All American Excavation, Inc. v. Austin Materials, LLC

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Nos. 04-15-00779-CV; 04-15-00780-CV; 04-15-000781-CV & 04-15-00782-CV
ALL AMERICAN EXCAVATION, INC.,
Appellant
v.
AUSTIN
AUSTIN MATERIALS, LLC d/b/a Ramming Paving Company,
Appellee
From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 2015-CI-10299; 2015-CI-10743; 2015-CI-13685 & 2015-CI-11880
Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 13, 2016
REVERSED AND REMANDED
All American Excavation, Inc. (“AAE”) appeals the trial court’s order in each of the
underlying causes denying its motion to abate and compel arbitration. AAE contends the trial
court erred in denying its motion to compel arbitration because AAE established as a matter of law
the claims asserted against it in the underlying causes by Austin Materials, LLC d/b/a Ramming
Paving Company were within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement. AAE further contends
the trial court erred in failing to abate the underlying causes pending the arbitration. We reverse
the trial court’s orders.
04-15-00779-CV; 04-15-00780-CV; 04-15-00781-CV & 04-15-00782-CV
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2013, AAE and Ramming Paving entered into a Subcontract Agreement containing
general provisions applicable to work to be performed by Ramming Paving for AAE. The work
was generally described as asphalt paving, seal coat and striping services. The Subcontract
Agreement stated that the owner, architect, and contract price would be determined by individual
purchase orders. The Subcontract Agreement contained a broad arbitration provision
encompassing “any dispute, controversy or claim” between the parties.
In 2015, Ramming Paving filed the underlying lawsuits against AAE claiming AAE had
failed to pay Ramming Paving for various services and materials it had provided on four
construction projects. AAE filed counter-claims asserting no amounts were due because of offsets
and back charges for defective work. In addition, AAE filed a motion to compel arbitration and
abate in each lawsuit.
On November 20, 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing on AAE’s motions. At the
hearing, AAE presented an affidavit from its President in each lawsuit. Ramming Paving
presented argument during the hearing regarding various reasons the Subcontract Agreement and
the arbitration provision contained therein were unenforceable, including lack of consideration or
mutuality and absence of specificity or detail. The trial court took the matter under advisement at
the conclusion of the hearing. After the hearing, both parties filed letter briefs further clarifying
their arguments. The trial court subsequently signed orders denying AAE’s motions, and AAE
now appeals.
VALIDITY OF AGREEMENT
“A party attempting to compel arbitration must first establish that the dispute in question
falls within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement.” J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128
S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003). “If the other party resists arbitration, the trial court must determine
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whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists.” Id. Ordinary principles of state contract law
determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists. G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire
V.P., LP, 458 S.W.3d 502, 524 (Tex. 2015). If the evidence establishes a valid agreement, “the
burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to raise an affirmative defense to enforcing
arbitration.” J.M. Davidson, Inc., 128 S.W.3d at 227. “The trial court’s determination of the
arbitration agreement’s validity is a legal question subject to de novo review.” Id.
AAE contends it proved the validity of the agreement; therefore, the trial court erred in
denying its motions to compel arbitration. Ramming Paving responds the agreement is not an
enforceable contract because its terms were too indefinite and the agreement was not supported by
consideration.
A. Indefiniteness of Subcontract Agreement
Ramming Paving contends the Subcontract Agreement lacks specificity because it refers
to documents in an exhibit which is not attached, refers to a purchase order which was not
introduced into evidence, and does not specify the required retainage. AAE responds the
Subcontract Agreement is a typical master agreement containing general terms which govern the
parties’ legal relationship upon the subsequent execution and acceptance of a purchase order or
other similar request for work or services on a specific project.
Generally, “[i]n order to be legally binding, a contract must be sufficiently definite in its
terms so that a court can understand what the promisor undertook.” T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank
of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. 1992). In the context of a master service agreement
between a contractor and a subcontractor, the master service agreement is not sufficiently definite
to bind either party to perform any services. Moser v. Aminoil, USA, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 774, 779
(W. Dist. La. 1985). The master service agreement “merely sets forth [the parties’] agreement to
abide by certain terms should they enter into contractual relations in the future.” Id. Once the
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contractor requests the services of the subcontractor, however, the request provides the remaining
material terms, and “the terms of the master service agreement are incorporated automatically into
the written or verbal contract to perform the specified services.” Id.
“The law favors finding agreements sufficiently definite for enforcement,” particularly
where services have been provided under the contract for which compensation was to be paid.
America’s Favorite Chicken Co. v. Samaras, 929 S.W.2d 617, 623 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1996, writ denied). “Where the evidence shows that the parties intended to enter into an
agreement, the courts should find the contract to be definite enough to grant a remedy provided
that there is a certain basis for determining the remedy.” Id.
In this case, the Subcontract Agreement provided the general terms that would govern any
asphalt paving, seal coat and striping services Ramming Paving provided to AAE. The remaining
material terms, including the identity of the specific project and the pricing terms, were to be
provided in a subsequent purchase order exchanged between the parties. Once AAE and Ramming
Paving agreed to the terms in a subsequent purchase order, the purchase order and the Subcontract
Agreement together would provide all material terms, thereby forming an enforceable contract.
During the hearing before the trial court, Ramming Paving referenced the Houston court’s
decision in ODL Servs., Inc. v. ConocoPhillips Co., 264 S.W.3d 399 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2008, no pet.), which it also cites in its brief. In that case, the predecessors of ODL Services,
Inc. and ConocoPhillips Co. entered into a master agreement pursuant to which ODL agreed to
provide services to Conoco. Id. at 403-05. The master agreement provided its terms would apply
on Conoco’s issuance and ODL’s acceptance of a Request for Services (“RFS”). Id. at 404. In
2006, ODL entered into an agreement to provide services to Conar Construcciones, C.A., a
Venezuelan company, which in turn had a contract with Conoco Venezuela C.A. (“CVCA”), an
affiliate of, but a separate company from, Conoco. Id. at 405. After Conar defaulted under its
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contract, a meeting was held on December 14, 2006, regarding the project at which representatives
from ODL and CVCA were present. Id. Conflicting evidence was presented as to whether Conoco
representatives also were present. Id.
In 2007, ODL made an arbitration demand on Conoco seeking almost $7 million for goods
and services it provided on the project after the December meeting. Id. at 406-07. Conoco filed a
petition for declaratory relief seeking to prevent ODL from pursuing arbitration under the master
agreement. Id. at 407. ODL sought mandamus relief after the trial court denied its motion to
compel. Id. at 403, 408. The Houston court noted “although the parties disputed whether the
request for ODL’s services that could trigger the Master Agreement could be made in ways other
than by issuing and executing a formal RFS, they did not dispute that some kind of request by
Conoco, and acceptance by ODL, was required to make the Master Agreement apply and for its
arbitration clause to bind Conoco.” Id. at 414. Although there was conflicting evidence on
whether some type of triggering request was made, the trial judge resolved the conflicting evidence
in favor of Conoco, “finding that ODL and Conoco did not enter into an agreement on December
14, 2006 that [invoked] the Master Agreement.” Id. at 416. Instead, the trial court “found that
CVCA (not Conoco) agreed on December 14, 2006, to begin paying [ODL] directly.” Id.
“Consequently, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that no arbitration
agreement existed between” ODL and Conoco. Id.
In the instant case, the only evidence presented with regard to the Subcontract Agreement
were the affidavits of AAE’s president in which he stated the Subcontract Agreement, which was
attached to the affidavit as an exhibit, “was the master agreement between [the parties] concerning
the work and project made the basis of the claims at issue in this lawsuit.” The same affidavit was
filed in each lawsuit. These affidavits are evidence that a request was made that triggered the
Subcontract Agreement which thereby governed the completed work Ramming Paving performed
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on each project. Because the affidavits were evidence establishing a definite, enforceable, valid
agreement, the burden shifted to Ramming Paving. See J.M. Davidson, Inc., 128 S.W.3d at 227.
Ramming Paving presented no controverting evidence at the hearing. Therefore, the ODL Servs.,
Inc. decision is factually distinguishable.
Because the only evidence established that AAE made a request for Ramming Paving’s
services which triggered the Subcontract Agreement for the work performed by Ramming Paving,
we conclude the Subcontract Agreement coupled with the request was sufficiently definite to be
enforceable.
B. Consideration
Ramming Paving also contends the Subcontract Agreement and the arbitration provision
lacked consideration. With regard to the Subcontract Agreement, “[a] contract must be based upon
a valid consideration, in other words, mutuality of obligation.” Federal Sign v. Tex. Southern
Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 408 (Tex. 1997). Consideration is a bargained for exchange of promises.
Id.; Marx v. FDP, LP, 474 S.W.3d 368, 378 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied). As
previously noted, the only evidence presented at the hearing before the trial court established AAE
made a request for Ramming Paving’s services which triggered the Subcontract Agreement with
regard to the projects in question. Therefore, the evidence established Ramming Paving promised
to provide AAE with its services on the projects, and AAE agreed to pay Ramming Paving for
those services. Thus, the Subcontract Agreement was supported by sufficient consideration. See
In re AdvancePCS Health, L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 607 (Tex. 2005) (noting party who used the other
party’s services and network to obtain reimbursements for its services pursuant to a provider
agreement for ten years could not claim agreement was without consideration); United States ex
rel. D.R. Swindle Constr., L.P. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur., No. 7:08-CV-00174-O, 2009 WL
1904852, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2009) (holding sufficient consideration existed to support
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subcontract agreement where plaintiff agreed to provide labor for a project in exchange for
compensation from the defendant).
With regard to the arbitration provision, “[a]rbitration agreements, like other contracts,
must be supported by consideration.” In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex.
2006). “In the context of stand-alone arbitration agreements, binding promises are required on
both sides as they are the only consideration rendered to create a contract.” In re AdvancePCS
Health, L.P., 172 S.W.3d at 607; see also In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d at 676
(noting “consideration may take the form of bilateral promises to arbitrate”). If “one party can
avoid its promise to arbitrate by amending the [arbitration] provision or terminating it altogether,”
however, the promise is illusory. In re 24R, Inc., 324 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. 2010). “When
illusory promises are all that support a purported bilateral contract, there is no mutuality of
obligation, and therefore, no contract.” Id.
The rule is different, however, when the arbitration provision is part of a larger underlying
contract. See In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195 S.W.3d at 676; In re AdvancePCS Health, L.P.,
172 S.W.3d at 607. In that context, “the rest of the parties’ agreement provides the consideration.”
In re AdvancePCS Health, L.P., 172 S.W.3d at 607; see also In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 195
S.W.3d at 676 (noting “when an arbitration clause is part of a larger, underlying contract, the
remainder of the contract may suffice as consideration for the arbitration clause”). In this case,
the arbitration provision is part of the larger Subcontract Agreement which provides the
consideration. See Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. Levco Constr., Inc., 359 S.W.3d 843, 853-54 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. dism’d) (holding underlying construction contract provided
consideration for arbitration provision contained therein); United States ex rel. D.R. Swindle
Constr., L.P., 2009 WL 1904852, at *2 (holding consideration existed for arbitration provision in
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subcontract agreement). Therefore, we hold the arbitration provision is supported by adequate
consideration.
C. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we hold AAE proved the existence of a valid agreement that was
supported by consideration and sufficiently definite to be enforceable. 1
UNCONSCIONABILITY
In its brief, Ramming Paving also argues the Subcontract Agreement is unenforceable for
reasons of unconscionability. Ramming Paving did not, however, present this argument to the trial
court. A party must present argument to the trial court that an arbitration provision is
unconscionable, or the argument is waived and cannot be considered for the first time on appeal.
See Winslow v. D.R. Horton America’s Builder, No. 04-12-00376-CV, 2013 WL 2368300, at *1
n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 29, 2013, no pet.); 950 Corbindale, L.P. v. Kotts Capital
Holdings Ltd. P’ship, 316 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.).
STAY OF REMAINING PROCEEDINGS
In its second issue, AAE contends the trial court abused its discretion in failing to abate the
underlying cases pending the arbitration. Because the trial court denied AAE’s motion to compel,
it did not expressly rule on AAE’s request to abate the claims involving parties other than AAE
and Ramming Paving pending the outcome of the arbitration. We address AAE’s second issue
because it is likely to arise again on remand. See Garza v. Cantu, 431 S.W.3d 96, 107 n.7 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (addressing issue likely to arise again on retrial in
1
Because we hold the arbitration agreement is valid, we do not address AAE’s alternative argument regarding whether
Ramming Paving’s challenges to the agreement’s validity presented an issue of substantive arbitrability which the
arbitrator should have decided.
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the interest of judicial economy); Sheshtawy v. Sheshtawy, 150 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (addressing issue likely to arise on remand).
During the hearing, AAE argued Ramming Paving’s claims against the other parties in the
underlying lawsuits were derivative of the claims between AAE and Ramming Paving. For
example, if Ramming Paving did not prevail at arbitration, Ramming Paving could not recover on
any surety bonds or foreclose on any liens which are the types of claims asserted against the other
parties to the lawsuits. We agree that in order to resolve the claims against the other parties, a
determination is first required as to whether Ramming Paving is entitled to recover against AAE,
which is an issue to be resolved in the arbitration. Accordingly, the litigation against the other
parties “must be abated to ensure that an issue [to be determined by the arbitrator] is not decided
instead in collateral litigation.” In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 196 (Tex.
2007).
CONCLUSION
Because AAE proved the existence of a valid, enforceable arbitration agreement, no
defenses to the enforcement of the agreement were established, and no dispute was raised as to
whether Ramming Paving’s claims fall within its scope, the trial court erred in denying AAE’s
motions to compel. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s orders denying AAE’s motions to
compel arbitration and “remand [these causes] with instructions to the trial court to enter [orders]
compelling arbitration between the parties and staying all other proceedings pending the outcome
of the arbitration.” Nabors Drilling USA, LP v. Pena, 385 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2012, pet. denied); see also Henry v. Gonzalez, 18 S.W.3d 684, 692 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2000, pet. dism’d by agr.) (remanding cause with instructions to enter order compelling
arbitration and staying all other proceedings pending the outcome of the arbitration).
Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
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