Billy Bob Aldridge D/B/A Alamo Bail Bonds v. State

No. 04-98-00298-CV

Billy Bob ALDRIDGE d/b/a Alamo Bail Bonds, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 49th Judicial District Court, Webb County, Texas Trial Court No. 97-CVC-00863-D1 Honorable Manuel R. Flores, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Justice

Sitting: Alma L. López, Justice

Catherine Stone, Justice

Paul W. Green, Justice

Delivered and Filed: March 3, 1999

REVERSED AND RENDERED

This appeal arises from a bond forfeiture brought by the State against Billy Bob Aldridge. Aldridge asserts that he has been exonerated from liability on Jaime López's bond because he (1) provided an affidavit showing that the accused had been incarcerated in federal custody in compliance with Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.16 (Vernon Supp. 1999), and (2) the accused's subsequent deportation to Mexico constituted an uncontrollable circumstance preventing the accused's appearance at court under Tex. Code Crim Proc. Ann. art. 22.13 (Vernon Supp. 1999).

Factual and Procedural Background

Jaime López was arrested on April 27, 1997. Two days later, Billy Bob Aldridge posted a $5,000 bond to bail out López for which Aldridge was paid $500. On that same day, López was transferred to federal custody at the Corrections Corporation of America for deportation to his native country of Mexico. Also on that same day, Aldridge, as surety, prepared an affidavit of incarceration requesting that he be relieved of liability. This affidavit was signed by a deputy from the Webb County Sheriff's Office. Aldridge did not request or obtain a warrant for López. When López did not appear in court to answer the charges against him, the trial court determined that Aldridge was not relieved of liability as López's surety and ordered recovery of $5,000 plus costs.

Article 17.16 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that:

(a) A surety may before forfeiture relieve himself of his undertaking by:

(1) surrendering the accused into the custody of the sheriff of the county where the prosecution is pending; or

(2) delivering to the sheriff of the county where the prosecution is pending an affidavit stating that the accused is incarcerated in federal custody, in the custody of any state, or in any county of this state.

(b) For the purposes of Subsection (a)(2) of this article, the bond is discharged and the surety is absolved of liability on the bond on the sheriff's verification of the incarceration of the accused.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.16 (Vernon Supp. 1999). Section 17.19 provides in pertinent part that a surety, "desiring to surrender his principal, may file an affidavit of such intention before the court . . . ." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.19(a) (Vernon Supp. 1999). If the court "finds that there is cause for the surety to surrender his principal, the court shall issue a warrant of arrest for the principal." Id. at 17.19(c).

The trial court noted that article 17.16 was not meant to be used as a loophole for a surety to be relieved of liability. The State further contends that compliance with article 17.16 is not sufficient and that Aldridge was also required to obtain a warrant under article 17.19. The State maintains that articles 17.16 and 17.19 constitute a two-step process that a surety must complete. However, precedent makes clear that articles 17.16 and 17.19 are two separate methods by which a surety may surrender his principal. See Austin v. State, 541 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Linder v. State, 734 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. App.--Waco 1987, pet. ref'd). Article 17.16 allows the surrender of a principal without warrant if the principal will surrender willingly and without the use of force. Austin, 541 S.W.2d at 165; Linder, 734 S.W.2d at 170. If this is not the case, the surety must comply with article 17.19 and secure a warrant of arrest for the principal. Austin, 541 S.W.2d at 165; Linder, 734 S.W.2d at 170.

In the present case, Aldridge complied with article 17.16 by providing an affidavit showing that the accused was incarcerated in federal custody. Such action should have relieved Aldridge of liability. Aldridge was not required to also obtain or request a warrant for López's arrest. Aldridge's first point of error is sustained.

Because Aldridge is relieved from liability by complying with article 17.16, we need not address his second point of error. The judgment of the trial court is reversed thereby relieving Aldridge of liability.

Catherine Stone, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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