Ausencio Ventura and Juan Carlos Ventura v. Martin Vasquez

Opinion issued December 19, 2019
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-19-00240-CV
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AUSENCIO VENTURA AND JUAN CARLOS VENTURA, Appellants
V.
MARTIN VASQUEZ, Appellee
On Appeal from the 127th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2016-13514
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants, Ausencio Ventura and Juan Carlos Ventura, challenge a
summary judgment rendered in favor of appellee, Martin Vasquez, based on
limitations grounds. Vasquez’s motion for summary judgment asserted that,
although they had filed suit before limitations expired, Appellants had not served
him until after limitations ran, and they had not used due diligence in serving him.
In one issue, Appellants assert that the trial court erred in granting Vasquez’s
motion for summary judgment. They contend that the evidence raised a fact issue
regarding whether Appellants had exercised due diligence in effecting service.
Because we conclude that the summary-judgment evidence did not raise a fact
issue on this point, but instead established conclusively that Appellants did not
exercise reasonable diligence in serving Vasquez, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
Background
On March 5, 2014, Appellants and Vasquez were involved in a car accident.
Claiming injuries from the accident, Appellants sued Vasquez on March 2, 2016,
three days before the expiration of the statute of limitations. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE § 16.003(a) (establishing two-year statute of limitations for personal-
injury actions). Appellants retained a private process serving company,
Professional Civil Process, to serve Vasquez.
On March 4, 2016, Appellants provided Professional Civil Process with the
citation and petition to serve Vasquez. Between March 5 and March 10, 2016, the
assigned process server, F. Berry, made four unsuccessful attempts to serve
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Vasquez at an address on 15th Street in La Porte, Texas, identified as Vasquez’s
residence.
On March 11, 2016, Berry signed a document entitled, “Declaration of Not
Found (Due and Diligent Search),” in which Berry stated that, “[a]fter due and
diligent effort as set forth below, I have been unable to effect personal service upon
Vasquez, Martin.” Berry then provided the details regarding the four unsuccessful
attempts he had made to serve Vasquez at the address. Berry explained that, during
the first attempt on March 5, he was told by a teenager at the address that the boy’s
father, Martin Vasquez, Sr., lived there but that his brother, Martin Vasquez, Jr.,
did not. On the second attempt at service on March 7, Berry found no one at home
and left a delivery notice at the residence. Berry returned to the address on the
evening of March 9. Berry noted in the declaration that “the subject” resided at the
address “but is not home at this time.” Martin Sr.’s teenage son told Berry that his
father was working nights, and Berry left a delivery notice with the teenager.
Finally, on March 10, Berry said that he again returned to the address and spoke
with Martin Sr., who told him that he did not know anything about the car
accident. Martin Sr. said that it must have been his 20-year-old son, Martin Jr.,
who had been involved in the accident. Based on the exchange, Berry determined
that Martin Jr., not Martin Sr., was the person who needed to be served. Berry also
determined that Martin Jr. did not reside at the address with his parents.
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Appellants’ attorney, S. Cruz, provided Professional Civil Process with
Vasquez’s birthdate and driver’s license number on March 11. Although Cruz
discussed Vasquez’s address with Professional Civil Process Servers, no further
attempts at service were made during the remainder of March, April, and May. The
address, at which Berry made the four unsuccessful service attempts, was
ultimately determined to be Vasquez’s address.
On May 25, 2016, Appellants filed the Declaration of Not Found that Berry
signed. Five weeks later, on June 30, 2016, Appellants filed a motion for substitute
service. On July 14, the trial court signed an order granting the motion. Appellants
informed Professional Civil Process Servers about the order granting substitute
service on July 26. Vasquez was personally served on August 1, 2016.
After answering, Vasquez filed a motion for summary judgment on October
8, 2016. In his motion, he asserted that the statute of limitations barred Appellants’
suit because they had not exercised diligence in serving him. To meet his
summary-judgment burden, Vasquez requested the trial court to take judicial notice
of the pleadings in the court’s file showing (1) the car accident occurred on March
5, 2014; (2) Appellants filed suit on March 2, 2016; and (3) he was not served until
August 1, 2016, five months after suit was filed and after limitations had run.
Appellants filed a response to the motion for summary judgment. As
summary-judgment evidence, they offered Berry’s Declaration of Not Found,
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detailing his four unsuccessful attempts to serve Vasquez. Appellants also offered
the affidavit of their attorney, Cruz, in which she reiterated the information about
Berry’s four unsuccessful service attempts between March 5 and March 10, and
she also stated as follows:
[O]n March 11, 2016, I contacted the company Professional Civil
Process Servers to discuss this matter and provided them with Martin
Vasquez’s date of birth and driver’s license number.
Between March, April and May, I discussed with [Professional] Civil
Process Servers to confirm whether or not we had the correct address
for Defendant. The address was confirmed to be the same address
used for all previous attempts. There was no other address to attempt
service of process.
On May 25, 2016[,] the Declaration of [Not Found] was filed with the Court.
On June 30, 2016[,] we submitted the Motion for Substitute Service to
the Court.
On July 14, 2016, this Court signed the order granting the Motion for
Substitute Service.
On July 26, 2016, I followed up with Professional Process Server [sic]
to inform them that the Court signed the order granting Substitute
Service.
On August 1, 2016, Defendant Martin Vasquez was personally served
with process.
The trial court granted Appellants’ motion for summary judgment on
December 4, 2018. This appeal followed.
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Motion for Summary Judgment
In their sole issue, Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment. Appellants assert that the summary-judgment evidence
showed that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether they
exercised due diligence in attempting to serve Vasquez between the filing of the
suit on March 2, 2016 and serving Vasquez on August 1, 2016.
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d
844, 848 (Tex. 2009). A party moving for traditional summary judgment has the
burden to prove that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); SeaBright Ins. Co. v.
Lopez, 465 S.W.3d 637, 641 (Tex. 2015). When a defendant moves for summary
judgment, it must either (1) disprove at least one essential element of the plaintiff’s
cause of action or (2) plead and conclusively establish each essential element of its
affirmative defense, thereby defeating the plaintiff’s cause of action. Cathey v.
Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). A matter is conclusively established if
reasonable people could not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the
evidence. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005). To
determine whether there is a fact issue in a motion for summary judgment, we
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review the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, crediting
favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could do so and disregarding contrary
evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. See Fielding, 289 S.W.3d at 848
(citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827).
B. Applicable Legal Principles
“Summary judgment on a limitations affirmative defense involves shifting
burdens of proof.” Perez v. Efurd, No. 01–15–00963–CV, 2016 WL 5787242, at
*2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing
Proulx v. Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213, 215–16 (Tex. 2007)). When a plaintiff files his
petition within the limitations period but obtains service on the defendant outside
of the limitations period, the service is valid only if the plaintiff exercised diligence
in procuring service. Davis v. Roberts, No. 01–10–00328–CV, 2011 WL 743198,
at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing
Ashley v. Hawkins, 293 S.W.3d 175, 179 (Tex. 2009)); see also Proulx, 235
S.W.3d at 215 (providing that “a timely filed suit will not interrupt the running of
limitations unless the plaintiff exercises due diligence in the issuance and service
of citation”). If a plaintiff diligently effects service after the expiration of the
statute of limitations, then the date of service relates back to the date of filing.
Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 215. But, if a defendant affirmatively pleads the defense of
limitations and shows that service has occurred after the limitation’s deadline, the
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burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove diligence. Ashley, 293 S.W.3d at 179; Proulx,
235 S.W.3d at 215.
Diligence is determined by asking “whether the plaintiff acted as an
ordinarily prudent person would have acted under the same or similar
circumstances and was diligent up until the time the defendant was served.”
Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216. The plaintiff must present evidence regarding the
efforts made to serve the defendant and “explain every lapse in effort or period of
delay.” Id. The question of the plaintiff’s diligence in obtaining service is generally
one of fact to be “determined by examining the time it took to secure citation,
service, or both, and the type of effort or lack of effort the plaintiff expended in
procuring service.” Id. If “one or more lapses between service efforts are
unexplained or patently unreasonable,” then the record demonstrates lack of
diligence as a matter of law. Id.
C. Due Diligence
Appellants alleged that the car accident occurred on March 5, 2014, setting
March 5, 2016 as the date the two-year statute of limitations expired. See TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a). In his motion for summary judgment, Vasquez
proved that he was not served until August 1, 2016, after limitations ran. As a
result, Vasquez met his initial burden of establishing that service was outside the
limitations period, and the burden shifted to Appellants to show that they exercised
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diligence in attempting to serve Vasquez after filing suit and until he was served.
See Ashley, 293 S.W.3d at 179; Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216. To satisfy their burden,
Appellants had to “present evidence regarding the efforts that were made to serve
the defendant, and to explain every lapse in effort or period of delay.” Proulx, 235
S.W.3d at 216.
The period between the filing of the lawsuit on March 2, 2016 and serving
Vasquez on August 1, 2016 was 152 days, or about five months. To show they
exercised due diligence in attempting to serve Vasquez during this period,
Appellants offered as summary-judgment evidence (1) the affidavit of their
attorney, Cruz, and (2) the Declaration of Not Found signed by the process server,
Berry.
The evidence showed that Berry received the citation and suit papers on
March 4, 2016. And, between March 5 and March 10, Berry made four attempts to
serve Martin Vasquez at the address identified as his residence.
During the first service attempt on March 5, Berry learned from a family
member that there were two persons named Martin Vasquez: Martin Sr. and Martin
Jr. Berry was informed that Martin Sr. lived at the address but that Martin Jr. did
not. Berry noted that “the subject” resides at the address, indicating that Berry
initially believed that Martin Sr., not Martin Jr., was the defendant. The evidence
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showed that Berry made two more service attempts on March 7 and 9, continuing
to pursue Martin Sr. as the defendant.
On the fourth service attempt on March 10, Berry spoke with Martin Sr. He
told Berry that he knew nothing about the car accident. Martin Sr. stated that his
20-year-old son, Martin Jr., must have been the one involved in the accident. He
said that Martin Jr. did not live at the address.
On March 11, Cruz contacted Professional Civil Process Servers “to discuss
this matter and provided them with Martin Vasquez’s date of birth and driver’s
license number.” When viewed in the light most favorable to them as non-
movants, Appellants’ evidence showed that they exercised diligence in pursuing
service during the initial 9-day period of March 2 to 11.
After the initial 9-day period, Cruz’s affidavit identified a gap-in-service
period: the 75-day period between March 12 and May 25, the date on which
Appellants filed Berry’s Declaration of Not Found in the trial court. Regarding this
period, Cruz stated that, “[b]etween March, April and May, I discussed with Civil
Process Servers to confirm whether or not we had the correct address for
Defendant. The address was confirmed to be the same address used for all previous
attempts. There was no other address to attempt service of process.”1
1
On appeal, Appellants also point to Cruz’s supplemental affidavit, filed along with
a motion for leave 52 days after the trial court granted Vasquez’s motion for
summary judgment. In the supplemental affidavit, Cruz indicated that she had
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In assessing this period, we find instructive Roberts v. Padre Island Brewing
Company, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet.
denied). There, the appellant asserted that she exercised due diligence by
repeatedly attempting to contact the process server and the county clerk’s office to
inquire about the status of service. See id. The court of appeals disagreed,
concluding that her acts did not constitute due diligence because it is the
responsibility of the person requesting service, and not the process server, to see
that the service is properly accomplished. Id. The court emphasized that reliance
on the process server does not constitute due diligence in attempting service of
process. Id.; see Taylor v. Thompson, 4 S.W.3d 63, 65 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
forgotten to mention in her previous affidavit (offered as summary-judgment
evidence) that her law office had flooded in April 2016. She said that the flood
“was part of the reason” why Appellants had delayed “until May 2016 to continue
with the efforts to secure service of process on [Vasquez].” However, because it
was not on file before the trial court ruled on the motion, we cannot consider
Cruz’s supplemental affidavit, including her statement that her office flooded in
April 2016, when assessing whether the trial court properly granted summary
judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) (providing that trial court considers
evidence “on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment
with the permission of the court”); Armstrong-Cody v. Kinder Morgan Prod. Co.,
LLC, No. 11-13-00073-CV, 2015 WL 302002, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan.
22, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (stating that court could not consider two depositions
on appeal because they did not exist when trial court ruled on motion for summary
judgment); Lewis v. Lamb, No. 09-06-201 CV, 2007 WL 2002901, at *4 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Apr. 12, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“We cannot consider
evidence that was not presented to the trial court for the summary judgment
ruling.”). In addition, the supplemental affidavit is not in the clerk’s record. We
note that “[e]vidence that is not contained in the appellate record is not properly
before this Court.” Tex. Windstorm Ins. Ass’n v. Jones, 512 S.W.3d 545, 552 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
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Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (“[A]ny misplaced reliance on the process server does not
constitute due diligence.”). The Roberts court stated that a reasonable person in the
same or similar circumstance would have employed an alternate process server, a
constable, or would have attempted service through other alternative court
approved methods. See Roberts, 28 S.W.3d at 621.
Here, Cruz’s affidavit indicates that Appellants relied on Civil Process
Servers to locate Vasquez during the 75-day period from March 12 to May 25. But,
as stated in Roberts, it was not the process servers’ responsibility to accomplish
service, it was Appellants’ responsibility. See id. And it is unclear what, if
anything, Civil Process Servers did during the two-and-one-half-month period.
Appellants point out that Vasquez’s family told Berry that Vasquez did not
live at the address that was ultimately determined to be the correct address. Even
so, Cruz’s affidavit shows no proactive steps by Appellants (or by Professional
Civil Process Servers on their behalf) to accomplish service during the 75-day
period. Cruz’s affidavit indicates only that she discussed with Professional Civil
Process Servers whether it had the correct address for Vasquez and that the address
was determined to be the right one.
Cruz’s affidavit does not describe what means, if any, were used by
Professional Civil Process Servers to locate Vasquez during this period or indicate
the intensity of the search. The affidavit also does not address how Appellants
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monitored the search to ensure that it was progressing or indicate how frequently
Cruz spoke to Civil Process Servers during March, April, and May about locating
Vasquez. In short, there is no indication why it took two-and-one-half months to
confirm that Vasquez lived at the address where service had already been
attempted.
Nor is there evidence that, during this period, Appellants sought the services
of an alternate process server, considered other means of service, or engaged in
other search methods to locate Vasquez. See Franklin v. Longview Med. Ctr., No.
12-18-00198-CV, 2019 WL 2459020, at *6 (Tex. App.—Tyler June 5, 2019, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (holding appellant failed to continually exercise due diligence in
attempting to serve defendant when evidence showed that, during separate 60- and
70-day periods of inactivity, appellant relied on process server to accomplish
service, but appellant offered no evidence showing that she had proactively
ensured service would be accomplished). Appellants’ evidence stands in contrast to
evidence offered in other cases in which courts have held that the evidence raised a
fact issue regarding diligence of service during gap periods of similar length to that
here. See, e.g., St. John Backhoe Serv. v. Vieth, No. 02–15–00098–CV, 2016 WL
4141026, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 4, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding
evidence showing that, during two-and-one-half month period of service delay,
plaintiff’s attorney retained new process server and asked process server to search
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tax records for new address and that draft affidavit raised fact issue about diligence
of service); Fontenot v. Gibson, No. 01-12-00747-CV, 2013 WL 2146685, at *3
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 16, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding
evidence showing that plaintiff’s attorney requested process server to investigate
defendant’s whereabouts, requested forwarding address from postal service, and
searched various websites for defendant’s address over two-month lapse-in-
service-period raised fact issue regarding due diligence).
The next period of delay identified by Cruz’s affidavit is the five-week
period from May 25, 2016 until June 30, 2016. Appellants filed Berry’s
Declaration of Not Found on May 25 but took no further steps to accomplish
service until June 30 when they filed the motion for substitute service. The
Declaration of Not Found, signed by Berry on March 11, detailed his attempts to
serve Vasquez between March 5 and March 10. However, Appellants do not
explain how filing the Declaration of Not Found by itself aided in accomplishing
service, particularly when Appellants did not file the motion for substitute service
until June 30, five weeks later. See Carter v. MacFadyen, 93 S.W.3d 307, 314–15
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (“A flurry of ineffective
activity does not constitute due diligence if easily available and more effective
alternatives are ignored.”). Further, Appellants offered no evidence to explain the
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five-week period of inactivity between the filing of the Declaration of Not Found
and the filing of the motion to substitute.
Appellants point out that the courts in Proulx and in Fontenot held that short
periods of delay, when considered in the context of the overall course of effecting
service, do not conclusively establish a lack of due diligence to accomplish service.
See Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216–17; Fontenot, 2013 WL 2146685, at *2. However,
Proulx and Fontenot are distinguishable from this case. In those cases, the
summary-judgment evidence demonstrated that service was being actively pursued
throughout the duration of the time it took to accomplish service. See Proulx, 235
S.W.3d at 216–17 (determining that movant failed to conclusively establish lack of
diligence when evidence showed plaintiff had made 30 attempts at service at five
addresses over nine-month period and had hired two process servers and two
investigators to locate defendant, who had been actively dodging service);
Fontenot, 2013 WL 2146685, at *2 (holding two-week delay between request for
first citation and court’s issuing citation, followed by two-week delay in delivering
it to process server; three-week delay between court clerk’s issuing second citation
and plaintiff’s sending citation to process server; and three-week delay between
process server’s receipt of citation and process server’s first attempt at service did
not demonstrate lack of diligence when other evidence showed activity to
accomplish service, such as service attempts, searching the internet for current
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address, and obtaining new citation over the course of overall six-month period it
took to effect service). In contrast, as discussed above, the summary-judgment
evidence here does not demonstrate due diligence by Appellants to accomplish
service from March 12 to June 30, a period of three-and-on-half months out of the
five-month-period it took to serve Appellants after suit was filed.
We conclude that, after Vasquez met his summary-judgment burden,
Appellants did not meet their burden. Appellants’ summary-judgment evidence did
not raise a fact issue regarding whether they exercised due diligence during their
lapse in service efforts but instead conclusively established that they did not
exercise due diligence in effecting service during that time. We hold that the trial
court properly granted summary judgment in Vasquez’s favor.
We overrule Appellants’ sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Sherry Radack
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Lloyd.
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