Carolyn Gerdes v. John Kennamer and Mora Kennamer

                                    NUMBER 13-04-427-CV

                                 COURT OF APPEALS

                     THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                         CORPUS CHRISTI B EDINBURG

CAROLYN GERDES,                                                                        Appellant,

                                                             v.

JOHN KENNAMER AND MORA KENNAMER,                               Appellees.

                     On appeal from the 23rd District Court

                                      of Matagorda County, Texas.

                                M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

     Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Hinojosa and Rodriguez

      Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez  

Appellant, Carolyn Gerdes, contests a turnover order arising from the enforcement of a judgment against her husband, Roger Gerdes, Jr.  We affirm the order of the trial court.

I.  Facts and Procedural History

Appellee, John Kennamer, obtained a judgment against Roger and Carolyn Gerdes in the amount of $915,392.65.  The couple appealed, and we affirmed in Gerdes v. Kennamer, 155 S.W.3d 523, 535 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2004, pet. filed).  In a turnover order issued January 8, 2003, Roger Gerdes was required to (1) execute and turn over documents which would purportedly effect the transfer of all of the stock in Inmobiliaria Don Rogelio, a Mexican corporation, and (2) obtain the signature of Carolyn Gerdes on those documents. The couple appealed the turnover order, and we affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  Gerdes v. Kennamer, 155 S.W.3d 541, 550 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2004, no pet.). 

Roger Gerdes refused to comply and was jailed on September 16, 2003, for contempt. Kennamer obtained another turnover order on August 3, 2004, requiring Carolyn Gerdes to sign the documents transferring the stock in Inmobiliaria Don Rogelio.  In her pro se appeal, she claims (1) the trial court exceeded its scope of authority by requiring her to sign the documents giving up her half ownership of the shares and property in Mexico, (2) those documents are illegal, (3) the trial court judgment should have been nullified by the non-suit of Inmobiliaria Don Rogelio, and (4) the court abused its discretion for personal gain.

II. Collateral Estoppel

In her first issue, Carolyn Gerdes claims that the trial court exceeded its scope of authority by requiring her to sign documents giving up the property in Mexico.  In her second issue, she claims the documents she is being forced to sign are illegal because the stock they purport to transfer was never issued; additionally, such a transfer would violate Inmobiliaria Don Rogelio=s articles of incorporation. 

These arguments are identical to the arguments she and her husband made against the January turnover order.  See Gerdes, 155 S.W.3d at 546-48 (overruling their arguments that the trial court exceeded its scope of authority by requiring them to sign documents giving up the property, and that those documents would be illegal because they violate Don Rogelio=s articles of incorporation).  We may take judicial notice of the record in prior appeals because they involved the same parties and subject matter.  See In re Estate of York, 934 S.W.2d 848, 851 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 1996, no writ).  Our previous holdings on those issues stand.  Kennamer correctly argues that Carolyn Gerdes is collaterally estopped from relitigating these issues.  See Van Dyke v. Boswell, O=Toole, Davis & Pickering, 697 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tex. 1985) (AOnce an actually litigated and essential issue is determined, that issue is conclusive in a subsequent action between the same parties.@).  Appellant=s first two issues have been litigated and the results determined; therefore, those issues are collaterally estopped.  See id.

III. Sufficiency of the Argument

We evaluate pro se pleadings liberally.  Martin v. State Bd. of Crim. Justice, 60 S.W.3d 226, 228 (Tex. App.BCorpus Christi 2001, no pet.).  Nevertheless, we hold the remaining two issues are waived for inadequate briefing. AThe brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.@  Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h).

Appellant claims A[a]ny recourse from the trial court was done away with after the non-suit of Immobiliaria [sic].@  She gives us no facts from the record, no legal authority or explanation, and no guidance to support this claim.  See id.

Appellant also accuses the court of judicial misconduct:  AThe Court . . . abused its discretion for personal gain.  Trial Court Exhibit 26 shows payment from Kennamer of $20,000 to a judge. This clearly shows how Mr. Kennamer operates to obtain rulings in his favor.@  She does not provide us a copy of that exhibit, identify which judge was the recipient or under what context the payment was made. In sum, it is an unsubstantiated, vague accusation that provides nothing for us to review.  See id.

Because the remaining claims provide nothing for our review, we conclude they have been waived.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the order of the trial court.

Rogelio Valdez,

Chief Justice

Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed

this 22nd day of August, 2005.