DocketNumber： 04-99-00750-CV
Filed Date： 4/12/2000
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/6/2015
Opinion by: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice
Sitting: Phil Hardberger, Chief Justice
Tom Rickhoff, Justice
Alma L. López, Justice
Delivered and Filed: April 12, 2000
AFFIRMED
In Dallas County Civil Service Comm'n v. Warren, 988 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.), we reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of Warren on her unjust dismissal claim, but we affirmed that portion of the judgment in favor of Warren on her due process claim. Because the two claims were not sufficiently "intertwined to the point of being inseparable," we remanded the cause to the trial court with instructions to award Warren only those attorney's fees relating to her due process claim.(1) See id. at 873. This appeal arises from the trial court's judgment awarding Warren attorney's fees on remand.
After this cause was remanded, Warren submitted a new application for attorney's fees which incorporated the exhibits from her prior application. Those exhibits included the affidavits of the attorneys who performed services for her and the affidavit of an expert, who stated that the fees charged by the attorneys were fair and reasonable. After examining the detailed billing statements, Warren and her attorneys determined that $70,141.50 in attorney's fees were generated in connection with the litigation of the due process claim. Utilizing updated figures based on additional work performed, Warren's application states that the total fee for the work performed in relation to the due process claim was $86,111.50; however, the requested amount of actual fees was voluntarily reduced to $62,842.75. Warren's attorney stated that the posture of the case made it time-intensive and undesirable to take. Significant time and attention were devoted to the case, and a large percentage of the attorneys' time was consumed, as evidenced by the detailed time sheets. Warren's lead attorney stated that considerable skill was required in handling the case due to its complexity. Warren's expert stated that he was familiar with the experience of the lead attorneys, and that the fee rates charged were reasonable. Warren's attorneys handled the case on a contingency basis because Warren was without resources; however, the fee agreement provided that in the event attorney's fees were awarded, the attorneys would retain those fees in lieu of a contingency percentage. Warren's attorney stated that Warren was successful at trial in recovering a substantial portion of her back wages. In addition to recovering the actual fees, as voluntarily adjusted, Warren also requested an upward enhancement of 25% or $18,093.63 in view of the results that were achieved.
The Commission and County filed a response to Warren's application. The response asserted that the hourly rate requested for one of the attorneys was excessive, and the affidavits of two attorneys were attached to the response to support this assertion. Those affidavits also challenged the number of hours Warren claimed to be related to her due process claim, contending that not more than fifty hours of total time would have been necessary to prepare and present the due process portion of Warren's claims. Finally, the response refutes that an upward adjustment to the actual fees is warranted.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court awarded $76,579.75 in attorney's fees at the trial level, plus conditional attorney's fees of $10,000 if appealed to the court of appeals and an additional $5,000 if appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.
The amount of an award of attorney's fees rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the judgment will not be reversed on appeal without a clear showing of abuse of discretion. See Texas Workers' Compensation Ins. Fund v. Alcorta, 989 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.); Rowley v. Lake Area Nat'l Bank, 976 S.W.2d 715, 724 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to any guiding rules and principles. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). The standards set forth in Rule 1.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct are the principles which guide a trial court in determining the reasonableness of attorneys' fees. See id. Rule 1.04 sets forth eight factors to be considered, including: (1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered. Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof. Conduct 1.04(b) (1989), reprinted in Tex. Gov't Code Ann., tit.2, subtit. G app. (Vernon 1998) (State Bar Rules art. X, § 9). Although the trial court is to be guided by these factors and principles, the trial court is not required to detail the manner in which it considers those factors.
Warren's application addressed each of the factors listed in Rule 1.04, and Warren provided affidavits in support of her application. The affidavits discuss the complexity and consuming nature of the case, the attorneys' levels of experience, the fees customarily charged, and the results obtained. On remand, Warren examined the fee statements and segregated those fees she claimed to relate to the due process claim. Although the Commission and County presented controverting evidence, the trial court had the discretion to reject that evidence after reviewing the application and response, the detailed time records and the other evidence submitted. Cf. Ralston Oil & Gas Co. v. Gensco, Inc., 706 F.2d 685, 697 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that upon proper segregation of attorney's fees, same amount may be correct or court may determine that lesser or greater fee is correct). The trial judge, who originally heard the case, had first-hand knowledge of the time devoted during the original trial to each claim. The Commission and County believe that the attorney's fees award was excessive and that the trial judge did not delete a sufficient amount for the work done by Warren's attorneys on the unjust dismissal claim. As the amount of attorney's fees actually increased, rather than decreased, the second-time around, the objection by the Commission and County is understandable. However, the trial judge's award was within the range of the testimony, and the trial judge was in a better position than an appellate court to make a fair and just allocation of the attorney's fees, considering the Rule 1.04 standards. While this court would have awarded a lesser amount of attorney's fees, that does not mean the trial court abused its discretion. See Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985) (abuse of discretion not established where trial judge's decision is within the judge's discretionary authority even if appellate court might have decided the matter differently). The trial court acted within its discretion in its award of attorney's fees on remand.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
PHIL HARDBERGER,
CHIEF JUSTICE
DO NOT PUBLISH
1. With respect to the unjust dismissal claim, we concluded that the trial court erroneously submitted the substantial evidence issue to the jury and that the Commission erroneously imposed the burden of proof on Warren at the Commission's hearing. Dallas County Civil Service Comm'n, 988 S.W.2d at 870-71. We instructed the trial court to remand the cause to the Commission for a new hearing at which the burden of proof would be imposed on the County to prove that Warren's termination was justified by good cause. See id. at 873. The portion of the case relating to the resolution of the unjust dismissal claim on remand is not before us in the appeal.