James Ray Haggard v. State

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-17-00319-CR
NO. 09-17-00320-CR
__________________
JAMES RAY HAGGARD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 75th District Court
Liberty County, Texas
Trial Cause No. CR30744 (Counts 1 and 2)
__________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found James Ray Haggard (Haggard or Appellant) guilty of one count
of sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child by contact. See
Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 21.11, 22.011(a)(2) (West 2019). 1 Haggard pleaded “true”
1
We cite current versions of the statutes because subsequent amendments do
not affect our disposition.
1
to enhancement paragraphs in the indictment alleging prior felony convictions, and
the trial court sentenced Haggard to twenty-five years of confinement in each count,
with the sentences to be served consecutively. Raising seven issues, Haggard
appeals.
Background and Evidence at Trial
A grand jury indicted Haggard for the offenses of sexual assault of a child and
indecency with a child, and the indictment alleged that on or about October 5, 2013,
Haggard
COUNT I
. . . intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the sexual organ of [M.W.] 2 to
contact or penetrate the mouth of the defendant, without the consent of
[M.W.], a child younger than 17 years of age and not the spouse of the
defendant,
and/or
then and there, intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the sexual organ of
[M.W.] to contact or penetrate the sexual organ of the defendant,
without the consent of [M.W.], a child younger than 17 years of age and
not the spouse of the defendant,
and/or
then and there, intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the penetration of
the sexual organ of [M.W.] by defendant’s finger, without the consent
of [M.W.], a child younger than 17 years of age and not the spouse of
the defendant,
and/or
2
We refer to the victim, family members, and some others with initials or
aliases. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30 (granting crime victims “the right to be treated
with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the
criminal justice process”).
2
then and there, intentionally or knowingly cause[d] the penetration of
the sexual organ of [M.W.] by defendant’s sexual organ, without the
consent of [M.W.], a child younger than 17 years of age and not the
spouse of the defendant[.]
COUNT II
. . . with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of said
defendant, engage[d] in sexual contact with [M.W.] by touching the
breast of [M.W.], a child younger than 17 years of age and not the
spouse of the defendant,
and/or
then and there, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
said defendant, engage[d] in sexual contact with [M.W.] by touching
the genitals of [M.W.], a child younger than 17 years of age and not the
spouse of the defendant,
and/or
then and there, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
said defendant, cause[d] [M.W.], a child younger than 17 years of age
and not the spouse of the defendant, to engage in sexual contact by
causing the said [M.W.] to touch the genitals of the defendant,
and/or
then and there, with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
the defendant, cause[d] [M.W.], a child younger than 17 years of age
and not the spouse of the defendant, to expose her genitals[.]
M.W. testified that she referred to Haggard as “Uncle James,” that he is related
to her but not her uncle. According to M.W., she was close with him and spent a lot
of time at his house. M.W. testified that her family has been divided since October
5, 2013, due to Haggard’s assault against her. M.W. testified that on October 5, 2013,
when she was fifteen years old, she got in Haggard’s bed with him because she did
not want to sleep on the floor, he showed her pornography, he asked her to take her
3
clothes off, he caused her sexual organ to contact or penetrate his mouth, he
contacted or penetrated her sexual organ without her consent, he penetrated her sex
organ with his finger, he caused her to contact his sex organ, he touched her breast
with a part of his body, he touched her genitals with a part of his body, he caused
her to touch his genitals, and he caused her to expose her genitals to him. M.W.
testified that Haggard’s actions were done to make him sexually aroused. According
to M.W., he stopped when he thought he heard someone approaching the bedroom
and he told M.W. to put her clothes on. M.W. testified that she texted her friend that
night and called her boyfriend that next morning and told them what had happened.
The morning after the assault, while Haggard was at the doughnut shop, M.W.
called her mother crying and asked her mother to pick her up. M.W. testified that
about an hour later her aunt picked her and her sister up. M.W. testified that on the
way home she and her aunt discussed what took place to some extent. According to
M.W., at some point her father arrived at the house, but she only gave an account of
what happened to her mother and her aunt. M.W. testified that her mother bagged
up her clothes when she changed clothes. M.W. testified that on the following
Monday she went to the hospital for a sexual assault exam and answered questions
asked by the nurse performing the exam and completing a report. M.W. testified that
she also recalled being interviewed at Bridgehaven on October 15, 2013.
4
T.W., M.W.’s mother, testified that Haggard is her cousin and that she has
known Haggard her entire life. According to T.W., on October 5, 2013, her children
had been “hanging out with [Haggard’s] kids” at Haggard’s house as they typically
would. T.W. testified that she left around 8 p.m. and two of her children, A.W. and
M.W., stayed the night at Haggard’s house. T.W. testified that around 8:30 a.m. the
following morning she received a phone call from M.W. and she sounded distressed.
After they spoke, T.W. “took a minute to kind of grasp . . . what [M.W.] had told
[her,] and then T.W. called L.B., her brother’s ex-wife and one of her closest friends,
to ride with her to pick M.W. up. T.W. testified that because M.W. kept calling
distressed and asking her to hurry up, she had L.B. pick her up instead because L.B.
lived closer and L.B. could get there faster.
According to T.W., L.B. brought M.W. back to T.W.’s house and M.W.
relayed to them what had happened at Haggard’s house. T.W. explained that she
walked in and out of the room because she did not want to hear the details, and she
“just heard bits and pieces of it[.]” T.W. testified that she believed M.W., T.W. was
hurt and angry and that what she heard “changed everything[,]” and that Haggard
was “like a brother to [her].” T.W. testified that that evening they left for her niece’s
birthday party because plans had already been made and she did not know yet how
to handle the news of the assault. Before they left for the party, M.W. showered and
5
T.W. had M.W. put the clothes she had worn at Haggard’s house in a “zip lock bag[]”
because “[M.W.] had said that there was stuff on the clothing[.]” According to T.W.,
L.B. picked M.W. up from school the next morning and took her to the hospital
because T.W. could not leave work then, but T.W. met them there later after she had
arranged with her boss for her to leave work. Hospital personnel notified law
enforcement and T.W. provided law enforcement with her written statement.
L.B. testified that she previously had been married to T.W’s brother, and after
the divorce, L.B. remained friends with T.W. L.B. testified that she had known M.W.
since M.W.’s birth, and that M.W. referred to her as her “aunt[.]” According to L.B.,
on October 6, 2013, she had a phone call conversation with M.W.’s mother and
initially L.B. was going to go and see M.W. once M.W.’s mother picked M.W. up
from Haggard’s house, but the plans changed and L.B. picked M.W. up from
Haggard’s house. L.B. explained that she had been to Haggard’s house “probably
seven or eight times[]” before and that when she picked up M.W., M.W. stepped out
on the porch as L.B. pulled up and then L.B. walked into Haggard’s house. L.B.
testified that she was at Haggard’s house for approximately four or five minutes, she
spoke to Haggard, and that his demeanor “seemed normal.”
According to L.B., she picked up M.W. and A.W and that on the way to
M.W.’s house M.W. seemed quieter than usual. L.B. testified that M.W. recited the
6
events of what had taken place at Haggard’s house several times to her and M.W.’s
mother, and that although the basis of the account did not change, the account
became more detailed. L.B. testified that she saw a mark on M.W.’s breast that was
consistent with her having been assaulted. After several hours, L.B. left to allow
M.W.’s parents to decide how to proceed. L.B. testified that M.W.’s mother was
struggling with how to proceed because of the potentially “devastating” impact to
the family and she was “really scared, really upset, really lost.” L.B. explained that
at the time of the incident she worked in a sex offender rehabilitation program in the
prison, that she called a rape crisis center to get information on what she should do
because she felt like M.W. needed to go to a doctor and be examined, and that later
that day she called T.W. and told her she was going to pick up M.W. and take her to
the hospital, that M.W.’s mother was agreeable to that, and L.B. took M.W. to the
hospital. According to L.B., M.W. was nervous and scared on the way to the hospital
and that “[s]he cried quite a bit that day.” L.B. testified that she gave the clothes that
M.W. had been wearing on the day of the assault in a plastic bag to hospital
personnel. M.W.’s mother arrived at the hospital later.
Suzanne Devore, a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) employed by
Memorial Hermann Hospital on October 7, 2013, testified that she performed a
sexual assault exam on M.W. According to the SANE’s report, M.W. was brought
7
in by her aunt, L.B., and that M.W. reported being sexually assaulted on October 5,
2013. The SANE testified that, according to her report, M.W. stated the following
to her just prior to the exam:
I was in my uncle’s, James Haggard, house on Saturday and he
pulled me back to his bedroom. He’s my uncle, and I didn’t think he
would do anything perverted.
He told me to take off my shirt. I told him I felt uncomfortable.
He wasn’t forcing me, but he took my bottoms off and started playing
with my boobs with his fingers and started licking them.
On my right boob I have a hickey. . . .
....
He went down on me, his mouth inside and outside my vagina,
and then started doing the dirty deed, his penis inside my vagina[.]
He heard someone walking down the hall and said, “Hurry up
and put on your clothes.” He kept saying [] I better not tell because he
would lose his baby and if anyone found out he would go to jail.
....
He said, “You better not tell your mom.” I had an hour of sleep.
I woke up, called my mom, and told her to come get me. She asked if
he had tried to touch me; and I said yes, he did.
My mom asked me because my sister who is six doesn’t want to
go over there anymore, and my mom thinks my uncle’s boy who is 10
touched me.
After the sexual assault exam of M.W., the SANE noted in her report that
there was no trauma to M.W.’s sexual organs, but that M.W. had a bruise on her
right breast that the SANE believed was recent based on its coloring. The sexual
8
assault exam report and photographs of M.W.’s bruise taken the day of the exam
were admitted into evidence.
Detective Stephen Clappart, the chief investigator for the Harris County
District Attorney’s Office, testified that he observed via closed circuit television the
forensic interview of M.W. at Bridgehaven. Detective Clappart testified that he
noted in his report that the account of events that M.W. gave to the SANE examiner
was slightly different from what she gave to the Bridgehaven examiner in that she
reported to one of the examiners that Haggard had pulled her into the bedroom but
she did not report that to the other examiner. According to Detective Clappart, he
obtained buccal swabs from Haggard.
Jessica Lake, a forensic scientist at the Texas Department of Public Safety
crime lab, testified that she performed serology testing on evidence she had received
for the case. According to Lake, M.W.’s vaginal and anal swabs from the sexual
assault kit tested negative for the presence of semen and sperm, and that panties, bra,
a sports bra, and a shirt allegedly worn by M.W. on the day of the alleged sexual
assault also tested negative for the presence of semen. Lake’s Forensic Biology
Laboratory Report was admitted into evidence.
Andrea Smith, a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public Safety
crime laboratory, testified that she works on the same team as Lake and completed
9
DNA testing in the case. Smith testified that the DNA profile from the vaginal swab
was consistent with M.W. Smith tested the swab of M.W.’s right breast and
concluded that M.W. and Haggard could not be excluded as contributors to the
profile. According to Smith, under DNA Minifiler testing of the swab of M.W.’s
right breast, the DNA profile “is 339 billion times more likely if the DNA came from
[M.W.] and James Haggard than if the DNA came from [M.W.] and one unrelated
unknown individual.” Smith testified that using newer and more advanced testing
with STRmix probabilistic genotyping software, the profile obtained from the swab
is “219 quadrillion times more likely if the DNA came from [M.W.] and James
Haggard than if the DNA came from [M.W.] and one unrelated unknown
individual.” Smith’s DNA Laboratory Report, Supplemental DNA Laboratory
Report, and Minifiler Laboratory Report were admitted into evidence.
Testimony via Facebook Live3
In issue one, Haggard argues the trial court erred in permitting the SANE to
testify, over Haggard’s objection, via “Facebook Live” and that he was harmed by
3
On appeal, Appellant refers to the live two-way video streaming capability
as “Facebook Live[,]” but the trial record reflects that the application used for the
SANE’s testimony was “FaceTime[,]” which is “an application that allows
individuals to make video calls from telephones[,]” and “FaceTime may also be run
from other electronic devices.” Perone v. State, No. 14-12-00969-CV, 2014 Tex.
App. LEXIS 4078, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 15, 2014, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (footnotes omitted).
10
such error. The central purpose of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause is
to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it
to rigorous testing in an adversarial proceeding before the trier of fact. Maryland v.
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990). Accordingly, “‘the Confrontation Clause reflects
a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial[.]’” Id. at 849 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980). In the absence of an
actual face-to-face confrontation, a defendant’s right to confront accusatory
witnesses may be satisfied if (1) denial of such confrontation is necessary to further
an important public policy and (2) the reliability of the testimony is otherwise
assured. Id. at 850.
After voir dire but prior to the presentation of evidence, the State made an oral
motion to allow the SANE, as an expert and a fact witness to the extent of what the
sexual assault examination entailed and evidence she gathered incident to the
examination, to testify via “Face Time.” The defense objected under the Sixth
Amendment confrontation clause and the Fifth Amendment due process clause, and
cited Maryland v. Craig, and U.S. v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006) in
support. The trial court went over the FaceTime procedure on the record. The trial
court confirmed that the SANE would be displayed “at least on the 60 or 65-inch TV
that the jury can view[,]” defense counsel and the defendant could see the testimony,
11
the jury would have view of the SANE’s face at all times during her testimony, the
SANE could see the person asking questions, and that the SANE would be given
instructions to “stay[] in front of the camera system . . . which is whatever her device
is[.]”
Prior to the trial court overruling the objection, the trial court, State’s counsel,
and Haggard’s counsel engaged in the following discussion:
THE COURT: Well, I think [Maryland v. Craig] was a situation where
they put the witness behind a screen and asked questions of the witness.
We’re not talking -- I mean that way the jury would be deprived
of viewing the witness’ demeanor or expressions and other indicia of
the reliability or lack of reliability that a face to face confrontation
would otherwise supply.
It’s the court’s understanding that the Sixth Amendment
confrontation clause is designed to ensure the reliability of the evidence
that’s actually received, and the reliability of that evidence has to be
testified through rigorous cross examination.
It’s the court’s opinion that anything that would have the chilling
effect on the right of cross examination would by its very nature be
suspect but --
....
[Defense Counsel]: That case, Maryland versus Craig came up with the
Craig ruling; and then you have Yates in 2006. The reason in Yates, the
Australian witnesses could not testify in Alabama is they were
unwilling to travel.
The government asserted that the important public policy reasons
for allowing them to testify utilizing two-way video conference for
providing the fact-finder with crucial evidence expeditiously and justly
resolving the case in ensuring that foreign witnesses can so testify.
12
The 11th Circuit held that these concerns were not the type of
public policies that are important enough to outweigh the defendant’s
rights to confront their accusers face to face.
My understanding of the Maryland versus Craig, what came out
of that, Judge, was that -- let’s see.
THE COURT: Counsel, I don’t mean to interrupt; but I think what’s
crucial to a determination of the state’s request is the function that this
witness is going to provide in the case.
Now, if we’re talking about a witness that is a fact witness to the
point that that witness will be called upon to make an identification of
the defendant as the alleged perpetrator cross examination face to face
I think is crucial; but here we’re talking about an expert witness that is
not going to be called upon to make any in-court identification or is not
going to be called upon to testify to any of the factual allegations
contained in the indictment.
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, I don’t think the Supreme Court
differentiates between a state’s witness. They have the power to
subpoena a witness or have them come.
She has chosen not to come. There is no public policy that
alleviates what -- I believe even the 9th Circuit says they should be able
to have confrontation face to face. In doing so you will set a precedent
not only in this court but all over, Judge.
The only time I have seen them allow someone not to be present
is because of some type of medical issue or maybe they are out of
Country or something to that or in the military or something to that
effect, but just because they don’t want to come --
THE COURT: I agree with you, counsel; but those were witnesses as
to the operative facts of the case. They were not a witness situated such
as this witness and that is as an expert witness.
Now, who is this witness associated with at the time? A hospital?
[Prosecutor]: Yes, sir. I believe it was part of the Hermann Hospital
group.
13
THE COURT: [T]here is a procedure available to secure the presence
of out of state witnesses.
Now, you represented to the court that at all times this witness
indicated her willingness to accept reimbursement of compensation for
travel expenses and would actually appear in person; is that true?
[Prosecutor]: That is true. I have [someone] that has been in direct
contact with her that can testify to that.
THE COURT: When did this change?
[Prosecutor]: Friday.
THE COURT: Friday being --
[Prosecutor]: Three days ago.
THE COURT: The 11th, and today is August 14th. Obviously[,] you
don’t have time to secure an order from the appropriate court in
Montana to direct the witness to do anything.
[Prosecutor]: Judge, it was 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, between 1:00
and 2:00 when we even found out about it, Judge.
THE COURT: Well, the best authority in Texas is [Stevens v. State, 234
S.W.3d 748 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).] [I]t found that the
decision of the court to allow or not to allow should be examined on an
abuse of discretion standard.
This again constituted a fact witness that appeared by Skype or
some other device similar to what is being proposed here. It went on to
note the salutary effects of face to face confrontation include the giving
of testimony under oath.
I’m assured this will occur in this particular case. We won’t allow
any testimony not to be under oath by a person authorized to administer
oaths. [Also], [t]he opportunity for cross examination.
The court concludes the manner in which it’s being proposed will
not have a chilling effect on the right of cross examination, the ability
of the fact-finder to observe demeanor evidence -- and you assure me
14
that the witness will be instructed to stay in front of a TV that will be
broadcast on a 60 to 65-inch TV for the jury’s consideration -- the
reduced risk that a witness will wrongfully implicate an innocent
defendant when testifying in his presence.
That is not an element in this case because this witness is an
expert witness and will be testifying only to perhaps her training and
then what she did incident to her sexual assault examination, right?
[Prosecutor]: That’s correct.
....
[Prosecutor]: She collected the SANE kit and submitted the SANE kit
to the sheriff’s department to put in the chain of custody to send it to
the DPS lab along with everything else.
....
[Defense Counsel]: Again, Judge, my belief is that this can only happen
with exceptional circumstances that outweigh or public policy that
outweighs my client’s constitutional rights to confront the witness face
to face here in the courtroom.
THE COURT: [I]f this is anything other than an expert witness I think
I would have to agree with you. I think the Texas cases also recognize
that exceptional circumstances must exist to allow.
....
THE COURT: . . . . If [Defense counsel] wants to recall her in his case
in chief, then he cannot be deprived of that opportunity. . . .
....
THE COURT: . . . . Assuming that the manner in which this testimony
will be presented is exactly as represented to the court, that counsel will
have a full opportunity to observe the witness, the witness will be able
to see the questioner be it the state or the defense counsel, that the
15
witness will at all times be in full view for the jury’s consideration as
to demeanor, etc., and that the witness has no personal knowledge of
any facts as alleged in the indictment and only testify as an expert
witness as far as being a SANE examiner and what she did incident to
that examination in identifying anything that she retrieved from the
examination, the court is going to allow the testimony in that manner.
Haggard objected again when the State called the SANE to testify, arguing it
violated due process as contained in the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation,
and the trial court overruled the objection. The trial court further noted that cross-
examination would be available, the witness was in full view, and that that witness
was an expert witness and not a fact witness for identification purposes. The SANE
testified that she chose to not appear at trial, had no medical issue preventing her
from appearing at the trial, and she was not subpoenaed. According to the SANE,
she is a consultant for hospitals and attorneys, and she chose not to attend the trial
for personal and economic reasons because she had travelled to Houston the prior
week to testify in another trial and had to travel back to Houston soon to be with a
family member in hospice care. The SANE explained that she had agreed to appear
and testify and the State did not subpoena her, but the Friday before the trial she
changed her mind.
On appeal, Haggard contends that as to the SANE’s testimony via live
videoconference “there was no important public interest for her to do so, nor was the
reliability of her testimony assured to override Appellant’s right to confront her[,]”
16
and that the testimony contributed to Haggard’s convictions. According to Haggard,
(1) the SANE’s failure to appear was voluntary and the State did not issue a
subpoena, (2) the SANE was given an oath in Montana by a notary public and not
by the clerk of the court or judge in Liberty County, (3) the record does not reflect
that Haggard was moved so that the SANE could see him or that the trial court
instructed the SANE be able to see Haggard, and (4) the jury’s ability to observe the
SANE’s demeanor was impaired when the live videoconference connection was lost
momentarily as the SANE recited what M.W. had reported to her.
Even assuming without deciding that the trial court abused its discretion in
allowing the SANE’s testimony, the violation of the Sixth Amendment right of
confrontation constitutes constitutional error that is subject to a harmless error
analysis. Shelby v. State, 819 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (citing
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986)).
When assessing harm under a Confrontation Clause issue, we apply a three-
pronged test. Id. at 547. First, we assume that the damaging potential of the cross-
examination was fully realized. Id. Second, with that assumption in mind, we review
the error by considering the following factors: the importance of the witness’s
testimony in the State’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence
or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting material points of the
17
witness’s testimony, the extent cross-examination was otherwise permitted, and the
overall strength of the State’s case. Id. Third, we determine whether the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
The SANE was an expert witness who testified about what M.W. reported to
her, the findings from her examination of M.W., and the chain of custody regarding
evidence the SANE obtained. After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that
much of the SANE’s testimony was cumulative of M.W.’s testimony, and the SANE
was not a crucial identification or fact witness. The record demonstrates that the trial
court permitted Haggard to fully cross-examine the SANE. There was evidence
introduced from M.W., L.B., and T.W., as well as from the forensic witnesses that
corroborated the material points of the SANE’s testimony, and the State’s case was
not dependent upon the SANE’s testimony.
M.W.’s testimony alone is sufficient to support Haggard’s convictions. See
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07(b)(1) (West Supp. 2018); Garcia v. State, 563
S.W.2d 925, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (sexual assault of a child); Jones v. State,
428 S.W.3d 163, 169-70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (indecency
with a child). M.W. testified that on October 5, 2013, when she was fifteen years
old, she got in Haggard’s bed with him because she did not want to sleep on the
floor, he showed her pornography, he asked her to take her clothes off, he caused
18
her sexual organ to contact or penetrate his mouth, he contacted or penetrated her
sexual organ without her consent, he penetrated her sex organ with his finger, he
caused her to contact his sex organ, he touched her breast with a part of his body, he
touched her genital with a part of his body, he caused her to touch his genitals, and
he caused her to expose her genitals to him. M.W. testified that Haggard’s actions
were done to make him sexually aroused. Also, the jury heard the testimony of a
forensic scientist that the profile obtained from the swab from M.W.’s breast is “219
quadrillion times more likely if the DNA came from [M.W.] and James Haggard
than if the DNA came from [M.W.] and one unrelated unknown individual.”
Because our review of the record shows that the properly admitted evidence
overwhelmingly established Haggard’s guilt, we conclude, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the admission of the SANE’s testimony via live videoconferencing did
not contribute to Haggard’s convictions. We overrule issue one.
“T’s” Presence During M.W.’s Testimony
In issue two, Haggard argues that the trial court erred in allowing “T” to stand
behind nineteen-year-old M.W. during her testimony. According to Haggard, M.W.
was an adult at the time of trial and the trial court made no findings pursuant to
article 38.074 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Prior to M.W.’s testimony,
the following exchange occurred outside of the jury’s presence:
19
[Prosecutor]: Judge, pursuant to the code [M.W.]’s requesting that she
be allowed a support person to stand in the courtroom with her. She
was a child victim.
Although she’s an adult now she would like to have T[] stand
behind her.
THE COURT: It will be permitted. All right. We’re going to bring the
jury in. If you will just stand where you are. In a moment I will ask
your name and swear you in.
Section 3(b) of article 38.074, titled “Testimony of Child in Prosecution of
Offense[,]” provides that
“[o]n the motion of any party . . ., the court shall allow the child to have
a toy, blanket, or similar comforting item in the child’s possession while
testifying or allow a support person to be present in close proximity to
the child during the child’s testimony if the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the child cannot reliably testify
without the possession of the item or presence of the support person, as
applicable; and (2) granting the motion is not likely to prejudice the
trier of fact in evaluating the child’s testimony.”
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.074, § 3(b) (West Supp. 2018). Section
1(2) provides that a “‘[s]upport person’ means any person whose presence would
contribute to the welfare and well-being of a child.” Id. § 1(2). Section 1(1) states
that in Article 38.074 “child” has the meaning assigned by section 22.011(c) of the
Penal Code, which defines “child” as “a person younger than 17 years of age.” Id.
§ 1(1); Tex. Penal Code Ann. 22.011(c)(1). Section 3(d) provides that the “court
may set any other conditions and limitations on the taking of the testimony of a child
that it finds just and appropriate, considering the interests of the child, the rights of
20
the defendant, and any other relevant factors.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
38.074, § 3(d). “A support person who is present during a child’s testimony may not:
(1) obscure the child from the view of the defendant or the trier of fact; (2) provide
the child with an answer to any question asked of the child; or (3) assist or influence
the testimony of the child.” Id. § 3(c).
Haggard’s counsel did not object to “T’s” presence nor did Haggard’s counsel
request findings pursuant to article 38.074, section 3(b). Accordingly, his complaint
about “T’s” presence during M.W.’s testimony is not preserved for appellate review.
See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a) (preserving error for appellate review requires the
complaining party to show that he presented his complaint to the trial court in a
timely request, objection, or motion and that the trial court ruled on the request). We
overrule issue two.
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
In issue three, Haggard claims his trial counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to opinion testimony as to M.W.’s credibility and in not objecting to “T’s”
presence behind M.W. during her testimony. Haggard argues these errors deprived
him of a fair trial.
A defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of
counsel at trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
21
685-86 (1984). To establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel,
Haggard must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694. The party alleging ineffective assistance has the
burden to develop facts and details necessary to support the claim. See Jackson v.
State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). A party asserting an ineffective-
assistance claim must overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” See Thompson v. State,
9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). An
appellant’s failure to make either of the required showings of deficient performance
or sufficient prejudice defeats the claim of ineffective assistance. Rylander v. State,
101 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); see also Williams v. State, 301 S.W.3d
675, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“An appellant’s failure to satisfy one prong of the
Strickland test negates a court’s need to consider the other prong.”).
The right to effective assistance of counsel ensures the right to “reasonably
effective assistance[,]” and it does not require that counsel must be perfect or that
the representation must be errorless. See Ingham v. State, 679 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984). The appropriate context is the totality of the representation;
22
counsel is not to be judged on isolated portions of his representation. See Thompson,
9 S.W.3d at 813; Solis v. State, 792 S.W.2d 95, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Isolated
failures to object to improper evidence or argument ordinarily do not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Ingham, 679 S.W.2d at 509; Ewing v. State,
549 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). To meet his burden regarding his
claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to evidence, Appellant
must also establish that the trial court would have committed error in overruling such
objection had an objection been made. See Vaughn v. State, 931 S.W.2d 564, 566
(Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
Ordinarily, on direct appeal, the record will not have been sufficiently
developed during the trial to demonstrate in the appeal that trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance under the Strickland standards. Menefield v. State, 363 S.W.3d
591, 592-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Before we denounce trial counsel’s actions as
ineffective, counsel should normally be given an opportunity to explain the
challenged actions. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005). When counsel has not been given an opportunity to explain the challenged
actions, we will only find deficient performance if the conduct was “‘so outrageous
that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.’” Id. (internal citations
omitted).
23
Haggard asserts that trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the
State’s questioning of T.W. regarding whether she believed what M.W. told her
about the incident. According to Haggard, there is no objectively reasonable reason
for not objecting to the question as the testimony decides a critical issue for the jury,
the credibility and truthfulness of the complainant, and that the trial court would
have erred if it had overruled the objection had counsel objected. Haggard also
argues that an objectively reasonable trial attorney would have objected to M.W.
having a support person (“T”) present during M.W.’s testimony because section
38.074 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure does not permit a person testifying
at age nineteen to have a support person present during her testimony. As to both
instances, Haggard argues that the jury used the evidence as proof of Haggard’s guilt
or to find M.W.’s testimony more credible, and therefore, there is a reasonable
probability that, but for these deficiencies, the result of the trial would have been
different.
As to trial counsel’s failure to object to the State’s questioning of T.W.
regarding whether she believed M.W.’s account of the incident, counsel’s trial
strategy could have been to permit the State to predicate its case on M.W.’s
credibility and then undermine M.W.’s credibility by cross-examining M.W., T.W.,
and L.B. regarding the details given by M.W. in her accounts of the incident. The
24
record before us does not support Haggard’s contention that no reasonable trial
strategy could have existed for his counsel’s failure to object to the questioning of
T.W. regarding whether she believed M.W. Based on the record before us, Haggard
has failed to overcome the “strong presumption” that his trial counsel provided
reasonably professional assistance by not objecting to this question by the State. See
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Furthermore,
Haggard has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s failure to object to the State’s question, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The jury heard M.W.’s own
testimony, saw photographs of M.W. after the incident, and heard testimony by a
forensic scientist of the likelihood that Haggard was a contributor to the DNA swab
of M.W.’s right breast. A reasonable jury could have found Haggard guilty even if
it had not heard T.W.’s testimony that she believed M.W.
Even assuming without deciding that the trial court would have sustained an
objection by Haggard’s trial counsel to “T’s” presence during M.W.’s testimony and
that “T’s” presence was error, Haggard has not met his burden to demonstrate that
the result would have been different if the presence of “T” as a “support person” had
not been allowed. See id. at 687-88, 694. Haggard does not argue that “T” in any
way influenced M.W.’s testimony, and Haggard’s claim that the jury found M.W.
25
more credible due to the presence of “T” is purely speculative. We overrule issue
three.
Jury Charge Error
In issues four and five, Haggard contends the trial court erred because the jury
charge in each count allowed for a non-unanimous verdict and, as a result, Haggard
suffered egregious harm.
As to Count I, Haggard asserts the State’s indictment alleged four separate
and distinct offenses, the jury was not instructed that it cannot return a guilty verdict
unless it unanimously agrees upon the commission of any one of the criminal acts,
and the unanimity requirement is undercut when a jury risks convicting the
defendant of different acts instead of agreeing on the same act for a conviction. The
jury charge verdict form for Count I asked the jury to find Haggard guilty or not
guilty of “the felony offense of Sexual Assault of a Child as charged in Count I of
the indictment.” The application paragraph of the jury charge as to Count I stated
the following:
You must decide whether the State has proved, beyond a
reasonable doubt, four elements. The elements are that:
1. On or about the 5th day of October, 2013, in Liberty County,
Texas;
2. The defendant . . . did then and there[] intentionally or
knowingly;
3. Cause:
26
a. The sexual organ of [M.W.] to contact or penetrate the
mouth of the defendant, and/or
b. The sexual organ of [M.W.] to contact or penetrate the
sexual organ of the defendant, and/or
c. The penetration of the sexual organ of [M.W.] by
defendant’s finger, and/or
d. The penetration of the sexual organ of [M.W.] by
defendant’s sexual organ;
4. Without the consent of [M.W.], a child younger than 17 years
of age and not the spouse of the defendant.
You must all agree on elements 1, 2, 3, and 4 listed above.
If you all agree the State has proved each of the four elements
listed above, beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant
“guilty.”
If you all agree the State has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, one or more of elements 1, 2, 3, or 4 listed above you must find
the defendant “not guilty.”
Haggard argues that the jury charge as to the sexual assault charge was infirm
because the indictment sought to convict Haggard of sexual assault of a child in one
conviction by proving any of the two offenses alleged within one count, the trial
court instructed the jury in the application paragraph that they could find Haggard
guilty if they believed either of the two offenses, and that the unanimity requirement
is undercut when a jury risks convicting the defendant of different acts instead of
agreeing on the same act for a conviction.
As to Count II, the jury charge verdict form asked the jury to find Haggard
guilty or not guilty of “the felony offense of Indecency with a Child by Sexual
27
Contact as charged in Count II of the indictment.” The application paragraph of the
jury charge as to Count II stated the following:
You must decide whether the State has proved, beyond a
reasonable doubt, four elements. The elements are that:
1. On or about the 5th day of October, 2013, in Liberty County,
Texas;
2. The defendant . . . did then and there[] with the intent to
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of said defendant;
3. Engage in sexual contact with [M.W.] by:
a. Touching the breast of [M.W.], and/or
b. Touching the genitals of [M.W.], and/or
c. Causing the said [M.W.] to touch the genitals of the
defendant, and/or
d. Causing [M.W.] to expose her genitals;
4. [M.W.] was a child younger than 17 years of age and not the
spouse of the defendant.
You must all agree on elements 1, 2, 3, and 4 listed above.
If you all agree the State has proved each of the four elements
listed above, beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant
“guilty.”
If you all agree the State has failed to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, one or more of elements 1, 2, 3, or 4 listed above you must find
the defendant “not guilty.”
Under Texas law, jury unanimity is required in all criminal cases. Jourdan v.
State, 428 S.W.3d 86, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A jury must reach a unanimous
verdict about a specific felony that the defendant committed, meaning the jury must
agree upon “a single and discrete incident that would constitute the commission of
the offense alleged.” See Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (quoting Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
28
While jury unanimity generally is not required on the alternate modes or means of
commission, the jurors must all agree “that the defendant committed the same,
single, specific criminal act.” See Jourdan, 428 S.W.3d at 94; Ngo v. State, 175
S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
A defendant may choose to require the State to elect a specific criminal act
that it relies upon for conviction. See Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 775. Even if the
defendant does not require an election, “guaranteeing unanimity is ultimately the
responsibility of the trial judge[,]” and “[t]he trial judge is therefore obligated to
submit a charge that does not allow for the possibility of a non-unanimous verdict.”
Id. at 776.
Haggard argues that the jury could have relied on separate acts of criminal
conduct, which constituted different offenses or separate units of prosecution, and
the jury instructions in the application paragraph for Count I and Count II that the
jurors must all agree that the State has proved each of the four elements beyond a
reasonable doubt did not rectify the error.
That said, Haggard also concedes that for both Counts I and II his trial counsel
did not object to the charge and did not request the State to make an election as to
which acts they were proceeding on for conviction. Reversal for an unobjected-to
erroneous jury instruction is proper only if the error caused actual, egregious harm
29
to the appellant, not merely theoretical harm. Arrington v. State, 451 S.W.3d 834,
840 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985) (op. on reh’g). Actual egregious harm is established if the jury charge
affected the very basis of the case, deprived the defendant of a valuable right, or
vitally affected a defensive theory. Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 840; Almanza, 686
S.W.2d at 172. This analysis is fact-specific and is done on a case-by-case basis.
Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 840 (citing Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d 703, 710 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013)). When assessing harm based on the particular facts of the case,
we consider (1) the entire jury charge, (2) the state of the evidence, including
contested issues and the weight of the probative evidence, (3) the parties’ arguments,
and (4) all other relevant information in the record. See id. (citing Almanza, 686
S.W.2d at 171). An appellate court will “inquire about the likelihood that the jury
would in fact have reached a non-unanimous verdict on the facts of the particular
case.” Jourdan, 428 S.W.3d at 98.
Assuming without deciding that the jury charge permitted non-unanimous
verdicts on the evidence presented in the case, neither the parties nor the trial judge
compounded the alleged error by telling the jury that it did not have to be unanimous
regarding the specific instances of criminal conduct in rendering its verdicts. The
record indicates that M.W. testified that during the incident Haggard committed all
30
the separate acts of criminal conduct alleged in the application paragraphs for Counts
I and II and as alleged in the indictment, and Haggard’s defense was that M.W. was
not credible. The jury was not persuaded that he did not commit the offenses or that
there was any reasonable doubt. On this record, it is logical to infer that the jury
unanimously agreed that Haggard committed all the separate instances of criminal
conduct alleged in Counts I and II during the incident. See Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at
777-78. We conclude that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that any error
regarding unanimity caused actual egregious harm to Appellant. See Arrington, 451
S.W.3d at 845. We overrule issues four and five.
Punishment
In issue six, Haggard argues his punishment in Count II is void. Specifically,
Haggard asserts that his twenty-five-year sentence for indecency with a child
exceeds the maximum allowed by the Legislature. Despite Haggard’s contention on
appeal otherwise, the jury charge for Count II tasked the jury with finding Haggard
not guilty or guilty of the felony offense of Indecency with a Child by Sexual Contact
as charged in Count II of the indictment but did not task the jury to find Haggard not
guilty or guilty of the offense of Indecency with a Child by Exposure. Haggard did
not object to the jury charge. As to Count II, the jury found Haggard guilty of
indecency with a child by contact. Haggard stipulated that he was the same person
31
convicted in the punishment enhancement allegations, and the trial court assessed
punishment at twenty-five years in prison to run consecutively with the sentence in
Count I. The twenty-five-year sentence was within the statutory range. See Tex.
Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32 (West 2019) (first-degree-felony punishment range is
imprisonment for life or for any term not more than 99 years or less than 5 years),
12.42(b) (West 2019) (enhancement of second-degree felony to first-degree felony
if defendant has previous felony conviction), 21.11(d) (offense of indecency with a
child by contact is a second-degree felony). We overrule issue six.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In issue seven, Haggard challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the convictions in Count I and Count II. According to Haggard, M.W.’s testimony
was not credible, and she was impeached with prior statements as to the details of
the alleged offenses.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the
State proved the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, we apply the
Jackson v. Virginia standard. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894-95 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Under that
standard, a reviewing court must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable
to the verdict and determine whether a rational justification exists for the jury’s
32
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 902; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319. “A jury may accept one version of the facts and reject another, and it may reject
any part of a witness’s testimony.” Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2018). As the trier of fact, the jury is the sole judge of the weight and credibility
of the witnesses’ testimony, and on appeal we must give deference to the jury’s
determinations. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899, 905-06. If the record contains
conflicting inferences, we must presume the jury resolved such facts in favor of the
verdict and defer to that resolution. Id. at 899 n.13 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326).
On appeal, we serve only to ensure the jury reached a rational verdict, and we may
not substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556,
562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In our review, we consider both direct and
circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
evidence. Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Hooper
v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In indecency and sexual assault
cases involving a child, the testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support
a conviction. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07(b)(1); Garcia, 563 S.W.2d
at 928 (sexual assault of a child); Jones, 428 S.W.3d at 169-70 (indecency with a
child). The State has no burden to produce any corroborating or physical evidence.
Martines v. State, 371 S.W.3d 232, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no
33
pet.). The appellate court views the sufficiency of the evidence against a
hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
A person commits the offense of sexual assault of a child if the person
knowingly (1) causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any
means; (2) causes the penetration of the mouth of a child by the sexual organ of the
actor; (3) causes the sexual organ of a child to contact or penetrate the mouth, anus,
or sexual organ of another person, including the actor; (4) causes the anus of a child
to contact the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor; or
(5) causes the mouth of a child to contact the anus or sexual organ of another person,
including the actor. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(2). “‘Child’” means a
person younger than 17 years of age.” Id. § 22.011(c)(1).
To establish the offense of indecency with a child by contact, the State had to
prove that Appellant engaged in sexual contact with M.W., a child younger than
seventeen years of age. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(1). Section 21.11’s
definition of “sexual contact” includes acts, if committed with the intent to arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person, of “any touching by a person, including
touching through clothing, of the . . . breast . . . of a child[.]” See id. § 21.11(c)(1).
34
M.W. testified that on October 5, 2013, when she was fifteen years old,
Haggard caused her sexual organ to contact or penetrate his mouth, he contacted or
penetrated her sexual organ without her consent, he penetrated her sex organ with
his finger, he caused her to contact his sex organ, he touched her breast with a part
of his body, he touched her genitals with a part of his body, he caused her to touch
his genitals, and he caused her to expose her genitals to him. M.W. testified that
Haggard’s actions were done to make him sexually aroused. M.W.’s testimony alone
was sufficient to support the convictions. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
38.07(b)(1); Garcia, 563 S.W.2d at 928 (sexual assault of a child); Jones, 428
S.W.3d at 169-70 (indecency with a child). The jury also heard Smith’s expert
testimony that using newer and more advanced testing with STRmix probabilistic
genotyping software, the profile obtained from the swab from M.W.’s breast is “219
quadrillion times more likely if the DNA came from [M.W.] and James Haggard
than if the DNA came from [M.W.] and one unrelated unknown individual.”
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we
conclude that a rational jury could have found the essential elements of the charged
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The jury was the
exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be
given their testimony, and could have found M.W.’s testimony, as well as testimony
35
of other witnesses credible and resolved any conflicting evidence in favor of the
verdict. See id.; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
art. 38.07. We overrule Haggard’s challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence.
Having overruled all of Haggard’s appellate issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgments.
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on April 17, 2019
Opinion Delivered May 29, 2019
Do Not Publish
Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.
36