Teresa Shippy v. Travis Boyd, Independent of the Estate of Daniel Allen Boyd

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-22-00188-CV
________________________
TERESA SHIPPY, APPELLANT
V.
TRAVIS BOYD, INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE
OF DANIEL ALLEN BOYD, DECEASED, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 84th District Court
Hansford County, Texas
Trial Court No. CV-05667, Honorable Curt Brancheau, Presiding
September 19, 2022
ORDER
Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ. 1
Pending before the court are the motions of Travis Boyd, Independent Executor of
the Estate of Daniel Allen Boyd, to dismiss the appeal and extend the deadline to file his
1 Justice Doss not participating.
appellee’s brief. He contends dismissal is appropriate because of the purported
untimeliness of Teresa Shippy’s notice of appeal.
The record discloses that Shippy filed her notice of appeal within 15 days after the
applicable deadline. The deadline fell on June 14, 2022. Though leave was not
requested to file it belatedly, such a motion is implied under these circumstances. See
Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997) (stating that a motion for an
extension of time to file a notice of appeal is implied when an appellant tenders a notice
of appeal within fifteen days after the notice of appeal deadline). Nevertheless, the
appellant must still reasonably explain the delay. Jones v. City of Houston, 976 S.W.2d
676, 677 (Tex. 1998). And, a reasonable explanation consists of any plausible statement
of circumstances indicating that the delay was neither deliberate nor intentional, but rather
inadvertent or from mistake or mischance. Garcia v. Kastner Farms, Inc., 774 S.W.2d
668, 669 (Tex. 1989).
Shippy explained that she began her calculation of the appellate deadline not from
the date on which the trial court signed the final summary judgment under attack. Rather,
she did so from the date on which the court signed an order quashing a post-judgment
notice of deposition, i.e., an order that did not modify the final judgment in any way.
Despite the long-settled nature of the law requiring the calculation of the time period to
begin on the date the trial court signed the final judgment, her excuse evinces a mistake
within the scope of Garcia and Jones. Consequently, we deny both the motion to dismiss
and the implied motion to extend the deadline for filing appellee’s brief. Boyd’s brief is
due thirty days after Shippy’s brief is filed.
Per Curiam