DocketNumber： 03-94-00347-CR
Filed Date： 5/8/1996
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/5/2015
A jury found Charlie Dean Hays intentionally and knowingly caused Emily Shannon's death, rejecting his contention that he acted from sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. (1) The trial-court judgment convicts Hays accordingly and sentences him to ninety-nine years imprisonment as assessed by the jury. Hays appeals. We will affirm the trial-court judgment.
Hays testified that he and Shannon drove to his parents' home in the evening. Seeing a skunk in the front yard, he obtained a firearm from inside the house. The skunk disappeared. He and Shannon talked about their estrangement. He asked Shannon to spend the night with him. She refused, stating she was going elsewhere to "sleep with John." Hays testified the two began to argue. He "blacked out" and could remember nothing after that. Bullets recovered from Shannon's body and spent casings recovered at the scene matched the firearm that lay at Hays's feet when investigators arrived at his parents' home.
Undisputed evidence showed that Shannon received two gunshot wounds. The first resulted from a firearm that discharged while the muzzle was in contact with her chin. The wound was not fatal. The second and fatal wound was to the back of Shannon's head, fired at point-blank range. The physical evidence suggested that Shannon was shot first on the front porch, that she moved to the side of the house near a window, and that she was followed while her assailant reloaded the single-shot firearm and released the automatic safety, and then placed the muzzle at the back of Shannon's head and fired. Hays's brother testified without contradiction that he saw Hays shoot Shannon in the back of the head near the window; that Hays entered the residence, appeared dazed, and explained his actions by saying "So. I just don't give a f--- anymore." Hays went to his room, placed the muzzle of the firearm in his mouth, and fired. He recovered from his wound after being in a coma for a number of weeks.
Over Hays's objection that the evidence was hearsay, the trial judge admitted in evidence the testimony of four witnesses relating what Shannon told them before Hays killed her, namely:
(1) Hays "had been calling [Shannon] and he would call her and then say ugly things to her--that she was a slut--and then the next minute he would call back and say `I love you, let's get back together.' that sort of things."
(2) Hays said "if he couldn't have [Shannon], no one else would."
(3) Hays "had grabbed [Shannon] by the throat" and slapped and tried to choke her after entering her home one night.
(4) Shannon said "she did not know what to do about [Hays], that she wanted to be friends with him."
(5) Shannon and Hays "had been at a party and they had been in a fight and he had pushed her down."
(6) Hays had pushed Shannon "down in front of her friends" and "called her a whore," and Shannon had showed the witness a resulting bruise on her leg.
(7) Hays was asking Shannon to return gifts, money, and other items that he had given her.
(8) Hays was calling Shannon at "her job and saying she was a whore [and] a slut."
In Hays's first point of error, he contends admitting the foregoing hearsay was reversible error. The State replies that the testimony was admissible to show Shannon's then-existing "state of mind," an exception to the hearsay rule. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 803(3). We believe item four falls within the exception and therefore admitting that evidence was not error. We believe admitting the remaining items was error, however, because they do not amount to statements pertaining to the declarant's [Shannon's] state of mind or emotion as Rule 803(3) requires. Rather, Shannon's reported statements attributed acts and words to Hays; her statements are silent as to any affect these might have had on her state of mind or emotions, although such an affect might be imagined or inferred if one first believed the truth of her statements relating what Hays said and did. See Jones v. State, 515 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); cf. Pena v. State, 864 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. App.--Waco 1993, no pet.). We hold that admitting the indicated items was error.
The error is harmless, however, if the overwhelming evidence dissipates the effect of the error upon the jury's function in determining the facts. See Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Nevertheless, we may not hold the error harmless unless we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneously admitted evidence made no contribution to Hays's conviction or punishment. Tex. R. App. P. 81(b)(2); Johnson v. State, 660 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
In light of the undisputed eyewitness evidence of Hays's guilt of an execution-style murder, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneously admitted hearsay evidence did not contribute to his conviction or sentence. We overrule his first point of error. (2)
In his third point of error, Hays complains the eight items of hearsay evidence were erroneously admitted because they amount to evidence of extraneous offenses. He includes in his complaint the additional non-hearsay testimony of a witness that Hays forced his way into her home shouting "Where is she. Where is she." He was, evidently, inquiring about Shannon. As discussed previously, we believe any error resulting from admitting the seven hearsay statements does not require reversal. The additional hearsay statement regarding Shannon's desire to remain friends with Hays cannot accurately be characterized as evidence of an extraneous offense. Concerning Hays's complaint about the non-hearsay testimony that Hays forced his way into the home of the witness, shouting as he did, we hold the evidence admissible to show Hays's relationship with Shannon. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.36(a) (West Supp. 1996); (3) Pena, 864 S.W.2d at 150. We overrule Hays's third point of error.
The State possessed a written statement purportedly given to the police and signed by Chris Quenimen. In the statement, Quenimen related that he was with Hays four days before the homicide and on that occasion Hays said that he was going to kill Shannon and himself. As indicated below, the trial judge allowed the State to question Quenimen, in the jury's presence, concerning the contents of the statement. In his second point of error, Hays contends this was reversible error because the State's primary purpose in calling Quenimen was to place the incriminating contents of the statement before the jury by means of a sham impeachment of Quenimen following his testimony that he could not remember making the statement. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 607; Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 862, 873-74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1368 (1995); Hulen Wendorf, et al., Texas Rules of Evidence Manual, Crim. 607 at VI-37 (3d ed. 1991).
Outside the jury's presence, Quenimen testified variously as follows: (1) he did not remember giving the statement to the police or Rachel Shaw; (2) he recognized the statement; (3) the statement bore his name at the top and his signature at the bottom; (4) the statement was in his handwriting; (5) he did not know whether the contents were true; (6) he did not know and could not remember whether he lied when he gave the statement; (7) he did not give the statement to the police or Rachel Shaw; and (8) he signed the statement after reading it but he did not know why he gave it.
Before Quenimen was called to testify in the jury's presence, Hays's counsel objected as follows:
The State is now on notice prior to his testimony that he doesn't remember anything that occurred.
I'm going to object to the State being entitled to impeach their own witness through a statement such as, something such as this, your honor.
The trial judge overruled the objection and Quenimen testified as follows before the jury: (1) he did not remember being at the house on the occasion when Hays stated his intention to kill Shannon and himself; (2) he did remember that Hays was present at the house on that occasion; (3) he did not recall giving a statement concerning that occasion; (4) the written statement (which was shown to him) bore his signature and he wrote it, but he did not recall doing so nor did he recall filling in the printed parts and giving his birthdate and the number of his driver's license; (5) when asked whether he remembered any incident like that described in the written statement, he replied "I don't know nothing"; (6) no one threatened him when he gave the statement and no one paid him in that connection; and (7) if he made the statement, he would not have lied.
For purposes of discussion, we assume that defense counsel's objection was sufficiently specific to raise for appellate review Hays's second point of error. Cf. Garcia, 887 S.W.2d at 874.
It is plain from the record that Quenimen did not admit unequivocally that he gave the statement shown to him and from which he was questioned. He was, moreover, given several opportunities to admit or deny making the statement or to explain its contents after it was shown to him. We hold the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in the circumstances. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 612(a); McGary v. State, 750 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Aranda v. State, 736 S.W.2d 702, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1241 (1988); Smith v. State, 520 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956); Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Denial of Recollection As Inconsistent With Prior Statement So as to Render Statement Admissible, 99 A.L.R. 3d 934, 954-57 (1980). And because Hays did not request an instruction limiting use of the statement contents to impeachment purposes alone, the State was free to argue the matters about which Quenimen was questioned. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 105(a); Garcia, 887 S.W.2d at 878; Smith, 520 S.W.2d at 386. We therefore overrule Hays's second point of error.
In his fourth point of error, Hays contends the trial court erred in denying his several requests for a mistrial. He contends first that the trial court should have granted his request for mistrial when the prosecution elicited testimony prohibited by an order in limine. In each instance, Hays objected, the trial judge sustained the objection, and instructed the jury to disregard the evidence. We hold these instructions cured any prejudice. See Sheppard v. State, 545 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
In his argument to the jury, the prosecutor discussed what he would do to the perpetrator of a crime committed against a member of his family and how this related to a person of "ordinary temper." The trial judge sustained Hays's objection and instructed the jury to disregard the argument as improper. We find this cured any prejudice. See Carter v. State, 614 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The prosecutor also declared in his argument "I think [Hays] had already decided that nobody else was going to have her." The trial judge sustained Hays's objection but declined to instruct the jury to disregard the comment. We believe the absence of an instruction was harmless. The statement was, we believe, not calculated to inflame the jury. (4) See Sheppard, 545 S.W.2d at 818. We overrule the point of error.
In his fifth point of error, Hays contends the trial court erred (1) in admitting the State's photograph of Shannon, apparently taken in connection with her high-school graduation while (2) refusing to receive in evidence a photograph of Shannon, taken when she was "booked" at the sheriff's office, offered by Hays. We hold the first photograph was relevant, and therefore admissible, to establish the identity of the decedent. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 401; Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Because the first photograph had been admitted in evidence for that purpose, the prejudicial effect of the second photograph outweighed in our opinion any probative value attributed to it. See Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 403. We hold accordingly and overrule Hays's fifth point of error.
For the reasons given, we affirm the trial-court judgment.
John Powers, Justice
Before Justices Powers, Jones and Kidd
Affirmed
Filed: May 8, 1996
Do Not Publish
1. 1 See Penal Code, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 399, sec. 1, § 19.02, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 913, amended by Act of May 28, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 426, art. 2, § 1, 1973 Tex Gen. Laws 1122, 1123 (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02, since amended) ("Murder"); Penal Code, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 399, sec. 1, § 19.03, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 913, amended by Act of May 28, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 426, art. 2, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122, 1124 (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.04, since amended) ("Voluntary Manslaughter").
2. 2 Unlike decisions finding inadmissible evidence contributed to the jury's verdict, the State's case here is largely based on direct and not circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Morales v. State, 745 S.W.2d 483, 491 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1988, no pet.); Contreras v. State, 766 S.W.2d 891, 892-93 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1989, no pet.).
3. At the time the offense was committed, the statute now codified at article 38.36(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure appeared in section 19.06 of the Penal Code. See Penal Code, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 399, sec. 1, § 19.05, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 883, 913, amended by Act of May 28, 1973, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 426, art. 2, § 1, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1122, 1124 (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.06, since repealed and recodified at Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.36(a) (West Supp. 1996)). Because the recodification effective September 1, 1994, had no substantive effect, the Code of Criminal Procedure is cited for the sake of convenience.
4. 4 Earlier in the State's jury argument, the prosecutor stated, "I don't mean, when I say I think, Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm not giving you my personal opinion. I may slip and say that. I apologize." This suggests that his statements were not calculated to inflame the minds of the jury.
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In his fourth point of error, Hays contends the trial court erred in denying his several requests for a mistrial. He contends first that the trial court should have granted his request for mistrial when the prosecution elicited testimony prohibited by an order in limine. In each instance, Hays objected, the trial judge sustained the objection, and instructed the jury to disregard the evidence. We hold these instructions cured any prejudice. See Sheppard v. State, 545 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
In his argument to the jury, the prosecutor discussed what he would do to the perpetrator of a crime committed against a member of his family and how this related to a person of "ordinary temper." The trial judge sustained Hays's objection and instructed the jury to disregard the argument as improper. We find this cured any prejudice. See Carter v. State, 614 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The prosecutor also declared in his argument "I think [Hays] had already decided that nobody else was going to have her." The trial judge sustained Hays's objection but declined to instruct the jury to disregard the comment. We believe the absence of an instruction was harmless. The statement was, we believe, not calculated to inflame the jury. (4) See Sheppard, 545 S.W.2d at 818. We overrule the point of error.
In his fifth point of error, Hays contends the trial court erred (1) in admitting the State's photograph of Shannon, apparently taken in connection with her high-school graduation while (2) refusing to receive in evidence a photograph of Shannon, taken when she was "booked" at the sheriff's office, offered by Hays. We hold the first photograph was relevant, and therefore admissible, to establish the i