests only in an aggrieved party. Cty. of El Paso v. Ortega, 847 S.W.2d 436, 442
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1993, no writ). “An aggrieved party is one who has a
justiciable interest recognized by law which is injuriously affected by the trial
court’s judgment.” Hanna v. Godwin, 876 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tex. App.—El Paso
1994, no writ). A party lacks standing when it is not personally aggrieved. See
Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848‒49 (Tex. 2005).
The trial court’s order granting the interlocutory summary judgment for
Empire Petroleum aggrieved Arlington Valero but had no injurious affect upon
Ghaffari individually. He therefore lacks standing to complain of any potential
errors that may have affected only Arlington Valero. See Torrington Co., 46
S.W.3d at 843; Brauss v. Triple M Holding GmbH, 411 S.W.3d 614, 625 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (“[T]he Nixdorf Appellants are not injuriously
affected by the judgment in favor of the Horseshoe Appellants and have no
standing to appeal that portion of the judgment.”).
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Standing is a prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction. Bland ISD v. Blue,
34 S.W.3d 547, 553‒54 (Tex. 2000). Because Ghaffari lacks standing to assert
the only issues that he raises, we dismiss this appeal for want of subject-matter
jurisdiction.2 See Vickery v. Vickery, No. 01-95-00008-CV, 1996 WL 255755, at
*2‒3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 16, 1996, no writ) (holding similarly).
/s/ Bill Meier
BILL MEIER
JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and KERR, JJ.
DELIVERED: February 22, 2018
2
Insofar as Ghaffari challenges the April 28, 2017 order in the manner that
Empire Petroleum construes his argument, we agree with Empire Petroleum that
Ghaffari has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the
cause and remaining claims for want of prosecution. To the extent that Ghaffari
can appeal a judgment entirely in his favor, we would affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
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