Jeff Kaiser, P.C. and Jeffery Benedict Kaiser, A/K/A Jeffrey B. Kaiser v. State

ACCEPTED
03-15-00019-CV
6315674
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
7/31/2015 3:49:43 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
No. 03-15-00019-CV
FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DAUSTIN,
ISTRICTTEXAS
AUSTIN, TEXAS 7/31/2015 3:49:43 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
JEFF KAISER, P.C. AND
JEFFERY BENEDICT KAISER
Appellants,
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee.
Appeal from the 98th District Court of Travis County, Texas,
No. D-1-GV-13-000790, Honorable John Wisser presiding
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
KEN PAXTON Sean M. O’Neill
Attorney General of Texas State Bar No. 24070354
Assistant Attorney General
CHARLES E. ROY sean.oneill@texasattorneygeneral.gov
First Assistant Attorney General Kevin R. Sauer
State Bar No. 24088355
JAMES E. DAVIS Assistant Attorney General
Deputy Attorney General kevin.sauer@texasattorneygeneral.gov
For Civil Litigation Bankruptcy & Collections Division
P.O. Box 12548, MC 008
RONALD R. DEL VENTO Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Assistant Attorney General Tel: (512) 475-4567
Chief, Bankruptcy & Collections Fax: (512) 936-1409
Division COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
ORAL ARGUMENT CONDITIONALLY REQUESTED
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a list of all parties to the proceedings in the trial court below,
together with the names and addresses of all counsel in accordance with Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(a):
Defendants/Appellants: Plaintiff/Appellee:
Jeff Kaiser, P.C. and Jeffery The State of Texas
Benedict Kaiser
Appellate Counsel Appellate Counsel
for Defendants/Appellants: for Plaintiff/Appellee:
George F. May Sean M. O’Neill
TWOMEY | MAY, PLLC Kevin R. Sauer
2 Riverway, 15th Floor OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Houston, Texas 77056 BANKRUPTCY & COLLECTIONS
DIVISION
P.O. Box 12548
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Trial Counsel Trial Counsel
for Defendants/Appellants: for Plaintiff/Appellee:
Jeffery B. Kaiser John C. Adams
JEFF KAISER, P.C. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Enterprise Bank Tower BANKRUPTCY & COLLECTIONS
2211 Norfolk St. Ste 528 DIVISION
Houston, Texas 77098 P.O. Box 12548
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Harold N. May
TWOMEY | MAY, PLLC
2 Riverway, 15th Floor
Houston, Texas 77056
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ....................................................... ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................. v
ABBREVIATIONS AND RECORD REFERENCES .........................................xi
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................................................................... xii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ....................................... xiii
ISSUES PRESENTED .......................................................................................xiv
STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................1
I. Appellants’ Late Filing of Tax Reports ............................................1
II. The State’s Filing of a Tax Lien and Suit .........................................1
III. Trial and Judgment ............................................................................2
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................................... 5
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES.................................................................... 7
I. Appellants Failed to Carry the Burden of Proof on
Their Affirmative Defense of Limitations ........................................7
A. Appellants failed to elicit evidence of a relevant
date for limitations that could make suit
untimely under section 111.202 ..............................................7
B. Under the plain language of section 111.202, the
State’s filing of a tax lien made suit timely ..........................10
C. Even under Appellants’ interpretation of section
111.202, Appellants failed to produce evidence
that limitations had run .........................................................17
D. Appellants’ alternative argument that a four year
limitations period under the Remedies Code
barred suit is contrary to express provisions of
the Remedies Code ...............................................................18
II. The State Offered Legally and Factually Sufficient
Evidence to Support the Trial Court’s Judgment
Awarding Delinquent Taxes ...........................................................19
iii
A. Appellants fail to address finding number nine,
which independently supports the trial court’s
judgment ...............................................................................19
B. The State introduced legally sufficient evidence
of the franchise tax delinquency at trial ................................20
C. The record contains factually sufficient evidence
of the franchise tax delinquency ...........................................23
D. The Trial Certificate, standing alone, is legally
and factually sufficient evidence of liability at
trial ........................................................................................25
III. The State Offered Legally Sufficient Evidence to
Support the Trial Court’s Award of $2,500.00 in
Attorney’s Fees ...............................................................................30
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .........................................................................36
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9.4......................................37
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................37
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page(s)
Ayeni v. State,
440 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.).................................27
Barras v. Barras,
396 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) ... 15
Bauer v. Williams,
No. 03-07-00494-CV, 2008 WL 3166311
(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 8, 2008, no pet.) ...............................................32
Bubnis v. Leander Indep. Sch. Dist.,
No. 03-13-00196-CV, 2015 WL 1478207
(Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 25, 2015, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) ......................23
Bullock v. American Heart Ass’n,
360 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) ....................15–16
Cain v. Bain,
709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986) ...............................................................23, 25
Calvert v. Eng’rs & Fabricators, Inc.,
440 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. App.—Austin 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ..................... 9
City of Keller v. Wilson,
168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) .....................................................................23
Crowson v. Crowson,
No. 03-11-00795-CV, 2013 WL 6665022
(Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 13, 2013, pet. denied) ................................15, 18
El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas,
370 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2012) ..................................................32, 33, 34, 35
Elkins v. State,
No. 03-98-00698-CV, 2000 WL 963160
(Tex. App.—Austin July 13, 2000, pet. denied) .......................................19
v
EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Davis,
167 S.W.3d 406 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet denied) ...........................30
Ferrant v. Graham Assocs., Inc.,
No. 02-12-00190-CV, 2014 WL 1875825
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 8, 2014, no pet.) ........................................33
Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc.,
960 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. 1998) .......................................................................21
Garibay v. State,
No. 03-01-00500-CV, 2002 WL 1992299
(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 30, 2002, no pet.) .............................................18
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Saenz,
873 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1993) ...............................................................27–28
Hatcher v. State,
81 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1935) .......................................................................14
Hertzberg v. Austin Diagnostic Clinic Assoc., P.A.,
No. 03-07-00072-CV, 2009 WL 2913620
(Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 11, 2009, no pet.) ............................................33
Horvath v. Hagey,
No. 03-09-00056-CV, 2011 WL 1744969
(Tex. App.—Austin May 6, 2011, no pet.) ...............................................20
Hylton v. State,
665 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. App.—Austin 1984, no writ) ................................26
In re A.B.P.,
291 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) ...................................30
Kawaja v. State,
No. 03-05-00491-CV, 2006 WL 1559343
(Tex. App.—Austin June 8, 2006, no pet.) .........................................26, 27
vi
Kinnard v. Braziel Cooler-Freezer Mfg., Inc.,
No. 10-06-00103-CV, 2007 WL 2315962
(Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 14, 2007, no pet.) ...................................31, 32, 35
Lawyers Sur. Corp. v. State,
825 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ) ..........................13, 14
Legere v. Legere,
No. 03-12-00046-CV, 2013 WL 692450
(Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 22, 2013, no pet.)..............................................32
Lund v. Giauque,
416 S.W.3d 122 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) .........................14
Metroplex Mailing Servs., LLC v. RR Donnelley & Sons Co.,
410 S.W.3d 889 (Tex. App—Dallas 2013, no pet.) ............................30, 34
Ocean Transp., Inc. v. Greycas, Inc.,
878 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) ........ 8, 10
Parker v. State,
36 S.W.3d 616 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.)...................................29
Parker v. State,
40 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.)...................................29
Penny v. State,
No. 03-97-00399-CV, 1998 WL 394173
(Tex. App.—Austin July 16, 1998, no pet.) (mem. op.) ...........................27
Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
772 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. 1989) .....................................................................23
Randall v. Goodall & Davison, P.C.,
No. 03-12-00005-CV, 2013 WL 3481518
(Tex. App.—Austin July 2, 2013, pet. denied) .........................................21
Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League,
801 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) ................................................30
vii
Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Invs., Inc.,
148 S.W.3d 143 (Tex. 2004) .....................................................................32
Shepherd v. Ledford,
962 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. 1998) .......................................................................16
Shields v. State,
27 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.)...................................19
Southwestern Bell Media, Inc. v. Lyles,
825 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) ..... 23
State v. Barbee,
No. 03-99-00560-CV, 2000 WL 766274
(Tex. App.—Austin June 15, 2000, pet. denied)...........................10, 11, 12
State v. Durham,
860 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. 1993) .......................................................................19
State v. Glass,
723 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e) ....................26
Sundance Oil Co. v. Aztec Pipe & Supply Co., Inc.,
576 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1978) ...............................................................28, 29
Sundown Farms, Inc. v. State,
89 S.W.3d 291 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.)...................................27
Vo Eng’g, Ltd., Co. v. Cai,
No. 03-13-00529-CV, 2015 WL 513269
(Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 4, 2015, no pet. h.)....................20–21, 22, 23, 25
Wilson v. State,
272 S.W.3d 686 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) ....................12, 13
Wimmer v. State,
No. 03-03-00135-CV, 2004 WL 210629
(Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 5, 2004, pet. denied) .........................................22
viii
Wood v. Pyramid Cmty. Dev. Corp.,
No. 14-13-00990-CV, 2014 WL 6602424
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 20, 2014, no pet.) ....................7, 8
Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc.,
769 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1988) ....................................................................... 7
RULES
Tex. R. App. P. 47.7 ............................................................................................11
Tex. R. Civ. P. 94.................................................................................................24
Tex. R. Civ. P. 185...............................................................................................28
Tex. R. Civ. P. 299...............................................................................................20
Tex. R. Evid. 406 .................................................................................................25
STATUTES
Tex. Gov’t Code § 2107.006 .........................................................................30, 34
Tex. Tax Code § 111.008.......................................................................................9
Tex. Tax Code § 111.013...................................................................19, 25, 27, 29
Tex. Tax Code § 111.016.....................................................................................29
Tex. Tax Code § 111.022.......................................................................................9
Tex. Tax Code § 111.060.....................................................................................22
Tex. Tax Code § 111.202..............................................................................passim
Tex. Tax Code § 111.207.....................................................................................17
Tex. Tax Code § 113.006.....................................................................................16
Tex. Tax Code § 171.152.......................................................................................3
ix
Tex. Tax Code § 171.255.................................................................................2, 29
x
ABBREVIATIONS AND RECORD REFERENCES
PARTIES:
“Appellee” or “State” means Plaintiff/Appellee the State of Texas.
“Appellants” means Defendants/Appellants Jeff Kaiser, P.C. and Jeffery Benedict
Kaiser.
“Jeffery Kaiser” means Appellant Jeffery Benedict Kaiser.
“Comptroller” means “The Comptroller of Public Accounts for the State of
Texas.”
RECORD REFERENCES:
Citations to the Clerk’s Record appear as...................................... “(CR [page#].)”
Citations to the Reporter’s Record appear as ... “([Vol #] RR [page#] at [line#].)”
Citations to Appellants’ Brief appear as .............................“(Kaiser Br. [page#].)”
xi
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case: Appellee, the State of Texas (the “State”), filed
suit to recover delinquent franchise taxes from
Jeff Kaiser, P.C. The State also brought suit
against the Corporation’s officer Jeffery Benedict
Kaiser (“Jeffery Kaiser”) to recover the
delinquent taxes under Texas Tax Code section
171.255.
Course of Proceedings: Trial was to the bench on October 27, 2014.
After the close of testimony, the court took the
case under advisement, issuing judgment on
December 2, 2014. Appellant requested findings
of fact and conclusions of law and the trial court
issued such findings and conclusions on
December 22, 2014.
Trial Court: The 98th District Court, Travis County, Texas;
the Honorable John Wisser, presiding.
Trial Court’s Disposition: The trial court entered final judgment for the
State. The final judgment found Appellants
jointly and severally liable to the State for
$34,776.53 in franchise tax and interest, $2,500
in attorney’s fees, as well as post-judgment
interest.
xii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellee does not believe that oral argument is necessary to resolve this appeal
because the appeal involves a limited record and Appellants’ primary issue
regarding the statute of limitations may be resolved by Appellants’ failure to
adduce any evidence to support the defense. However, if this Court determines
that oral argument is required, Appellee requests time to present their position to
the Court.
xiii
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Where Appellants adduced no evidence of a relevant date that fell more
than three years prior to suit, did they fail to carry their burden to establish
the affirmative defense of limitations under section 111.202 of the Texas
Tax Code?
2. Where the last filed tax lien was filed within three years of the State filing
suit, is suit timely under the plain language of section 111.202 of the Texas
Tax Code?
3. Where Appellants filed tax reports reciting an amount owed, did not plead
payment, and adduced no evidence of payment, was the Court’s judgment
that the tax debt remained due and owing legally and factually insufficient?
4. Where the State’s attorney testified about his experience, the complexity of
the case, the total amount of fees, and the reasonableness of the fees, was
there legally sufficient evidence to award $2,500.00 in attorney’s fees after
a bench trial?
xiv
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Appellants’ Late Filing of Tax Reports
Jeffery Benedict Kaiser (“Jeffery Kaiser”) is the sole officer and director of
Jeff Kaiser, P.C. (3 RR 26.) Jeff Kaiser, P.C. was incorporated in Texas in mid-
2001. (3 RR 25.) Jeff Kaiser, P.C. failed to file its initial franchise tax report. In
2003, the Comptroller of Public Accounts for the State of Texas (“Comptroller”)
forfeited Jeff Kaiser, P.C.’s corporate privileges for failure to file the report. (Id.)
In August of 2008, Jeffery Kaiser filed bankruptcy. (3 RR 26.) On
December 22, 2008, during the pendency of the bankruptcy, Jeffery Kaiser late-
filed franchise tax reports for Jeff Kaiser, P.C. for the reporting years of 2004,
2005, 2006, and 2007. (3 RR 25.) The reports showed $32,579.00 in franchise
tax due on gross receipts of more than one million dollars. (3 RR 10–11, 14–15,
17–18, 21–22.) Neither Jeffery Kaiser nor Jeff Kaiser, P.C. remitted the franchise
tax stated on those reports to the Comptroller. On July 15, 2009, Jeffery Kaiser’s
Chapter 7 bankruptcy case was concluded; he received a general discharge. (3
RR 26.)
II. The State’s Filing of a Tax Lien and Suit
On April 15, 2013, the Comptroller filed a State Tax Lien against Jeff
Kaiser, P.C. for the delinquent franchise taxes. (2 RR 12–13; 3 RR 8–9, 26.) On
August 2, 2013, the State of Texas (“State”) filed suit on behalf of the Comptroller
1
against Jeff Kaiser, P.C. and Jeffery Kaiser to recover the unpaid franchise taxes,
plus applicable penalties and interest. (CR 3–10.) The State alleged that Jeffery
Kaiser was individually liable for the unpaid franchise taxes under section
171.255 of the Texas Tax Code (“Tax Code”), which makes the officer of a
corporation whose corporate privileges have been forfeited for failure to file a
report individually liable for all debts of the corporation incurred after the due
date of the report. (CR 4.)
III. Trial and Judgment
The trial on the State’s claims was before Judge John Wisser, presiding
over the 98th District Court of Travis County, Texas. At trial, the State and
Appellants entered into evidence a Joint Stipulation that resolved numerous
factual issues. (2 RR 6 at 11–13; 3 RR 25–30.) Trail witnesses included Rose
Fitzgerald, an investigator from the Office of the Attorney General, and Jeffery
Kaiser.
Ms. Fitzgerald testified to her experience with the investigation of tax debts
owed to the Comptroller and her experience with the Comptroller’s mainframe
computer system. (2 RR 9–10.) In her testimony, she authenticated a Texas
Comptroller’s Certified Claim for Texas Franchise Tax (“Trial Certificate”),
which stated the amount of the State’s claim, and testified as to the calculation of
the interest that had accrued from the date included in the Trial Certificate to the
2
date of trial. (2 RR 10–11.) Ms. Fitzgerald also authenticated a computer
printout from the Comptroller’s mainframe system, which itemized the franchise
tax delinquency as of the date of trial, and the tax lien filed by the Comptroller on
April 15th, 2013. (2 RR 11–13.)
Mr. Kaiser testified that he was the “sole shareholder” of Jeff Kaiser, P.C.
and that he had signed and late-filed 1 the franchise tax reports for Jeff Kaiser, P.C.
for the reporting years of 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 on December 22, 2008. (2
RR 14–21.) Mr. Kaiser noted that the reports included interlineations that
involved a line drawn through the amount owed and a zero written to the side.
(Id.) Mr. Kaiser testified that he had not made the interlineations. (Id.)
The State’s attorney, John Adams, recalled Ms. Fitzgerald to inquire about
the interlineations. (2 RR 23–24.) She testified that an interlineated zero
indicated that the reported amount was not paid when the report was filed and that
the Comptroller’s practice when a taxpayer files a report but doesn’t remit
payment is “[g]enerally, this very thing, we’ll either draw a line across the amount
that is due and put a zero on there to show no payments were paid towards this
amount.” (2 RR 25–26.)
1
The correct due dates for these franchise tax reports were March 15, 2004, March 15, 2005,
March 15, 2006, and March 15, 2007 respectively. Tex. Tax. Code § 171.152(c).
3
Mr. Adams then testified as to attorney’s fees. He first addressed his
experience and noted that the case was “somewhat more complex” than the
average tax case because it involved issues of the effect of bankruptcy on
franchise taxes and the application of a statute of limitations. (2 RR 27–28.) He
testified that he had spent at least 10 hours “working on legal research, reviewing
the documents, drafting and preparing for a hearing on a motion for summary
judgment and attending the motion for summary judgment hearing.” (2 RR 28.)
He then testified that his time would be “worth at least” $250.00 per hour. (2 RR
29.) Appellants’ counsel moved to strike Mr. Adams’ testimony, arguing that Mr.
Adams was required to produce detailed time records. (2 RR 29–31.) Appellants’
counsel did not secure a ruling on Appellants’ oral motion to strike. (2 RR 31 at
12–14.)
After testimony was complete, Appellants’ counsel moved to withdraw
stipulation number 12, which stated that the “franchise taxes delinquent from Jeff
Kaiser, P.C. are accurately stated and quantified in Exhibit B to Plaintiffs Original
Petition[.]” (2 RR 33–34; 3 RR 26.) The State agreed to withdrawal of the
stipulation. (2 RR 34 at 21–22.) The trial court subsequently entered judgment
for the State for $34,776.53 in franchise taxes and $2,500.00 in attorney’s fees.
(CR 81.) Pursuant to Appellants’ request, the trial court issued findings of fact
and conclusions of law. (CR 82–87.) The trial court’s findings include a finding
4
that on “the date of trial of this case, the sum of $34,776.53 in franchise taxes,
penalties and interest was due from Jeff Kaiser, P.C.” (CR 85.) Appellants then
timely initiated this appeal. (CR 88–89.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellants argue that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the State’s
claims on the basis of limitations. Appellants fail to acknowledge that, as an
affirmative defense, the burden was on Appellants to establish their defense of
limitations. Under the relevant statute, section 111.202 of the Tax Code, the State
has three years to file suit from 1) the date a deficiency determination becomes
due, 2) the date a jeopardy determination becomes due, or 3) the last filing of a
tax lien. Appellants offered no evidence of the date a deficiency or jeopardy
determination became due, and the only evidence of a tax lien was a lien filed
within months of suit. Because Appellants failed to offer, let alone seek admission
of, evidence that would demonstrate that a limitations period began more than
three years prior to suit, they could not carry their burden to show that one expired
prior to suit.
In any event, under the plain language of section 111.202, the State’s filing
of a tax lien made suit timely. The statute allows suit within three years of the
last filed lien. Because the State’s first lien was filed less than four months prior
to suit, suit was timely under the statute.
5
Appellants also argue that the trial court’s judgment was 1) based solely on
the prima facie evidentiary effect of the Comptroller’s Trial Certificate and 2) that
the admission of tax reports with interlineations vitiated any evidentiary effect of
the Trial Certificate. Appellants are wrong on both counts. The trial court made
a finding of fact sufficient to support entry of the judgment, which stated that on
“the date of trial of this case, the sum of $34,776.53 in franchise taxes, penalties
and interest was due from Jeff Kaiser, P.C.” (CR 85.) Nothing in that finding
requires reference to the Trial Certificate. Because the finding was supported by
legally and factually sufficient evidence, including tax reports filed by Jeffery
Kaiser stating the amounts due and a document from the Comptroller stating the
current balance, the judgment is supported by legally and factually sufficient
evidence without reference to the Trial Certificate.
The Trial Certificate, however, independently supports the judgment.
Appellants assert that the admission of tax reports with interlineations by the
Comptroller eliminates the prima facie effect of the Trial Certificate. This Court
has held that the heavy burden placed on a taxpayer opposing a Comptroller’s
certificate at trial requires the taxpayer to conclusively establish that he owes no
tax. The State admitted testimony that the Comptroller’s practice is to make
interlineations identical to those in Appellants’ reports when payment is not
remitted with filed reports. Therefore, there is evidence that such interlineations
6
are consistent with the existence, not absence, of Appellants’ tax liability.
Because Appellants did not conclusively prove that they owed no tax, the Trial
Certificate is sufficient evidence to support entry of the judgment.
Finally, Appellants challenge the award of $2,500.00 in attorney’s fees,
asserting that the absence of documentary evidence requires reversal.
Documentary evidence is not a prerequisite in Texas to recovery of traditional
attorney’s fees. Because the State’s attorney testified to his experience, the
complexity of the case, the services he performed, and that $2,500.00 was a
reasonable fee for those services, the award of attorney’s fees is proper.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. Appellants Failed to Carry the Burden of Proof on Their Affirmative
Defense of Limitations
A. Appellants failed to elicit evidence of a relevant date for
limitations that could make suit untimely under section 111.202.
Appellants had the burden of proof at trial to prove that the State did not
timely file suit; they failed to carry this burden. Wood v. Pyramid Cmty. Dev.
Corp., No. 14-13-00990-CV, 2014 WL 6602424, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] Nov. 20, 2014, no pet.) (citing, inter alia, Woods v. William M.
Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1988). Under section 111.202 of the
Tax Code, suit is timely if filed within 3 years after a deficiency or jeopardy
determination has become due and payable or within 3 years after the last
7
recording of a state tax lien. Tex. Tax Code § 111.202. Because Appellants did
not offer any evidence of the date a deficiency or jeopardy determination became
due and payable and because the first recording of a state tax lien occurred within
three years of suit, the trial court did not err in denying Appellants’ affirmative
defense. Ocean Transp., Inc. v. Greycas, Inc., 878 S.W.2d 256, 268 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1994, writ denied) (overruling defendant’s limitations challenge
following jury trial where defendant failed to prove when limitations accrued).
Surprisingly, Appellants admit that no evidence of the date of a deficiency
determination or jeopardy determination was adduced at trial. (Kaiser Br. 15, 17,
23, 25, 26, 31.) Appellants fail to appreciate that they bore the relevant burden to
admit this evidence.2 Wood, 2014 WL 6602424, at *9.
At trial and on appeal, Appellants make the awkward legal argument that
their failure to produce any evidence as to the date a deficiency or jeopardy
determination became due means that limitations should run from the date that
2
Appellants erroneously assert that the absence of evidence of the date of a deficiency or
jeopardy determination means that no determination or assessment occurred. (Kaiser Br. 25
(“The Comptroller did not audit, assess, or otherwise disagree with the tax due on the reports
filed by Jeff Kaiser, P.C.”); Kaiser Br. 26 (“There was no timely assessment of additional taxes,
no jeopardy determination, and no deficiency determination.”).) This is a logical fallacy.
Where the only burden either side had was Appellants’ burden to establish the date of a jeopardy
or deficiency determination, their failure to do so cannot establish non-occurrence of a
determination.
8
Appellants chose to late-file their franchise tax reports. (Kaiser Br. 18, 22, 23.)
But that date has no support in the text of the statute. Tex. Tax Code § 111.202.3
Section 111.202 has three specific dates that are relevant to limitations: the
date a deficiency determination became due and payable, the date that a jeopardy
determination became due and payable, or the last filing of a lien. The filing date
of a late-filed tax report is none of these. The Tax Code makes clear that a
deficiency determination occurs after the Comptroller exercises his discretion and
determines he “is not satisfied with a tax report or the amount required to be paid”
in the report. Tex. Tax Code § 111.008. Similarly, a jeopardy determination is a
discretionary determination when the “comptroller believes” collection is
jeopardized by delay. Tex. Tax Code § 111.022. Appellants’ unilateral action of
late-filing cannot automatically trigger either of these discretionary
determinations.
Appellants could have elicited testimony as to the date of any deficiency or
jeopardy determination, but did not. Such determinations are generally noticed
by virtue of a letter sent to the taxpayer, a record of which is kept by the
Comptroller. Tex. Tax Code § 111.008(b). Thus, Kaiser himself could have
3
Furthermore, this Court has considered this argument under pre-codification tax statutes and
rejected it because such an interpretation would render “the four-year period for making
deficiency determinations . . . meaningless.” See Calvert v. Eng’rs & Fabricators, Inc., 440
S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. App.—Austin 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (interpreting Article 20 of Title
122A, Taxation-General, the predecessor to the Texas Tax Code).
9
testified to the date he received such a letter. Or Appellants could have questioned
the State’s witness, Rose Fitzgerald, as to the date either determination was made.
Or Appellants could have propounded discovery on the State and then admitted
Comptroller records into evidence. Appellants took none of these actions; instead
Appellants asserted that limitations ran from a date with no support in section
111.202. In doing so, Appellants failed to establish the defense of limitations.
See Ocean Transp., 878 S.W.2d at 268 (overruling defendant’s limitations
challenge following jury trial where defendant failed to prove when limitations
accrued).
B. Under the plain language of section 111.202, the State’s filing of
a tax lien made suit timely.
The plain language of section 111.202 states that the Comptroller “may
bring an action in the courts of this state” to recover taxes “at any time within
three years after the last recording of a lien.” Tex. Tax Code § 111.202. It is
uncontested that the State filed its first tax lien against Jeff Kaiser, P.C. on April
15, 2013 and filed suit on August 2, 2013. (See 3 RR 26.) Under the plain
language of the statute, suit was filed within three years after the last recording of
a lien and was therefore timely. See State v. Barbee, No. 03-99-00560-CV, 2000
WL 766274, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin June 15, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated
for publication) (holding suit timely because lien was filed within three years after
the last recording of a lien).
10
Appellants assert that the statute’s plain language cannot be taken at face
value. But that is exactly what this Court did in Barbee, the only case to consider
the lien language. 4 There, the taxpayer asserted that limitations on one of the
State’s claims had run in 1992, more than three years before the State filed suit,
because a “Tax Statement of Account” sent out in 1989 was a deficiency or
jeopardy determination. Barbee, 2000 WL 766274, at *4. While the State
disputed the taxpayer’s characterization of the notice and argued that later notices
issued in 1994 constituted the original deficiency determination, the Barbee Court
held that, “more importantly,” the suit was timely because the State had filed its
first lien against Barbee in 1995, less than “nine months before it filed suit.” Id.
The Barbee Court made it clear that the 1995 lien and the 1994 deficiency notices
each made suit timely without regard to whether a deficiency or jeopardy
determination was made more than three years earlier in 1989:
Even if we were to assume Barbee is correct that the
October 1989 “Statement of Account” was a deficiency or
jeopardy determination for purposes of section 111.202,
the State nevertheless filed its lien against Barbee on
February 20, 1995, just nine months before it filed suit.
Because it filed suit within three years after this “last
recording of a lien” and within three years after sending
Barbee the “Notices of Tax Due,” we conclude that the
State’s suit on the March 1989 taxes is not barred by any
statute of limitations.
4
Barbee was issued prior to January 1, 2003 and was not designated for publication. It is
therefore not binding precedent on this Court, but may be cited and considered for its persuasive
value. Tex. R. App. P. 47.7.
11
Id. This holding in Barbee is entirely consistent with the result reached by the
trial court below. The State filed its first lien on April 15, 2013 and the State filed
suit on August 2, 2013, less than four months later. (See 3 RR 26.) As in Barbee,
“the State’s suit [for] taxes is not barred by any statute of limitations.” 2000 WL
766274, at *4.
Barbee is incompatible with Appellants argument that the State “must
initiate a lawsuit within three years of the date the taxes were due” unless “the
State files a lien against the taxpayer within the limitations period[.]” 5 (Kaiser
Br. at 13.) In Barbee, the taxes at issue were “due and payable in March 1989,”
but the State’s first lien was not filed until 1995, more than three years later. 2000
WL 766274, at *3–4.
Choosing not to address Barbee, Appellants cite Wilson v. State, 272
S.W.3d 686 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied), and imply that its statement
that “the Comptroller may bring an action . . . within three years after the
deficiency has become due and payable” stands for the proposition that the date a
tax becomes due and payable triggers the running of a three-year limitations
5
Appellants’ interpretation of the statute is a moving target. (Compare, e.g., Kaiser Br. at 17–
18 (“the State had three years from the date the taxes were due to file either a lien or a lawsuit”)
with Kaiser Br. at 31 (“A lien must be filed during the [four year] time in which a tax may be
assessed . . .”)). The above quoted formulation is the interpretation set forth in Appellants’
“Issues Presented.” (Kaiser Br. at 13).
12
period. (Kaiser Br. at 30 (arguing that limitations should run from the “day a late
report is filed[,]” because that is when the tax became “due and payable”).)
Wilson provides no support for this proposition. Appellants’ citation to Wilson is
selective and misleading; the following sentence in the opinion clarifies that the
relevant date the “deficiency has become due and payable” for section 111.202
purposes, absent tolling, was August 18, 2003. Wilson, 272 S.W.3d at 689
(emphasis added). A brief review of the facts recited in Wilson makes plain that
August 18, 2003 was the date a deficiency determination became due, not the date
the underlying taxes—for the period from April 1999 through January 2003—
became due. Id. at 687 (“[The] Comptroller . . . commenced a sales tax audit of
Wilson Nursery for the period of April 1, 1999, through January 31, 2003” and
“the Comptroller sent Wilson Nursery a notification of audit results. The
notification stated that . . . the amount would become final on August 18,
2003[.]”). Thus, Wilson provides no support to Appellants’ argument; instead, it
reinforces a plain language interpretation of section 111.202.
Appellants also cite to dicta from Lawyers Surety Corporation v. State, 825
S.W.2d 802 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ). (Kaiser Br. 27–29.) The issue
in Lawyers Surety was not construction of section 111.202; instead, the issue was
whether section 111.202 applied to the claim at all. Lawyers Sur., 825 S.W.2d at
803. In Lawyers Surety, the State brought suit against a surety to recover the value
13
of bonds issued by the surety to secure gasoline and diesel fuel taxes. Id. at 802–
03. The State expressly conceded that, as to the taxpayer, limitations had run and
barred suit, but argued that the claim against the surety was not barred. Id. at 803.
The Lawyers Surety Court held that the bond was “simply collateral security and
incidental to the taxpayer’s statutory obligation” and that under controlling
Supreme Court precedent “action is also barred on the bond” where “when suit is
barred for breach” of the taxpayer’s liability. Id. (citing Hatcher v. State, 81
S.W.2d 499 (Tex. 1935)). The language cited by Appellants is obiter dictum
arising after this Court had already found its decision governed by controlling
Supreme Court authority and merely supplies additional rationale for the
proposition that if limitations “is established, it should apply to the surety as well
as the principal[,]” which is an issue not present in this case. Id. at 804; see also
Lund v. Giauque, 416 S.W.3d 122, 129 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.)
(“Obiter dictum is a statement not necessary to the determination of the case and
that is neither binding nor precedential.”).
Appellants also contend for the first time on appeal that, because the lien
enumerated only the 2004 taxes, it is only applicable to limitations for that year.6
(Kaiser Br. 33.) Appellants are estopped from making this argument because they
6
Again, this argument ignores the fact that it was Appellants’ burden to prove limitations.
Wood, 2014 WL 6602424, at *9.
14
stipulated that the lien was “for the delinquent Franchise Taxes.” (3 RR 26.)
Other stipulations make clear that the language “the delinquent Franchise Taxes”
refers to all taxes sued upon and not merely those arising in a particular year. (See
3 RR 25–26 (Joint Exhibit 1, referring to the “franchise taxes” that are
“delinquent” as those that were those included in the Comptroller’s certificate,
which references all four years, which was attached to the joint exhibit).)
Appellants also waived this argument because they did not make it below, 7 did
not challenge an express finding that the lien was “for the taxes . . . owed . . . for
the tax years 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007,” and because they do not cite to a single
case or statute in their brief to support the argument. See Crowson v. Crowson,
No. 03-11-00795-CV, 2013 WL 6665022, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 13,
2013, pet. denied) (holding that an alternative argument that document failed to
meet a particular statutory requirement was waived by appellant’s failure to raise
the claim in trial court); Barras v. Barras, 396 S.W.3d 154, 169 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (failure to request additional or amended
findings of fact relevant to defendant’s limitations defense waived the defense);
Bullock v. American Heart Ass’n, 360 S.W.3d 661, 665 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012,
7
In the trial transcript, there are only three references to the year 2004; each of those involves
the 2004 tax report, not the lien. (2 RR 16 at 9–11, 17 at 3–12.)
15
pet. denied) (“Failure to cite legal authority or provide substantive analysis of the
legal issue presented results in waiver of the complaint.”).
In any event, any tax lien “is sufficient to cover all taxes of any nature”
accrued “before or after the filing of the notice.” Tex. Tax Code § 113.006.8
Thus, the lien filed for the 2004 franchise tax report year also secures Appellants’
unpaid taxes for the report years 2005, 2006, and 2007. Appellants’ argument
would lead to the absurd result that a lien, which when foreclosed would allow
recovery of all taxes at issue, would be insufficient for limitations purposes as to
those same taxes. No language in section 111.202 supports Appellants’ argument.
Rather, section 111.202 allows suit to recover the “amount delinquent[,]” not the
amount enumerated in a lien. Tex. Tax Code § 111.202. The Court should reject
Appellants’ argument that the lien is only relevant to limitations for a claim for
2004 taxes because Appellants are estopped from making this argument by their
own stipulation and because the argument is not supported by any provision of
the Tax Code. See Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Tex. 1998) (holding
that defendants were estopped from re-arguing facts that appeared in a stipulation
to the trial court because such facts were “judicially admitted”).
8
This is also clearly stated on the lien admitted into evidence in this case. (3 RR 8.)
16
C. Even under Appellants’ interpretation of section 111.202,
Appellants failed to produce evidence that limitations had run.
Though Appellants construction of the statute below and on appeal is
inconsistent, they admit that a lien is valid for limitations purposes if filed within
the four year assessment period. (Kaiser Br. 31 (“A lien must be filed during the
time in which a tax may be assessed . . .”), 40 (“If the State had, before [the date
assessment limitations expired,] filed a lien, the State could have extended the
time it had to initiate this action . . .”).) Appellants argue that the assessment
period 9 began running on December 22, 2008, when they late-filed their reports.
But Appellants ignore Tax Code section 111.207, which states that a “bankruptcy
case . . . suspends the running of the period . . . for the assessment of any tax.”
Tex. Tax Code § 111.207. Here, the franchise tax reports were filed during the
pendency of Jeff Kaiser’s bankruptcy, which was concluded on July 15, 2009. (3
RR 26, 28 (Joint Exhibit 1, stipulations No. 14, No.16, and discharge document).)
Thus, the assessment period would only begin to run on July 16, 2009 and would
then conclude on July 16, 2013, three months after the State filed its lien. (CR
85.) Because Appellants concede that a lien filed within the assessment window
is valid for limitations purposes and the stipulated facts demonstrate that the lien
was filed within that assessment window, suit could not be barred by limitations.
(Kaiser Br. 31–32; 3 RR 26.)
17
D. Appellants’ alternative argument that a four year limitations
period under the Remedies Code barred suit is contrary to
express provisions of the Remedies Code.
Appellants briefly argue that, if this suit is not barred by Tax Code section
111.202, “the Court should . . . find the State’s claims subject to the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, section 16.004’s 4-year statute of limitations on the
collection of a debt or the 4-year residual statute of limitations in section 16.051.”
(Kaiser Br. at 33.) As with many arguments raised in Appellants’ brief, this
argument was not asserted below, and is therefore waived. See Crowson, 2013
WL 6665022, at *7. But even if not waived, the argument is easily rebutted. The
State is never subject to the limitations periods provided by either of these statutes.
Under section 16.061 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, “[a] right
of action of this state or a political subdivision of the state . . . is not barred by any
of the following sections: 16.001–16.004, [and] 16.051[.]” See Garibay v. State,
No. 03-01-00500-CV, 2002 WL 1992299, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 30,
2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (rejecting application of statute of
limitations found in section 16.003 of the Civil Practices and Remedies Code to
the State’s tort claim to recover unpaid taxes on the basis of section 16.061). Thus,
absent any restrictions imposed by the Tax Code, the State would not be subject
9
Assessment limitations was not pled as a defense, nor was it raised at trial. (CR 11–12.)
Additionally, Appellants did not seek or secure any finding related to an assessment limitations
defense. (CR at 82–87.)
18
to sections 16.004 or 16.051, and as with other debts, could never be barred from
collecting a tax debt. See Elkins v. State, No. 03-98-00698-CV, 2000 WL 963160
at *2, n. 3 (Tex. App.—Austin July 13, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for
publication) (holding that under section 16.061, claim by State to recoup student
loan debt was not subject to limitations); c.f. Shields v. State, 27 S.W.3d 267, 275
(Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (citing State v. Durham, 860 S.W.2d 63, 67
(Tex. 1993) for the general proposition that “the State in its sovereign capacity is
not subject to the defense of limitations”).
II. The State Offered Legally and Factually Sufficient Evidence to
Support the Trial Court’s Judgment Awarding Delinquent Taxes
A. Appellants fail to address finding number nine, which
independently supports the trial court’s judgment.
In Section III of their brief, Appellants challenge the legal and factual
sufficiency of the State’s evidence at trial. (Kaiser Br. 34–38.) Appellants’
argument rests on a flawed assumption that the trial court’s judgment necessarily
relies only on the prima facie evidence provided by the Comptroller’s Trial
Certificate pursuant to Tax Code section 111.013 of the Tax Code. (See Kaiser
Br. 19, 35, 37, 41 (repeatedly arguing that State “relied entirely upon the
presumption” and “introduced no other evidence”).) Appellants appear to
argue—without citation to supporting authority—that the inclusion of a
conclusion of law stating that the Trial Certificate constituted prima facie
19
evidence means that 1) the trial court did not consider or weigh any other
evidence, and 2) that the judgment may only be supported by the Trial Certificate.
(See Kaiser Br. 11, 13, 19, 36, 37, 38, 41 (arguing that the trial court “did not
engage in any weighing of the evidence”).) Appellants’ argument requires this
Court to ignore not only case law regarding omitted findings 10, but also an express
finding by the trial court that on “the date of trial of this case, the sum of
$34,776.53 in franchise taxes, penalties and interest was due from Jeff Kaiser,
P.C.” 11 (CR 85.) The finding makes no mention of the Trial Certificate or prima
facie evidence and itself independently supports the judgment. The trial court’s
judgment should be affirmed because there is legally and factually sufficient
evidence, beyond the Trial Certificate, to support this finding.
B. The State introduced legally sufficient evidence of the franchise
tax delinquency at trial.
To successfully challenge the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on
which Appellants did not have the burden of proof at trial, they “must demonstrate
that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding.” Vo Eng’g, Ltd., Co. v.
10
An appellate court presumes any omitted findings favorable to the judgment where: (1) an
element of the ground of recovery was included in the findings of fact; (2) the omitted element
has not been properly requested; and (3) the omitted finding is supported by the evidence. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 299; Horvath v. Hagey, No. 03–09–00056–CV, 2011 WL 1744969, at *6 (Tex.
App.—Austin May 6, 2011, no pet.).
11
Given the existence of this finding, Appellants’ assertion that “[t]he trial court’s [sic] made
no finding of fact concerning the evidence of delinquency” is baseless. (Kaiser Br. 36–37.)
20
Cai, No. 03-13-00529-CV, 2015 WL 513269, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 4,
2015, no pet. h.). Anything more than a mere scintilla of evidence is legally
sufficient to support a finding. Id. (citing Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio
Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998)); see also Randall v.
Goodall & Davison, P.C., No. 03-12-00005-CV, 2013 WL 3481518, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Austin July 2, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reversing trial court’s grant
of summary judgment dismissing negligence claims because plaintiff produced
more than a mere scintilla of evidence in response to defendant’s no-evidence
summary judgment motion).
Contrary to Appellants’ claim that “[t]he State introduced no evidence other
than the Comptroller’s ‘trial’ certificate,” the State introduced ample evidence of
Appellants’ franchise tax delinquency at trial.12 (See Kaiser Br. 37.) At trial, in
addition to the Trial Certificate, (3 RR 5), the State introduced a printout from the
Comptroller’s mainframe system showing the franchise tax delinquency as of the
date of trial, (3 RR 7), and copies of Jeff Kaiser, P.C.’s Texas Corporation
Franchise Tax Reports for the 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 reporting years signed
by Appellant Jeffery Kaiser, (3 RR 10–11, 14–15, 17–18, 21–22).13 These
12
Appellants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support Jeffery Kaiser’s
individual liability for the debts of Jeff Kaiser, P.C.
13
Appellee additionally introduced a document reflecting the interest calculation from the date
of the Trial Certificate to the date of trial (3 RR 6.)
21
documents were admitted into evidence without objection. (2 RR 12 at 5–8, 21
at 19–22.)
Appellant Jeffery Kaiser admitted at trial that he signed the Franchise Tax
Reports for the 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 reporting years on behalf of Jeff
Kaiser, P.C. (2 RR 17 at 3–5, 18 at 2–4, 19 at 8–11, 20 at 7–8.) The Franchise
Tax Reports stated the amount of franchise tax due, the Comptroller’s printout
demonstrated that the amount remained delinquent, and section 111.060 of the
Tax Code provides the rate at which interest accrues on such delinquent taxes.
The evidence is much more than a scintilla; the trial court could have relied on
these documents, taken judicial notice of the pre-judgment interest section of the
Tax Code, and calculated the exact amount awarded. See, e.g., Vo Eng’g, 2015
WL 513269, at *2; see also Wimmer v. State, No. 03-03-00135-CV, 2004 WL
210629, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 5, 2004, pet. denied) (affirming
calculation of interest on tax claim by court).
22
C. The record contains factually sufficient evidence of the franchise
tax delinquency.
To mount a successful challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence
on an issue, Appellants must show that the finding is “so contrary to the evidence
as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.” Vo Eng’g, 2015 WL 513269, at *2
(citing Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986)). In making its
determination, a reviewing court must consider all evidence supporting and
contradicting the challenged finding. Bubnis v. Leander Indep. Sch. Dist., No.
03-13-00196-CV, 2015 WL 1478207, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 25, 2015,
no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (citing Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442,
445 (Tex. 1989)) (overruling factual sufficiency challenge to judgment rendered
following jury verdict). Where trial is to the bench, the trial court is the “sole
judge of the credibility of the witnesses” and “[a]s long as the evidence falls
‘within the zone of reasonable disagreement,’” appellate courts should not
substitute their judgment for that of the trial court. Vo Eng’g, 2015 WL 513269,
at *2 (citing Southwestern Bell Media, Inc. v. Lyles, 825 S.W.2d 488, 493 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168
S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005)).
Appellants’ factual sufficiency challenge appears to be based on
handwritten interlineations of lines through the amount of tax due stated on each
of the four Texas Franchise Reports and the appearance of “0’s” next to those
23
lines. (See Kaiser Br. 35, 37–38; 3 RR 10, 14, 17, 21.) Appellants claim that
“[t]he State’s sole fact witness testified that she had reviewed but no personal
knowledge [sic] of the statement made in the Comptroller’s certificate, and
admitted that the Comptroller’s office had altered the tax reports to put ‘zero’ as
the tax due without explanation.”14 (See Kaiser Br. 35 (citing 2 RR 26–27).) This
is a misstatement of the trial testimony and ignores the substance of the State’s
fact witness’s testimony.
The State presented testimony from Rose Fitzgerald, an investigator at the
Office of the Attorney General’s Bankruptcy and Collections Division with
knowledge of the practices of the Comptroller derived from over 20 years of
experience handling collections of delinquent taxes. (2 RR 24 at 15–17.) Ms.
Fitzgerald testified that when a taxpayer files a tax report, but fails to remit
payment with that report, Comptroller’s staff will generally “draw a line across
the amount that is due and put a zero on there to show no payments were paid
towards this amount.” (2 RR 24 at 21–25, 25 at 1.) Despite the existence of this
clear and direct explanation, Appellants have not merely ignored Ms. Fitzgerald’s
14
Appellants never proposed a factual scenario that explains how interlineations made by the
Comptroller to tax returns filed by Jeffery Kaiser could alter Appellants’ liability. To the extent
Appellants argue that the interlineations could create a fact issue as to whether the Comptroller
released or discharged Jeff Kaiser, P.C.’s liability or that Jeff Kaiser, P.C. paid the tax, these
are all affirmative defenses that were not pled or argued and would be Appellants’ burden to
establish. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 94 (“In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, . . . discharge in bankruptcy, . . . payment, release, . . .
waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”).
24
testimony, they have baldly asserted that Ms. Fitzgerald “admitted that the
Comptroller’s officer had altered the tax reports to put ‘zero’ as the tax due
without explanation.” (Kaiser Br. 16 (emphasis added).)
Ms. Fitzgerald’s testimony provided evidence that the Comptroller’s
routine practice is to mark out the amount due and put a zero next to that amount
when a taxpayer submits a report without making a payment. See Tex. R. Evid.
406.15 This explanation fully accounts for the interlineations in a manner that
supports the continued existence of the debt and therefore the judgment. Even if
reasonable minds could disagree as to the credibility of Ms. Fitzgerald’s testimony
or the meaning of the interlineations on the Franchise Tax Reports, under the
proper standard of review, Appellants’ factual sufficiency challenge must fail
because the trial court’s finding that the franchise tax debt remained due is not “so
contrary to the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.” See Vo
Eng’g, 2015 WL 513269, at *2 (citing Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d at 176).
D. The Trial Certificate, standing alone, is legally and factually
sufficient evidence of liability at trial.
Independent of the legal and factual sufficiency argument above, the Trial
Certificate is, pursuant to section 111.013 of the Tax Code, prima facie evidence
15
“Habit; Routine Practice – Evidence of a person's habit or an organization's routine practice
may be admitted to prove that on a particular occasion the person or organization acted in
accordance with the habit or routine practice. The court may admit this evidence regardless of
whether it is corroborated or whether there was an eyewitness.” Tex. R. Evid. 406.
25
of the debt sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. Citing law related to
other statutes and to judicially-created presumptions, while ignoring cases
addressing the very statute at issue here, Appellants erroneously argue that the
Trial Certificate has no evidentiary value because the interlineations on the reports
created a “fact issue” as to liability. (Kaiser Br. 11, 19, 36–37, 41.) As this
Court’s precedent makes clear, a Comptroller’s certificate is sufficient to support
a judgment even where a defendant admits evidence to dispute the tax liability.
This Court has long held that to overcome the prima facie effect of
Comptroller’s certificates “the taxpayer must conclusively establish that he owes
no tax.” Kawaja v. State, No. 03-05-00491-CV, 2006 WL 1559343, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Austin June 8, 2006, no pet.) (citing State v. Glass, 723 S.W.2d 325, 327
(Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The taxpayer must present “evidence
tending to support the contrary as would be conclusive, or evidence which would
be so clear and positive it would be unreasonable not to give effect to it as
conclusive.” Id. (citing Hylton v. State, 665 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Tex. App.—Austin
1984, no writ)). In Kawaja, the defendant, by affidavit, stated that his business
records were destroyed by a flood, that he applied a low markup on beer, and that
he had never sold tobacco products, presumably challenging the basis for the
audit. Id. at *2–3. This Court held that defendant had not overcome the prima
facie effect of the Comptroller’s certificate because he had not “come forward
26
with evidence conclusively establishing that he owed no tax.” Id. at *2. Here,
Appellants did not come forward with any testimony suggesting that they did not
owe tax and Appellants have never contended that they paid the franchise taxes
they reported owing to the Comptroller. Instead, they rely on interlineations in
tax documents for which the record contains an explanation that does not relieve
them of liability. See supra, at II.C. Because Appellants’ evidence is far less
conclusive than evidence this Court has previously found insufficient to defeat
judgment based on a Comptroller’s certificate,16 the evidence cannot require
reversal here.
Appellants largely ignore cases addressing section 111.013 of the Tax
Code. Instead they cite to a case involving a judicially-created presumption for
their argument that “when the party benefiting from a presumption introduces
evidence contrary to the evidence on which the presumption is based, the
presumption is lost.” (See Kaiser Br. 35 (citing to Gen. Motors Corp. v. Saenz,
16
See also Ayeni v. State, 440 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (holding
that affidavits which attached sales tax returns and vendor receipts were insufficient to defeat
summary judgment because they did not state “Ayeni’s total sales amounts” and therefore did
not raise a question of fact “as to the correct amount of sales taxes owed”); Sundown Farms,
Inc. v. State, 89 S.W.3d 291, 294 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (holding that invoices
presented by taxpayer could not rebut the presumption because they were “not sufficiently
detailed to compel the conclusion that the services described were exempt”); Penny v. State,
No. 03-97-00399-CV, 1998 WL 394173, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin July 16, 1998, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (holding that appellants who testified that they
transferred the business and presented a warranty deed showing conveyance of the property did
not overcome the presumption of correctness the Comptroller’s certificate).
27
873 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1993).) In General Motors, the Texas Supreme Court
considered the ‘Magro presumption’ in products liability cases, which provides a
presumption that, for the purposes of causation, an adequate warning from the
manufacturer would have been read and heeded. 873 S.W.2d at 357–59. The
General Motors Court made clear that the only effect of the Magro presumption
is “to shift the burden of producing evidence to the party against whom it
operates.” Id. at 359. Though cases have described the prima facie effect of a
Comptroller’s certificate as a “presumption of correctness,” it does not follow
from the use of the word ‘presumption’ that judicially-created presumptions,
which merely shift the burden of production, operate in the same manner as a
Comptroller’s certificate that is granted evidentiary weight by statute.
Appellants also cite to Sundance Oil Co. v. Aztec Pipe & Supply Co., Inc.,
576 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. 1978), for the proposition that a sworn account is deficient
and “not prima facie evidence of the debt when the movant’s own pleadings and
exhibits raise a fact question of whether the nonmovant was a party to the
transaction.” (See Kaiser Br. 35.) Suits on sworn account are governed by Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 185, which states that the filing of specific pleadings with
exhibits and affidavits “shall be taken as prima facie evidence . . . unless the party
resisting such claim” files a verified denial. Tex. R. Civ. P. 185. Sundance merely
stands for the proposition that where the pleadings and exhibits required by Rule
28
185 are internally inconsistent, they do not meet the requirements of Rule 185 and
cannot trigger its evidentiary effect. In this case, the only document required to
trigger section 111.013’s evidentiary effect is the Trial Certificate. Because that
Certificate unambiguously discloses Appellant Jeff Kaiser, P.C.’s liability for
unpaid franchise tax, penalties, and interest, Sundance is irrelevant. (3 RR 5.)
Finally, Appellants cite to Parker v. State, 40 S.W.3d 555 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2001, no pet.), arguing that interlineations on the tax reports “raised an
issue regarding taxes assessed and collected that was not addressed in the
certificate.” (Kaiser Br. 37.) Parker is inapplicable to this case. In Parker, the
State brought suit against an individual pursuant to section 111.016 of the Tax
Code to recover sales tax, penalties, and interest originally incurred by his
corporation. Parker v. State, 36 S.W.3d 616, 617–18 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000,
no pet.). The Parker Court held that the State was required to “prove the actual
amount he received or collected,” a necessary element of section 111.016, because
that element—actual collection—was not addressed in the certificate. Id. at 618.
Unlike Parker, the State’s claim against Jeff Kaiser, P.C.,17 which requires only
proof of the amount and its delinquency, is not subject to any additional element
not addressed by the Trial Certificate.
17
Appellant Jeffery Kaiser’s individual liability under section 171.255 of the Tax Code for any
delinquency of Jeff Kaiser, P.C. was not challenged below and has not been raised on appeal.
29
III. The State Offered Legally Sufficient Evidence to Support the Trial
Court’s Award of $2,500.00 in Attorney’s Fees
Under the traditional method of awarding fees applicable in this case,
documentary evidence is not a prerequisite. Metroplex Mailing Servs., LLC v. RR
Donnelley & Sons Co., 410 S.W.3d 889, 900 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.)
(citing In re A.B.P., 291 S.W.3d 91, 99 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.)). It has
consistently been held that an attorney’s testimony about his experience, the total
amount of fees, and the reasonableness of the fees charged is sufficient to support
an award. Id.; see also Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880,
881 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (requiring consideration of factors including nature
and complexity of case, nature of services provided by counsel, time required for
trial, amount of money involved, client’s interest that is at stake, responsibility
imposed upon counsel, and skill and expertise required). Where an appellant, as
here, challenges the amount of attorney’s fees awarded, 18 those amounts are
reviewed under a legal sufficiency standard, viewing the evidence in a light that
tends to support the disputed finding and disregarding evidence and inferences to
the contrary. EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Davis, 167 S.W.3d 406, 418 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2005, pet. denied). “If more than a scintilla of evidence supports the
challenged finding, the legal sufficiency challenge must fail.” Id. Because the
18
Appellant has not challenged the availability of attorney’s fees in this case, which were
awarded under section 2107.006 of the Texas Government Code.
30
State’s counsel testified as to his experience, the total amount of fees, and the
reasonableness of the fees, there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the
State’s $2,500 attorney fee award and Appellants’ challenge should be rejected.
Kinnard v. Braziel Cooler-Freezer Mfg., Inc., No. 10-06-00103-CV, 2007 WL
2315962, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 14, 2007, no pet.) (overruling legal
sufficiency challenge to trial court’s award of attorney’s fees where counsel
testified as to a reasonable rate and an approximate number of hours expended).
The State’s trial counsel, John Adams, began his attorney’s fee testimony
by briefly outlining his experience, which includes over 15 years of practice with
the Office of the Attorney General. (2 RR 27–28.) Mr. Adams then testified as
to the complexity of the case and expressly identified two unique issues that
contributed to the complexity: the question of whether bankruptcy discharged
franchise taxes and application of the statute of limitations. (2 RR 28.) Mr.
Adams went on to identify the tasks he performed prior to trial including “legal
research, reviewing . . . documents, drafting and preparing for a hearing on a
motion for summary judgment and attending the motion for summary judgment
hearing. (2 RR 28.) Finally, Mr. Adams testified that these tasks took him at least
10 hours and that a reasonable rate would be $250 dollars per hour. (2 RR 28–
29.) After Mr. Adams completed his testimony, counsel for Appellants asked
whether Mr. Adams had kept time records and moved to strike Mr. Adams’
31
testimony, 19 but did not cross-examine Mr. Adams regarding his experience, his
actions in the case, or the reasonableness of the fee requested.
Oral testimony similar to Mr. Adams’ is regularly held to be legally
sufficient to support attorney’s fees. 20 See Legere v. Legere, No. 03-12-00046-
CV, 2013 WL 692450, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 22, 2013, no pet.) (affidavit
testifying that attorney had been licensed in Texas since May 2001, that his hourly
rate of $250 “is a reasonable rate for a family law attorney in Travis County” and
that “he had worked more than 40 hours trying to resolve the case” was sufficient
to support a $2,500 fee award); Kinnard, 2007 WL 2315962, at *3 (overruling
legal sufficiency challenge to trial court’s award of attorney’s fees where counsel
testified as to a reasonable rate and an approximate number of hours expended).
In their brief, Appellants cite El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, for the premise that,
because the State did not rely on documentary evidence, the State’s evidence in
support of its attorney’s fee award was legally insufficient. 21 370 S.W.3d 757
19
The motion to strike was implicitly denied by the entry of the trial court’s judgment. That
denial has not been challenged by Appellant.
20
Attorney fee testimony is “taken as true as a matter of law” if the testimony, like Mr. Adams’
testimony, “is not contradicted by any other witness and is clear, positive, direct, and free from
contradiction[,]” especially where, as here, the opposing party had an opportunity to disprove
the testimony but failed to do so. Legere, 2013 WL 692450, at *7.
21
Appellants erroneously refer to an abuse of discretion standard for reviewing the amount of
an attorney’s fee award. That is the standard for whether attorney’s fees should be available in
the first instance. See Bauer v. Williams, No. 03-07-00494-CV, 2008 WL 3166311, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Austin Aug. 8, 2008, no pet.) (in UDJA context, explaining that the “question of a
judge’s decision to award or not award attorney’s fees is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of
discretion”) (citing Ridge Oil Co., Inc. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 162 (Tex. 2004)).
32
(Tex. 2012). The legal issues in Olivas are inapposite to the present appeal. In
Olivas, the Supreme Court analyzed an attorney’s fee claim under the Texas
Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). Id. at 758–59. As the Supreme
Court explained, “Texas courts have looked to federal law in applying” the
TCHRA, including its attorney’s fee provision, and imported the federal “lodestar
method” used in Title VII attorney’s fee claims into the TCHRA. Id. at 760. Thus,
the Olivas Court’s analysis of the legal sufficiency requirements for the federal
“lodestar method”22 is not relevant to a claim for attorney’s fees that arises under
another statute. See, e.g., Ferrant v. Graham Assocs., Inc., No. 02-12-00190-CV,
2014 WL 1875825, at *7, 8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 8, 2014, no pet.)
(summarizing intermediate court decisions holding that Olivas “does not require
admission of hourly time records in all cases” and holding that Olivas does not
“mean that evidence of attorney’s fees is legally insufficient in an ordinary, non-
lodestar, hourly-fee breach of contract case unless contemporaneous time records
As this Court has stated, a challenge to the evidentiary support for the amount of fees is a
challenge to legal sufficiency. Hertzberg v. Austin Diagnostic Clinic Assoc., P.A., No. 03-07-
00072-CV, 2009 WL 2913620, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 11, 2009, no pet.) (“[W]e review
the amount of attorney’s fees awarded under a legal-sufficiency standard[.]”). Indeed, that is
the basis for reversal in the case on which Appellants’ rely. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d at 764 (“[W]e
hold that the fee application and proof in this case did not provide the trial court legally
sufficient evidence to calculate a reasonable fee award[.]”).
22
Throughout its opinion in Olivas, the Supreme Court regularly caveated its legal holdings as
only applicable where, unlike here, an attorney is “applying for a fee under the lodestar
method.” Olivas, 370 S.W.3d at 759–60 (“Although state procedural rules govern the
determination of attorney’s fees in a suit brought under state law, Texas courts have looked to
federal law in applying our own statute, including section 21.259(a) of the TCHRA. . .”).
33
are admitted into evidence.”); see also Metroplex Mailing Servs., 410 S.W.3d at
900 (“[Olivas] has no bearing on non-lodestar awards of fees such as those made
in breach of contract cases.”). Indeed, in Olivas, the Supreme Court twice
distinguished Texas caselaw that the court summarized as holding that “detailed
billing records or other documentation” are not required “as a predicate to an
attorney's fees award” specifically because those cases involved “a different
statute and a different issue.” 370 S.W.3d at 762 (“While Texas courts have not
routinely required billing records or other documentary evidence to substantiate a
claim for attorney's fees, the requirement has merit in contested cases under the
lodestar approach.”). Finally, the fee statute in this case states that the Attorney
General can recover fees “in the same manner as provided by general law[,]”
thereby expressly rejecting any heightened standard, like the standard in Olivas.
Tex. Gov’t Code § 2107.006.
But Olivas is not only legally distinguishable, it is also factually distinct.
In Olivas, the plaintiff sought to recover $464,000 in attorney’s fees for 890 hours
of work by multiple attorneys and legal assistants in a case where the plaintiff was
successful on only one of multiple claims and recovered only slightly more than
$100,000 in damages.23 That is to say that, in Olivas, the attorney’s fees amounted
23
Olivas, 370 S.W.3d at 765 (“The jury awarded Olivas $1,700 in back pay and $103,000 for
past and future compensatory damages[,] . . . $464,000 [in] attorney fees and $6,500 [in]
paralegal fees[,] . . . [but t]he court of appeals reversed the back-pay award. . .”).
34
to more than 450% of the damages awarded; a ratio that would raise any jurist’s
eyebrow. In contrast, here the State sought a fee that amounted to less than 7%
of the debt at issue and sought compensation for only 10 hours of work preparing,
briefing, and attending both a summary judgement motion and a bench trial where
Plaintiff prevailed on all claims.
Appellants’ argument rests entirely on Olivas, a case that is factually and
legally inapplicable. Mr. Adams’ attorney’s fee testimony was clear and direct
and comported with the general standard for attorney’s fees that governs this case.
It provided more than a scintilla of evidence to support the attorney’s fee award.
Appellants’ legal sufficiency argument should be rejected. See Kinnard, 2007
WL 2315962, at *3 (overruling legal sufficiency challenge to trial court’s award
of attorney’s fees where counsel testified as to a reasonable rate and an
approximate number of hours expended).
35
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
The State respectfully asks this Court affirm the trial court’s Judgment.
Respectfully Submitted,
KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas
CHARLES E. ROY
First Assistant Attorney General
JAMES E. DAVIS
Deputy Attorney General
For Civil Litigation
RONALD R. DEL VENTO
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Bankruptcy & Collections Division
/s/ Sean M. O’Neill
KEVIN R. SAUER
Assistant Attorney General
State Bar No. 24088355
kevin.sauer@texasattorneygeneral.gov
SEAN M. O’NEILL
Assistant Attorney General
State Bar No. 24070354
sean.oneill@texasattorneygeneral.gov
Bankruptcy & Collections Division
P. O. Box 12548, MC 008
Austin, Texas 78711-2548
Tel.: (512) 463-2173
Fax: (512) 936-1409
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
THE STATE OF TEXAS
36
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9.4
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(2)(B) because, according to the Microsoft Word 2013
word court function, it contains 9,159 words on pages xi and 1–36, excluding the
parts of the brief exempted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 9.4(i)(1).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in Microsoft Word 2013
using a conventional typeface in 14-point font except for footnotes, which are 12-
point font.
/s/ Kevin R. Sauer
KEVIN R. SAUER
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellee was
served electronically on:
George F. May
TWOMEY | MAY, PLLC
2 Riverway, 15th Floor
Houston, Texas 77056
/s/ Kevin R. Sauer
KEVIN R. SAUER
37
No. 03-15-00019-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
AUSTIN, TEXAS
JEFF KAISER, P.C. AND
JEFFERY BENEDICT KAISER
Appellants,
vs.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee.
Appeal from the 98th District Court of Travis County, Texas,
No. D-1-GV-13-000790, Honorable John Wisser presiding
APPENDIX TO
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Tab 1: Trial Court Judgment
Tab 2: Trial Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Tab 3: Section 111.202 of the Texas Tax Code
Appendix
TAB 1
DC BK14336 PG222
Fllad in The District Court
of Travis Cc:Jnty, Texas
NO. D-l-GV-13-000790 At M.
Amatia Rodri uez-Mendoza, Ci..:1k
THE STATE OF TEXAS IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
VS
TRAVIS COUNTY. TEXAS
JEFF KAISER, P.C. AND JEFFERY
BENEDICT KAISER, A/KIA JEFFREY
B. KAISER 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FINAL JUDGMENT
BE IT REMEMBERED that on October 27, 2014. the above-entitled and numbered cause
came before the Court for trial; and the Court proceeded to consider the pleadings and the
evidence admitted at trial, and the arguments of counsel: and the Court found that judgment
should be rendered for Plaintiff; it is therefore
ORDERED that Plaintiff. THE STATE OF TEXAS, recover from Defendants JEFF
KAISER. P.C. AND JEFFERY BENEDICT KAISER. A/KIA JEFFREY B. KAISER, jointly
• and severally, the sum of $34, 776.53. which sum represents the franchise tax. penalties and
interest. shown in the Comptroller' s certificates admitted into evidence in this matter, plus
interest at the statutory rate specified in Ch. 111.010 of the Texas Tax Code on those amounts
from October 27. 2014 until paid: and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff~ the State of Texas. recover from the Defendants JEFF
KAISER, P.C. AND JEFFERY BENEDICT KAISER. A/KIA JEFFREY B. KAISER, jointly
and severally, the sum of $2,500.00 as its reasonable and necessary attorney's foes; plus court
costs herein incurred and court costs which may hereafter be incurred in the collection of this
judgment if the same be necessary, for all of which execution and other process necessary to
enforce this judgment may issue.
This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable.
81
Appendix
TAB 2
Filed in The District Court
of Travis County, Texas~
OEC 2 2 2014
D-1-G V-13-000790 Al Q/26 ~'M.
Amalia Rodriguez-Mendoza, lerk
THE STATE OF TEXAS IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
vs. TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS
JEFF KAISER, P.C. AND
JEFFERY BENEDICT KAISER, 98TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
A/KJA JEFFREY B. KAISER
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On the 27th day of October 272014, came on to be heard the above numbered and styled
cause. Having heard the testimony, admitted exhibits into evidence, and entertained argum ent of
counsel the Court makes the following findings and conclusions:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. Jeff Kaiser, P.C. was a Texas Professional Corporation.
2. Jeff Kaiser, P.C. was incorporated on or about July JO, 2001 by filing Articles of
incorporation with the Texas Secretary of State.
3. Jeff Kaiser was the initial director of Jeff Kaiser, P.C. listed m the Articles of
lncorporation.
4. Jeff Kaiser, P.C. did not file its first Franchise Tax/Public lnformation Report when due.
5. On January 28, 2003 , the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts forfei ted the corporate
privileges of Jeff Kaiser, P.C. because the corporation fai led to file its first Franchise
Tax/ Public lnfo nnation Report when that report was due.
6. The Texas Secretary of State forfeited the corporate charter of Jeff Kaiser, P.C. on
August 22, 2003.
7. On December 22, 2008, Jeff Kaiser, P.C. filed Franchise Tax Returns for calendar years
2004, 2005 , 2006, 2007 and 2008.
84
8. The Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts has certified to the Texas Attorney General
that Franchise Taxes are delinquent from Jeff Kaiser, P.C.
9. On October 27, 2014, the date of trial of this case, the sum of $34,776.53 in franchise
taxes, penalties and interest was due from Jeff Kaiser, P.C.
I0. Jeff Kaiser, listed as the initial director of Jeff Kaiser, P.C. is the same person as Jeffery
Benedict Kaiser, a/k/a Jeffrey B. Kaiser, the named individual defendant in this lawsuit.
11. Jeff Kaiser was the sole officer and director of Jeff Kaiser, P.C.
12. On April 15, 2013, the Texas Comptroller of Pub Iic Accounts filed a State Tax Lien
against Jeff Kaiser, P.C. for the delinquent Franchise Taxes.
13. The franchise taxes delinquent from Jeff Kaiser, P.C. are accurately stated and quantified
in Exhibit B to Plaintiffs Original Petition in this case, a Certified Claim for Texas
Franchise Tax from the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts.
14. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants pursuant to Section 171.255 of the Texas Tax
Code.
15. On August 8, 2008, Defendant Jeffery Benedict Kaiser filed for bankruptcy under
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the Houston Division of the United
States Bankruptcy Court; Case No. 08-35261.
16. The Plaintiff entered no appearance, nor filed any Proof of Claim in the Bankruptcy case
of Jeffery Benedict Kaiser.
17. On July 15, 2009, Defendant Jeffery Benedict Kaiser was granted an unrestricted general
discharge in the bankruptcy case.
18. On April 15, 2013, nine (9) years and eight (8) months after the forfeiture of the
corporate charter of Jeff Kaiser, P.C.; and three (3) years and eight (8) months after
Defendant Jeffery Benedict Kaiser's Bankruptcy Discharge, the Texas Comptroller of
Public Accounts filed a tax lien against Jeff Kaiser, P.C. for the taxes allegedly owed by
Defendant Jeff Kaiser, P.C. for the tax years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007.
19. On August 2, 2013, the State of Texas filed this lawsuit against Jeff Kaiser, P.C. , and the
individual former officer/director of that corporation, Jeffery Benedict Kaiser.
20. August 2, 2013 is less than three years after April 15, 2013.
21. The attorney's fee requested by Plaintiff, The State of Texas, in the amount of $2,500.00
is reasonable in this case.
2
85
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. This case was brought by the State of Texas to secure a judgment for delinquent franchise
taxes against the permitted taxpayer, Jeff Kaiser, P.C. pursuant to Chapter 171 of the
Texas Tax Code, and to impose personal liability for the delinquent franchise taxes on the
individual defendant, Jeffery Benedict Kaiser, a/k/a Jeffrey B. Kaiser, pursuant to Texas
Tax Code § 17 l.255.
2. In their Answer, Defendants raised the defense of the statute of limitation to Plaintiffs
cause of action to recover delinquent franchise taxes.
3. The statute of limitation applicable to this case is Texas Tax Code § 111.202, which
provides in part: "At any time within three years after a deficiency or jeopardy
determination has become due and payable or within three years after the last
recording of a lien, the comptroller may bring an action in the courts of this state ... "
4. The State's recording of its tax lien on April 15, 2013 , commenced the running of the
statute of limitation in this case.
5. The State's filing of suit on August 2, 2013 was timely under Texas Tax Code § 111.202.
The State's cause of action for recovery of delinquent franchise taxes is not barred by the
statute of limitation.
6. In his Answer, Defendant Jeffery Benedict Kaiser, a/k/a Jeffrey B. Kaiser raised the
defense of Discharge in Bankruptcy to his personal liability for the franchise taxes made
the subject of this lawsuit.
7. At or prior to trial, Defendant Jeffery Benedict Kaiser, a/k/a Jeffrey B. Kaiser abandoned
the defense of Discharge in Bankruptcy to his personal liability for the franchise taxes
made the subject of this lawsuit by failing to raise, argue or offer evidence to support the
defense of Di scharge in Bankruptcy.
8. Regardless of Defendant's abandonment of the defense of Discharge in Bankruptcy, the
taxes made the subject of this lawsuit are excepted from discharge in bankruptcy by the
operation of Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §523(a)( I)(B)(ii). That section excepts from
discharge any taxes for which a return is required and for which the returns are filed after
they were due, and after two years before the date of filing the petition in bankruptcy.
3
86
9. Pursuant to Texas Tax Code § 111.013. the Texas Comptroller's Certified Claim for
Texas Francllise Tax constitutes prima facie evidence of:
(I) the stated tax or amount of the tax. after all just and lawful
offsets, payments, and credits have been allowed:
(2) the stated amount of penalties and interest;
(3) the delinquency of the amounts; and
(4) the compliance of the comptroller with the applicable
provisions of this code in computing and determining the amount
due.
10. Neither Defendant Jeff Kaiser. P.C. nor Defendant Jeffery Benedict Kaiser. a/k/a Jeffrey
B. Kaiser offered evidence sufficient lo overcome the statutory presumptions in favor of
the State's Certified Claim for Texas franchise Tax.
11. Pursuant to Texas Tax Code § 171.255. as an officer and director of JeIT Kaiser. P.C..
Defendant Jeffery Benedict Kaiser. a/k/a Jeffrey B. Kaiser is personally liable for the
delinquent franchise taxes of Jeff Kaiser, P.C. that accrued after the corporate privileges
of Jeff Kaiser. P.C. were forfeited for the failure to file a report or pay a tax or penalty
and before such corporate privileges were revived.
12. De!endanLS Jeff Kaiser. P.C. and Jeffery Benedict Kaiser. a/k/a Jeffrey B. Kaiser are
jointly and severally liable for the delinquent franchise taxes made the subject of this
lawsuit.
13. Plaintiff, The State of Texas. is entitled to recover attorney·s fees pursuant to TEX. GOVT
CODE ANN.§ 2107.066.
14. Defondants Jeff Kaiser, P.C. and Jeffery Benedict Kaiser, a/k/a Jeffrey B. Kaiser are
jointly and severally liable for the attorney's fees awarded lo Plaintiff in this case.
Signed on the 21" day of ~r. 2014.
WlSSER
PRESIDfNG
4
87
Appendix
TAB 3
§ 111.202. Suit Limitation, TX TAX § 111.202
Vernon's Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated
Tax Code (Refs & Annos)
Title 2. State Taxation (Refs & Annos)
Subtitle B. Enforcement and Collection (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 111. Collection Procedures (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter D. Limitations (Refs & Annos)
V.T.C.A., Tax Code § 111.202
§ 111.202. Suit Limitation
Currentness
At any time within three years after a deficiency or jeopardy determination has become due and payable or within three years
after the last recording of a lien, the comptroller may bring an action in the courts of this state, or any other state, or of the United
States in the name of the people of the State of Texas to collect the amount delinquent together with penalties and interest.
Credits
Acts 1981, 67th Leg., p. 1508, ch. 389, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1982.
Notes of Decisions (2)
V. T. C. A., Tax Code § 111.202, TX TAX § 111.202
Current through Chapters effective immediately through Chapter 46 of the 2015 Regular Session of the 84th Legislature
End of Document © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1