DocketNumber: No. 14011
Citation Numbers: 220 S.W.2d 689
Judges: Cramer
Filed Date: 4/29/1949
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/1/2021
Facts
This case was submitted to the trial court on an agreed statement of facts, the material parts -of which were in Substance
The court, on such agreements, entered judgment for appellee, and against appellant for $1747.22, with interest at 6% per annum from April 19, 1948, plus costs, and this appeal has been properly perfected fr-om that judgment.
Opinion
The contract between the government agency, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, and appellee is contained in the application and the Cotton Crop Insurance Regulations, of appellant, covering the year involved here and subject to the limited authority of the agents -of appellant thereunder. As stated by Justice Frankfurter in Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill et al, 332 U.S. 380, 68 S.Ct. 1, 2, 92 L.Ed. 10, 175 A.L.R. 1075: "(1-4) The case no doubt presents phases of hardship. We take for granted that, on the basis of what they were told by the Corporation’s local agent, the respondents reasonably believe-d that their entire crop was covered -by petitioner’s insurance. And so we -assume that recovery •could be had against a private insurance company. But the Corporation is not a -private insurance company. It is -too late in the -day t-o urge that the Government is just another -private litigant, for purposes of charging it with liability, whenever it takes -over a business theretofore -conducted by private enterprise or engages in competition with private ventures. Government is not partly public or partly private,
The application for insurance contained the following provision : “The undersigned (George Phillips) * * * hereby applies to the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation * * * 'for insurance to cover his interest as landlord, owner, tenant or sharecropper in American Upland 'Cotton crops to fee planted on all insurance units located in (Kaufman County, Texas) in which the applicant has an interest -at the time of planting.” Section 419.2 of Cotton Crop Insurance Regulations for the Year 1946 and Succeeding Crop Years, Federal Register, November 24, 1946, Vol. II, Section 230, p. 14,355, provides: “An application (for insurance) shall cover the applicant’s interest in the cotton crop on all insurance units located * * * in the county * * * in which the applicant has an interest at the time of the planting of the cotton crop to be harvested in 1946 and any succeeding crop year while the contract remains in force.” Under the agreed statement of facts, “at the time of planting” George Phillips owned ¼. of the crops, under the regulations and the terms of the lease.
In the Merrill case cited above, the rule that these regulations are binding is discussed as follows: “Congress could hardly define the multitudinous details appropriate for the business of crop insurance when the Government entered it. Inevitably ‘the terms and conditions’ upon which valid governmental insurance can be had must be defined by the agency acting for the Government. And so Congress has legislated in this instance, as in modern regulatory enactments it so often does by conferring the rule-making power upon the agency created for carrying out its policy. See § 516(b), 52 Stat. 72, 77, 7 U.S.C. § 1516(b), 7 U.S.C.A. § 1516(b). Just as everyone is charged with knowledge of the United States Statutes at Large, Congress has provided that the appearance of rules and regulations in the Federal Register gives legal notice of their contents. 49 Stat. 502, 44 U.S.C. § 307, 44 U.S.C.A. § 307”; and as follows: “The oft-quoted observation in Rock Island, Arkansas & Louisiana R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143, 41 S.Ct. 55, 56, 65 L.Ed. 188, that ‘Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government,’ does not reflect a callous outlook. It merely expresses the duty of all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress for charging the public treasury. The ‘terms and conditions’ defined by the Corporation, under authority of Congress, for creating liability on the part of the Government preclude recovery for the loss of the reseeded wheat no matter with what good reason the respondents thought they had obtained insurance from the Government.”
See also Felder v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 4 Cir., 146 F.2d 638.
Appellee says that his acquisition of a ¾ interest in the 1946 cotton crop on the farms of George Phillips and his filing of a record of transfer to him, entitled him to the benefits of the contract between appellant and George Phillips, landlord, and also that he acquired at least a J4 of the landlord George Phillips’s ⅛ or ¾6th of the cotton, since George Phillips had, the right to transfer such portion as he owned at the time of the planting.
The measure of damage applied by the itrial court was the highest reasonable cash •market value of cotton between the time ;the amount became due and the time of •trial. Appellee assigns error to this as a ■proper pleasure of damage. The rule laid .down in Randon v. Barton, 4 Tex. 289, is -.that .where the damages are for breach .of contract to convey chattels, where the .purchase price is paid; the measure of .damages is the value of the article at time (Of trial, which was the test applied by the trial court. This rule was modified in Heilbroner v. Douglass, 45 Tex. 402, at page 407, where it .was freíd that it is inequitable fro allow highest price of an article after default in delivery; measure of damage is the value at time agreed for delivery, with interest.
We have carefully considered this record and have concluded that the correct measure of damage in this case is the one set out in the Heilbroner case above. It follows that the judgment of the trial court should be modified so as to reduce the recovery from $1,747.22 to $299.60, with interest thereon from April 30, 1947, the date appellant refused the claim. For general discussion of damages here, see 3 Texas Law Review 44.
For the', reasons above stated, the costs of appeal are taxed one-third against appellant and two-thirds against appellee. The judgment as modified is affirmed.