in Re: Ruth Torres

DENY; and Opinion Filed October 4, 2018.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-00774-CV
IN RE RUTH TORRES, Relator
Original Proceeding from the 44th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-16-08711
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang-Miers, Fillmore, and Stoddart
Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
In this original proceeding, relator Ruth Torres complains of an agreed temporary
injunction signed September 13, 2016 and fifteen other orders signed between February 14, 2018
and June 7, 2018. Relator seeks a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to dissolve the agreed
temporary injunction and vacate the other fifteen orders addressed in the petition. Relator also
seeks a writ of prohibition and a writ of injunction. We deny the relief requested.
To be entitled to mandamus relief, a relator must show both that the trial court has clearly
abused its discretion and that relator has no adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co.,
148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). Based on the record before us, we
conclude relator has not established her right to mandamus relief as to any of the orders at issue.
We, therefore, deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.
A writ of prohibition is used to protect the subject matter of an appeal or to prohibit an
unlawful interference with enforcement of an appellate court’s judgment. Holloway v. Fifth Court
of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tex.1989) (orig. proceeding). The writ is designed to operate
like an injunction issued by a superior court to control, limit, or prevent action in a court of inferior
jurisdiction. Id. at 682–83. This Court may issue a writ of prohibition in only limited
circumstances, none of which are present here. In re Bolton, No. 05-10-01115-CV, 2010 WL
4011041, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 14, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); Humble Expl.
Co., Inc. v. Walker, 641 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, no writ).
Here, relator seeks a writ of prohibition that would prohibit the trial court from (1) ordering
removal, alteration or destruction of documents in the record or in any party’s possession, (2)
finding contempt based on the temporary injunction or confidentiality order (3) engaging in ex-
parte communications with any party on substantive issues, (4) admitting or using relator’s
privileged communications with her clergy, (5) infringing on relator’s rights of freedom of speech
and religion, and (6) ordering relator or her entities in default. Relator argues that the trial court’s
rulings have infringed on her rights of freedom of speech and freedom of religion and have
permitted witness tampering and spoliation of evidence. Based on the record before us, we
conclude relator has not established a basis for the issuance of a writ of prohibition. Relator has
not shown that any actions by the trial court are interfering with this proceeding or any of relator’s
other pending appeals. Accordingly, we deny relator’s petition for writ of prohibition.
Finally, relator seeks a writ of injunction to enjoin the real parties in interest from filing
litigation against potential witnesses, from filing new claims against relators, from tampering with
witnesses or spoliation of evidence, or from infringing on relator’s rights to freedom of speech and
religion. The courts of appeals have limited injunctive powers. “Each court of appeals ... may
issue ... all ... writs necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of the court.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
22.221(a) (West Supp. 2017). A court of appeals does not have “original jurisdiction to grant writs
of injunction, except to protect its jurisdiction over the subject matter of a pending appeal, or to
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prevent an unlawful interference with the enforcement of its judgments and decrees.” Ott v. Bell,
606 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1980, no writ). Here, relator has not shown that a
writ of injunction is necessary to protect our jurisdiction over a pending appeal in this Court or to
prevent the interference with the enforcement of one of this Court’s judgments. Accordingly, we
deny relator’s petition for writ of injunction.
Based on the record before us, we conclude relator has not shown she is entitled to the
relief requested as to any of the orders of which she complains. Accordingly, we deny relator’s
petition for writ of mandamus, petition for writ of prohibition, and petition for writ of injunction.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a) (the court must deny the petition if the court determines relator is not
entitled to the relief sought).
/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/
ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
JUSTICE
180774F.P05
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