Curtis Woodruff v. State

ACCEPTED
07-14-00339-CR
SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AMARILLO, TEXAS
7/14/2015 5:19:51 PM
Vivian Long, Clerk
NO. 07-14-00339-CR
IN THE FILED IN
7th COURT OF APPEALS
COURT OF APPEALS AMARILLO, TEXAS
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 7/14/2015 5:19:51 PM
AMARILLO, TEXAS VIVIAN LONG
_________________________________ CLERK
CURTIS WOODRUFF
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
_________________________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE 140TH DISTRICT COURT
OF LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS
CAUSE NO. 2014-403,191
_________________________________
BRIEF FOR THE STATE
_________________________________
MATTHEW D. POWELL
Criminal District Attorney
Lubbock County, Texas
TRACI BOWMAN
COURTNEY GRAFFT
Assistant Criminal District Attorneys
(Trial Attorneys)
ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED JEFFREY S. FORD
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Lubbock County, Texas
State Bar No. 24047280
P.O. Box 10536, Lubbock, TX 79408
Phone (806)775-1166
FAX: (806)775-7930
E-mail: JFord@co.lubbock.tx.us
(On appeal)
ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE
Identity of Parties and Counsel
Appellant:
Curtis Woodruff
Appellant’s trial attorneys:
Jesse Mendez, Attorney at Law, 2833 74th Street, Lubbock, TX 79423;
phone (806)748-5287; fax (806)748-5256
Marlise Hernandez Boyles, Law Office of Jorge E. Hernandez, P.O. Box
2936, Lubbock, TX 79408; phone (806)765-7257
Appellant’s appellate counsel:
Julie Panger, The Kiechler Law Firm, 619 Broadway Street, Lubbock, TX
79401; phone (806)712-2889; fax (808)712-2529
State of Texas:
At trial:
Traci Bowman & Courtney Grafft, Assistant Criminal District Attorneys,
Lubbock County Criminal District Attorney’s Office, P.O. Box 10536,
Lubbock, Texas 79408; phone (806) 775-1100; fax (806)775-7930
On appeal:
Jeffrey S. Ford, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Lubbock County
Criminal District Attorney’s Office, P.O. Box 10536, Lubbock, Texas
79408; phone (806) 775-1166; fax (806)775-7930
Trial Judge:
Honorable Jim Bob Darnell, Presiding Judge, 140th District Court of
Lubbock County, Texas, Lubbock County Courthouse, 904 Broadway, Suite
349, Lubbock, TX 79401
i
Table of Contents
PAGE
Identity of Parties and Counsel ...................................................................................i
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... ii
Table of Authorities ................................................................................................... v
Statement of the Case................................................................................................ix
Statement of the Facts ................................................................................................ 1
Suppression Hearing………………………………………………………...1
Trial Testimony (of Officer Sims)……………………………………………5
Summary of the Argument......................................................................................... 7
Argument and Authorities……………………………………………………….....9
First Issue Presented (Responsive to Appellant’s First and Second Issues):
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the statements and
physical evidence in the case because both the statements and the physical
evidence were obtained without his Miranda warnings first being given, and that
the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction but for the improper
admission of the statements and physical evidence. The trial court properly denied
the motion to suppress and allowed the admission of the statements because
Appellant was not in custody when the statements were given. Even if the
statements were improperly admitted, however, the physical evidence was still
ii
admissible because (a) Appellant was not being interrogated when he was asked
for consent to search; and (b) Appellant gave voluntary consent for a search of his
pockets and the bag and case he had been carrying. Furthermore, the evidence was
legally sufficient to support the conviction because a proper sufficiency review
accounts for all the evidence in the case—regardless of whether it was properly or
improperly admitted. Was Appellant in custody for Miranda purposes when he
gave the relevant statements in the case? If the statements were improperly
admitted at trial, was the consent to search and physical evidence nonetheless
admissible into evidence? Was the evidence legally sufficient to support the
conviction based on all of the evidence admitted at trial?.........................................9
I. Miranda custody standard………………………………………………..10
II. Appellant was not “in custody” within the meaning of Miranda………13
III. Even if Appellant was “in custody” when he was handcuffed, the
officer’s action in asking for consent to search did not constitute
“interrogation” for Miranda purposes……………………………….20
IV. Even if Appellant was “in custody” when some or all of the relevant
statements were given, the physical evidence, i.e., the checkbook and
other evidence, would not have been required to be suppressed…...21
V. The evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction……………25
Conclusion…………………………………………………………………28
iii
Conclusion and Prayer ............................................................................................. 29
Certificate of Service ............................................................................................... 29
Certificate of Compliance…………………………………………………………30
iv
Table of Authorities
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PAGE
U.S. CONST. amend. V………………………………………………………...10, 21
U.S. SUPREME COURT & FEDERAL CASE LAW
U.S. v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.) (op. on reh’g en banc), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 924, 109 S. Ct. 306, 102 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1988)……………………………12
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991)……...12
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980)……20
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)……….25
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S. Ct. 711, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977) (per
curiam)…………………………………………………………………………….11
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).....passim
U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 159 L. Ed. 2d 667 (2004) (plur.
op.)……………………………………………………………………………21-22
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643 (2004)...19, 20
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994)
(per curiam)………………………………………………………………….........12
U.S. v. Stevens, 487 F.3d 232 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 936, 128 S. Ct. 336,
169 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2007)…………………………………………………………...21
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)………………..17
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S. Ct. 457, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995)……11
v
TEXAS CASE LAW
Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)……………………….26
Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)………………………...13
Baker v. State, 956 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)…………………………..22
Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)………………………18
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plur. op.)…………….25
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)…………………...26-27
Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)……………...11, 12, 17
Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)…………………..11, 12
Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)………………………….25
Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)……………….12-14, 17
In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 2008)………………………………………….22
In re J.T.M., 441 S.W.3d 455 (Tex. App.—El Paso, no pet.)…………………….24
Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)……………………..22, 24
Jones v. State, 7 S.W.3d 172 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d)...21
Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)…………………………10
Martinez v. State, 272 S.W.3d 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)………………….19, 20
Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)………………………23
State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)………………………17-19
vi
Ramirez v. State, 105 S.W.3d 730 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.)…………...17
Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)………………………..19
Wert v. State, 383 S.W.3d 747 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.)..18
Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)……………………….27
TEXAS RULES AND STATUTES
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22……………………………………...14, 19
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 2(a)…………………………………...10
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 5……………………………………...14
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 32.51(b)(1)………………………………………………27
TEX. R. APP. P. 3.2………………………………………………………………..viii
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a)…………………………………………………………….24
vii
NO. 07-14-00339-CR
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AMARILLO, TEXAS
_________________________________
CURTIS WOODRUFF
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
_________________________________
BRIEF FOR THE STATE
_________________________________
To the Honorable Court of Appeals:
The State of Texas, the prosecuting authority in Cause No. 2014-403,191 in
the 140th District Court of Lubbock County, and Appellee before the Seventh
Court of Appeals, respectfully submits this brief in reply to the brief filed by
Appellant appealing his conviction for the offense of Fraudulent Use or Possession
of Identifying Information. The parties will be referred to as “Appellant” and
“State.”1
1
TEX. R. APP. P. 3.2.
viii
Statement of the Case
Appellant was charged by indictment in Cause No. 2014-403,191 on August
5, 2014, with the offense of fraudulent use or possession of identifying
information, for an offense alleged to have occurred on October 1, 2013. (Clerk’s
Record (CR) p. 7). Following a two-day jury trial, from August 25-26, 2014,
Appellant was convicted of the offense by the jury. (CR p. 74) (Reporter’s Record
(RR) vol. 5, p. 29). The trial court assessed Appellant’s punishment at eighteen
(18) years imprisonment on August 27, 2014. (CR pp. 82-85) (RR vol. 6, pp. 14-
15). The trial court certified that Appellant has the right of appeal. (CR p. 78) (RR
vol. 6, p. 15).
ix
Statement of Facts
Suppression Hearing:
Prior to the start of the voir dire examination, Appellant asked whether the
State was planning to introduce his un-Mirandized statements during trial. After
the State said that it was planning on introducing those statements, a hearing was
held (immediately after the jury was sworn in) to determine whether the statements
were admissible in the absence of the Miranda warnings having first been given.
(RR vol. 3, pp. 7, 113-58). Officer Brad Sims was called as the sole witness at the
hearing. (RR vol. 3, pp. 116-50).
Officer Sims testified about the stop, search and seizure, and statements
given by Appellant. He was working patrol on the night of October 1, 2013, when
he received a call from dispatch directing him to the 2000 block of 10th Street for a
vehicle burglary possibly in progress. He was advised that an unknown male had
been walking up to cars pulling on door handles and had made entry into a vehicle
that was unlocked. When the 9-1-1 callers approached him, the man fled
northbound. (RR vol. 3, pp. 117-18). Sims arrived in the area looking for a black
male wearing a blue and white striped shirt, wearing a blue bandanna, and carrying
a black bag (which was the description given by dispatch). (RR vol. 3, p. 118).
Sims went from the 2000 block of 10th Street and started looking northeast, which
is the way he had been advised the unknown male had fled. (RR vol. 3, p. 119).
1
Sims saw a man matching the description in the parking lot of the Stripes store at
Avenue Q and Marsha Sharp Freeway. (RR vol. 3, pp. 119, 133).
Sims came in contact with the man after activating his emergency lights. The
man—who was identified in court as Appellant—was wearing a light gray and
blue striped shirt, a blue bandanna on his head, and had a black bag around his
shoulder, and was carrying what appeared to be a black briefcase in his hand. (RR
vol. 3, pp. 120-21, 134). Sims told Appellant to place everything that was in his
hands on the ground and walk towards him (based on his suspicion that Appellant
had just committed a vehicle burglary and had multiple things in his hand that he
could conceal weapons in, as well as the potential to conceal weapons in his
clothing. (RR vol. 3, pp. 121-22, 134). Sims conducted a pat-down search; nothing
was discovered during the pat-down search. (RR vol. 3, p. 122). Appellant was not
free to leave at that time. (RR vol. 3, p. 136).
Sims then asked for and received verbal consent to search Appellant’s
pockets. Sims located two debit cards (a MasterCard and a Visa card) in
Appellant’s right front pocket. (RR vol. 3, pp. 122-23, 136). Sims noticed that the
names on the cards (Joe Ramirez and Jennifer Martinez) did not match Appellant.
When asked who the cards belonged to, Appellant advised that the cards belonged
to his girlfriend—though he said his “girlfriend’s” name was Jennifer, but did not
know her last name. (RR vol. 3, pp. 123, 137). When asked about the second card
2
that had a male’s name on it, Appellant stated that he did not know whose card it
was and that he found the cards on the ground. (RR vol. 3, p. 124). After hearing
the inconsistent explanations, Sims placed Appellant in handcuffs to detain him
and escorted him back to his patrol car. Id. Sims placed Appellant in handcuffs for
the following reasons: (1) based on his belief that a crime had occurred; (2)
because Appellant was a suspect in that crime; (3) for Sim’s safety since he was
still by himself (since Appellant is a significantly larger man than Sims)2; and (4)
to limit Appellant’s use of his hands so he would not be able to fight or flee.
However, Appellant was not under arrest at that time since an investigation was
still ongoing. (RR vol. 3, p. 125).
After Sims placed Appellant in his patrol vehicle, he wanted to further
investigate who the cards belonged to. Id. Appellant gave verbal consent to search
the bag and the case that he had had with him. (RR vol. 3, pp. 125-26, 137). The
drawstring Cowboys bag contained a knife and a checkbook with multiple checks
in it (eleven checks). The checks belonged to Harold and Shirley Dron. (RR vol. 3,
p. 126). Sims also located a small envelope from Chase bank with $25.00 dollars
inside of it, a window breaking tool, a Walgreen’s bag full of five unopened
Copenhagen cans, an HTC phone charger, a wheel lock key, an air purifier, and
2
Officers Brennan Kent and Belinda House eventually arrived on the scene, but they arrived
after Appellant had been handcuffed. (RR vol. 3, pp. 143-44, 146, 150).
3
loose change ($13.74 in all). (RR vol. 3, pp. 126-27, 141). Sims believed those
items were suspicious because they were all items that can immediately be located
in a vehicle. (RR vol. 3, p. 127). The black case contained a portable gas grill. (RR
vol. 3, p. 129).
Sims Mirandized Appellant after locating the checks and other items inside
of the bag. Appellant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak to him. (RR
vol. 3, pp. 127-28, 143, 145). He was not under arrest at that time. (RR vol. 3, p.
127). Appellant told Sims that he was walking to the Avenue Q Wal-Mart when he
located the plastic bag by the Flying J with the two debit cards inside of the bag.
He pulled the debit cards out of the bag and placed them in his pocket. He then
walked to the Wal-Mart, used the change counter, and was walking back to the
Coronado Inn when he was stopped by Sims. (RR vol. 3, p. 128). He also said he
was never in the area of 10th Street. (RR vol. 3, p. 129). He said he was carrying
the portable gas grill because he and his girlfriend had just gotten into a fight and
she drove by and dropped it off with him because she was moving out. Id. After
attempting (without success) to locate the victims of the checkbook and debit cards
thefts, Sims placed Appellant under arrest. (RR vol. 3, pp. 129-30, 150).
Following Officer Sims’ testimony, Appellant argued that the statements
should be suppressed because Sims should have Mirandized him either when he
had Appellant place his hands on the patrol car or when Sims placed Appellant in
4
handcuffs and placed him in the patrol car since he was in custody (in that he was
not free to leave). (RR vol. 3, pp. 152-57). The State argued that this was a
temporary detention while Sims investigated the possible car burglaries. When
Sims found the debit cards, that was a continuation of the temporary detention to
find out information about why he could potentially have those cards. And, the
search of the bag and the case was done based on consent. (RR vol. 3, pp. 155-56).
The trial court ruled that it would “overrule your objection as far as the pat-down
and the consent to search his pockets and the consent to search the bag and case
that he had. The Court will sustain your objection as far as going into any
statements the Defendant made after the point in time he was Mirandized. Prior to
that time, the Court will allow the State to go into those statements that he made to
the officer during that investigative stop.”3 (RR vol. 3, p. 158).
Trial Testimony (of Officer Sims):
Officer Sims was called as the second State’s witness during trial. He
received a call from dispatch at 1:20 a.m. on October 1, 2013, about a possible
burglary of a vehicle in progress. (RR vol. 4, p. 16). Sims found Appellant, as the
man matching the description provided him by dispatch, in the area of Marsha
Sharp and Avenue Q at the Stripes store. (RR vol. 4, p. 17). Sims activated his
3
Appellant waived his objection to the admission of the post-Miranda statements prior to the
start of the guilt-innocence phase of trial. (RR vol. 4, pp. 6-7).
5
lights, after which Appellant stopped, turned around, and looked at him. Sims had
Appellant put down the black bag and case he was carrying and walk to him. (RR
vol. 4, pp. 19, 21). Sims had Appellant place his hands on the hood of his patrol car
so he could perform a pat-down search. Sims was still by himself when he
performed the pat-down search. (RR vol. 4, p. 22). Appellant gave verbal consent
to search his pockets. Sims found two debits cards in Appellant’s right front pocket
that belonged to two separate people. (RR vol. 4, pp. 23-24). Sims asked Appellant
about the debit cards to determine if he had the right to have those cards on him.
Appellant said that the cards belonged to his “girlfriend.” When asked about the
card with the man’s name on it, he said he did not know who the other one was.
(RR vol. 4, pp. 24-25). Appellant then changed his story to say he found the cards
on the ground. (RR vol. 4, p. 25).
Sims decided to place Appellant in handcuffs for his (Sims’) safety to detain
Appellant while he further investigated whether Appellant had the right to possess
those debit cards. He placed Appellant in the back of his patrol car. He did not
inform Appellant that he was under arrest at that time. (RR vol. 4, p. 26). Appellant
gave verbal consent to search the bag and the case he had been carrying. Id. Sims
first searched the drawstring bag. He found a knife, a checkbook for Harold and
Shirley Dron, an envelope from Chase Bank with $25 in it, a window breaking
tool, an open Walgreen’s bag with five unopened Copenhagen snuff cans inside of
6
it, numerous miscellaneous receipts, a cashier’s check receipt from Bank of
America, a HTC phone charger, tire wheel lock key, an auto air purifier, and
$13.34 in loose change. (RR vol. 4, pp. 26-36). Inside of the black case was a
portable gas grill. (RR vol. 4, p. 37).
After searching the bag and the case, Sims Mirandized Appellant because he
wanted to ask Appellant specific questions about an offense that he believed had
just occurred. (RR vol. 4, p. 37). Appellant waived his Miranda rights and agreed
to talk to him. Id. After Appellant provided his explanation (and after Sims
unsuccessfully tried to locate the victims), Sims placed Appellant under arrest. (RR
vol. 4, pp. 37-40, 67).
Summary of the Argument
Appellant argues in his first issue that the trial court erred in failing to
suppress the statements and physical evidence in the case because the statements
and physical evidence were obtained without his Miranda warnings first being
given. The evidence was admissible because Appellant was not “in custody” when
the statements at issue were given—in that his freedom of movement had not been
restricted to the degree associated with an arrest.
Assuming, arguendo, that some or all of the statements were improperly
admitted, neither the consent to search nor the physical evidence was required to
7
be suppressed. First, the consent to search the bag and case—done after Appellant
was handcuffed and placed in a squad car—did not constitute “interrogation” for
Miranda purposes since the act of giving consent did not constitute an
incriminating statement. Second, the physical evidence was properly admitted
because the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does not require suppression of
the physical fruits (i.e., the checkbook and other items located within the bag and
case) of a suspect’s unwarned but voluntary statements. Because the consent to
search the bag and case and the physical evidence located within the bag and case
were properly admitted, any error from the “improper” admission of the statements
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant argues in his second issue that the evidence is legally insufficient
to support the conviction because the statements and evidence was improperly
admitted at trial. But, since a sufficiency review takes account of all of the
evidence admitted at trial, regardless of whether it was properly or improperly
admitted, the statements and physical evidence admitted during trial should be
considered in the sufficiency analysis. The evidence was legally sufficient since it
shows that Appellant possessed the victim’s checkbook without the victim’s
consent with the intent to harm or defraud her.
8
Arguments and Authorities
First Issue Presented
(Responsive to Appellant’s First and Second Issues)
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the statements and
physical evidence in the case because both the statements and the physical
evidence were obtained without his Miranda warnings first being given, and that
the evidence is legally insufficient to support the conviction but for the improper
admission of the statements and physical evidence. The trial court properly denied
the motion to suppress and allowed the admission of the statements because
Appellant was not in custody when the statements were given. Even if the
statements were improperly admitted, however, the physical evidence was still
admissible because (a) Appellant was not being interrogated when he was asked
for consent to search; and (b) Appellant gave voluntary consent for a search of his
pockets and the bag and case he had been carrying. Furthermore, the evidence was
legally sufficient to support the conviction because a proper sufficiency review
accounts for all the evidence in the case—regardless of whether it was properly or
improperly admitted. Was Appellant in custody for Miranda purposes when he
gave the relevant statements in the case? If the statements were improperly
admitted at trial, was the consent to search and physical evidence nonetheless
9
admissible into evidence? Was the evidence legally sufficient to support the
conviction based on all of the evidence admitted at trial?
I. Miranda custody standard
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Miranda4 court stated that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612.
Those procedural safeguards, known as the Miranda warnings, are codified in
Texas as Article 38.22 § 2(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 2(a); see Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 650 n. 11 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1996).
The Supreme Court limited the application of Miranda warnings to
statements that stem from custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation is
described as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.” Miranda at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612. Miranda warnings are required
“only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render
4
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
10
him ‘in custody.’” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 107, 116 S. Ct. 457, 463,
133 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995), citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct.
711, 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977) (per curiam).
There are at least four general situations that may constitute custody:
(1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way, (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the
suspect that he cannot leave, (3) when law enforcement officers create
a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his
freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and (4) when
there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not
tell the suspect that he is free to leave.
Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); accord Gardner v.
State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). For the first through third
Dowthitt factors, the restriction upon freedom of movement must amount to the
degree associated with an arrest as opposed to an investigative detention. For the
fourth Dowthitt factor, the officer’s knowledge of probable cause must be
manifested to the suspect, with such manifestation occurring either by transmission
of information substantiating probable cause by the officers to the suspect, or by
the suspect to the officers. Id. at 255. In the fourth factor, custody is not
automatically established merely because probable cause is manifested; rather,
“custody is established if the manifestation of probable cause, combined with other
circumstances, would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint
to the degree associated with an arrest.” Id. The appropriate inquiry is whether the
11
suspect has been formally arrested or had his or her freedom of movement
restricted to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury v. California,
511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1528-29, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994) (per curiam);
Gardner, 306 S.W.3d at 293-94.
The determination of whether a suspect was in custody must be made on an
ad hoc basis, after considering all of the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating
officers or the person being questioned. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323, 114 S.Ct. at
1529; Dowthitt at 255. A person is in “custody” only if, under the circumstances, a
reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement was restrained to
the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury at 322-25, 114 S. Ct. at 1528-
30; Herrera at 525. The “reasonable person” standard presupposes an innocent
person. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2388, 115 L. Ed. 2d
389 (1991) (emphasis taken from opinion); Dowthitt at 254. The “reasonable
person,” for purposes of the custody determination, must be “neutral to the
environment and to the purposes of the investigation—that is, neither guilty of
criminal conduct and thus overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of
the circumstances.” U.S. v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir.) (op. on reh’g
en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924, 109 S. Ct. 306, 102 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1988).
12
When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a Miranda-violation claim, an
appellate court conducts a bifurcated review: “it affords almost total deference the
trial judge’s rulings on questions of historical fact and on application of law to fact
questions that turn upon credibility and demeanor, and it reviews de novo the trial
court’s rulings on application of law to fact questions that do not turn upon
credibility and demeanor.” Alford v. State, 358 S.W.3d 647, 652 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012). A trial judge’s ultimate “custody” determination presents a mixed question
of law and fact. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
When a trial judge denies a motion to suppress and does not enter findings of fact,
the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, with
the Court assuming that the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support
its ruling as long as those findings are supported by the record. Herrera, 241
S.W.3d at 527.
II. Appellant was not “in custody” within the meaning of Miranda
Appellant argues in his first issue that the trial court erred in failing to
suppress his un-Mirandized statements and the physical evidence obtained by
Officer Sims because those statements and evidence were obtained in violation of
Miranda. In particular, he argues that “[f]rom the time [Appellant] placed his
hands on the patrol vehicle, he was in a custodial interrogation, and he should have
13
been read his Miranda rights.”5 He further argues that the “level of deprivation”
only increased because he “was later arrested, placed in the patrol car, and then
formally arrested and taken to jail.”6 The issue to be determined here is whether
Appellant was “in custody” when the statements at issue were given. If Appellant
was not “in custody” when the statements were given, then the statements were not
required to be suppressed because “nothing in [Article 38.22] precludes the
admission . . . of a statement that does not stem from custodial interrogation.”7
The evidence adduced from both the suppression hearing and trial shows the
following:
1. Officer Sims detained Appellant near the Stripes store at Avenue Q and
Marsha Sharp Freeway based on reasonable suspicion that Appellant had
been involved in several vehicle burglaries a few blocks away from that
area;
2. After seeing that Appellant was carrying a bag and a case, Sims had
Appellant place the items on the ground and walk towards him due to
concern that Appellant could have weapons in his possession;
5
(Appellant’s Br. at 10).
6
(Appellant’s Br. at 8).
7
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 5. The Court of Criminal Appeals’ construction of
“custody” for purposes of Article 38.22 is consistent with the meaning of “custody” for Miranda
purposes. Herrera at 526.
14
3. Sims had Appellant place his hands on the hood of his patrol car so he could
perform a pat-down search of Appellant due to his reasonable belief that
Appellant could have weapons in his possession;
4. A patdown search was conducted, but nothing was found during the
patdown;
5. Appellant was not free to leave at that time because Sims was conducting an
investigative detention;
6. Sims asked for and received verbal consent to search Appellant’s pockets.
7. When Sims searched Appellant’s pockets, he located two debit cards in
Appellant’s right front pocket, neither of which had Appellant’s name on
them;
8. After seeing that neither of the cards had Appellant’s name on them, Sims
asked who the cards belonged to;
9. After Appellant gave inconsistent stories about who the cards belonged to
and where he found them, Sims placed Appellant in handcuffs to detain
him—in part because there was a safety issue since Sims was still the only
officer on the scene at that time—and put Appellant in his patrol car;
10.Appellant was not under arrest when he was placed in handcuffs since the
handcuffing was part of an investigative detention to further investigate
whether Appellant had the right to possess the debit cards;
15
11.Appellant was not informed that he was being placed under arrest for
anything at that time;
12.After placing Appellant in his patrol vehicle, Sims asked for—and
received—verbal consent to search the bag and case that Appellant had had
with him;
13.When the bag was searched, Sims found (among other items) a checkbook
with Harold and Shirley Dron’s names inside;
14.Appellant was then read his Miranda warnings since Sims wanted to ask
Appellant specific questions about an offense that he believed had just
occurred;
15.Appellant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to speak to Sims; and
16.After hearing Appellant’s story and unsuccessfully trying to locate the
victims, Appellant was placed under arrest.
The trial court properly denied Appellant’s verbal motion to suppress the
statements at issue. Though no findings of fact were filed, an implicit finding of
fact supporting the trial court’s ruling would be that Appellant was not “in
custody” at any time before the Miranda warnings were given because the
investigative detention had not evolved into a custodial detention. This implicit
finding of fact is supported by the record.
16
Appellant first argues that he was in custody when he was ordered to place
his hands on the patrol vehicle because he was “deprived of his freedom of action
in a very significant way—he was not free to leave when he was ordered to place
his hands on the patrol vehicle.”8 However, the proper standard for determining
custody is not whether the restriction on the detainee’s freedom of movement is
just “significant”; instead, it must be to the degree associated with an arrest. State
v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), citing Dowthitt at 255;
Herrera at 525.
Under the proper standard, Officer Sims’ actions in having Appellant place
his hands on the hood of his patrol car did not elevate the situation beyond an
investigative detention since it was part of a permissible Terry9 frisk—in that Sims
reasonably believed that Appellant may be carrying a weapon. See Ramirez v.
State, 105 S.W.3d 730, 739-40 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). Likewise, the
search of his pockets did not convert the investigative detention into a custodial
detention since it was simply a continuation of the investigative detention and did
not constitute a restriction upon freedom of movement that would be associated
with an arrest as opposed to an investigative detention.
8
(Appellant’s Br. at 8).
9
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).
17
Appellant further argues that the deprivation of freedom of movement
continued when he was later “arrested” and placed in the patrol car before being
formally arrested.10 However, his argument seems to be predicated on his belief
that the officer’s act of handcuffing him and placing him in his patrol car equates
to custodial (as opposed to investigative) detention. But, placing handcuffs on a
defendant and placing him or her in a patrol car does not, in and of itself, mean that
a suspect is “in custody” for Miranda purposes. See Wert v. State, 383 S.W.3d 747,
754 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.), citing Balentine v. State, 71
S.W.3d 763, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Instead, handcuffing is “only one of a
range of relevant factors” to rely upon in determining whether a defendant is in
custody for Miranda purposes. See Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d at 374.
Under the facts of this case, the handcuffing and placement of Appellant in
the patrol car did not convert the investigative detention into a custodial detention.
Sims handcuffed Appellant and placed him into the patrol car after hearing the
inconsistent explanations about the debit cards. Appellant was not told that he was
being placed under arrest or that Sims had probable cause to believe he had
committed an offense. Instead, Sims placed Appellant in handcuffs for officer
safety reasons because he suspected that a crime had occurred (but without
relaying that suspicion to Appellant) and he (Sims) was still by himself at the time.
10
(Appellant’s Br. at 8).
18
The handcuffing was part of the continued investigative detention so Sims could
further investigate whether Appellant had the right to possess the debit cards. Thus,
the act of handcuffing Appellant for officer safety reasons and placing him in his
patrol car was part of a valid investigative detention while the investigation into
Appellant’s legal right to possess the debit cards was ongoing.11
Based on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, Appellant was not
“in custody” for Miranda or Article 38.22 purposes until after the bag had been
searched and the checkbook was located. That is because a reasonable person
would not believe that he or she was “in custody” until that point. Contrary to
Appellant’s contention,12 this was not a case where the practice of “question first
and warn later” was used in the hopes of obtaining incriminating evidence and then
delivering the Miranda warnings “midstream.”13 A “question first and warn later”
policy presupposes that the suspect is in custody when he or she is interrogated and
11
See Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (finding that the
handcuffing of the appellant was part of a proper temporary investigative detention based on
officer safety considerations); cf. Ortiz at 374-75 (finding that the handcuffing had changed the
detention into a custodial arrest because the officers stated in the appellee’s presence that they
had found something illegal or dangerous on the appellee’s wife’s person and the officers
handcuffed the appellee at the same time his wife was handcuffed, thereby conveying to the
appellee the officers’ belief that the appellee was associated with his wife’s illicit behavior).
12
(Appellant’s Br. at 7, 10-11).
13
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609-17, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2608-13, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643
(2004) (discussing the police tactic of intentionally withholding Miranda warnings until after
interrogating and drawing out a confession before giving the Miranda warnings and then asking
for a waiver, after which the officers would elicit a subsequent incriminating statement—known
as the “question-first” tactic); Martinez v. State, 272 S.W.3d 615, 619-21, 626-27 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008) (discussing the “two-step strategy” of interrogating first and warning later).
19
is only given Miranda warnings after a confession is given.14 That debunked policy
was not at issue here, however, since Appellant was not in custody when he gave
the relevant statements at issue.
III. Even if Appellant was “in custody” when he was handcuffed,
the officer’s action in asking for consent to search did not
constitute “interrogation” for Miranda purposes
For the reasons noted above, the handcuffing did not constitute “custody”
for Miranda purposes. As such, there is no need to consider whether Appellant had
been interrogated when he was asked for consent to search the bag and case. But,
even if he was in “custody” when he was handcuffed and placed in the back of the
patrol car, Miranda warnings were still not required to be given since he was not
being interrogated when he was asked for consent to search the bag and case.
Interrogation, for Miranda purposes, “refers not only to express questioning,
but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely
to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446
U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980). However, the act
of asking for consent to search does not constitute interrogation since the act of
14
See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 604, 124 S.Ct. at 2605 (“This case tests a police protocol for custodial
interrogation that calls for giving no warnings of the rights to silence and counsel until
interrogation has produced a confession.”) (emphasis added); Martinez, 272 S.W.3d at 627 (“In
this case, the officers did not apprise appellant of his Miranda rights when they began custodial
interrogation and failed to apply any curative measures in order to ameliorate the harm caused
by the Miranda violation.”) (emphasis added).
20
granting consent is not, in and of itself, an incriminating statement or testimonial
for Fifth Amendment purposes. See U.S. v. Stevens, 487 F.3d 232, 242 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 936, 128 S. Ct. 336, 169 L. Ed. 2d 236 (2007); Jones v. State,
7 S.W.3d 172, 175 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d).
Sims’ act of asking for consent to search the bag and case was not
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from Appellant—and
Appellant’s act of granting consent to search did not constitute an incriminating
statement. After Appellant was placed in handcuffs and put in the patrol car, Sims
asked for and was granted verbal consent to search the bags.15 The next verbal
statement from Appellant that shows up in the record was Appellant’s waiver of
his Miranda rights and agreement to speak to Officer Sims.16 Since there was no
interrogation for Miranda purposes when Sims asked for and received consent to
search the bag and case, the granting of consent is admissible.
IV. Even if Appellant was “in custody” when some or all of the
relevant statements were given, the physical evidence, i.e., the
checkbook and other evidence, would not have been required
to be suppressed
The failure to give a suspect the Miranda warnings does not require
suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s unwarned but voluntary
statements. U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634, 124 S. Ct. 2620, 2624, 159 L. Ed. 2d
15
(RR vol. 3, pp. 125-26; vol. 4, p. 26).
16
(RR vol. 3, p. 128; vol. 4, p. 37).
21
667 (2004) (plur. op.); Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766, 773 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003); Baker v. State, 956 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997); In re H.V., 252
S.W.3d 319, 329 (Tex. 2008). In Patane, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
the nontestimonial fruit of a voluntary statement given in the absence of Miranda
warnings, i.e., the weapon that formed the basis of the defendant’s felon-in-
possession-of-firearm trial, was not required to be suppressed since the weapon
was recovered based on the suspect’s voluntary statements that he possessed it and
advising the officers where it could be found. Patane, 542 U.S. at 634-35, 643, 124
S. Ct. at 2624-25, 2630.
Even if Appellant had been in custody for Miranda purposes when the
checkbook and other physical evidence was located during the searches, that would
not require suppression of the physical evidence since Appellant voluntarily
consented to a search of the bag from which the physical evidence at issue was
located (as discussed in the preceding section of this brief). The evidence shows
that Appellant gave voluntary consent to search both his pockets17 and the bag and
case he had been carrying.18 There was never any argument presented during the
suppression hearing that his consent to search was involuntary. While Appellant
did argue at the conclusion of the suppression hearing that he could not make the
17
(RR vol. 3, pp. 122, 136; vol. 4, p. 23).
18
(RR vol. 3, pp. 125-26) (RR vol. 4, p. 26).
22
decision to consent without first being provided his Miranda warnings,19 that is not
the proper standard for determining voluntariness of consent. Instead, the question
in determining whether consent to search is voluntary is “whether the person’s
‘will ha[s] been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically
impaired,’ such that his consent to search must have been involuntary.” Meekins v.
State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
In light of the evidence showing that Appellant was cooperative throughout
the investigation, consented both to a search of his pockets and the bag and case he
had been carrying, and that he waived his Miranda warnings and agreed to speak
to Officer Sims, the evidence shows that Appellant’s consent to the search of the
bag was voluntary.20 Thus, because the consent to search the bag was voluntary,
the physical fruits of the unwarned but voluntary statements (the checkbook and
the identity of the owner of the checkbook) did not require suppression, even if the
un-Mirandized statements did require suppression.
Because the physical fruits of the unwarned but voluntary statements were
not required to be suppressed, any error in the admission of the un-Mirandized
statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (under a constitutional harm
19
(RR vol. 3, p. 158).
20
See generally Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 462-64 (determining that the consent to search was
voluntary in light of the defendant’s actions in cooperating with the officer by giving consent and
then stepping out of the vehicle so the officer could perform a search).
23
analysis21) since “the record does not support a conclusion that the trial court’s
error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.”22 This is so because
the improper un-Mirandized statements (if any) amounted to evidence that
Appellant gave inconsistent statements about who the debit cards belonged to and
where he found them (since the act of consenting to a search did not constitute
interrogation). The testimony about the inconsistent statements, however, did not
relate to the issue of whether Appellant possessed identifying information of the
victim without her consent and with the intent to harm or defraud her—which was
proven not by the un-Mirandized statements, but by the testimony that Appellant
possessed the checkbook without the victim’s consent after the checkbook had
been stolen from her. Therefore, any error from the erroneous admission of the un-
Mirandized statements did not “materially affect[] the jury’s deliberations”23 and
was therefore harmless.
21
See Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 777-83 (applying a Rule 44.2(a) constitutional harm analysis to a
Miranda violation).
22
See In re J.T.M., 441 S.W.3d 455, 463-66 (Tex. App.—El Paso, no pet.) (finding that the error
from admission of an un-Mirandized statement where the defendant admitted to having
additional marijuana in the Chevy Tahoe was harmless because there was sufficient evidence
affirmatively linking the defendant to the marijuana found in the vehicle even without his post-
arrest statement—with some of that evidence being the physical fruits of the first statement (i.e.,
the marijuana which the defendant removed from his pocket and placed on the hood of the patrol
car)).
23
Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 777.
24
V. The evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction
Appellant argues in his second issue that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to prove that Appellant fraudulently used or possessed identifying
information. In particular, he argues that without Officer Sims’ testimony, which
should have been suppressed, the evidence was insufficient to prove that Appellant
committed the offense of fraudulent use or possession of identifying information
because no witnesses were able to identify Appellant as the person who allegedly
burglarized vehicles.
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court views all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determines, based on that
evidence and any reasonable inferences therefrom, whether a rational jury could
have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Gear
v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), citing Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). “Sufficient
evidence is ‘such evidence, in character, weight, or amount, as will legally justify
the judicial or official action demanded.’ In criminal cases, only that evidence
which is sufficient in character, weight, and amount to justify a factfinder in
concluding that every element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt is adequate to support a conviction.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 917
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plur. op.) (Cochran, J., concurring). A sufficiency review
25
determines whether “the necessary inferences made by the trier of fact are
reasonable, based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence.” Adames v. State,
353 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
Appellant’s sufficiency argument is contingent upon his assertion that
Officer Sims’ testimony was improperly admitted into evidence. However, that
claim lacks merit for the reasons discussed in the preceding sections of this brief.
Appellant’s statements during the course of the investigation were properly
admitted during trial because Appellant was not in custody at the time the
statements at issue were given. And, the physical evidence and consent to search
obtained during the course of the investigation were properly admitted, even if the
statements were not, because the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine does not
require suppression of physical evidence obtained as a result of the un-Mirandized
statement.
Additionally, even if the statements and/or physical evidence were
improperly admitted, that would still not affect whether the evidence was sufficient
to support the conviction. In conducting a legal sufficiency review, courts
“‘determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based upon the
combined and cumulative force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict.’ [The] review of ‘all of the evidence’ includes evidence
that was properly and improperly admitted.” Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772,
26
778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (internal footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also
Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 774 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (stating that in
conducting a legal sufficiency analysis, a reviewing court “must consider the
cumulative force of all the evidence, including improperly admitted evidence.”)
(internal footnote omitted). Thus, even if the statements and/or physical evidence
was improperly admitted, the legal sufficiency review would still include both the
statements and physical evidence.
Under the proper standard, the evidence was legally sufficient to support the
conviction. To commit the offense of fraudulent use or possession of identifying
information (as alleged in the indictment here24), Appellant had to, with the intent
to harm or defraud another, and without the consent of Shirley Dron, possess
identifying information of Shirley Dron, i.e., her checkbook containing her name,
address, bank routing number, and account number. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §
32.51(b)(1). As shown from the trial testimony, Appellant possessed Shirley
Dron’s checkbook with the intent to harm or defraud her, and that the possession of
the identifying information was without Ms. Dron’s consent.25 Therefore, based on
the evidence admitted at trial (regardless of whether it was properly or improperly
admitted), any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
24
(CR p. 7).
25
(RR vol. 4, p. 60).
27
offense of fraudulent use or possession of identifying information beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
The trial court properly denied Appellant’s verbal motion to suppress and
allowed the admission of the statements into evidence during trial because the
statements were not given while Appellant was “in custody” for Miranda purposes.
Even if he was “in custody” for Miranda purposes, however, Appellant’s consent
to search the bag and case and the physical fruits of the search were not required to
be suppressed, even if some or all of Appellant’s pre-Miranda statements were
required to be suppressed. Any error in the “improper” admission of the pre-
Miranda statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the physical
fruits of the search were not required to be suppressed—which was the evidence
that led to Appellant’s conviction for the offense of fraudulent use or possession of
identifying information. Furthermore, the evidence was legally sufficient to
support the conviction since all the evidence admitted during trial, regardless of
whether it was properly or improperly admitted, is considered in a legal sufficiency
review.
Appellant’s first and second issues should be overruled.
28
Conclusion and Prayer
For the reasons stated above, no reversible error has been committed and the
State respectfully requests that the Court should affirm the judgment and sentence
in all things.
Respectfully submitted,
MATTHEW D. POWELL
Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 00784782
By: /s/ Jeffrey S. Ford
Jeffrey S. Ford
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Lubbock County, Texas
State Bar No. 24047280
P.O. Box 10536
Lubbock, Texas 79408
(806)775-1166
FAX (806)775-7930
E-mail: JFord@co.lubbock.tx.us
Certificate of Service
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing brief has been delivered to Julie
Panger, Attorney for Appellant, by e-mail delivery to julie@thelubbocklawyer.com
on July 14, 2015.
MATTHEW D. POWELL
Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 00784782
By: /s/ Jeffrey S. Ford
Jeffrey S. Ford
29
Certificate of Compliance
Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3), I further certify that, relying on the
word count of the computer program used to prepare the foregoing State’s
Response, this document contains 6,354 words, inclusive of all portions required
by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1) to be included in calculation of length of the document.
MATTHEW D. POWELL
Criminal District Attorney
State Bar No. 00784782
By: /s/ Jeffrey S. Ford
Jeffrey S. Ford
30