DocketNumber： 03-97-00605-CR
Filed Date： 1/14/1999
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 4/17/2021
In four points of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence unlawfully obtained and that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's verdict. We will overrule appellant's points of error and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Officers armed with a search warrant seized cocaine that they found in appellant's residence. All of appellant's points of error are based on his contention that the affidavit upon which a magistrate issued the search warrant did not show probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The magistrate found probable cause and issued the search warrant on September 22, 1995, authorizing a search of appellant's residence for marihuana and cocaine. The search warrant was issued after the magistrate was presented an affidavit that alleged probable cause as follows:
Affiant, Penny L. Dunn, is employed by the San Marcos Police Department and is currently assigned to the Narcotics Division. Affiant has been employed as a Peace Officer for nine years. Affiant has been involved in numerous narcotic investigations during Affiant's career and has received numerous hours of training in narcotics enforcement.
Affiant has observed cocaine, crack cocaine, methamphetamine, marihuana, Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), heroin, psilocybin mushrooms, and other illegal narcotics in these investigations and is aware of how they are packaged for sale, transported, and used. Affiant knows that narcotic dealers keep books, ledgers, receipts, tally sheets, bank records, money orders, and other papers relating to the manufacture, cultivation, transportation, sale and distribution of illegal controlled substances.
On Thursday, September 21, 1995 Cpl. Dunn was contacted by Crimestoppers Caller #82X regarding narcotics violations. Caller #82X advised that a Hispanic male named Kenneth and a second, unidentified Hispanic male are living in a small camping trailer in the trailer park across from the Stadium Plaza Strip center on Aquarena Springs Dr., San Marcos, Hays County, Texas. The caller described Kenneth as being 27 to 28 years of age, 5'6" and heavy set. Caller #82X stated that the subjects are selling large quantities of marihuana and cocaine from the camping trailer. Caller #82X stated that the camping trailer is an older trailer and is parked in the third slot, on the left as you enter the driveway of the trailer park. The caller further described the trailer as having a clothesline in front. Caller #82X stated that Kenneth drives a green Ford, short-bed truck.
Caller #82X stated that he/she had been in the residence in the past week and had observed two or three pounds of marihuana and a small amount of cocaine in the residence. Caller #82X stated that Kenneth stores the marihuana in the refrigerator. Kenneth advised Caller #82X that he was traveling to Laredo, Texas to "re-up" his supply of marihuana and cocaine and would return this week. Caller #82X stated that Kenneth returned on Sunday, September 17, 1995 and that Kenneth's roommate returned on Tuesday, September 19, 1995. Caller #82X stated that Kenneth has called in the past 48 hours and advised that he had returned. Caller #82X stated that Kenneth offered large amounts of marihuana and cocaine for sale and provided his pager number, 753-3100, for contact.
On Monday, September 11, 1995 Officer D. Fisher of the San Marcos Police Department - Narcotics Division received a call from a subject, who requested anonymity. The caller stated that Kenneth Luna, (who lives in a small trailer located in the first or second lot, on the left, as you enter College View Mobile Home Park), is selling marihuana and cocaine from his residence. Caller stated that he/she had been in the residence recently and that Kenneth Luna had brought out some cocaine and marihuana while he/she was there. The caller stated that Kenneth Luna keeps the drugs in a small barrel inside the residence. The caller stated that Kenneth Luna drives a dark green, possibly a Ford, truck.
Cpl. Dunn was able to corroborate the following information through other investigative techniques. Records from the San Marcos Utilities indicates that the lot described by both callers is College View Mobile Home Park lot #21 and the utilities are in the name of Noel O. Luna. Records from Household Driver's Record (HDR) show a common address for Noel Omar Luna and Kenneth Cesar Luna at 108 Applewood Drive, Brownsville, Texas. The HDR records give a date of birth of Noel Luna of 2/11/72 and for Kenneth Luna of 8/18/69 (26 years of age). Records from Database Technologies (DBT) were obtained regarding vehicles registered to 108 Applewood, Brownsville, Texas. A 1995 Ford Truck was found registered to Concepcion Luna, Texas license plate HH6491, at 108 Applewood, Brownsville, Texas along with other vehicles.
A check of border crossing records with the United States Customs Service indicate the vehicle registered to Concepcion Luna (Texas License plate HH6491) has crossed the United States of America and Mexico border four times in the past 30 days. The last crossing, returning to the United States was Sunday, September 17, 1995.
A check of record with Century Telecommunications for the pager number given to Caller #82X show the number (512-753-3100) belonging to Kenneth Cesar Luna. A Texas driver's license number was recorded on the original invoice dated August 25, 1994. The license number from the invoice is issued to Kenneth Cesar Luna at 108 Applewood, Brownsville, Texas with a date of birth of 8/18/69.
On Thursday, September 21, 1995 Officer Fisher located and observed the trailer as described by the two callers. The trailer is located at 1201 Aquarena Springs, Lot #21, College View Mobile Home Park, San Marcos, Hays County, Texas.
Criminal records were checked with TCIC/NCIC on Kenneth Luna and Noel Luna. Kenneth Luna has previous arrests for Bringing in Illegal Aliens (commonly known as smuggling illegal aliens) and Assault. Noel Luna has no criminal history.
Based on the callers information and the ability to corroborate the callers information regarding the identification of subjects, location and description of residence, the identification of a suspect vehicle and the confirmation of a border crossing in the past four days, Affiant believes that a usable quantity of marihuana and cocaine is being kept at the above described residence.
WHEREFORE, Affiant asks for issuance of a Warrant that will authorize Affiant to search said suspected place and premises for said property and seize the same and to arrest each said described and accused person.
Whether the facts alleged in a probable cause affidavit sufficiently support a search warrant is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances. The probable cause determination is simply a practical common sense decision whether, given the circumstances described in the affidavit, there is a fair probability that contraband will be found in a particular designated place. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 228-29 (1983); Ramos v. State, 934 S.W.2d 358, 362-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Hackleman v. State, 919 S.W.2d 440, 447 (Tex. App.--Austin 1996, pet. ref'd untimely filed). "The allegations are sufficient if they would 'justify a conclusion that the object of the search is probably on the premises.'" Ramos, 934 S.W.2d at 362-63 (quoting Cassias v. State, 719 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). "The magistrate is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances alleged." Id. at 363; Gish v. State, 606 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). In determining whether an affidavit for a search warrant shows probable cause, a reviewing court looks to the four corners of the affidavit. See Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 148 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Doescher v. State, 578 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Flores v. State, 888 S.W.2d 193, 197 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd); Mayfield v. State, 800 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1990, no pet.). "Statements made during the pretrial hearing do not factor into that determination." Massey, 933 S.W.2d at 148.
Appellant argues that the information officers received from the anonymous informers was stale. In so doing, appellant divides and considers separately various pieces of information and does not consider the totality of the circumstances. Also, appellant argues there was a lack of corroboration of the information obtained from the informers. Again, appellant divides and considers separately pieces of information and corroborative evidence, not the totality of the circumstances.
Applying the principles of the cases cited and following the proper reviewing standard, we find that given the circumstances described in the affidavit, there was a fair probability the contraband described would be found in the place designated. Therefore, the affidavit met the probable cause requirement.
Appellant also asserts that this is a special case and that we should look beyond the face of the affidavit and consider testimony admitted on the hearing of his motions to suppress. We first note that a trial court need not hear a pretrial motion to suppress evidence. See Roberts v. State, 545 S.W.2d 157,158 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Writt v. State, 541 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Bosley v. State, 414 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). In its discretion, the trial court may deny a hearing on the pretrial motion. In this case, appellant filed two motions to suppress evidence. Both motions made broad, general, conclusory allegations but failed to specifically mention the suppression of the cocaine that appellant was alleged to have possessed. A motion to suppress should be a specific pleading. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 11.2(a) (3d ed. 1996). Furthermore, a motion to suppress evidence is nothing more than a specialized objection to the admissibility of evidence. See Gulitz v. State, 617 S.W.2d 949, 952 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Therefore, a motion to suppress should be as specific as an objection to evidence offered during trial. See Mayfield, 800 S.W.2d at 935. Nevertheless, despite the deficiencies of appellant's motions, the trial court heard the motions to suppress before evidence was presented to the jury. In that hearing, the warrant and the affidavit were admitted in evidence. Appellant also offered the testimony of the affiant and made the same arguments that he has made on appeal. We are unable to detect any evidence offered on the hearing that is substantially different than that included in the affidavit. Appellant did not, during the hearing, and has not on appeal, made any claim that the information and allegations in the affidavit were false. Therefore, a Franks question was not raised. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978); Ramsey v. State, 579 S.W.2d 920, 922-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Hackleman, 919 S.W.2d at 448-49; Dow v. State, 626 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1981, no pet.). In the circumstances of this case, we will not depart from the general rule that courts look to the four corners of a probable cause affidavit to determine whether probable cause existed for the issuance of the search warrant. We overrule appellant's first point of error and his "first alternative" point of error.
In his remaining points of error, appellant claims that: (1) "The evidence is legally insufficient because, in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could not have answered in the affirmative to instruction No. 6"; and (2) "The evidence is factually insufficient because, when viewing all the evidence equally, any rational trier of fact could not have answered in the affirmative to instruction No. 6." We must summarize some of the procedural facts to explain appellant's contention.
After the trial court overruled appellant's motions to suppress the evidence, the State in the trial before the jury needlessly offered in evidence the probable cause affidavit and the search warrant. Appellant affirmatively stated he had no objection to their admission. The affidavit and the warrant were admitted for the jury's consideration. Thereafter, Penny Dunn, the affiant, and Danny Fisher, the other officer who furnished information used in the affidavit, both testified before the jury. These witnesses testified and repeated the hearsay alleged in the affidavit.
Appellant requested a jury charge that resulted in the jury being charged that:
You have heard testimony from Corp. Penny Dunn and Officer Danny Fisher regarding statements from a confidential informant on September 11, 1995, and regarding statements from a second confidential informant on September 21, 1995. In addition, you have received evidence of a probable cause affidavit. It has been admitted into evidence solely to aid you, if it does, in determining whether probable cause existed on September 22, 1995, to conduct the search of the premises known as 1201 Aquarena Springs Drive, Lot #21, San Marcos, Hays County, Texas. This evidence was admitted for this purpose, and this purpose only, and should not be considered by you for any other purpose other than that for which it was admitted. Extraneous conduct or offenses in State's Exhibit One are not to be considered by you in your determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant in this case.
Our law provides that any evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the State of Texas or in violation of the Constitution or the laws of the United States shall be disregarded by the jury.
Now before you consider any testimony or evidence concerning the exhibit which has been admitted into evidence and alleged to be a controlled substance, namely: cocaine, you must first find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aforesaid evidence was lawfully seized pursuant to a validly issued Search Warrant, and that said Search Warrant was properly issued based upon legally sufficient probable cause, and if you do not so find beyond a reasonable doubt, then you will disregard the aforesaid evidence.
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal case.
In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evidence so obtained.
(b) It is an exception to the provisions of Subsection (a) of this Article that the evidence was obtained by a law enforcement officer acting in objective good faith reliance upon a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate based on probable cause.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 38.23 (West Supp. 1999). "A trial court is required to include a properly worded Article 38.23 instruction in the jury charge only if there is a factual dispute as to how the evidence was obtained." Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); see Merriweather v. State, 501 S.W.2d 887, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Foster v. State, 814 S.W.2d 874, 883 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1991, pet. ref'd); Finney v. State, 672 S.W.2d 559, 568 (Tex. App.--Austin 1984, no pet.). The issue of whether evidence was obtained unlawfully may be raised from any source, and may be strong, weak, contradicted, unimpeached, or unbelievable. See Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
On appeal, appellant contends that "the State opened the door for consideration of the officers' testimony by consensually relitigating the issue" of probable cause, and therefore it was properly submitted to the jury. To support this argument, appellant relies principally on Hardesty v. State, 667 S.W.2d 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Hardesty is not applicable because it is not concerned with probable cause for a search but is concerned with the admission of a confession. In confession cases, the trial court originally determines the admissibility of the confession, but the jury determines the weight to be given the confession. For a discussion of this difference between probable cause for search cases and confession cases, see Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.02(e) (3d ed. 1996).
Although the issues may have been relitigated, appellant did not testify or offer any other testimony to rebut the factual allegations of the probable cause affidavit; no disputed fact issues were raised. In his fifty-page brief, appellant argues that the affidavit and the officer's testimony are insufficient to show probable cause; he makes no factual dispute claim. In other words, appellant disagrees with the conclusion that probable cause was shown as a matter of law for the issuance of the warrant. Because there were no disputed fact issues, the determination of probable cause was a matter of law and there was no need to charge the jury on that issue. See Ainsworth v. State, 493 S.W.2d 517, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); McElwee v. State, 493 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Campbell v. State, 492 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Black v. State, 491 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Wilkerson v. State, 933 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd); Brooks v. State, 707 S.W.2d 703, 705-06 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd). This case is unlike Wilkerson, 933 S.W.2d 276, and Stone v. State, 703 S.W.2d 652, 654-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), where fact issues were raised concerning probable cause for the warrantless arrest of defendants.
Because there were no fact issues raised concerning probable cause in this case, it would have been unnecessary to submit appellant's requested charge to the jury, and we need not determine whether the facts legally and factually support the jury's implied finding that probable cause existed for issuance of the search warrant. We have already decided that the affidavit supported the issuance of the warrant as a matter of law.
We have considered and reviewed appellant's points of error as he framed them. However, there is a sounder reason for overruling appellant's points of error. The standards for determining legal and factual sufficiency of evidence are concerned with proof of "the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Whether probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant to search for cocaine was not an essential element of the criminal offense of possessing cocaine. Therefore, the standards for determining legal and factual sufficiency of evidence to support the elements of the offense charged do not apply to the Article 38.23 instruction admonishing the jury concerning the admission and the jury's consideration of certain evidence. We overrule appellant's second and third points of error.
The judgment is affirmed.
Carl E. F. Dally, Justice
Before Justices B. A. Smith, Powers* and Dally**
Affirmed
Filed: January 14, 1999
Do Not Publish
* Before John E. Powers, Senior Justice, (retired), Third Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003(b) (West 1998).
** Before Carl E. F. Dally, Judge (retired), Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by assignment. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.003(b) (West 1998).
> Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.02(e) (3d ed. 1996).
Although the issues may have been relitigated, appellant did not testify or offer any other testimony to rebut the factual allegations of the probable cause affidavit; no disputed fact issues were raised. In his fifty-page brief, appellant argues that the affidavit and the officer's testimony are insufficient to show probable cause; he makes no factual dispute claim. In other words, appellant disagrees with the conclusion that probable cause was shown as a matter of law for the issuance of the warrant. Because there were no disputed fact issues, the determination of probable cause was a matter of law and there was no need to charge the jury on that issue. See Ainsworth v. State, 493 S.W.2d 517, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); McElwee v. State, 493 S.W.2d 876, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Campbell v. State, 492 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Black v. State, 491 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Wilkerson v. State, 933 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd); Brooks v. State, 707 S.W.2d 703, 705-06 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd). This case is unlike Wilkerson, 933 S.W.2d 276, and Stone v. State, 703 S.W.2d 652, 654-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), where fact issues were raised concerning probable cause for the warrantless arrest of defendants.
Because there were no fact issues raised concerning probable cause in this case, it would have been unnecessary to submit appellant's requested charge to the jury, and we need not determine whether the facts legally and factually support the jury's implied finding that probable cause existed for issuance of the search warrant. We have already decided that the affidavit supported the issuance of the warrant as a matter of law.
We have considered and reviewed appellant's points of error as he framed them. However, there is a sounder reason for overruling appellant's points of error. The standards for determining legal and factual sufficiency of evidence are concerned with proof of "the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Whether probable cause existed for the issuance of a search warrant to search for cocaine was not an essential element of the criminal offense of possessing cocaine. Therefore, the standards for determining legal and factual sufficiency of evidence to support the elements of the offense charged do not apply to the Article 38.23 instruction admonishing the jury concerning the admission and the jury's consideration of certain evidence. We overrule appellant's second and third points of error.
The judgment is affirmed.
Carl E. F. Dally, Justice
Before Justices B. A. Smith, Powers* and Dally**
Affirmed
Filed: January 14, 1999
Do Not Publish
Flores v. State , 888 S.W.2d 193 ( 1995 )
Mayfield v. State , 1990 Tex. App. LEXIS 3153 ( 1990 )
McElwee v. State , 1973 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2381 ( 1973 )
Campbell v. State , 1973 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2435 ( 1973 )
Franks v. Delaware , 98 S. Ct. 2674 ( 1978 )
Jackson v. Virginia , 99 S. Ct. 2781 ( 1979 )
Thomas v. State , 1986 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 877 ( 1986 )
Brooks v. State , 1986 Tex. App. LEXIS 12492 ( 1986 )
Massey v. State , 1996 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 217 ( 1996 )
Ainsworth v. State , 1973 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2795 ( 1973 )
Stone v. State , 1986 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1178 ( 1986 )
Cassias v. State , 1986 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 879 ( 1986 )
Ramsey v. State , 1979 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1582 ( 1979 )
Black v. State , 1973 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2687 ( 1973 )
Gish v. State , 1980 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1370 ( 1980 )
Muniz v. State , 1993 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 5 ( 1993 )
Bosley v. State , 1967 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1072 ( 1967 )
Merriweather v. State , 1973 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 2117 ( 1973 )
Writt v. State , 1976 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1006 ( 1976 )