Donald Corey Hill v. State

Opinion issued February 4, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-14-00977-CR
———————————
DONALD COREY HILL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 240th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 05-DCR-043338
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Donald Corey Hill appeals the trial court’s judgment revoking his
community supervision and sentencing him to six years’ confinement. In his sole
issue, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking
community supervision and adjudicating him guilty because the State failed to
prove he violated the conditions of his community supervision.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In October 2007, appellant pleaded guilty to the second degree felony
offense of Attempted Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child. The trial court
deferred adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on 10 years’ community
supervision. The court attached numerous conditions to appellant’s deferred
adjudication.
In October 2008, appellant’s Community Corrections Office filed a Motion
for Modification of probation’s conditions of probation—which was granted by the
trial court—because “The Defendant repeatedly lies to his community corrections
officer, has missed five sex offender counseling groups, and missed a polygraph on
September 19, 2008.” Accordingly, the officer requested that the conditions of
probation be modified to include:
The Defendant shall remain in home confinement under electronic
monitoring (BI) at the following address, to-wit: “14223
BRUNSWICK POINT LANE, HOUSTON, TEXAS 77047”, under
the supervision of the Fort Bend County Community Supervision
and Corrections Department beginning on October 17. 2008 and to
continue to remain there at all times except for the following
circumstances, to-wit: (1) permission from the Community
Corrections Officer for the purpose of employment and/or
counseling, community service or (2) reporting to the Community
Corrections Officer as arranged;
In September 2008, September 2009, November 2009, November 2010, and
January 2011, the State filed Motions to Adjudicate Guilt on various grounds,
including not timely complying with sex offender registration requirements, failing
to timely complete community service, failing to pay various fees, unexcused
absences from mandated sex offender treatment program, suspension from sex
offender treatment program, prohibited contact with minor children, missing a
scheduled polygraph test, prohibited possession of more than one device with
internet access (including one with videos depicting unauthorized contact with
minor children), violation of curfew at least 45 times, failing to attend, participate
and successfully complete sex offender counseling, missing a scheduled
appointment with his community supervision officer, unauthorized use of Houston
Community College Computer lab, and possession of pornography on an
unauthorized cell phone.
On November 9, 2011, the trial court signed an order entitled “Judgment –
Adjudication of Guilt – Continuation of Deferred Adjudication Granted.” That
order chronicled appellant’s violations and provided: “Defendant will continue on
Deferred Adjudication with additional conditions. (1) 180 days in jail, (2) within
30 days from his release, defendant is to bring current all costs and fees which are
currently in arrears.”
A. The November 2013 Motion to Adjudicate Guilt
Almost two years after appellant was released from his confinement
resulting from the November 2011 order continuing his deferred adjudication, the
State again filed a motion to adjudicate guilt, in November 2013, alleging:
[W]hile the Defendant’s probation was in full force and effect, the
Defendant did violate the terms and conditions of his probation by:
 The Defendant failed to report, in person, to the Fort Bend
County Community Supervision and Corrections Department for the
months of June, July, September and October 2013 and one time in
August 2013;
 The Defendant failed to work faithfully at a suitable employment as
far as possible for the months of June, July, August, September and
October 2013;
 The Defendant failed to pay to the Fort Bend County Community
Supervision and Corrections Department a fee of $60.00 for the
months of March, April, May, June, July, August, September and
October 2013;
 The Defendant failed to pay a fee for alcohol/drug testing to the Fort
Bend County Community Supervision and Corrections Department
within ten (10) days of the giving of a specimen for tests conducted
on April 24, 2013 and May 13, 2013;
 The Defendant failed to attend, participate in, and successfully
complete sex offender counseling at the Center for Healthy Sexuality
Restitution and Responsibility Treatment Program as evidenced by
missing his group on August 23, 2012, September 13, 2012, October
25, 2012, January 10, 2013, February 7, 2013, April 18, 2013, June 4,
2013, June 13, 2013, June 29, 2013, July 5, 2013, July 11, 2013, July
18, 2013, July 25, 2013, August 1, 2013, August 8, 2013, and August
15, 2013, and further evidenced by the Defendant being
unsuccessfully discharged from treatment on August 20, 2013;
 The Defendant failed to be responsible for any costs of the program as
evidenced by being delinquent in the amount of $640.00 for treatment
service fees to The Center for Healthy Sexuality Restitution and
Responsibility Treatment Program;
 The Defendant failed to attend, participate in, and successfully
complete a sex offender treatment program with a Registered Sex
Offender Counselor approved by his Community Corrections Officer,
as evidenced by being unsuccessfully discharged from The Center for
Healthy Sexuality Restitution and Responsibility Treatment Program
on August20, 2013 due to excessive absences;
 The Defendant [failed to] pay a Sex Offender Supervision Fee of
$5.00 per month through the Community Supervision and Corrections
Department for the months of March, April, May, June, July, August,
September and October 2013.
B. The November 2014 Hearing
A hearing was held on the motion to adjudicate, at which several witnesses
testified for both the State and appellant.
1. State’s case
Timothy Olier, appellant’s community supervision officer, testified that he
assumed supervision of appellant’s case in February 2013. Olier testified that a
condition of appellant’s supervision was that he report to Olier in person twice
each month, and that—in violation of that requirement—appellant failed to report
at all in June, July, September, and October of 2013, and missed one of his two
visits in August 2013.
Olier also testified that appellant told him that he was employed by Federal
Express, but that, upon verification, Federal Express sent written documentation in
October 2013 that appellant had never been an employee. To Olier’s knowledge,
appellant was unemployed in June, July, August, September, and October 2013,
which was a violation of the probation requirement that appellant maintain suitable
employment. Lying and misleading Olier about his employment was an additional
violation of the appellant’s probation conditions.
Olier next testified that appellant failed to pay his required probation fees for
March, April, May, June, July, August, September, and October 2013; appellant
also failed to pay for the drug tests conducted April 24, 2013 and May 13, 2013,
which also violated his probation conditions.
When Olier took over appellant’s case, he learned that appellant had missed
some of his required sex offender therapy previously, and then—after Olier took
over his case in February 2013—appellant missed additional therapy sessions in
violation of the conditions of his probation. Specifically, appellant missed sessions
on August 23, 2012, September 13, 2012, October 25, 2012, January 10, 2012,
Februray 7, 2013, April 18, 2013, June 6, 2013, June 13, 2013, June 20, 2013, July
5, 2013, July 11, 2013, July 18, 2013, July 25, 2013, August 1, 2013, August 8,
2013, and August 15, 2013. These absences led to appellant’s discharge from the
program as unsuccessful on August 20, 2013, which was an additional violation of
his probation conditions.
In addition, Olier testified that—in violation of appellant’s probation
conditions—appellant was delinquent $640 in treatment fees for sex offender
counseling and, he did not pay his $5 sex offender supervision fee in March, April,
May, June, July, August, September, or October of 2013.
At the end of May 2013, appellant contacted Olier and told him that he was
ill and in the hospital. Olier told him that he needed to provide documentation of
that hospitalization and contact Olier upon release. Appellant provided a
document that, in Olier’s opinion, did not appear to be legitimate. It stated that
appellant had leukemia, but was not signed by the doctor that supposedly
submitted it. Appellant did not provide any additional medical records or
documentation.
In July 2013, appellant called and reported to Olier that he was in the
hospital with a broken hip and, in August 2013, he called Olier to report that he
was in the hospital awaiting a kidney transplant from his girlfriend. Olier asked for
documentation. Appellant told him that the hospital would fax documentation
about the cancer and broken hip, but Olier never received any such fax. In August
2013, appellant told Olier that his girlfriend had gotten copies of the medical
information and would bring the documents to Olier that day, but she never
showed.
On August 22, 3013, appellant reported to Olier’s office in person, and had
no outward apparent physical signs of medical problems. In Olier’s opinion,
appellant looked perfectly healthy.
In September 2013, when appellant again failed to report to Olier’s office,
Olier searched the Internet and found pictures appellant had posted of his recent
wedding and a narrative of his life with his new wife.
Finally, Olier testified that his department’s goal is to ultimately assist
people in completing their supervision. The department addresses noncompliance
issues and tries to direct probationers to get them back on track. If delinquency in
fines are an issue, the department will work out a payment plan. If there is a
medical condition, the department will work with a probationer, but will require
proper and complete documentation. Olier stated that he attempted to assist
appellant in succeeding, but that appellant did not cooperate or do anything to
demonstrate that he is interested or trying to come into compliance with the terms
of his supervision. Olier did not believe that appellant was truthful with him
through much of his time under supervision.
Kim Cabrera, a community corrections officer, testified that she is the court
liaison officer for the trial court. One of her job duties is to ensure that defendants
placed on deferred adjudication receive a copy of—and understand—the judgment
and the applicable conditions and requirements before they leave the courtroom.
She also testified that once a defendant meets with their probation officer, which
usually happens the week after the court’s judgment is signed, the defendant is
again explained all the conditions and requirements, and the defendant’s
background information is collected.
Cabrera explained all of the conditions to appellant when he was first placed
on deferred adjudication, and again when the State filed several times to adjudicate
guilt based on violations of those conditions. She testified that appellant was given
many opportunities to successfully comply with probation conditions. She said
that on the one hand, appellant was always respectful in person, but that he would
not follow through with things that he said he would do. Appellant’s mother was
very negative about her son’s probation, and did not respond to the department’s
request for her to help appellant become compliant. Cabrera has only two medical
records in her file related to appellant—the form referencing leukemia, and
hospital discharge paperwork from April 2013. Her department was unable to
determine the legitimacy of the first form, as appellant did not give the department
permission to independently seek his medical records.
Cabrera said that during the pendency of the current motion to adjudicate,
appellant has not made any effort to come into compliance with the conditions of
his probation.
2. Appellant’s case
Appellant’s mother, Sylvia Hill, testified that appellant currently works as a
manager at Capp Electric. As a young child, appellant was diagnosed with
parvovirus, which they later learned—when appellant was 9 years’ old—was
actually acute anemia. Over the years, the diagnosis was never clear, but he had
on-and-off problems that were associated with either leukemia, sickle-cell, or
anemia.
She testified that, in appellant’s early 20s, after he was on probation, he
started having more health problems, but it was never clear what was wrong.
According to Hill, appellant suffered headaches, vomiting, and had a blood
transfusion. In May or June of 2013, appellant was told that the symptoms were a
part of having leukemia, or that he could “possibly” have such a cancer. She
conceded that he was never actually diagnosed with cancer. But appellant could
not work, was fatigued and, with another hospitalization, he was told he had
immunodeficiency syndrome.
She testified that appellant felt too bad to do many of his probation visits,
but that he could not go to the doctor because he lacked insurance coverage. She
opined that despite missing probation visits, sex offender counseling, and getting
behind on payments, appellant did the best he could to comply with his
probationary terms, given the circumstances.
She further opined that medical reasons were the only reason that appellant
did not successfully complete his probation conditions. In addition to the blood
and immune system issues, he was diagnosed with pneumonia in April of 2013,
and then had an allergic reaction to the medication. She testified that appellant
hurt his hip, but did not break it, playing in July 2013, which prevented him from
complying with his probation requirements. Then, in August, acute anemia was in
appellant’s blood that could impact his kidneys, so he had a series of blood
transfusions.
Finally, Hill testified that appellant’s health had improved since the motion
to adjudicate guilt was filed because medications were helping, and that he could,
given one more chance, comply with all his probation terms. Also, because he is
now employed, he can pay for the transfusions he needs to feel better. She testified
that while she had medical records from when appellant was a young child, she did
not have any documentation about his recent medical issues or treatments.
Katrina Hill, appellant’s wife, next testified about the health problems she
has known him to have since 2009, the year they met. She testified that appellant’s
medical problems often prevented him from complying with his probation
requirements. She claimed he has been in the hospital too many times for her to
count, and he was regularly ill and in great pain. Sometimes transfusions helped,
sometimes they did not.
Finally, Katrina testified that appellant’s health has been better since the
motion to adjudicate guilt was filed, and he is able to work and has insurance. She
believes he just needs one more chance to get everything done.
On cross-examination, she conceded that appellant had insurance from
August 2013 to October 2014—so he had access to the medications and care that
made him better—but he did not make any attempts to get into compliance with his
probation. Katrina did not have any of appellant’s medical records to provide.
Larry Hill, appellant’s father, testified about appellant’s medical problems as
a child. He explained that blood transfusions were paid for by his insurance
through dependent care until appellant reached the age he could no longer be
covered. After that, they relied upon the emergency room.
Larry produced medical records for appellant from August 2014, reflecting
that appellant had multiple blood transfusions. These were admitted into evidence,
as well as other medical records Larry produced from appellant’s childhood
medical care.
He testified that it was appellant’s medical problems that prevented him
from complying with his probation conditions. He conceded that appellant was
actually not diagnosed with cancer (even though at one point doctors had not ruled
that out), and that appellant had not broken his hip or had a kidney transplant.
Rather, appellant suffered a hip injury and needed a blood transfusion to eliminate
the possibility of kidney complications. Larry testified that he did not have any of
appellant’s medical records from 2013.
Appellant testified on his own behalf. He explained that since starting his
job in August 2014, he has insurance and can afford transfusions that make him
feel better. After he served his 180 days in jail on the last motion to adjudicate
guilt, he committed to try his best to complete his probation.
In 2010, appellant began to get sick again and started receiving blood
transfusions. In 2013, he was cut off from his father’s insurance coverage, and at
that time he was diagnosed with immunodeficiency syndrome. One symptom he
suffered regularly was debilitating migraine headaches.
Appellant testified that he had pneumonia and an allergic reaction around
April 2013. And then, in May or June or 2013, he was diagnosed with leukemia
after he had a bout with the flu. He could not always report to his probation officer
because he was sick, exhausted, and in pain. He claimed though, that he stayed in
touch with Olier, his probation officer at the time, who told him to just call when
he was feeling better. With his weakness and pain, he thought he had a broken hip
in August of 2013. Appellant testified that he told Olier in August 2013 that he
had kidney stones, and that he needed blood transfusions. He denied telling Olier
that he needed a kidney transplant.
Appellant also claimed that his health issues prevented him from working.
He testified that he did everything to the best of his ability to make his probation
work, but he was physically unable to comply with the probation requirements for
the months of June, July, September, and October of 2013.
In August 2013, around the time the motion to adjudicate was filed, his
health started improving and he got a job and insurance. Appellant testified that,
as the date of the hearing in November 2014, nothing would currently keep him
from successfully complying with his last three years of probation. Given the
chance, he testified that he would start by paying his fees, keeping regular doctors’
appointments to stay healthy, and continuing at his job. He also claimed that he
would do the required sex offender counseling and complete the mandated
program.
On cross examination, appellant conceded that he had not paid any probation
fees since his release from custody, despite having had a job the last two months.
His plan instead was to save up over a period of time a lump sum to get current.
Appellant claimed that Olier was untruthful on the stand about several
things. He disputed Olier’s testimony that appellant had not stayed in contact with
him while he was sick, and he disputed Olier’s testimony that appellant told him he
had a kidney transplant.
Appellant also conceded that he was not sick during January, February,
March, April, and May of 2013. He claims he did his best to comply during that
period. He also conceded that he was physically able to do all his probation in
August, September, and October of 2012. Appellant disputed the accuracy of his
wife’s testimony that for the year before the hearing, appellant had access to
insurance and had been medically okay. He also disputed Cabrera’s testimony that
he had not made attempts to get into compliance with his probation terms in the
past year.
Appellant testified that, contrary to Olier’s testimony, every time appellant
was released from a hospital stay, he provided documentary proof to Olier. Olier’s
testimony to the opposite, according to appellant, was untruthful. Appellant claims
to have provided to Olier much more than the two documents Olier acknowledged
receiving. Appellant also told the court that he did not have any medical
documents reflecting his care or hospitalizations from 2013, but that his lawyer had
copies of those records. Other than the limited records produced by his father, no
medical records were introduced by appellant.
C. The Judgment
After closing arguments, the trial court announced that it was granting the
State’s motion to adjudicate guilt, acknowledging that appellant had been sick over
time, but nonetheless faulting him for failing to comply with the probation
conditions he was capable of performing and for failing to take advantage of
opportunities to communicate to the probation department and document illnesses.
The court announced a sentence of six years’ confinement with credit for time
served.
The trial court’s November 6, 2014 judgment found the following alleged
probation violations true:
 The defendant failed to report, in person, to the Fort Bend County
Community Supervision and Corrections Department for the months
of June, July, September, and October 2013 and one time in August
2013;
 The defendant failed to work faithfully at a suitable employment for
the months of June, July, August, September and October 2013;
 The defendant failed to pay to the Fort Bend County
Community Supervision and Corrections Department a fee of $60
00 for the months of March, April. May, June, July, August,
September and October 2013;
 The defendant failed to pay a fee for drug/ alcohol test within 10 days
of giving the specimen for tests conducted on April 24, 2013, and
May 13, 2013;
 The defendant failed to attend, participate in, and successfully
complete in sex offender counseling at the Center for Healthy
Sexuality Restitution and Responsibility Treatment Program as
evidenced by missing his group on August 23, 2012; September 13,
2012; October 25, 2012; January 10, 2013; February 7, 2013; April18,
2013; June 4, 2013; June 29, 2013; July 5, 2013; July 11, 2013; July
18, 2013; July 25, 2013; August 1, 2013; August 8, 2013 and August
15, 2013, and further evidenced by the defendant being unsuccessfully
discharged from treatment on August 20, 2013.
 The defendant failed to be responsible for any costs of the program as
evidenced by being delinquent in the amount of $648.88 for
treatment service fees to the Center of Healthy Sexuality Restitution
and Responsibility Treatment Program;
 The defendant failed to attend, participate in, and successfully
complete a sex offender treatment program with a Registered Sex
Offender Counselor approved by his Community Corrects Office, and
evidenced by being unsuccessfully discharged from The Center for
Healthy Sexuality Restitution and Responsibility Treatment Program
on August 20, 2013 due to excessive absences;
 The defendant failed to pay a Sex Offender Supervision Fee of $5.00
per month through the Community Supervision and Corrections
Department for the months of March, April, May, June, July, August,
September and October 2013.
Appellant timely appealed.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
In his sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by revoking his community supervision because the State failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence the six allegations that the trial court found to be
true.
A. Standard of Review
The trial court’s decision on a motion for adjudication of guilt and to revoke
deferred adjudication community supervision is reviewable in the same revocation
of ordinary community supervision. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 §
5(b) (West Supp. 2011). We review an order revoking community supervision for
abuse of discretion. Akbar v. State, 190 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); see Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984). The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
person on community supervision violated a term of his supervision. Rickels v.
State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763–64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When the sufficiency of
the evidence is challenged, the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the
trial court’s findings. See Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1981). The State meets it burden when the “greater weight of the
credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that the defendant violated a condition
of his community supervision.” Akbar, 190 S.W.3d at 123. “When a trial court
finds several violations of community-supervision conditions, we will affirm the
order revoking community supervision if the proof of any single allegation is
sufficient.” Shah v. State, 403 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2012, pet. ref’d); see also Marcum v, State, 983 S.W.2d 762, 766–67 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (recognizing that the State only need prove
one violation of a condition of probation and that the failure of a defendant to
report to his community supervision officer as instructed on one occasion is
sufficient grounds for adjudication of guilt).
B. Failure to Report
Appellant argues that the requirements\ that he report to his probation officer
was unconstitutionally vague. Specifically, he argues that his right to due process
was violated by the trial court adjudicating his guilt for violation of this allegedly
vague condition:
D. Report, in person, to the Fort Bend County Community
Supervision and Corrections Department during the normal working
hours of said department, and on today’s date and on the same date of
each month thereafter unless a different date, within one calendar
month is agreed to by yourself and your Community Corrections
Officer; and obey all the rules and regulations of the Fort Bend
County Community Supervision and Corrections Department;
Appellant cites several cases finding revocation of probation for failure to
report to a community supervision officer to be an abuse of discretion because
there was insufficient evidence about when and where the appellants in those cases
were required to report. E.g., Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984) (reversing revocation of probation for failure to the Houston Regional
Council on Alcoholism because the undisputed evidence showed appellant was
unable to get information about where or when to attend, despite his repeated
efforts); Cotton v. State, 472 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (“With
regard to the failure to report to the probation department as directed, there is no
evidence in the record as to when appellant was to report. Therefore, we conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking probation on this ground.”);
Harris v. State, 608 S.W.2d 229, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. [panel op.] 1980) (“The
order to revoke probation for violation of this condition cannot be sustained
because this condition [stating only “report to probation officer as required”] is so
vague and indefinite that it cannot be enforced; it does not inform the probationer
with sufficient certainty of what he is to do.”).
The State responds that (1) this argument was waived because it was not
raised at the time of sentencing to preserve this argument, and (2) the reporting
conditions were not vague.
Generally, a condition of probation cannot be challenged for the first time on
appeal when no objection is made in the trial court. Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530,
532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Roberts v. State, No. 12-01-00175-CR, 2002 WL
480608, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler March 28, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op.; not
designated for publication). But see Dansby v. State, 448 S.W.3d 441, 449–50
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (when community supervision conditions do not put
defendant on sufficient notice that he is waiving certain rights, complaint about
condition may be raised for the first time on appeal).
We need not address the State’s waiver argument because we agree with the
State that the reporting condition was not unconstitutionally vague. Unlike the
cases relied upon by appellant, the reporting condition here is more specific and
similar to those that have been grounds for revocation of probation in other cases.
For example, in Stephens v. State, one of appellant’s community service
conditions was to:
Report immediately in person on November 16, 1992 to the Harris
County Adult Probation Department Intake Division, 49 San Jacinto
Street, Houston, Texas and thereafter on the 16th of each month to
your designated Probation Officer unless different dates within a
calendar month are agreed to by you and your Probation Officer.
983 S.W.2d 27, 29 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). The appellant
in that case argued that there was insufficient evidence that he violated this
condition. Unlike the cases appellant cites, but similar to this case, the appellant
Stephens did not claim that he did not understand the requirements to report:
The conditions of his probation required that he report in person each
month as indicated or as agreed to with his probation officer.
Stephens’ probation officer testified that he told Stephens he could
pick the day he reported each month, but that he must report each
month. In addition, the record shows that Stephens was fully aware of
this requirement. Stephens also testified that his failure to appear was
because he did not abide by his agreement to appear. He was not
acting under a mistaken belief that he did not have to report in person
each month.
Id. at 29–30. Likewise, here, appellant never claimed during the revocation
hearing that he did not understand the reporting requirement; instead, he gave
excuses about why he missed the appointments. The language and facts of the
cases cited by appellant are inapposite.
Rather than claim he did not know when he was to report, in appellant’s
brief, he claims that “the evidence offered sufficient to satisfy the community
corrections officer that he was ill and unable to report at times.” But the trier of
fact is the sole judge of credibility in a probation revocation proceeding, Lopez v.
State, 46 S.W.3d 476, 482 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d), and Olier
testified that appellant did not provide him with the requested medical
documentation that would have excused each of his absences.
Because the evidence demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
appellant knowingly failed “to report, in person, to the Fort Bend County
Community Supervision and Corrections Department” on more than one occasion,
the evidence is sufficient to support revocation of appellant’s community
supervision.
C. Other grounds
The trial court also cited numerous other grounds for revocation of
appellant’s probation, including failure to maintain suitable employment, failure to
pay various fees, and failure to participate in and successfully complete a sex
offender treatment program. Appellant claims that the evidence shows that he was
unable, rather than unwilling, to pay various fees. But defendant himself testified
that, although he was employed, he had not made any payments towards his
delinquent fees and that he instead made the decision to not make any payments
under he saved up “for a lump sum to get current.” Thus, the evidence does not
support appellant’s contention that he was “unable, not unwilling, to pay.”
Appellant’s brief does not address at all the trial court’s findings related to
his failure to participate in, or complete, his court-ordered sex offender treatment
program. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). For all of
these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
adjudicating appellant’s guilt and finding that appellant violated at least one
condition of his community supervision. See, e,g., Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d
869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (“There is one sufficient ground for revocation,
the failure to report, and we do not need to address the other contentions raised
since the one probation violation will support the court’s order to revoke
probation.”).
We overrule appellant’s single point of error.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Sherry Radack
Chief Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Massengale and Brown.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).