Rowland Martin, Jr. v. Edward L. Bravenec and 1216 West Ave., Inc.

Case No. 04-14-00483-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
FOURTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
ROWLAND J. MARTIN. APPELLANT
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY AS
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF KING
EDWARD BRAVENEC AND 1216 WEST AVE., INC., APPELLEES
ft. ^ t*
S-- y e.z -n
en —• -\r~
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF % (V^
mr~— xr
CO
On Interlocutory Appeal
From Orders Of The 285th Judicial District Court
Bexar County, Texas
Submitted By:
Rowland J. Martin
951 Lombrano
San Antonio, Texas 78207
(210) 323-3849
IDENTITY OF PARTIES & COUNSEL
1. Appellant: Rowland J. Martin
Individually and As Administrator of The
Estate Of King
951 Lombrano
San Antonio, Tx 78207
Represented by: Pro se
2. Appellees Edward Bravenec, the Law Firm of
McKnight and Bravenec, 1216 West Ave.,
Inc.
Represented by: Glenn Deadman, Esq.
S. 509 Main Street
San Antonio, Texas, 78204
3. Interested Third Parties Subject To Joinder:
3a. Bailey Street Properties
Represented by: Law Office of McKnight and Bravenec
405 South Flores
San Antonio, Tx. 78205
3b. Torrabla Properties, LLC
18507 Canoe Brook,
San Antonio, Texas
Office Address:
1626 S.W. Military Dr.
San Antonio, Tx. 78201
Represented by: Unknown
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appellant Rowland J. Martin files this document for his brief in reply to the responding
brief Appellees filed on March 2,2014. The brief has been amended to include an Index Of
Authorities, proper citations to the record, and a proper certificate of service. Legal arguments on
issue and claim preclusion cited in Appellants Motion To Reopen are incorporated by reference
into the reply brief. Appellees are not prejudiced by the latter incorporation by reference because
they waived argument on the collateral estoppel issues.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL i
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES iv
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 1
ISSUE PRESENTED 3
LEGAL STANDARDS 3
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 9
I. Appellees Err By Asking The Court To Construe The TCPA In A Manner That Narrows
The Scope Of The Communications Referenced In The Text Of The Act 9
II. Appellees' Brief Fails On TCPA's First Prong By Neglecting To Controvert
Appellant's Fifth Point Of Error And Preponderant Evidence Establishing The
Exercise Of The Right To Free Speech And The Right To Petition 10
III. Appellees' Brief Confirms That They Defaulted On TCPA's Second Prong By
Presuming Erroneously That They Were Exempt From The Burden Of The TCPA's
Clear And Specific Evidence Standard 12
IV. Appellee's Brief Omits To Allege A Rebuttal Of Collateral And Deed Estoppel
Defenses And To Explain Why Their Omission In Trial Court Should Be Excused
On Appeal 15
A. The Collateral Estoppel Issues 16
B. The Deed Estoppel Issues 20
V. The Case Presents Issues Of Vital Importance For Uniformity In Anti-SLAPP
Dismissal Proceedings And For Observance Of Automatic Stay Requirements
By The Bexar County District Courts 22
CONCLUSION 24
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 25
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT 25
APPENDIX
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alexanderv. U.S., 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) , 7
Anderson v. Law Firm ofShorty, Dooley & Hall, 393 Fed. Appx. 214 (5th Cir.
Aug. 26,2010) 18
Avilav.Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) 6
Barrv. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1992) 17
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018,1025 (9th Cir. 2003), cert, denied 541 U.S. 1085 (2004) 7
Charalambopoulus v. Grammer, 2015 WL 390664 (N.D. Tex. January 29,
2015) 6,15,18
Cherokee Water, Co. v Advance Oil & Gas, Co., 843 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex. App. - Texarkana
1992, writ den'd) 9,10
Chisholm v. Chisholm, 209 S.W.3d 96, 98 (Tex. 2006) 19,21
Cortez v. Johnston, 378 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. denied)
Farias v. Garza, 426 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. filed May 6,
2014) :: 4
Hernandez v. Hayes, 931 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex. App. 1996, writ denied) 9
Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) 20,21
In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 653-54 (Tex. 2004) .• 6
James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam) 9
James, etal, v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135 (Tex. App.-Houston [1stDist.]) 5, 15
Jones v. Beckman, 2007 Cal. App. LEXIS 8326 (Cal. App., 2007) 21
Kinney v. BCG Attorney Search, Inc., 2014 WL 1432012, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 11,
2014, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) , 4
KTRK Television, Inc. v. Robinson, 409 S.W.3d 682, 688 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2013,
pet. denied)
La Chappelle v. Superior Court ofRiverside County, 2013 WL 1633657 (Cal. App. 4th Dist.
2013) 5,20
iv
LaJolla Group II, etal. v. Daniel A. Bruce, etal, 211 Cal.App.4th461 (Cal. App. 5th Dist.
2012) 5,19
Larry York v. State ofTexas, 373 S.W.3d 32 (2012) 19
Markel v. World Flight, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ) 13
Miranda v. Byles, 390 S.W.3d 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2012,pet. denied) 6
Mortgage-Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc., 999 A.2d 184 (N.H.
2010) 6
Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy HotelAssistedLiving, Ltd., 416 S.W.3d 71, 80 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist] 2013, pet. denied) 4, 13
Park 100 Investment Group v Ryan, 180 Cal. App. 4th 795 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist 2009) 18, 19
Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58 L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979) 17
Pickens v. Cordia, Case, 433 S.W.3d 179 (Tex, App. - Dallas 2014) 5
Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 166 S.W.2d 909, 912 (1942) 9
Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716, 725- 726 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2013, pet. denied) 4, 5
Reinagelv. Deutsche BankNat. Trust Co., 735 F.3d 220, 228 (5th Cir. 2013) 19
Rio Grande H20 Guardian v. Robert Muller Family P 'ship Ltd., 2014 WL 309776, at *2 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Jan. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) 4
Rochav. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, no writ) 19
San Jacinto Title Services ofCorpus Christi, LLC. v. Kingsley Properties, LP, 2013 WL
1786632, *5 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi April 25, 2013, pet. denied) 8
Sierra Club v. Andrews Cnty., 418 S.W.3d 711, 715 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, pet. filed) 4
Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965) 19,20
Teal Trading and Development, LP v Champee Springs Ranches Property Owners Association
Case No. 04-12-00623-CV(TXCt. App. 4, Mar. 19, 2014) 18
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154,159 n.4 (1984) 17
United States v. Mollier, 853 F.2d 1169,1175 n.7 (5th Cir. 1988) 17
Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delflno, 35 Cal. 4th 180,192 (2005) appealed in Super. Ct.
iv
No. CV780187(Cal. 2005) 20,21
Watson v. Kaminski, 5\ S.W.3d 825, 827 (Tex. App. 2001, no pet.) 10
Whisenhunt v. Lippincott, 416 S.W.3d 689, 695-96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. filed)....4
Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th 811, 123 CR2d 19, 24 Civ LR 242 (Sept.
2002) 21
Zuniga v. Grose, Locke, & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1994, writ
refd) 19
/
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
U.S. CONST, amend. I 6
TEX. CONST, art I, Section 8 8,7
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code (TCPA) Section 12.002(b) 14
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code (TCPA) Section 27.001(3) 5
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code (TCPA) Sections 27.00l(4)(A)(i) 5
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code (TCPA) Section 27.001(7) 5
Tex. Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code (TCPA) Section 27.002 7
Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code (TCPA) Section 27.003 3
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code (TCPA) Section 27.005(b) 5
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code (TCPA) Section 27.005(c) 4
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code (TCPA) Section 27.006(a) 4, 15
Tex.Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. Section 51.014 3
Tex. Prop. Code Section 202.003(a) 18
Comments And News Reports
6AC.J.S. ASSIGNMENTS §132 (2013) 22
Hon. Catherine Stoneand Wendy Martinez, "Caperton v. Massey Coal Co.: The Texas
Implications," St. Mary's Law Journal, 2010 12
"Feds want secret audio at trial; Informant, now dead, helped obtain it," San Antonio Express
News, March 20, 2015 12
iv
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On January 12, 2015, Appellantfiled his opening brief and on March 2, 2015, Appellees
filed a responding brief. There is no dispute that Appellees legal action for tort liability was
prompted by a certain published notice of apparent liability for purchase money lien claims, and
a perfected notice of lis pendens referring to the purchase money lien claim; or that their legal
action contemplated relief to enjoin future communications in and out of court. See generally,
Appellees' Briefat pp.9 -16. The major question of law they present for de novo review is
whether Appellant's motion to dismiss was sufficient to allege communications that involve the
exercise of the right to speech and to petition as would support appellate jurisdiction to enforce
the Texas Citizen's Participation Act.
According to Appellees, the TCPA is inapplicable because "one can infer that Martin
simply found a section of a statue [sic] that provided an automatic stay and through [sic] the
same into a briefing not supported by any case [sic] of action in a live pleading." Appellees' Brief
at para. 56,at p. 25. Appellees also appear to allege that Appellant's pleading is nullified by a
fatal defect. They seem to imply either that the defect nullifies the pleading, or that a moving
party has the burden to allege a predicate cause of action to qualify for TCPA relief. Although
difficult to interpret both in substance and form, Appellant construes the Appellees' brief to
allege that Appellant's motion to dismiss was insufficient to place them on notice that their
action lies within the scope of the TCPA, and that this relieved them of the TCPA burden to
them to prove every element of their prima facie claims for tort liability under the clear and
specific evidence standard.
To establishthe supposed legal basis for their contentions, Appellees argue in pertinent
part as follows:
The Texas system of pleadings is composed of petitions and answers... The pleadings
define the suit, give notice of the facts and legal theories of the case, guide the trial court
in admitting evidence and in charging the jury, restrict the trial court in rendering the
judgment an[d] form the basis for appellate review ... When there is no pleading, there
can be no judgment... Further, it is not proper to admit evidence unless it is addressed or
bares upon some issue raised by the pleadings ... There can be no fact issue as a result of
a non-plead cause of action.
Appellees' Briefat para. 52, p. 23-24. Though correct on the law, Appellees' brief omits to
allege the filing of a formal responsive pleading in response to the TCPA motion to dismiss, and
also neglects to explain the omission. Instead, they assert the unsupported fact theory that
Bravenec's chain of title related back to a foreclosure on October 3,2003, and ask the Court
instead to give dispositive effect to a typographical error attributed to Appellant's TCPA motion
to dismiss. In fact, the typographical error noted in the responding brief appears, not in
Appellant's TCPA Motion To Dismiss, but in a Memorandum Of Law supporting the Motion to
Dismiss, and even then only after Appellees waived the opportunity to plead opposition to TCPA
dismissal in the trial court by way of a formal pleading. See, "Motion To Dismiss " in Exhibit C.
Although Appellees' brief does repeat the res judicata arguments they raised in the trial
court to support the tortious interference claim, it offers no direct evidence and legal authority to
controvert Appellant's collateral estoppel defense. As such, their res judicata argument amounts
to a difference of opinion about the meaning oi Martin v. Grehn, Case No. 13-50070. Appellant
attaches dispositive significance to the fact the Appellees' brief fails to explain how the
presumed res judicata effect of the judgment in Martin v. Grehn would even plausibly
substantiate every element of their prima facie case for tort liability in light of a non-final
pending appeal in Martin v. Bravenec, CaseNo. 14-50093. By all indications, Appellees' TCPA
showing is predicated in its entirety on a legal theory that omits to differentiate claim preclusion
doctrine ("resjudicata") from issue preclusion doctrine ("collateral estoppel"), and whichoffers
no legal or evidentiary basis as such from which to discerna nexus with the "interference"
element or any other element of their claims for tort liability. Thus, the record is now ripe for the
Court to determine whether the trial court erred in agreeing with Appellees that Appellant's
speech as attacked by their tort liability claims is inherently ineligible for TCPA protection.
ISSUE PRESENTED
If the Appellees TCPA showing is insufficient as Appellant contends here, in his original
Fifth and Sixth Points of Error, Appellant's Opening Briefat p. 29 - 39, and in various
supporting pleadings on interlocutory appeal, the invalidity their cause of action for tort liability
necessarily moots the need to argue further about whether the temporary injunction order was a
void ab initio post-stay gag order as alleged. In the interest of simplifying the appeal, the sole
issue presented for the Court's consideration for reply brief purposes is this:
Whether the Appellees' responding brief sustains their burden to show, consistently with
applicable standards of review, that they produced clear and specific evidence of every
element of their prima facie case for tort liability, and that they rebutted Appellant's
defenses based on collateral and deed estoppel, in the dismissal proceeding below?
LEGAL STANDARDS
The TCPA provides in pertinent part that if a legal action is "based on, relates to, or is in
response to a party's exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association,
that party may file a motion to dismiss the legal action." Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §
27.003 (West Supp.2014). To prevail on a TCPA motion to dismiss, the movant bears the initial
burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiffs action is covered. The
party who brought the action can avoid dismissal if he or she "establishes by clear and specific
evidence a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question." Id. If the motion
is denied, the moving party is authorized to commence an interlocutory appeal which has the
effect of staying all trial court proceedings. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. Section 51.014.
Every Texas court of appeals to address the standardof review for the first prong of the
TCPA burden shifting analysis, including the Fourth Court of Appeals, has concluded that de
novo review applies. Rio Grande H20 Guardian v. Robert Muller Family P 'ship Ltd., 2014 WL
309776, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).1 In Farias v. Garza,
426 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, pet. filed May 6, 2014) (reversing trial court's
refusal to dismiss) this Court held in regard to the second prong that"... the proper standard is to
'determine de novo whether the record contains a minimum quantum of clear and specific
evidence that, unaided by inferences, would establish each essential element of the claim in
question if no contrary evidence is offered." Id, citing Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt, 404
S.W.3d 716, 726 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem.Code § 27.005(c). Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, 2013 WL
1867104, at *6 (examining pleadings and evidence to determine whether plaintiffs marshaled
any "clear and specific" evidence to support each alleged element of their causes of action).
TCPA 27.006(a) further provides that "[i]n determining whether a legal action should be
dismissed under [the TCPA], the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and
opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based." Id. (emphasis
added).
In James, et al, v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist] August 21,
2014, the court of appeals noted that evidence of a communication made in connection with a
1 Seealso, Kinney v. BCG Attorney Search, Inc., No. 03-12-00579-CV, 2014 WL 1432012, at *3
(Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 11, 2014, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (concluding parties' issues present "matters of
statutory construction" and are reviewed de novo); SierraClub v. Andrews Cnty., 418 S.W.3d 711,715
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, pet. filed); Whisenhunt v. Lippincott, 416 S.W.3d689, 695-96 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2013, pet. filed); Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v. Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd., 416 S.W.3d
71, 80 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); KTRK Television, Inc. v. Robinson, 409
S.W.3d 682, 688 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); Rehak Creative Servs., Inc. v. Witt,
404 S.W.3d 716, 725 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied).
judicial proceeding in the form of a notice of lis pendens satisfies the requirement to show that
claims in the underlying case are based on, related to, or are in response to appellants' exercise
of the right to petition as defined by the TCPA Sections 27.00l(4)(A)(i) and 27.005(b):
... [A]ppellees' ... claim is "based on, relates to, or is in response to" the lis pendens
filed by [Appellant] with the Harris County clerk that gave notice of her claims against
[Appellee] in the 61st District Court lawsuit, which seeks to cancel his transfer of [the
beneficiary's] home to a trust controlled by him. All of these are "communication[s] in or
pertaining to a judicial proceeding." See id. § 27.00l(4)(A)(i). Appellees argue that that
these actions cannot be constitutionally protected, but the cases they cite do not apply the
TCPA, or do not involve communications of the type at issue here. Accordingly, we hold
that appellants met their initial burden to prove that appellees' legal action related to their
exercise of the right of petition. See id. § 27.005(c).
Id. at p. 147. The holding in James is consistent with the national trend in Anti-SLAPP litigation
which treats lis pendens speech as a covered communication for Anti-SLAPP purposes. See,
Park 100 Investment Group v Ryan, Case No. B208189 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist 2009); La
Chappelle v. Superior Court ofRiverside County, 2013 WL 1633657 (Cal. App., 4th Dist. 2013)
(mandamus proceeding reversing lis pendens expunction); and La Jolla GroupII, et al. v. Daniel
A. Bruce, etal, 211 Cal. App. 4th 461 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 2012).
In Pickens v. Cordia, 433 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Tex, App. - Dallas 2014), the court of
appeals noted that the "exercise of free speech" is also defined as a "communication made in
connection with a matter of public concern." Id. at. A "matter of public concern" includes an
issue related to "(A) health or safety; (B) environmental, economic, or community well-being;
(C) the government; (D) a public official or public figure; or (E) a good, product, or service
in the marketplace." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 27.001(7). The Pickens court held that
a matter can be a public issue "because people in the public are discussing it or because people
other than the immediateparticipants in the controversy are likely to feel the impact of its
resolution." Id. citing Miranda v. Byles, 390 S.W.3d 543 (Tex. App.—Houston [1stDist.] 2012,
pet. denied). Other courts reviewing Anti-SLAPP litigation have found that matters of public
concern include speech addressed to the quality of legal services provided by a member of the
state bar, Avila v. Larrea, 394 S.W.3d 646 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied); viewpoints on
issues about compliance with canons of judicial conduct, Cortez v. Johnston, 378 S.W.3d468
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. denied) (strong matter of public concern involving a member
of the state judiciary); and viewpoints about the efficacy of public policy responding the
mortgage industry crisis, Mortgage-Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Industries, Inc.,
999 A.2d 184 (N.H. 2010). (anti-slapp case involving mortgage dispute).
The TCPA also provides rules of construction that the courts of appeals are obligated to
observe in appeals from denials of dismissal relief. For example, Subsection 27.011 (a) states
that "[fjhis chapter does not abrogate or lessen any other defense, remedy, immunity, or privilege
available under other constitutional, statutory, case, or common law or rule provisions," and
Subsection (b) states that "[fjhis chapter shall be construed liberally to effectuate its purpose and
intent fully." Id. Section 27.011 preserves collateral estoppel defenses, as indicated in
Charalambopoulus v. Grammer, 2015 WL 390664 (N.D. Tex. January 29, 2015), a TCPA
decision acknowledging that in a proper case, the moving party's assertion of issue preclusion
supports an automatic right to dismissal, although the court there concluded that the moving
party failed to establish the doctrine applied. Section 27.011 preserves rules under the United
States and Texas Constitutions that prohibit prior restraints on free speech. See U.S. CONST,
amend. I; TEX. CONST, art I, §8. A prior restraint is a judicial order forbidding certain
communications when issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur. See
Alexander v. U.S., 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). A prior restraint of expression bears"a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity." See In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 653-54 (Tex.
2004). The guidingpurpose behind the preservation of these defenses and rules of construction is
to afford a qualified moving party a substantive immunity from suit, Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d
1018,1025 (9th Cir. 2003), cert, denied 541 U.S. 1085 (2004), which in the context of the TCPA,
is intended to "encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak
freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent
permitted by law and, at the same time protect the rights of a person to file meritorious lawsuits
for demonstrable injury." Tex. Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 27.002.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant's opening brief thoroughly addressed Appellees' issue on whether the trial
erred by granting gag order relief on July 17, 2014. The opening brief was then augmented in a
supplemented briefing submission, and by way of a motion for special exceptions in Case No.
04-14-00483-CV, and a motion to reinstate his petition for extraordinary relief in Case No. 04-
14-00841-CV. In the current state of the record, Appellant submits that the Appellees'
submission on TCPA burden shifting requirements is the only issue the Court needs to consider
to dispose of the appeal. Careful examination of the Appellees' briefing reveals that they err in
general by asking the Court to adopt a construction that obscures the definition for
communications set forth in TCPA Section 27.005. The first prong of their TCPA analysis fails
to withstand scrutiny under the de novo review standard because it fails to establish that the
subject matter of their legal actions for tort liability falls outside the scope of the
communications covered by Section 27.005. The second prong of their analysis fails for legal
insufficiency under the TCPA's clear and specific evidence standard because it relies
substantially on adverse inferences, and without regard to the fact that Appellees' voluntarily
waivedthe opportunity to file a responsive pleading to address every element of the claims for
tort liability they assert. Even if Appellees could prevail on the first and second prong, which
they cannot, their brief makes no plausible attempt to controvert Appellant's collateral and deed
estoppel defenses with cognizable evidence and legal authority. Under the circumstances, the
only conclusion one can plausibly reach consistently with the guidingprinciples of the TCPA-
and the conclusion that Appellees should have reached before they filed their case - is that
Appellees' legal action to suppress future lis pendens speech is utterly repugnant to First
Amendment values and subject to mandatory dismissal under the TCPA as such. Under the
circumstances, Appellees' issue about whether the trial court erred in granting temporary
injunctive relief is functionally mooted by their lack of standing to maintain the underlying cause
of action whatsoever for tort liability.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
I. Appellees Err By Asking The Court To Construe The TCPA In A Manner That
Narrows The Scope Of The Communications Referenced In The Text Of The Act.
An important threshold matter concerning the proper statutory construction of the TCPA
is presented by Appellees' legal theory proposing to exclude coverage of Appellant's lis pendens
speech based on a pleading defect they neglected to raise during their appearance in the trial
court. Their construction "creates an absurdity [on appeal] by drawing an artificial distinction
within the class of defendants the TCPA was designed to protect regardless of whether they
suffered the harm for which the legislature addressed by enacting the TCPA." San Jacinto Title
Services ofCorpus Christi, LLC. v. KingsleyProperties, LP, 2013 WL 1786632, *5 (Tex.App.-
Corpus Christi April 25, 2013, pet. denied). Their construction should be summarily rejected in
the first instance because the TCPA imposes no requirement for the moving party to allege a
cause of action, as Appellees' brief appears to suggest, but instead merely requires the moving
party to invoke TCPA immunitiesby allegingthat the legal action by the plaintiff was in
response to the exercise of the right to speech and to petition by the movingparty. Further, a
8
typographical error in a motion to dismiss, such as the one Appellees cite in their briefrelating to
an event in the chain of title to the subject property, has no bearingwhatsoever on the overall
justiciability of a motion to dismiss in which a lis pendens communication injudicial proceeding
covered by 27.005(c) is properly alleged as the predicate for TCPA review.
In Charalambopoulus v. Grammer, Id, the Court noted that under Texas law publications
made in the course ofjudicial and quasi-judicialproceedings are absolutely privileged. This
"mean[s] that any statementmade in the trial of any case, by anyone, cannot constitute the basis
for a defamation action, or any other action." Hernandez v. Hayes, 931 S.W.2d 648, 650 (Tex.
App. 1996, writ denied) (citing James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam);
Reagan v. Guardian LifeIns. Co., 166 S.W.2d 909, 912 (1942)). The Charalambopoulus court
noted that the judicial proceedings privilege is "tantamount to immunity," and, where there is an
absolute privilege, no civil action in damages for oral or written communications will lie, "even
though the language is false and uttered or published with express malice." Id. "The scope of the
absolute privilege extends to all statements made in the course of the proceeding ... and attaches
to all aspects of the proceeding, including statements made in open court, hearings, depositions,
affidavits, and any pleadings or other papers in the case." Id. As indicated by James, Id, the
privilege ordinarily extends to the recording of a notice of a lis pendens which simply documents
that the interest of the grantor passes to the pendent lite purchaser subject to a determination by
the court. Cherokee Water, Co. v Advance Oil & Gas, Co., 843 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Tex. App. -
Texarkana 1992, writ den'd). Because the privilege extends to statements made in contemplation
of, and preliminary to, judicial proceedings, it would arguably cover the filing of pre-litigaiton
notices, such as Appellant's notice of apparent liability for purchase money claims, that precede
the lis pendens filing. See, Watson v. Kaminski, 51 S.W.3d 825, 827 (Tex. App. 2001, no pet.).
Even if there were no on-going judicial proceedings, moreover, the issues of public
concern qualify for coverage both under TCPA Section 27.005 and Section 8 of the Bill of
Rights of the Texas constitution: "Everyperson shall be at liberty to speak, write or publishhis
opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever
be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press. In prosecutions for the publication of
papers, investigating the conduct of officers, or men in public capacity, or when the matter
published is proper for public information, the truth thereof may be given in evidence. " Id.
Under the circumstances, the Appellees' brief is suspect on its face. The mere fact that
Appellees assert the right to maintain an independent cause of action to categorically enjoin
unpublished speech pertaining to a still pending case, and now argue on appeal that the Court
should unilaterally narrow the scope of the communications referenced in the text of the Act,
both strongly suggest that they are not parties to a meritorious lawsuit involving a demonstrable
injury as inferred from their arguments about res judicata by the trial court. Cherokee Water, Id.
II. Appellees' Brief Fails On The TCPA's First Prong By Failing To Controvert
Appellant's Fifth Point Of Error And Preponderant Evidence Of Appellant's
Exercise Of The Right To Free Speech And The Right To Petition.
Appellees purport to maintain causes of action for tortious interference with contractual
relations and fraud, but regardless of what labels they use to allege tort liability, the dispositive
factors on the TCPA's first prong are the existence of published communications in a judicial
proceeding in the form of lien and lis pendens notices , and communications about matters of
public concern both published and unpublished, both of which undoubtedly fall within the scope
of TCPA protection. Appellees' presentation at the hearing on July 9,2014 removes all doubt
that their action was in response to and based on the exercise of the right to speech and to
petition. Attorney Deadman's colloquy with the trial court on May 23,2014 explains his
10
rationale for his representations to the trial court on Bravenec's behalfin terms of lis pendens
speech:
THE COURT: "Okay. And your request for injunction is to prevent him filing the HS
pendens."
MR, DEADMAN: "That's the sole purpose, Judge .... In addition, we've asked that they
not contact the lender. What's happened in the past is, even if there's not a lis pendens, he
will contact the lender or the purchaser to let them know verbally, there's clouds on title,
he has an interest..."
Court Reporters' Transcriptfrom May 23, 2014, atp. 6, in Exhibit D ofAppellant's Second
Supplemental Appendix. Attorney Deadman that the right to petition was implicated in the
rationale for the tort liability alleged at the hearing on July 17,2014:
THE COURT: "... my intent was to draft the order as broadly as possible. I did not
intend the language [to] quote that phrase 'being given its broadest terms' to be included
in the order. Why is it in there?"
MR. DEADMAN: "The only reason that's in there ... [is] the lengthy history in this case
THE COURT: "I'll grant you that... [but] I don't know that you need that particular
language in the Order. I don't want to make it so broad that it's subject to constitutional
challenge ...."
See, Court Reporters' Transcriptfor July 17, 2014, at p. 13-14.
Applying both prongs of the criteria for TCPA coverage, it is evident from the Appellees'
own testimony and evidentiary submissions in support of temporary injunctive relief that, at
bottom, their entire litigation revolves Appellant's exercise of the right to free speech and to
petition. The gravamen of Appellees case, by their own account, lies in their interests in
enjoining future lis pendens speech and in resolving a difference of opinion with the Appellant
about the res judicata effect of the judgment for Bravenec in Martin v. Grehn and the collateral
estoppel effect of the federal court's final order decliningjurisdiction to expunge an earlier lis
pendens filing noticing Appellant's purchase money claims. See Defendants' Exhibit 2. At the
11
same time, the underlying speechwhich the Appellee's suit places in dispute implicates every
matter of public concern known to the TCPA.
Under any realistic construction to effectuate the purposes of the TCPA, Appellant's
speech can and should be deemed to encompass a request for adherence to disciplinary rules of
professional responsibility, and for observance ofjus cogens standards ofjudicial conduct, that
directly or indirectly touch every category of public concern known to the TCPA Section 27.005,
including "safety" from alleged deprivations of due process, the effect ofjudicial branch
operations on "economic and community well-being", "government accountability," Bravenec's
conduct as a "public figure," and the quality of legal services in the marketplace provided by him
and his firm. The public clearly had a right to know that a candidate for judicial office was suing
a former client, and was at the same time facing claims for legal malpractice himself arising from
a former attorney-client relationship. The public also stands to be affected by the resolution of
issues concerning the conflict between the State and the Fifth Circuit on laws governing post-
petition foreclosures and suspect lien assignments. Thus, even if Appellees had filed a written
response to the TCPA motion to dismiss, they would still have no realistic basis for disputing
that the underlying subject matter of Appellant's speech involves matters of public concern, both
in the sense that people other than the parties to this controversy are likely to feel the impact of
itsresolution, and that there is on-going public discussion onthese topics.2
HI. Appellees Brief Confirms That They Defaulted On The TCPA's Second Prong By
Presuming Erroneously That They Were Exempt From The Burden Of The
TCPA's Clear And Specific Evidence Standard.
As the appellees in an interlocutory appeal pursuant to TCPA Sections 27.003 and
2 See e.g., Hon. Catherine Stone and Wendy Martinez, "Caperton v. Massey Coal Co.: The Texas
Implications," St. Mary's Law Journal, 2010. Available at http://stmaryslawjournal.org/pdfs/Stone.pdf.
See also, "Feds want secret audio at trial; Informant, nowdead, helped obtain it," San Antonio Express
News, March 20, 2015, at p. A-3 (reporting on a pending federal caserelated to a local attorney's felony
conviction arising out of corrupt litigation in a state district court).
12
51.014(a)(12), their burdenwas to comply with the TCPA's clear and specific evidence standard.
This they failed to do. Due to Appellees' waiver of responsive pleadings, there is nothing in the
trial court record to document their compliance with the TCPA's requirement that they establish
every element of their prima facie case for tort liability with clear and specific evidence.
Appellee's resort to back-door arguments for exemptions from TCPA coverage, that the Court
should "infer that Martin simply found a section of a statue [sic] that provided an automatic stay
and through [sic] the same into a briefing not supported by any case [sic] of action in a live
pleading," is both legally non-justiciable under the heightened standards noted in Farias and
factually absurd as a response to Appellant's twelve points of error and motion for special
exceptions based on a fraud on the court below. It suffices to say that Appellees' fail to
distinguish the relief they sued to obtain from an explicit request for unlawful prior restraints.
Markel v. World Flight, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
Further, whether analyzed under the label of tortious interference with contractual
relations, or as a fraudulent filing of a public record, Appellees' core arguments about tort
liability fails to pass muster of the facts of this case. The court in Newspaper Holdings, Inc. v.
Crazy Hotel Assisted Living, Ltd., 416 S.W.3d 71; (Tex. App - 1st Dist. - Houston 2013)
disposed of the tortious interference claim comparable to the one under review here with the
following holding: "To establish a cause of action for tortious interference, a plaintiff must prove
that (1) a contract subject to interference exists, (2) the defendant committed a willful and
intentional act of interference with the contract, (3) the act proximately caused injury, and (4) the
plaintiff sustained actual damages or loss ...Ordinarily, merely inducing a contract obligorto do
what it has a right to do is not actionable interference." Id. On this basis, the court of appeals
there reversed a trial court order denying the defendant's TCPAmotion to dismiss. Here,
13
Appellees' offer no argument to explain why thetransfer of the subject property to Torralba
Properties makes this case distinguishable from the one in Newspaper Holdings, Id.
The courtof appeals in James, Id. disposed of a fraud claim identical to the one asserted
by Appellees pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Section 12.002(b) with the following
holding: "Appellees claimed ... that appellants knew that the lis pendenswas fraudulent when it
was filed and that [one appellant] admitted under oath that she knew that the lis pendens was
fraudulent. But no evidence supports these assertions, and [c]onclusory statements are not
probative and accordingly will not suffice to establish a prima facie case ... The evidence shows
that that the lis pendens provided notice of the pendency of the 61st District Court lawsuit,
which requested a declaratory judgment that a 2007 deed conveying [a] home to a trust creadted
and controlled by [appellee] is invalid." James, Id. at p. 28. Here, the probative evidence flowing
from Bravenec's testimony on July 9, 2014 established mainly that he lacked capacity to
differentiate truth and falsity in the context of his purported action for fraud.
The arguments offered by Appellee are far more obscure and deceptive because, unlike
the respondent in Newspaper Holdings and James, they waived the opportunity to file a written
response to Appellant's TCPA motion to dismiss, and instead relied on a showing calculated to
demonstrate why present and future lis pendens speech should be enjoined. As plead in
paragraphs 10, 37, 38, 50 and 51 of their brief, moreover, Appellees purport to maintain their
causes of action for tortious interference with contractual relations and fraud on theory that
Bravenec's chain of title began with a foreclosure sale transaction on October 3, 2003 which they
suppose to be wrongfully clouded by Appellant's lis pendens filings in 2014. In paragraph 10,
for example, Bravenec specifically asserts that his chain of title to the subject property beganon
October 3, 2003 with a foreclosure sale transaction executed by the late Albert McKnight.
14
Thereafter, he incorporates the same fact issue in paragraph 50 in support of his secondissue,
defending the trial court's order denying dismissal pursuant to the TCPA. See also Appellees'
Briefatparas. 3, 13, 26 and43. For his second issue, whetherthe trial court erred by ordering
the denial of TCPA dismissal relief, Bravenec alleges essentially in paragraphs 51-56 that
Appellant waived immunity from suit due to a defective TCPA motion to dismiss, and that the
trial court's denial of TCPA dismissal relief was proper because "numerous courts," allegedly
including the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas in Case No. SA 1l-CV-0414
and the U.S. Court of Appeals in Case No. 13-50070, adjudicated the supposed October 3, 2003
foreclosure transaction. No authority is cited for the latter proposition, and the reasoning of the
TCPA authorities on point expressly reject these conclusions. See, James, Id. at p. 147, and
Charalambopoulus, Id. at *26,
IV. Appellee's Brief Omits To Allege A Rebuttal Of Collateral And Deed Estoppel
Defenses And To Explain Why Their Omission In Trial Court Should Be Excused
On Appeal.
TCPA 27.006(a) provides that "[i]n determining whether a legal action should be
dismissed under [the TCPA], the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and
opposing affidavits stating the facts on which the liability or defense is based." (emphasis
added). Here, the record clearly shows that Appellant's estoppel issues by way of affirmative
defense were substantially unrebutted as indicated by Bravenec's testimony on cross-
examination as follows on July 9, 2014:
Q. ... Were you not aware that you would be collaterally estoppel from raising those
issues [about res judicata bars] in a state court forum?
A. I don't think that collateral estoppel would apply to me, so no, I don't agree with
that.
Q. How do you explain [that]?
15
A. Well, collateral estoppel would be against the losing party. And so we are the
prevailing party. So my interpretation of collateral estoppel... [is] that you were
collaterally estopped from asserting what is essentially a matter that had already
been decided in Federal Court [and] in Probate Court. So I think that was our
argument.
Q. Very well. But [Judge Hudspeth's] order denied you relief, the relief you
requested, did it not?
A. It did.
Q. Okay. So you were the losing party on this motion; is that correct?
A. On that one motion, [I] certainly was.
Court Reporters' Transcriptfor July 9, 2014, pp. 39 (lines 17 - 25) to 40 (lines 1-11).
The transcript of the cross examination of Appellee Bravenec's on July 9,2014 shows
that the Appellees' factually unsupported reliance on res judicata doctrine was equally
misplaced:
Q. ... you would agree that there are parties in a closing transaction who have
interests different than the seller?
A. Of course.
Q. So, would you agree that information that might be disadvantageous to the seller
might enable other parties to the transaction to protect their interest?
A. In this case or in abstract?
Q. Both. All of the above.
A. In abstract yes. In this case no.
Q. And why is that not in this case?
A. Because you lost the lawsuit in 2010 and you have no legal interest in the
property. So all you're really doing is keeping us from selling it by alerting a title
company that you might keep suing ...
Court Reporter's Transcription ForJuly 9, 2014 atp. 45 - 46 (emphasis added). Like the
testimony that preceded it, the lattertestimony also disregards the estoppel effect of the federal
16
court's order on March 5, 2014. See, Defendant's Exh. #2 in Clerk's Record Volume One.
Further, when asked to specify where the record of Martin v. Grehn contained textual references
to the disposition of Appellant's purchase money issues in Appellees' favor, however, Bravenec
states "I cannot show you." CourtReporters' Transcriptfor July 9, 2014, at p. 46, lines 13-16.
As explained below, the record evidence is insufficient to support the attribution to Appellees of
a rebuttal on the estoppel issues, Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1992)
(collateral estoppel); and Teal Tradingand Development, LP v Champee Springs Ranches
Property Owners Association, 432 S.W.3d 381 (Tex. App. - San Antonio, Mar. 19, 2014)
(discussing estoppel by deed).
A. The Collateral Estoppel Issues
The major implication of Bravenec's testimony - that there is no such thing as the
defensive use of collateral estoppel by parties on the losing end of a judgment - is simply
preposterous, and reflects a common misconception about the meaning of collateral estoppel
doctrine. Barr, Id. Offensive collateral estoppel describes when a plaintiff seeking to estop a
defendant from relitigating an issue which the defendant previously litigated and lost in a suit
involving another party. See Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 645, 58
L. Ed. 2d 552 (1979). Defensive collateral estoppel occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a
plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another
action against the same or a different party. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 159 n.4
(1984). Collateral estoppel is further differentiated according to mutuality versus non-mutuality,
i.e. whether parties with or without privity assert the estoppel bar, and whether the basis for the
alleged estoppel rests on legal and evidentiary factors. See United States v. Mollier, 853 F.2d
1169,1175 n.7 (5th Cir. 1988).
17
The collateral estoppel discussionin Appellant's Motion To Reopen in Case No. 04-14-
00841-CV is incorporated here by reference. The Anti-SLAPP litigation in Park 100 Investment
Group v Ryan, 180 Cal. App. 4th 795 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist, 2009) is instructive with respect to
Appellant's entitlement to prevail on the collateral estoppel defense asserted here. There, the
California court of appeals found "unpersuasive [the non-moving parties'} contention that the
rulings in Case No. BC349120 (the expungement order, the overruling of the demurrer and the
denial of the motion for summary adjudication) conclusively establish that the filing of the lis
pendens was illegal as a matter of law." Id. at *807 - 808. Not only do the facts here run
strikingly parallel to those in Park Fifth Circuit authority on point in Anderson v. Law Firm of
Shorty, Dooley & Hall, 393 Fed. Appx. 214 (5th Cir. Aug. 26, 2010) (applying separate
transaction rule of res judicata argument in attorney client dispute) also indicates that Appellees'
contentions about res judicata are either invalid or subject to exceptions. Larry York v. State of
Texas, 373 S.W.3d 32 (2012); Chisholm v. Chisholm, 209 S.W.3d 96, 98 (Tex. 2006). The
TCOA precedent in Charalambopoulus, Id. at *26, resolving collateral estoppel in favor of the
non-moving part and against the moving party, simply does not apply. Id.
B. The Deed Estoppel Issues
The record also supports the doctrine of estoppel by deed as an affirmative defense to the
Appellees' claims for tort liability. The lis pendens mandamus case in La Chappelle, Id. at * 1
and *2, and the regular appeal in La Jolla Group II, Id. at *473, are both instructive on this
point. Here as in La Chappelle and La Jolla, Appellant's rebuttal in his capacity as a purchase
money creditor has legal support in Pursuant to Tex. Prop. Code Section 202.003(a), and
citations to record in Appellant's Opening Brief, atpp. 39 - 42. In particular, it is claimed that a
purchase money lien interest in the subject property exists by virtue of restrictive covenants; that
18
the claimed purchase money lien interest touched and concerned the land at the time Bravenec's
grantor purchased it; that his dispute with the Appellant arises from a prior attorney client
relationship which involved vertical and horizontal privity; and that the lis pendens notices in
question ultimately enabled the contracting parties to exercise rights they already to treat
Appellant's lien claim as one that runs with the land. On these facts, Appellees are estopped from
denying facts in their chain of title that support Appellant's estoppel defenses. Teal Trading and
Development, Id. See also, Zuniga v. Grose, Locke, & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex. App.
San Antonio 1994, writ refd), and Rocha v. Ahmad, 662 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1983, no writ).3
V. The Case Presents Issues Of Vital Importance For Uniformity In Anti-SLAPP
Dismissal Proceedings And For Observance Of Automatic Stay Requirements
By The Bexar County District Courts.
On the facts of this case, the Appellee's brief can and should be disposed based on
Appellant's Fifth and Sixth Points of Error, Appellant's Opening Brief, at pp. 29-39, and the
general rule that the non-movant must sustain its burden on each essential element of the claim
unaided by inferences, presumptions and intendments. Farias, Id. In support of the reply brief,
Appellant also argues that the Appellees secured the temporary injunction order on July 17, 2014
after conditions for a TCPA automatic stay had been satisfied. Cf, Varian Medical Systems, Inc.
See, CRT #2 at p. 68 (referenceto purchase money interest); CRT #2 at pp. 43 - 45 (Bravenec
testimony indicating thatAppellant's lis pendens noticing purchase money claims burdened the property);
Exhibit B in TAB 3 of Appellant's Brief (reference to intentof second lien agreement that recorded
interests should run with the land); CRT#2 at pp. 22, lines 18-31 (Bravenec testimony on foreclosure
sale indicating he had notice of first and second liencovenants); and Exhibits A and B in Appellant's
TAB 3 (supporting conclusion that horizontal and vertical privity requirements were metthrough the
assignment of second lien interests to McKnight and Bravenec in 2005 andthrough a post-petition
trustee's foreclosure sale to them in 2006). Thus, even if the foreclosure sale is deemed valid, Appellees'
are estopped from claiming that it extinguished the purchase money interest. But see, 6A C.J.S.
ASSIGNMENTS § 132(2013) ("matters rendering the assignment absolutely invalid ..., such as ... the
nonassignability of the right attempted to be assigned" may be raised); Reinagel v. Deutsche Bank Nat.
Trust Co., 735 F.3d220, 228 (5thCir. 2013) ("Texas courts follow the majority rule thatan obligor can
defend "on any ground which renders the assignmentvoid.").
19
v. Delfino, 35 Cal. 4th 180, 192 (2005) appealedin Super. Ct No. CV780187 (Cal. 2005) (lack
of trial court jurisdiction due to appeal in Anti-SLAPP case triggering automatic stay).
In view of the above, Appellant attaches dispositive significance to the treatment the U.S.
Supreme Court accorded fifty years ago, in Stanfordv. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965), to a
"constitutionally intolerable" general warrant issued by the 57th District Court, which had
similarly authorized the broadest terms possible for a seizure by the state of "books, records,
pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written instruments":
Vivid in the memory of the newly independent Americans were those general warrants
known as writs of assistance under which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the
colonists. The hated writs of assistance ... were denounced ... as "the worst instrument of
arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of
law, that ever was found in an English law book," because they placed "the liberty of
every man in the hands of every petty officer" ... What is significant to note is that this
history is largely a history of conflict between the Crown and the press. ... In Tudor
England officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they
pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent... This is the history
which prompted the Court less than four years ago to remark that "[fjhe use by
government of the power of search and seizure as an adjunct to a system for the
suppression of objectionable publications is not new" ... [W]hat this history
indispensably teaches is that the constitutional requirement that warrants must
particularly describe the "things to be seized" is to be accorded the most scrupulous
exactitude when the "things" are books, and the basis for their seizure is the ideas which
they contain... The indiscriminate sweep of [the language in the warrant issued by the
57th District Court of Texas] is constitutionally intolerable. To hold otherwise would be
false to the terms of the [Bill of Rights], false to its meaning, and false to its history.
Id. (emphasis and bracketed language added). Here, as in Stanford, though "[t]he world has
greatly changed, and the voice of nonconformity now sometimes speaks a tongue which Lord
Camden might find hard to understand," the clear purpose of the TCPA paradigm is to guarantee
freedom and substantive immunity from the improper and unbridled use ofjudicial process "as
an adjunct to a system for the suppression of objectionable publications," Id, for the same
reasons the law 50 years ago protected Bexar County resident and activist John Stanford.
20
CONCLUSION
The Court is respectfully requested to apply Farias so as to give effect, not only to the
free speech principles that Stanford observes, but to the legacy its history reflects on matters of
"conscience and human dignity." Id. Here as in Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 472 (1987), the
instant TCPA appeal requests the Court to decide that "the First Amendment recognizes ... that a
certain amount of expressive disorder not only is inevitable in a society committed to individual
freedom, but must itself be protected if that freedom would survive." Id., and to apply the
protections that the TCPA was intended to provide. Cf, Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino,
Id, (automatic stay issue), Jones v. Beckman, 2007 Cal. App. LEXIS 8326 (Cal. App., 2007)
(rejecting Anti-Slapp cross appeal), and Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester, 28 Cal. 4th 811,
123 CR2d 19, 24 Civ LR 242 (Sept. 2002) (Anti-SLAPP case discussing fraud on the court).
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant prays that the Court grant relief
in all things, for such other relief both in law and in equity as he may be justly entitled.
Dated: April 6,2014 Respectfully Submitted,
Rowland J. Mactin
951 Lombrano
San Antonio, Tx 78207
(210) 323-3849
21
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.5(d), (e), I certify that I mailed a copy of this "Appellant's
Reply Brief to Attorney Glenn Deadmanat 411 S. South Main, San Antonio, Tx., on April 6,
2015.
Rowland J
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH WORD COUNT
In compliance with TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4, relying on the word count function in the word
processing software used to produce this document, I certify that the number of words in this
document including footnotes is 7,273.
Rowland J. martin
22
APPENDIX
A. Order of the U.S. District Court For The Western District Of Texas dated March 5, 2014
B. General Denial Of Cross Defendants Edward Bravenec And The Law Office of
McKnight and Bravenec
C. Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To The Texas Citizen's Participation Act Of Rowland J.
Martin
A
Case 5:ll-cv-00414 Document 173 Filed 03/05/2014EPage 1 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
ROWLAND J. MARTIN, JR., §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § No. SA-ll-CA-414
§
EDWARD BRAVENEC, ESQ., THE §
LAW OFFICE OF MCKNIGHT AND §
BRAVENEC, AND 1216 WEST AVE, §
INC., §
§
Defendants. §
ORDER
On January 18, 2013, Rowland Martin filed a notice of Lis
Pendens affecting the real property located at 1216 West Avenue,
San Antonio, Texas (the Property). The notice of Lis Pendens
indicated that Martin intended to appeal the judgment entered by
this Court in the above styled and numbered cause. After the Fifth
Circuit affirmed this Court's judgment and Martin refused to cancel
his notice of Lis Pendens, this Court entered an order cancelling
the Notice. Thereafter, Martin filed a motion for rehearing en banc
in the Fifth Circuit as well as an amended Notice of Lis Pendens.
On December 4, 2013, the Fifth Circuit denied his petition for a
rehearing and the Court entered an order cancelling the amended
notice of Lis Pendens. That same day, Plaintiff filed a third
notice of Lis Pendens, this time indicating that title to the
Property was affected by a Bexar County Probate Court matter styled
In re. Estate of Johnnie Mae King, Cause. No. 2001-PC-1263. The
Case 5:ll-cv-00414 Document 173 Filed 03/05/2014CPage 2 of 2
notice of Lis Pendens asserts that Martin was the administrator of
the Estate and that Defendant Edward Bravenec was "attorney of
record." It did not, however, clarify what bearing that probate
matter has on the Property at issue in the instant suit.
On February 13, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to expunge Lis
Pendens and a motion for contempt. When the Plaintiff failed to
respond to the motion, the Court ordered him to explain the
relationship, if any, between his administration of the Estate of
Johnnie Mae King and the title to the Property. Plaintiff has filed
no fewer than three responses to that order. It appears from those
responses that the Plaintiff, as the administrator of the estate of
Johnnie Mae King, is attempting to re-open and re-litigate a
probate matter against Edward Bravenec and the Law Offices of
McKnight and Bravenec. The propriety of that action and the
accompanying Lis Pendens is well outside of the scope of this
Court's jurisdiction. If the Defendants wish to pursue their
motion, they should file it in Bexar County Probate Court Number 1.
It is therefore ORDERED that the Defendants' motion for
contempt and to cancel lis pendens (Doc. No. 162) be, and it is
hereby, DENIED.
SIGNED AND ENTERED THIS Q j^ of March, 2014.
tRY LE$ HUDSPI
SENIOR UNITtED] STATES DISTRItS?^JUDGE
-2-
B
". V
CAUSE NO: 2014-CI-07644
EDWARD BRAVENEC AND 1216 § IN THE DISTRICT COURT
WEST AVE., INC. §
§
VS. § 285™ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
§
ROWLAND MARTIN, JR. §
§ BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
ROWLAND MARTIN, JR. §
§
VS. § JURY TRIAL REQUESTED
§
EDWARD BRAVENEC, AND THE LAW §
OFFICE OF MCKNIGHT AND BRAVENEC §
DEFENDANT'S GENERAL DENIAL
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
Now comes Edward Bravenec's, Defendant, in Answer to the Plaintiffs Counterclaims and
would show the Court as follows:
GENERAL DENIAL
1. Defendant, Edward Bravenec, denies each and every allegation contained in Plaintiffs'
pleadings and demands strict proof of Plaintiffs' allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
2. Edward Bravenec, by way offurther defense should be one necessary, Defendant pleads that
they are the affirmative defense of Res Judicata and Statue of Limitations.
r
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Edward Bravence prays that Plaintiffs take
nothing by their suit and that Edward Bravence recover from Plaintiffs his attorney's fees, costs, and
such other relief, at law or in equity, to which he shows himselfjustly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
GLENN J. DEADMAN, P.C.
509 S. Main Avenue
San Antonio, TX 78204
(210) 472-3900 — Telephone
(210) 472-3901 — Facsimile
gideadman@aol.com
Isi Glenn J. Deadman
Glenn J. Deadman
State Bar No. 00785559
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that onthe |Q day ofJune, 2014,1 electronically filed the Defendant's
General Denial with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system and I will mail via certified
mail such notification of such filing to the following:
Rowland J. Martin, Jr.
951 Lombrano
San Antonio, Texas 78207
210-323-3849
Isl Glenn J. Deadman
Glenn J. Deadman
c
Cause No. 2O14-CI-07644
EDWARD L. BRAVENEC AND 1216 IN THE DISTRICT COURT
WEST AVE., INC.
Plaintiff
v. C3
-<
ROWLAND MARTIN, JR. 285TH JUDICU L DISTRBGT moS
Defendants
ROWLAND MARTIN, JR.
Plaintiff
en m
v.
EDWARD L. BRAVENEC, AND THE LAW BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS
OFFICE OF MCKNIGHT AND BRAVENEC,
Defendants
In Re OLGA VASQUEZ-SILVA d/b/a ONE
FOR AUTISM, INC.
Impleaded Third Party JURY TRIAL REQUESTED
SPECIAL APPEARANCE FOR PLEAS TO JURISDICTION
AND TEXAS CITIZENS PARTICIPATION ACT MOTION TO DISMISS
TO THE HONORABLE COURT:
COMES NOW ROWLAND MARTIN, JR., the appellant in a notice of interlocutory
appeal filed on July 8, 2014, in this special appearance, to file his "SpecialAppearance For Plea
To Jurisdiction And Texas Citizens Participation Act Motion To Dismiss, "pursuant to the Open
Courts Doctrine of the Texas Constitution and the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA) in
Tex. Civ. Rem. & Prac. Code Sections 27.000 et seq.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An injunction is a remedial writ that depends on the issuing court's equityjurisdiction.
State v. Morales, 869 S.W. 2d 941,947 (Tex. 1994). Notice is hereby given that an appeal
DOCUMENT SCANNED AS FILED
contesting the interlocutory rulings at the hearing on July 1,2014 was filed in the Fourth District
Court of Appeals on July 8, 2014, under Section 51.014(a)(4) and the Texas Citizens
Participation Act, thus abating at least by implication a part of the Court's plenaryjurisdiction
for purposes of this setting. Langston, Sweet & Freese, PLLC v. Cletus P. Ernster, III, et al, 255
S.W.3d 402 (Tex. App. - 9th District, 2008) (finding that trial court lacked personal jurisdiction
over a litigant who moved for a special appearance). A separate Case No. 14-50093 related to
federal court orders referenced by the Plaintiffs is on appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals.
Nonetheless, in obedience to the Court's outstanding orders to show cause, and subject to this
special appearance, Defendant asserts a plea to the equitable jurisdiction of the Court, and moves
the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims tortious interference and cross motions for summary
judgment pursuant to the Texas Citizens Participation Act and case law authority in Zuniga v.
Grose, Locke, & Hebdon, 878 S.W.2d 313, 318 (Tex. App. San Antonio 1994, writ refd).
PLEA TO JURISDICTION
There are three reasons to sustain a plea to jurisdiction on equitable grounds. First, the
Court's equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief was arguably unsupported and flawed
from the inception of the case because the Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped form asserting the
cause of action they now allege. In short, Plaintiffs omitted to disclose to the Court that in past
litigation they waived challenges to Defendant's lien claim that they now invoke in this case
under the pretext of a lis pendens injunction. See infra at p. 4 -5. Bravenec himself judicially
admits his lack of standing to contest lien claims in his last motion to the federal court: "Movant
availed himself of federal court, and cannot assert matters he was required to raise in this suit
merely by filing the same matters under an unrelated cause in a different court." Motion For
Contempt in Case SA 1l-CV-0414 dated February 13, 2014 atp. 2. Yet this is what he did.
DOCUMENT SCANNED AS FILED
Second, as shown on July 1, 2014, Plaintiffs' prudential standing to invoke the Court's
jurisdiction is unsupported by law and evidence on the merits: (1) by their failure to produce
probative evidence of a contract, (2) by their reliance on moot theories about interference and
proximate causation that improperly conflate past cancellations of lis pendens notices withan
adverse disposition of the underlying lien interest in the subject property, and (3) by evidence
that a forfeiture of the corporate charter by the registered agent was a supersedingcause for the
damages they allegedly sustained from alleged failures of the purported sale to close. The
impleading of the registered agent for the purported or prospective pendent lite purchaser further
moots the tortious interference claim because the filing of constructive notices of lis pendensno
longer has any material bearing on the failure to close that the Plaintiffs seek to redress.
Third, the Plaintiffs' false representation to the Court that Defendant violated the
temporary restraining order by filing notices in Bexar County Deed Records places their
fundamental lack of prudential standing beyond doubt. By causing the Court to issue a show
cause order on false premisees, and then inducing the Court to misconstrue the Defendant as the
issuing party of a subpoena that was in fact issued by the District Clerkon Defendant's request,
Plaintiffs willfully obstructed Defendant's ability to use compulsory process to compel witness
testimony to confront patently false charges about criminal contempt. The inequitable nature of
the latterconduct calls the veracity and legitimacy of the case into question to the extentthere is
doubt about the Court's jurisdiction and discretion to grant Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief.
MOTION TO DISMISS
A. The Texas Citizens Participation Act
Separate and apart from pleas to jurisdiction, Defendant moves the Court to dismiss
Plaintiffs' original petition and cross motions for summary judgment as a matter of law pursuant
DOCUMENT SCANNED AS FILED
to the TCPA. The TCPA was enacted to authorize summary dismissal procedures to limit
lawsuits that attempt to silence criticism by individuals who speak out on a public issue or
controversy, and to encourage "citizen participation" which includes "commenting on the quality
of a business." House Comm. On Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B.
2973, 82nd Leg., R.S. at p. 1 (2011). Summary dismissal of Bravenec's tortious interference
claim is due because he is a candidate for elected office using this case to silence criticism about
the quality of his business as a former provider of legal service to the undersigned Defendant,
and because he has no preponderant evidence with which to sustain the mandatory elements of
his tortious interference claim. See e.g., American Heritage Capital, LP, v Dinal Gonzalez and
Alan Gonzalez, Cause No. DC-11-13741-C (68th Judicial District, 2012) (applying TCPA to
dismiss tortious interference claim); and Monaco Entertainment Group, LLCand David Cooper
v. CityofEl Paso, et al, Cause No. EP-11-CV-561-DB (W.D. Tex, 2012) (enforcing the TCPA).
B. Abridgment Of Defendant's Protected Right To Free Speech
In support of his motion to dismiss, Defendant first asserts a prima facie affirmative
defense of privilege, as a former client of Bravenec and as a third party legal malpractice
plaintiff, to defend his interest in a third party purchase money lien that arose when the grantor of
Bravenec's second lien in the subject property, Moroco Ventures, LLC, received down payment
funding through the Defendant to purchase the subject property in 2003. Due to the existence of
a viable affirmative defense, Bravenec's motion for criminal contempt and cross motion for
summary judgment constitute an impermissible infringement on Defendant's right to free speech
in violation of the Texas Citizen's Participation Act and a clear departure from case law
authority in HMC Hotel Properties11 Limited Partnership v. Keystone-Texas Property Holding
Corporations, Case No. 04-10-00620-CV (Tex. App. - San Antonio, 2013) reversed on other
DOCUMENT SCANNED AS FILED
grounds in Case No. 12-0289, S.W. 3d (Tex., June 13 2014) (noting privilege and
justification as affirmative defenses warranting dismissal of a suit for tortious interference with
contractual relations).
Bravenec's contention that Defendant's counterclaims for legal malpractice and issues
aboutparty purchase money lien interests are barred due to res judicata and limitationsfactors
directly support Defendant's burden of proof for dismissal under the TCPA. Regarding
limitations, the Texas Supreme Court has specifically held that "when an attorney commits
malpractice in the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of
limitations on the malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the
underlying claim are exhausted." GulfCoastInvestment Corp. v. Brown, 821 S.W.2d 159
(Tex.1991) (equitable tolling applied in legal malpractice case.) No claim for legal malpractice
was finally litigated in any prior state or federal court case. As the beneficiary of a recognized
legal malpractice privilege, and as party to pending suit in a suit litigation in Cause 2010-CI-
19099 that implicates the former attorney client relationship with Bravenec, Defendantis plainly
authorized to assert prima facie third party purchase money lien claims against property interests
and their proceeds that Bravenec acquired during the probate case as part of the consideration for
his services.
Bravenec's contentions about res judicata, though more appropriately characterized as
objections about issue preclusion, also support dismissal when examined in light of the guiding
principles cited in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 680 (1871). There, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted that when, in courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the pendency of a suit in one is relied on to
defeat a second suit in the other - as Bravenec attempting to do in his criminal contempt
proceeding below~ the identity of the parties, of the case made, and of the relief soughtshould
DOCUMENT SCANNED AS FILED
be such that if the first suit had been decided, it could be pleaded in bar as a former adjudication.
Id at p. 680. In such cases, the proceedings in an appellate court are part of the proceedings in
the first court, and orders made by it to be enforced by the court of primary jurisdiction are,
while unexecuted, a part of the case in the first suit, which may be relied on as lis pendens in
reference to the second suit. Id at p. 680.
Watson specifically notes that the nature and character of the title and possession to real
property decreed by a first court may be inquired into by another court, and if it was of a
fiduciary character, and the trust was not involved in the first suit, a second suit may be
maintained in any court of competentjurisdictionto declare, define, and protect the trust, though
the first suit may be still pending. Id at p. 681. Watson means Appellantretained a privilege
from a former relationship of trust, and this Court has TCPA jurisdiction to enforce it. Id.
C. Collateral Estoppel Issues
Bravenec is subject to collateral estopped from prosecuting tortious interference claims.
That Bravenec is acting in bad faith is evident from his failure to object in U.S. District Court
Case No. SA 1l-CV-0414 on March 5, 2014 to the purchase money lien claims that he now
attempts to restrain with fictitious charges about criminal contempt,1 from his allegation on or
1 Plaintiffs' previously argued in federal courtthat "[a] litigant who files a petition in court must
include all causes of action that relate to the incident or circumstances, or those claims are waived.
Commissioner v. Sunner, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1998). The prior judgment acts as res judicata, precluding
the parties from re-litigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action. Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 Sect. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980). As all matters relatingto the pendencyofthe
action involving real property were voluntarily submitted to this court byPlaintiff. Plaintiffis subject to
this court's orders, and this court has the solejurisdiction, for all orders relating to any lis pendens against
1216 WestAve. arising from the dispute that occurred from the alleged unlawful foreclosure." Document
162in Case SA 1l-CV-0414. The Orderof March 5, 2014 rejected the Plaintiffs lineof argument about
exclusive jurisdiction out of hand: "The propriety of... the ..Lis Pendens [dated December 3, 2013] is
well outside the scope of this Court's jurisdiction."Order of the U.S. District Court for the Western
District Of Texas, dated March 5, 2014. At the hearing on March 19, 20] 4, the Bexar County Probate
Court #1 made findings on an attorney withdrawal issue and a lis pendens notice issue, both of which
implicated Plaintiffs interest in the property as a purchase money creditor and malpractice claimant. That
court issued a ruling at Plaintiffs request tojudicially notice Defendant Bravenec's previously unnoticed
DOCUMENT SCANNED AS FILED
about June 13, 2014that Appellant had filed notices of lis pendens in the Bexar County Deed
Records, and from pleadings falsely asserting that Defendant represented himselfan attorney by
issuing a subpoena in violation of TRCP 176.4.
Zuniga explains the publicpolicyrationale for a zero tolerance approach to role-reversing
attorney conduct that increases and distorts litigation to the detriment of the judicial process:
For the law to countenance [an] abrupt and shameless shift of positions would give
prominence (and substance) to the image that lawyers will take any position, depending
upon where the money lies, and that litigation is a mere game and not a search for truth ...
It is one thing for lawyers in our adversary system to represent clients with whomthey
personally disagree; it is something quite different for lawyers ... to switch positions ...
simply because an assignment [has] given them a financial interest in switching.
Zuniga, Id. Here, Bravenec's unconscionable request for a finding of criminal contempt
represents the third time in less than a year that he has falsely attempted to incarcerate the
Defendant for speech in a judicial forum. The Court is respectfully requested to redress this fact
by dismissing his claim for tortious interference and his cross motionfor summary judgment, to
set a date for a jury trial on Defendant's counterclaims, and finally, to impose a constructive trust
to subrogate Defendant as the payee of the purported contract of sale, if any, and by
subordinating Bravenec to his net income from rental proceeds he has already collected.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Defendant prays that the Court grant relief
in all things, and for such other relief both in law and in equity as he may be justly entitled.
Dated: July 9, 2014
Rowland J. Ma
951 Lombrano
San Antonio, Tx 78207
(210)323-3849
withdrawal from the probatecase, and it granted lis pendens relief to Defendant Bravenec by way of a
finding only that the Estate was not a fee simple owner of the subject property. Defendants failure to
request reconsideration of the omission of limitations and res judicata accommodations in the respective
federal court and probate court orders effectively estops them from raising those arguments now.
DOCUMENT SCANNED AS FILED
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of this "Special Appearance For Plea To Jurisdiction And Texas
Citizens ParticipationAct Motion To Dismiss," will be hand delivered to Glenn Deadman on
July 9, 2014.
Rowland J. Martin, Jr.
DOCUMENT SCANNED AS FILED