DocketNumber： 04-02-00144-CV
Filed Date： 12/11/2002
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 4/17/2021
Opinion by: Alma L. López, Justice
Sitting: Alma L. López, Justice
Catherine Stone, Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 11, 2002
AFFIRMED
Appellant, Kenneth F. Kelch ("Kelch"), appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to K.M.K. Kelch presents five issues on appeal, asserting: (1) Kelch was denied a fair and impartial tribunal; (2) Kelch was deprived of competent, effective appointed counsel; (3) the ad litem who represented K.M.K. failed to act impartially; (4) the trial court erred in admitting and excluding certain evidence and in denying Kelch's motion for a continuance; and (5) the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's verdict. We affirm the trial court's order.
In his first issue, Kelch contends that Judge Alcala erred in denying Kelch's motion to recuse. Kelch further contends that Judge Jordan and Judge Alcala were biased.
The denial of a motion to recuse is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard on appeal. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 18a(f). On April 25, 2001, Kelch moved to recuse Judge V. Murray Jordan. As a result of the motion, Judge James Simmonds was appointed to preside over the underlying lawsuit. On June 7, 2001, Kelch moved to recuse Judge Simmonds. As a result, Judge Dick Alcala was appointed to preside over the underlying lawsuit. On January 2, 2002, Kelch filed a motion to recuse Judge Alcala. Section 30.016 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits a judge to decline recusal after a tertiary or third recusal motion is filed and to move the case to final disposition as though such a motion had not been filed. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 30.016 (Vernon Supp. 2002). Accordingly, Judge Alcala did not abuse his discretion in denying Kelch's tertiary motion to recuse.
Kelch further contends that Judge Jordan and Judge Alcala were biased against him. Kelch cites various rulings made by the trial court as evidencing the trial judges' bias. Judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion, and opinions the judge forms during a trial do not necessitate recusal unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 240 (Tex. 2001); In re M.C.M., 57 S.W.3d 27, 33 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). A party's remedy for unfair rulings is to assign error regarding the adverse rulings. See In re M.C.M., 57 S.W.3d at 33. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that neither Judge Jordan nor Judge Alcala demonstrated a bias that would support recusal.
Kelch's first issue is overruled.
In his second issue, Kelch contends that he was deprived of his right to competent, effective counsel. Section 107.013(a) of the Texas Family Code requires a trial court to appoint an attorney ad litem to represent the interests of an indigent parent who responds in opposition to a suit seeking termination of his or her parent-child relationship. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.013(a) (Vernon 2002). The intermediate courts of appeals are split on whether the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in criminal actions extends to a civil proceeding for termination of parental rights. In re I.V., 61 S.W.3d 789, 799 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.) (noting split). Those courts finding that a parent is entitled to effective assistance of counsel have applied the two-prong test for criminal cases set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984), requiring the appellant to show that (1) his counsel's performance was deficient to the level that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. In re I.V., 61 S.W.3d at 799.
Assuming without deciding that Kelch was entitled to effective assistance of counsel, the record does not support Kelch's claim of ineffective assistance. Instead, the record implicates a different rule applicable to appointed counsel in criminal cases which provides that a trial court is under no duty to search until it finds an attorney agreeable to the accused. Malcom v. State, 628 S.W.2d 790, 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Garner v. State, 864 S.W.2d 92, 98 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd). Based on motions filed by Kelch, the trial court appointed three different attorneys to represent Kelch's interests. When the trial court denied the motion by Kelch to remove his third attorney, Kelch elected to proceed pro se. See In re T.V., 8 S.W.3d 448, 450 (Tex. App.--Waco 1999, no pet.) (noting parent may waive right to appointed counsel if knowing and intelligent waiver of right appears on the record). The record does not demonstrate that the third attorney appointed to represent Kelch was ineffective, and the trial court was not required to locate an attorney agreeable to Kelch.
Kelch's second issue is overruled.
In his third issue, Kelch contends that the attorneys at litem appointed to represent K.M.K. did not represent K.M.K.'s interests impartially. Section 107.014(a) of the Texas Family Code requires an attorney ad litem appointed to represent a child to: (1) investigate the facts of the case; (2) obtain and review copies of relevant medical, psychological, and school records; and (3) become familiar with the American Bar Association's standards of practice for lawyers who represent children in abuse and neglect cases. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §107.014(a) (Vernon 2002). Section 107.014(a) also permits an attorney ad litem for the child to call, examine, or cross-examine witnesses. Id. The record demonstrates that the attorneys at litem appointed to represent K.M.K. fulfilled these responsibilities. Furthermore, section 107.014(b) requires an attorney ad litem appointed to represent a child to interview the child, individuals with significant knowledge of the child's history and condition, and all parties to the suit. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §107.014(b) (Vernon 2002). The record demonstrates that the attorneys ad litem appointed to represent K.M.K. also fulfilled this responsibility. Kelch's contention that the attorneys at litem failed to represent K.M.K.'s interests impartially is not supported by the record.
Kelch's third issue is overruled.
A. Judge Jordan's Pre-Trial Rulings
In his first sub-issue, Kelch contends that Judge Jordan's pre-trial rulings commented on the weight of the evidence and ultimate issues, depriving Kelch of his right to trial by jury. It appears from Kelch's brief that he is challenging the trial court's determination that K.M.K.'s counselor was qualified to render opinions. Kelch did not pursue a Robinson hearing to challenge the counselor's qualifications, and Kelch was permitted to introduce evidence in an effort to impeach the counselor's qualifications. Accordingly, Kelch was not deprived of his right to raise the issue regarding the counselor's qualifications before the jury.
B. Hearsay
Kelch contends that the trial court erred in allowing portions of a report prepared by K.M.K.'s counselor into evidence that contained statements K.M.K. made to the counselor. Even assuming that the trial court erred in admitting the portions of the report, erroneous rulings on the admissibility of evidence ordinarily do not result in reversible error where the evidence in question is not controlling on a material issue dispositive of the case. Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 396 (Tex. 1989). Kelch fails to demonstrate how the entire case turned on the portions of the report that were admitted; therefore, Kelch has failed to show that any error in admitting the portions of the report constituted reversible error.
C. Expert Witnesses
The trial court denied additional psychological evaluations of K.M.K. based on the best interest of the child. During the course of the underlying lawsuit, K.M.K. was evaluated by three separate experts. Kelch has not demonstrated how the trial court's ruling was an abuse of the trial court's discretion given the history of the proceedings.
D. Continuance
The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the trial court's sound discretion, and the trial court's denial of a continuance will not be disturbed unless the record discloses a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Wood Oil Distrib. Inc., 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1988). In this case, the January 28, 2002, trial date was set at a pre-trial hearing held on September 5, 2001. The only ground Kelch asserted for requesting the continuance on his own behalf was the desire to fire his attorney. As previously stated, Kelch was seeking to fire the third attorney appointed by the trial court to represent him. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that there was not sufficient cause to grant the continuance. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 251.
E. Conduct of Trial - Examination of Witnesses and Introduction of Evidence
The discretion vested in the trial court over the conduct of a trial is great. Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 240. A trial court may properly intervene to maintain control in the courtroom, to expedite the trial, and to prevent what it considers to be a waste of time. Id. at 241. In addition, the admission and exclusion of evidence is committed to the trial court's sound discretion and is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. 1995). Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in limiting the examination of witnesses, limiting the scope of the witnesses' answers to those that were responsive to the questions asked, and in admitting and excluding evidence.
Involuntary termination proceedings must be strictly scrutinized. Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). A parent's parental rights can only be terminated by a showing of clear and convincing evidence. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §101.007 (Vernon 2002). In deciding a legal sufficiency issue, we consider only the evidence tending to support the finding and disregard all evidence to the contrary. In re M.A.N.M., 75 S.W.3d 73, 77 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, no pet.). If more than a scintilla of evidence supports the finding, the appealing parent cannot prevail on a legal sufficiency point. Id. We apply an intermediate standard of clear and convincing evidence when an appellant challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence. See In re B.T., 954 S.W.2d 44, 46 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, writ denied); In re H.C., 942 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, no writ). Under this standard, we ask whether sufficient evidence was presented to produce in the mind of a rational fact finder a firm belief or conviction that grounds exist for termination. In re C.H., No. 00-0552, 2001 WL 1903109, at *8 (Tex. July 3, 2002).
The court may order the termination of a parent-child relationship upon proof that: (1) the parent has committed one of the acts listed in section 161.001(1) of the Texas Family Code; and (2) termination is in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §161.001 (Vernon 2002). In this case, the jury was instructed that it was required to find that one of the following events occurred: (1) Kelch knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the child; (2) Kelch engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct that endangers the physical and emotional well-being of the child; (3) Kelch has been convicted for being criminally responsible for the serious injury of a child which constituted a violation of Sections 22.011 and 22.021 of the Texas Penal Code, to wit: Sexual Assault and Aggravated Sexual Assault; or (4) Kelch knowingly engaged in criminal conduct that has resulted in his conviction of an offense and confinement or imprisonment and inability to care for the child for not less than two years from the date of filing the petition. Court documents were introduced into evidence together with testimony that established that Kelch had been convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and one count of sexual assault of a child. The child was Kelch's step-daughter. Kelch was sentenced to ninety-nine years' imprisonment, and his sentence commenced March 17, 1997. This evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that Kelch engaged in one of the events listed in the jury charge which would support termination under section 161.001(1).
Termination must also be in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §161.001(2) (Vernon 2002). There is a strong presumption that the best interest of the child is served by keeping custody in the natural parent. See In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). The factors which a court should consider when determining the best interest of the child include: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the parental ability of the individuals seeking custody; (4) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child; (5) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (6) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (7) the acts or omissions of the parents which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (8) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976).
The evidence showed that K.M.K. wanted Kelch's parental rights terminated and even wanted to change his name. Because Kelch is serving a ninety-nine year prison sentence for a crime he committed against his step-daughter while K.M.K. was in his custody, Kelch is unable to provide for the emotional and physical needs of K.M.K., and has no present ability to parent K.M.K. Evidence was admitted to show that K.M.K. was likely aware of the sexual assault against his sister while both were in Kelch's custody. K.M.K.'s mother sought counseling for K.M.K., and the support provided by K.M.K.'s mother and step-father improved K.M.K.'s behavior to such a level that K.M.K. no longer requires counseling and has drastically improved his grades in school. Although K.M.K.'s mother was placed on deferred adjudication for endangering her daughter by leaving her in Kelch's care, K.M.K.'s mother took parenting classes and sought counseling to improve her parenting skills. K.M.K.'s step-father seeks to adopt K.M.K., and K.M.K. will be provided a stable home environment. Kelch's conviction and K.M.K.'s behavioral outbursts after seeing Kelch are evidence that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one. Kelch does not offer any excuse for the actions leading to his conviction but continues to maintain his innocence. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury's finding that the termination of Kelch's parental rights was in the best interest of K.M.K.
Kelch's fifth issue is overruled.
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Alma L. López, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
State v. Wood Oil Distributing, Inc. ( 1988 )
Gee v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. ( 1989 )
City of Brownsville v. Alvarado ( 1995 )
In the Interest of B.T. ( 1997 )
Dow Chemical Co. v. Francis ( 2001 )
In the Interest of H.C. ( 1997 )
Malcom v. State of Texas ( 1982 )