Juliane Myra Minor v. State

NUMBER 13-14-00161-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
JULIANE MYRA MINOR, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 105th District Court
of Kleberg County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Garza, and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
Appellant Juliane Myra Minor appeals the trial court’s denial of her application for
writ of habeas corpus alleging a double jeopardy violation. 1 By one issue, Minor
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Pre-trial writs of habeas corpus are permitted in very limited circumstances. Ex parte Smith, 178
S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Because Minor’s double jeopardy issue, if meritorious, would
contends that the double jeopardy prohibitions of the United States Constitution and the
Texas Constitution bar her prosecution for criminally negligent homicide following her
citation under the Texas Transportation Code for “allowing an unlicensed juvenile to drive
a motor vehicle.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (West, Westlaw through 2015
R.S.); TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.458 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). We
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
It is undisputed that on June 1, 2012, Minor allowed her unlicensed sixteen-year-
old son, whom we will refer to as B.C., to drive her Hummer H2. B.C. failed to control
his speed while rounding a curve, veered into the opposite lane of travel, and struck
Stephanie Butler’s oncoming vehicle. Butler was eight months pregnant at the time of
the collision, and her unborn child died as a result of accident-induced trauma.
Both B.C. and Minor received traffic citations following the accident. Minor was
cited for permitting an unauthorized person to drive pursuant to the Texas Transportation
Code. Minor paid a total of $120 dollars for a fine and associated court costs.
Subsequently, Minor was indicted for criminally negligent homicide. The indictment
alleged Minor caused the death of Butler’s unborn child by allowing an unlicensed juvenile
to drive a motor vehicle.
Minor filed a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court alleging that the prosecution
for criminally negligent homicide constituted double jeopardy because she had previously
been cited for allowing an unlicensed juvenile to drive a motor vehicle and had paid a fine.
bar prosecution, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See id. (recognizing that “the denial of relief on a
pretrial writ of habeas corpus may be appealed immediately”).
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The trial court denied Minor’s application and determined that a citation for permitting an
unauthorized person to drive was not a lesser-included offense of criminally negligent
homicide. This interlocutory appeal followed.
II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
By her sole issue, Minor contends that the double jeopardy prohibitions in the
federal and state Constitutions prevent her prosecution for criminally negligent homicide.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects an accused against: (1) a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense prosecuted in
the same trial. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410;
415–16 (1977); Ex parte Amador, 326 S.W.3d 202, 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see Ervin
v. State, 991 S.W.2d 804, 806–07 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (distinguishing a “multiple
prosecution” double jeopardy claim, in which a defendant had previously received a
conviction for driving while intoxicated and was subsequently tried for involuntary
manslaughter, from a “multiple punishment” double jeopardy claim in which multiple
offenses were prosecuted in a single trial).
We apply a de novo standard of review when the trial court's decision to deny relief
on a writ of habeas corpus involves a question of law. See State v. Nkwocha, 31 S.W.3d
817, 820 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.); see also Rice v. State, 333 S.W.3d 140, 144
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). In analyzing a “multiple-prosecution” double jeopardy claim in
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which two distinct statutory provisions are at issue, as in this case, we initially determine
whether “each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” See United
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 697 (1993); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
304 (1932) (applying a “same elements” test for purposes of double jeopardy). Under
Blockburger’s same-elements test, “lesser-included offenses are legally the same as a
greater offense, and are wholly subsumed by the elements of the greater offense, unless
the potential lesser-included offense requires proof of a fact not required to establish the
greater offense.” Ex parte Castillo, No. PD-0545-14, __S.W.3d__, 2015 WL 3486960, at
*2 (Tex. Crim. App. June 3, 2015) (citing Brown, 432 U.S. at 168); see also TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.) (providing the
statutory framework by which we make a lesser-included offense determination).
We apply Texas law to determine if one offense is a lesser-included offense for
double jeopardy purposes. See generally Ex parte Watson, 306 S.W.3d 259, 265 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009) (recognizing that Hall v. State, 225 S.W.3d 524, 535 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007) applies when performing a double jeopardy analysis). If we determine that the
offense is legally a lesser-included offense, we then look at the evidence to determine if
a true double jeopardy violation occurred. See id.
B. Discussion
We begin our analysis under Blockburger and decide whether the two offenses are
the same for purposes of double jeopardy. See Blockburger, 286 U.S. at 304. We do
this by determining whether Minor’s traffic citation pursuant to the transportation code is
a lesser-included offense of criminally negligent homicide under the penal code. See
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Brown, 432 U.S. at 165; Blockburger, 286 U.S. at 304; Ex parte Watson, 306 S.W.3d at
265. Applying Hall in this double jeopardy context, we begin the lesser-included offense
analysis by looking only to the statutory elements of criminally negligent homicide as
modified by the allegations in the indictment. See 225 S.W.3d at 536. The indictment
must either allege all of the elements of section 521.458 of the transportation code, or
elements and facts from which all elements of a section 521.458 violation could be
deduced. See State v. Meru, 414 S.W.3d at 163 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“The elements
of the lesser-included offense do not have to be pleaded in the indictment if they can be
deduced from facts alleged in the indictment.”).
The indictment provides as follows: “Juliane Myra Minor, defendant, on or about
June 1, 2012, in Kleberg County, Texas, did then and there, by criminal negligence, cause
the death of an individual, namely the unborn child of Stephanie Butler, by allowing an
unlicensed juvenile to drive a motor vehicle.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (noting
that a person commits the offense of criminally negligent homicide “if he causes the death
of an individual by criminal negligence”). An offense under this section is a state jail
felony.
Section 521.458 of the Texas Transportation Code provides the following:
(a) A person may not knowingly permit or cause the person’s child or
ward who is under 18 years of age to operate a motor vehicle on a
highway in violation of this chapter.
(b) A person may not authorize or knowingly permit a motor vehicle
owned by or under the control of the person to be operated on a
highway by any person in violation of this chapter.
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.458.
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Comparing the statutory elements of criminally negligent homicide, as modified by
Minor’s indictment, with the elements of section 521.458 of the Texas Transportation
Code, we ask: “Are the elements of the lesser offense established by proof of the same
or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged?”
See Hall, 225 S.W.3d at 536 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09(1)). The
answer is that they are not. The facts required to prove the lesser offense under the
transportation code include at least one fact that is not the same as, or less than, those
required to establish criminally negligent homicide: the requirement that the violation be
“knowingly” committed. Compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 with TEX. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 521.458.
Moreover, even were we to consider the indictment’s phrase “by allowing” to mean
“knowingly,” as used in the statute, the transportation code still requires proof of additional
elements—i.e., that Minor let her “child or ward” drive the vehicle under section
521.458(a) or that the vehicle in question was “owned by” or “subject to” Minor’s control
under section 521.458(b). See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.458; Meru, 414 S.W.3d
163. Therefore, the transportation code requires proof of B.C.’s relation to Minor under
one section, and proof of Minor’s degree of ownership or control over the subject vehicle
under another.2 See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.458(a–b). We could not therefore
deduce that if Minor is guilty as charged by the indictment, she is also guilty of the lesser-
offense described in the transportation code. See Meru, 414 S.W.3d at 162–63.
Because a determination of Minor’s traffic citation requires proof of more elements
2 The traffic citation did not specify the subsection of the statute under which Minor was initially
cited.
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than required by her indictment for criminally negligent homicide, it cannot be a lesser-
included offense pursuant to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure or Texas case law.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 39.07; Meru, 414 S.W.3d at 162–63; Hall, 225
S.W.3d at 536. Minor has not satisfied the Blockburger “same elements” test, and
Minor’s “multiple-prosecution” double jeopardy claim fails. See Vitale, 447 U.S. at 415–
16; Ex parte Watson, 306 S.W.3d at 262–63; Guzman, 182 S.W.3d at 191–92.
We overrule Minor’s sole issue on appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Minor’s application for writ of habeas corpus.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
25th day of June, 2015.
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