Moises Renteria v. State

ACCEPTED
06-15-00106-CR
SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
11/16/2015 2:32:49 PM
DEBBIE AUTREY
CLERK
NO. 06 – 15-00106 – CR
FILED IN
6th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF TEXARKANA, TEXAS
APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS 11/16/2015 2:32:49 PM
DEBBIE AUTREY
Clerk
MOISES RENTERIA
Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee
On appeal from the 188TH District Court, Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 38,802-A
BRIEF OF THE STATE OF TEXAS
– ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED –
CARL L. DORROUGH
Criminal District Attorney
Zan Colson Brown
Texas Bar No. 03205900
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Gregg County, Texas
101 East Methvin St., Suite 333
Longview, Texas 75601
Telephone: (903) 236–8440
Facsimile: (903) 236–3701
E-mail: zan.brown@co.gregg.tx.us
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................1
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................2
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .....................................................................7
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................9
1) Appellant intended to waive a jury, and although he was
reluctant to sign the waiver, he eventually did so. .....................................9
2) Appellant did not clearly demonstrate incompetence as his
appellate brief claims. ..............................................................................11
a) Article 46 B was changed, effective on September 1, 2011, to
eliminate the requirement of bona fide doubt of a
defendant’s incompetence; this case was heard before that
date. ..........................................................................................................12
b) Trial Court sua sponte ordered a competency examination, but
no competency trial; this is not an abuse of discretion. ...........................14
c) Legal Standards. ............................................................................................17
PRAYER .................................................................................................................20
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ..................................................................21
1
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Marbut v. State, 76 S.W.3d 742, 747-48 (Tex. App. - Waco 2002, pet. ref'd)........12
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966) ..............17
State Cases
Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 599-601 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)…………..….…12
Burke v. State, 792 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d) 17
Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ........................ 16, 17
Grant v. State, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1453 (Tex. App. 2008)…………….…….19
Leonard v. State, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 7404 (Tex. App. Texarkana Sept. 9,
2010)…………………………………………………………………..………17
McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)....................... 11, 12, 17
Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ................................ 17, 19
Statutes
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 46 B.005 (a) (Vernon, 2009) ..............................................12
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 46 B.005 (c) (Vernon, 2009) ..............................................13
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 46B.004 (c-1) (Vernon 2011) .............................................11
Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. 46B.003 (Vernon, 2009) ................................................16
2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Moises Renteria was charged by indictment with the one count of
Aggravated Sexual Assault and one count of Indecency with a Child. CR 6.
Appellant entered a not guilty plea on August 1, 2011, and was sentenced to
concurrent sentences of life for Count I, and 20 years for Count II. 3 RR 127.
Before the trial, Appellant’s attorney had moved to withdraw as counsel due to an
unspecified conflict between Appellant and his counsel. CR 42. The Court heard
that motion on February 17, 2011, but did not rule on it; instead, in an abundance
of caution, he ordered Renteria to be examined on issue of competency. 2 RR 9-10;
CR 45.
At the hearing on the motion for withdrawal, his counsel offered a letter
written in Spanish by Renteria explaining his reasons for wanting the attorney to
withdraw. The interpreter summarized the letter’s contents: Counsel was not
representing him to his satisfaction; Counsel predicted court events that did not
occur; “that he is a witch that – that he’s being delayed in the process to go to court
many times”; and that a cotton swab of his mouth was used for DNA testing
instead of semen. 2 RR 5.
Renteria, after being sworn, elaborated on the semen-sample complaint: an
attorney from child protective services allegedly told Renteria that he was going to
be giving a semen sample and would have to take a lie-detector test. Then his
3
counsel told him that he had been misinformed, and that his counsel “was going to
do his work and only his work.” 2 RR 5. Renteria complained of being in jail for
16 months and 17 days without a trial, even though he has been before a judge
many times and had been told a trial should take place within six months. 2 RR 5-
6. He claimed discrimination. 2 RR 6. His father had died and his mother had
suffered an accident, and his four children were starving, and his attorney did not
appear to care. 2 RR 6. He concluded with, “I have a lot to say and many things to
say, but I prefer to remain silent.” 2 RR 6.
He denied being given an offer of a plea agreement, but his attorney said he
had relayed the offer of 15 years. 2 RR 7-8. (That offer was made before
Renteria requested a DNA test). Id. The attorney reported to the Court that
Renteria would not plead guilty to anything because he was innocent. 2 RR 7-8.
Once the DNA results were in, the offer was changed to 40 years, which the
attorney negotiated down to 35. 2 RR 8. The State’s attorney stated that 35 years
was still the recommendation by the State at the time of the motion to withdraw. 2
RR 8.
Regarding the jury waiver, Defense Counsel told the court that he and
Renteria had spoken about a jury trial and the attorney had explained that a jury
was twelve citizens, not professional judges. 2 RR 9. Then Renteria decided he
wanted to be tried by a judge. 2 RR 9. Counsel went on to explain to the trial
4
court that there had not been a signed jury waiver because their conversation had
taken place at the jail, not in open court where Renteria could have executed the
waiver. 2 RR 9.
When asked by the Court if he wanted a jury trial, Renteria expressed his
dissatisfaction with being asked such questions, asserting that “What could have
been done in six months is being now done in 16 months and 17 days.” At that
point, the trial judge began, but did not finish a sentence explaining his ruling, “I
think what the Court is going to do out of abundance of caution--- yes, go ahead.”
2 RR 9. Renteria then continued his list of complaints, some of which seemed
related to his major complaint about the delayed proceedings, but some of which
seemed unrelated. 2 RR 10. These will be discussed in more detail in the argument
section.
At that point, the judge expressed his concern about Renteria’s ability to
communicate with his attorney and to assist in preparing for trial, and whether he
understood these proceedings. 2 RR 10. He explained that Dr. Allen would, with
the help of the interpreter, examine him for competence to stand trial. 2 RR 10.
Proceedings were abated until that report came in. No objection from either
attorney appears in the record, but Renteria himself threatened to alert the media,
because he wanted “all of Mexico to know about this, what is happening.” 2 RR
10.
5
The order appointing Dr. Allen recites that the defense had filed a motion for
a competence exam, but the Reporter’s Record and the docket sheet both indicate
that the decision for such an examination was the judge’s idea. 2 RR 10; CR 45,
46. The motion to withdraw had said nothing about incompetence. 2 RR 42.
Dr. Allen’s report was not mentioned in the Reporter’s Record, but the
Clerk’s Record shows that Dr. Allen sent copies to both attorneys and the Court on
March 4, 2011 CR 50. Dr. Allen’s findings were that Renteria was competent,
although he noted that Renteria would not sign a form stating he understood the
process because the form was not in Spanish. CR 50. He further noted that
Renteria’s thoughts were adequately organized; responses were relevant, rational,
and logical; there were no indications of cognitive impairment nor psychiatric
disorder. CR 51. Regarding the “magical thinking” which had concerned his
counsel and the interpreter, Dr. Allen attributed it to his culture, rather than mental
illness. CR 51.
Dr. Allen concluded that Renteria is competent because he demonstrates an
adequate rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him, as well
as the capacity to cooperate and collaborate with counsel rationally in his own
defense. Dr. Allen further concluded Renteria is neither mentally retarded nor
psychotic nor in need of psychiatric care. CR 53.
6
On the day of trial there was another prolonged discussion about whether
Renteria would sign a jury waiver, but he eventually did so, and after the judge
assured himself that Renteria had signed it voluntarily, the judge accepted it and a
bench trial began. At the end of the bench trial, the judge found him guilty on both
counts and sentenced him to life for the aggravated sexual assault and twenty years
for indecency with a child, with both sentences to run concurrently. See
Judgments, CR 54-59.
This out-of-time appeal, which was allowed after a writ of habeas corpus
was granted, ensued.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant waived a jury trial orally, and albeit reluctantly, in writing; he
never once said he wanted a jury. Appellant was not incompetent to stand trial.
While there was some minimal concern about his competence to stand trial, and
while the Trial Court did see fit to order a competence examination “out of an
abundance of caution,” there was no need for a competency trial. Nobody
requested one and nobody objected to the lack of one. Under the law at the time of
this case, bona fide doubt regarding his competence was required. The testimony
elicited at trial was not sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding Appellant’s
competence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to order a
7
competency trial under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 46B. There was
sufficient testimony to demonstrate that Appellant understood where he was, what
he was charged with, the roles played by court participants, and the implication of
his jury waiver.
8
ARGUMENT
1) Appellant intended to waive a jury, and although he was reluctant to sign
the waiver, he eventually did so.
Appellant’s first point of error alleges that his waiver of a jury trial was
involuntary. The record, however, includes a written waiver of jury trial signed
August 1, 2014. CR 62. Appellant claims that Appellant did not understand the
concept of a jury trial, the significance of a jury waiver, or the consequences of the
waiver.
This appellant, a Spanish-speaker, told his trial counsel, who was also fluent
in Spanish, that he preferred for the judge to determine his guilt rather than have
twelve citizens do so. 2 RR 9. Thus, he understood the concept of a jury trial.
When the judge asked him if he wanted a jury trial, he at first objected to
being asked such a question after having been in jail for over sixteen months. 2 RR
9. Then he listed other objections he had to the proceedings and the lack of support
from others, but he did not answer the judge’s question. 2 RR 10. This caused the
judge to (in “an abundance of caution”) order an examination by Dr. Allen, with an
interpreter’s services.) 2 RR 9, 10. The trial court appropriately declined to rule on
the attorney’s motion to withdraw, abating all proceedings until that report came
in, but promising that if Dr. Allen found him competent, there would be a jury trial.
Later, after the evaluation had been received by all parties, Renteria was
again asked if he wanted a trial to the court, not a jury, and he immediately
9
responded, “Yes, that is how it is.” 3 RR 8. He did not, however, want to sign a
paper saying he did not want a jury; the judge had to patiently explain to him that if
he did not freely and voluntarily sign the jury waiver, the case would have to go to
a jury and it would not be concluded that day. 3 RR 8-16. Before he signed the
waiver, he wanted to say something to the judge, but the judge cautioned him
against that and insisted that he wait until the appropriate time during the trial
when he could testify under oath and have his say then.
Renteria never explained why he did not want to sign the jury waiver, saying
only that he shouldn’t have to do so. Dr. Allen had reported that Renteria also
refused to sign a paper for him, stating the Dr. Allen had explained the process to
him. CR 50. In that situation, he had refused because Dr. Allen had no Spanish
version of the document. Id.
Eventually, however, Renteria signed the jury waiver and after appropriate
questions to ensure that the waiver was voluntary, the judge accepted the jury
waiver and the bench trial proceeded. CR 62; 3 RR 16-17.
Renteria waived his right to a jury trial orally in open court and in writing.
The record is devoid of any statement by Renteria that he wanted a jury trial. His
attorney had explained what a jury was. Renteria attempted to avoid signing the
jury waiver until after he had said something to the judge. Eventually, however, he
relented and signed the required waiver. The Court thus complied with statutory
10
provisions for waiving a jury trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Art. 1.13. Appellant has
not rebutted the presumption of regularity in court proceedings. His first point of
error should be rejected.
2) Appellant did not clearly demonstrate incompetence as his appellate brief
claims.
In his second point of error, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by
failing to properly hold a hearing regarding Appellant’s competency to stand
trial, claiming that “Appellant’s basically nonsensical ramblings brought to the
trial court’s attention that the issue of competency existed.” Appellant’s Brief at
11-12.
Appellant demonstrated a reluctance to sign his jury waiver, but he did
not demonstrate incompetence. He demonstrated dissatisfaction with his
attorney and he demonstrated a reluctance to communicate with his attorney,
but he did not demonstrate an inability to communicate effectively with his
attorney. He did not demonstrate any mental illness, any psychotic thinking, or
any inability to understand the proceedings. He obstinately expressed his desire
to not have to sign the jury waiver, but eventually, he signed it. The judge did
not accept it until he established on the record that it was voluntary. Renteria
repeatedly expressed his desire to speak directly with the judge, but the judge,
11
of course, denied his request, and explained why. Renteria expressed
dissatisfaction with the slow process, but he did not demonstrate an inability to
understand the proceedings. He might not have had a complete understanding
of the proceedings before he came to court, but he certainly had the capacity to
understand when the judge explained the proceedings to him. He demonstrated
a desire to have the trial proceed on his terms, but he did not demonstrate
incompetence. Obstinate behavior does not constitute incompetence.
a) Article 46 B was changed, effective on September 1, 2011, to eliminate
the requirement of bona fide doubt of a defendant’s incompetence; this
case was heard before that date.
At the time of the hearing on his counsel’s motion to withdraw, in February
of 2011, a trial court’s doubt had to rise to the level of “bona fide” doubt. Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. 46B. The section that did away with the bona fide doubt
standard was not effective until September 1, 2011. Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
46B.004 (c-1) (2011).
At the time this case was heard, the state of the law was as described in the
McDaniel case. McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The
steps needed for a trial court to inquire about competence are as follows:
“1) if a competency issue is raised by the defendant, any party, or the
court; and 2) evidence of incompetency is brought to the attention of
the trial court by the defendant, any party, or the court; 3) of the type
to raise a bona fide doubt in the judge's mind regarding the
defendant's competency to stand trial; then 4) the judge must conduct
12
a Section 2 ‘competency inquiry’ to determine if there is some
evidence sufficient to support a finding of incompetence, and if there
is, 5) the judge must impanel a jury for a Section 4 ‘competency
hearing.’ Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 599-601 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001); see also id. at 602...; see also Marbut v. State, 76 S.W.3d 742,
747-48 (Tex. App. - Waco 2002, pet. ref'd) (following Alcott in setting
out appropriate steps and concluding that defendant failed to offer
sufficient evidence to create a bona fide doubt of competency).”
McDaniel at 712.
A trial judge need not perform a competency inquiry unless evidence is
presented that raises a bona fide doubt in the judge's mind regarding the
defendant’s “present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding” or defendant's “rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings.” McDaniel at 712.
After an informal inquiry, if the court determines that evidence exists to
support a finding of incompetency, the court “shall order an examination” to
determine the issue. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 46 B.005 (a) (Vernon, 2009). The
court shall then order a competency trial before determining whether the defendant
is incompetent to stand trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 46 B.005 (b) (Vernon, 2009).
However, a competency trial is not needed if:
1. Neither party requests a competency trial.
2. Neither party opposes a finding of incompetency.
3. The judge does not, on its own motion, determine a trial is necessary.
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. 46 B.005 (c) (Vernon, 2009).
13
The trial court, in accordance with the statute in effect at the time, exercised
caution by ordering, on its own motion, a competency evaluation, but did not see
fit to order a competency trial. Neither party requested it, neither party objected,
and the judge did not, on his own, deem it necessary. Such action, or lack thereof,
on the part of the trial court was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, and did not
constitute an abuse of discretion. Thus, Appellant’s second issue should be
decided in favor of the state, and his conviction affirmed.
b) Trial Court sua sponte ordered a competency examination, but no
competency trial; this is not an abuse of discretion.
Defendant’s attorney did not file for a competency evaluation, but instead
moved to withdraw and set a hearing. At that hearing, Defendant’s behavior raised
some doubt in the judge’s mind as to Defendant’s competence. The doubt was
minimal, because the sua sponte order for an evaluation was made “in an
abundance of caution.” 2 RR 9-10. Furthermore, the record reflects that no one
requested a competence trial nor objected to the lack of one. Nor does the record
reflect that any party opposed a finding on the competency issue. The trial court
did not determine, on its own motion, to order a formal trial on the issue. This
shows compliance with Chapter 46B.
The appellant argues that his behavior clearly showed that he did not
understand the proceedings. See Appellant’s Brief at 12, citing 2 RR 5-6 and 9-10.
14
The defendant’s words were being translated from Spanish to English. On
pages 5 and 6 of Volume 2, Mr. Renteria was trying to explain to the judge why he
wanted his trial counsel to be replaced: he claimed a Child Protective Services
attorney had told him he would be giving a semen sample and would have to take a
lie detector test. His attorney told me that information was wrong. 2 RR 5. His
attorney allegedly said “that he was going to do his work and only his work.” 2 RR
5. Renteria was competent enough to explain to the Court why his attorney should
be replaced.
He complained of having been in jail for sixteen months and seventeen days.
He said his attorney had given him a paper to sign so that his trial would be open. 2
RR 6. He claimed that he had been discriminated against. 2 RR 6. He claimed to
have been in front of many other judges where he was told he could have a trial in
a period from one to six months, and he was unhappy because that had not
happened. 2 RR 6. He further complained that his attorney was not sympathetic
when he learned that Renteria’s father had died and his mother was in an accident,
that his wife was working and his children in Mexico were starving. 2 RR 6.
While appellant claims that this monologue proves incompetency, it can
arguably also be viewed as evidence that Mr. Renteria knew exactly what was
happening—he was arguing for the judge to allow his attorney to withdraw. He
knew the judge’s role; he knew his attorney’s role, and he understood the concept
15
of a speedy trial. He might not be an excellent orator, but he was not incompetent
to stand trial.
On pages nine and ten, the defendant continued to express his outrage that
his case had not been tried within six months, even when asked about whether he
wanted a jury. 2 RR 9. At that point, the judge began to announce the evaluation:
“I think what the Court is going to do out of abundance of caution—yes, go
ahead.” 2 RR 9.
Renteria then mentioned a paper that “this gentleman wanted me to sign on
the 29th of November,” had been signed in the middle of December of 2009. 2 RR
10. He expressed his frustration that there had been a change in the lab, and that he
didn’t have the name of the first lab. 2 RR 10. He stated that he had been sent to a
different jail, and that he had asked his pastor to investigate a lady named Ana
when “the tests were run over there.” 2 RR 10. He complained of his lack of
support from anybody. He concluded, “What I’m telling you Mr. Judge or Your
Honor is do with me whatever you want. With all my respect.” 2 RR 10.
Again, the appellant argues that Renteria’s words indicate incompetence.
His words, though inarticulate, indicate his frustration with the process, his
dissatisfaction with his attorney, and his dissatisfaction with his situation and the
lack of support, but they do not indicate incompetence. He understood the
proceedings. He demonstrated he has the capacity to communicate with his
16
attorney and assist in his own defense. He does not show mental illness that causes
him to be unable to communicate. His English may be deficient, but he never
complained that his attorney could not speak Spanish or that the interpreter was
ineffective.
Then the judge finished his ruling that there would be a competency
evaluation, followed by a jury trial. Neither Renteria nor his attorney nor the
attorney for the State objected. The evaluation occurred and a report was sent to all
parties. No further discussion of competence was had on the record, even at
subsequent proceedings.
c) Legal Standards.
This Court has previously found that a trial court's decision not to conduct a
competency hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Leonard v. State, 2010
Tex. App. LEXIS 7404 (Tex. App. Texarkana Sept. 9, 2010) (mem. op. not
designated for publication), (relying on Moore v. State, at 393. A trial court abuses
its discretion if its decision is arbitrary or unreasonable. Leonard v. State, (citing
Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)).
Under Texas law, a defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. Tex.
Code of Crim. Proc. 46B.003. In Fuller v. State, cited by Appellant to support his
claim that a trial court must hold a separate, formal hearing on competence, the
17
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals summarized the law applicable to this issue. An
accused person is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have "sufficient present
ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding" or "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against" him. Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815 (1966)). The
Fuller and Pate courts defined “bona fide doubt” as “a real doubt in the judge’s
mind as to the defendant’s competency.” Id., quoting Pate v. Robinson at 378.
Evidence raising bona fide doubt does not need to be sufficient to support a finding
of incompetence and is “qualitatively different from such evidence.” Id., quoting
Alcott v. State, 51 S.W.3d 596, 599, n. 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
Bona fide doubt is shown by “recent severe mental illness, at least moderate
retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant.” McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d
704, 710 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
A person’s disruptive and unruly courtroom behavior isn’t necessarily
sufficient evidence of incompetence to stand trial. Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “If such actions were probative of incompetence, one
could effectively avoid criminal justice through immature behavior.” Burke v.
State, 792 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d).
18
In an unpublished opinion, the First District Court of Appeals discussed a
defendant whose behavior sounds like Renteria’s:
Although appellant’s answers were, at times, rambling and
nonresponsive…, most of appellant’s testimony reveals simple that he
wanted an opportunity to tell his story in his own way and to relate
what he felt was important. Appellant’s testimony also indicated that
he understood the charges against him. … While some of appellant’s
testimony may have been damaging and ill-advised, it did not suggest
that he lacked a rational understanding of the case against him or an
inability to communicate with his counsel.
Grant v. State, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1453 (Tex. App. 2008) (mem. op. not
designated for publication.
The trial court in this case raised the issue of incompetence, but did not
follow through with a trial on competency. The doubt raised in this case was
minimal and was assuaged by the report from Dr. Allen. Nobody requested a
hearing, and nobody objected when Dr. Allen’s report was distributed. Nobody
opposed the implied finding on the issue of incompetence.
Appellant’s second point of error should be rejected and the conviction
affirmed.
19
PRAYER
The State prays that the conviction and sentence be affirmed because he
voluntarily waived a jury trial and the judge did not abuse his discretion by not
conducting a competency trial.
Respectfully Submitted,
_/s/ Zan Colson Brown
Zan Colson Brown
Texas Bar No. 03205900
Assistant District Attorney
101 East Methvin St., Suite 333
Longview, TX 75601
Telephone: (903) 236–8440
Facsimile: (903) 236–3701
Email: zan.brown@co.gregg.tx.us
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing has been
forwarded to all counsel of record by electronic filing
this 12th day of November, 2015.
_/s/ Zan Colson Brown ___
Zan Colson Brown
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
20
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that the BRIEF OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, exclusive of the
following: caption, identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral
argument, table of contents, index of authorities, statement of the case, statement
of issues presented, statement of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history,
signature, proof of service, certification, certificate of compliance, and appendix,
contains 4,030 words, according to Word software.
/s/_ZanColson Brown
Zan Colson Brown
Assistant District Attorney
21