Scott Kelly Birkholz v. State

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OPINION
Nos. 04-06-00251-CR, 04-06-00252-CR, 04-06-00253-CR
Scott Kelly BIRKHOLZ,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 226th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 2004-CR-5574, 2004-CR-5575, 2004-CR-5576
Honorable Pat Priest, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice
Rebecca Simmons, Justice
Delivered and Filed: January 14, 2009
REVERSED AND REMANDED
In the early morning hours of January 3, 2003, witnesses came upon a one-car accident in
Helotes. They were able to pull one person, Scott Kelly Birkholz (“Birkholz”), from the burning car.
The three remaining accident victims perished in the fire: Tracy Birkholz, his wife; Brandon
Birkholz, his brother; and Thomas Bowen, his friend. A blood draw showed Birkholz’s blood
alcohol level was 0.12, and a title search revealed the car involved was registered to his name.
Birkholz was arrested and charged with responsibility for the accident.
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A jury found Birkholz guilty of three counts of intoxication manslaughter and assessed
punishment of community supervision for a period of ten years. The trial court denied Birkholz’s
motions for a new trial. On appeal, Birkholz contends that (1) the trial court erred in denying his
motion to reopen, and (2) the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury’s findings that he
was driving. We agree that the trial court erred in failing to reopen the evidence and thus reverse and
remand.
MOTION TO REOPEN
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.02 provides, “The court shall allow testimony
to be introduced at any time before the argument of a cause is concluded, if it appears that it is
necessary to a due administration of justice.” TEX . CODE. CRIM . PRO . art. 36.02 (Vernon 2007). The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has noted that a “due administration of justice” requires a judge
to reopen the case if the evidence would materially change the case in the proponent’s favor. Peek v.
State, 106 S.W.3d 72, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). That the proffered evidence is relevant is not
enough; it “must actually make a difference in the case” and not be cumulative of evidence
previously presented. Id.; see also Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 155 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
In addition, the new evidence must be introduced prior to closing arguments in order to meet the
standard. Peek, 106 S.W.3d at 79.
We review the trial court’s decision on a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion. See
Peek, 106 S.W.3d at 79. There is an abuse of discretion if the trial court denies a timely motion to
reopen and the proffered evidence would have materially changed the case in the proponent’s favor.
See id. at 78. We will not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless such ruling falls outside the “zone
of reasonable disagreement.” Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
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Further, no reversible error exists in the refusal to reopen unless a substantial right of a party is
affected. TEX . R. APP . P. 44.2(b); Rodriguez v. State, 974 S.W.2d 364, 370 (Tex. App.–Amarillo
1998, pet. ref’d).
Relevant Facts
On January 3, 2003 at approximately 2:45 a.m., witness Debbie Crow was driving her car
when she saw a fire. As she got closer she realized the fire came from a car that was upside down
and burning from the back. Crow called 911 and then approached the car, which was so full of
smoke she was unable to see inside. Crow unsuccessfully attempted to break in the driver’s window.
A few minutes later, witness David Green arrived on the scene, and was able to kick in the driver’s
side window. Birkholz reached his hands out of the car, and Crow and Green pulled him out. They
dragged him a few feet away from the vehicle. While Green tended to Birkholz, Crow returned to
the car to help the other occupants escape, but was unsuccessful. They then moved Birkholz further
away from the car. Birkholz appeared dazed and incoherent, and was unaware he had been burned.
Law enforcement officers then began responding to the accident. Bexar County Sheriff’s
Deputy Belton Johnson was the first to arrive, and he noticed that Birkholz smelled like alcohol. He
sat Birkholz in his patrol car so he would not be hurt; however, he then realized Birkholz’s clothes
were still smoking, and moved him back outside. Birkholz was placed on a gurney, and paramedics
began cutting his clothes away from him. As they tried to treat Birkholz, he was uncooperative and
combative, removing and shredding the burn blanket, pulling at belts, and being belligerent with the
technicians.
Another sheriff’s deputy, Dennis O’Steen, went to the ambulance where the technicians
were treating Birkholz. At that point, paramedic Robert Moya told O’Steen that if he wanted to talk
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to Birkholz he needed to do it then, because they were going to sedate him in order to continue
treatment. Birkholz told O’Steen repeatedly that he was not driving the car. When asked who else
was in the vehicle, Birkholz first said he did not know, then said it might have been his wife and
brother. It was not until the fire was put out that officials realized a third victim was in the car.
After O’Steen questioned Birkholz, Moya gave Birkholz 3 milligrams of Versed to sedate
him, and then 100 milligrams of Vecuronium, a paralytic agent that enabled the paramedics to
intubate Birkholz so he could breathe more easily and be treated for his burns. Due to this sedation
with Versed, the effects of which are enhanced by alcohol, Birkholz lost his memory of the accident
and the events leading up to it. At trial, Moya testified that the amnesia-producing drug Versed can
cause someone to experience amnesia and retrograde amnesia. Individuals given Versed do not
recall incidents at or around an event.
Birkholz was airlifted to University Hospital, where a blood draw was performed at
approximately 5:45 a.m. Birkholz’s blood-alcohol level was approximately 0.12 at the time of the
draw. Extrapolation revealed that his blood-alcohol level at the time of the accident was
approximately 0.18. Credit card records revealed that prior to the accident, the group had been to
several establishments that evening, charging alcoholic drinks at each.
Motion to Reopen with New Evidence
Birkholz was indicted on three counts of intoxication manslaughter. At trial, the key issue
argued by both sides was whether Birkholz was driving the car. The State presented evidence in
support of its argument that Birkholz was driving the car at the time of the accident. Evidence
presented at trial included: the fact that Birkholz was pulled from the window on the driver’s side
of the car; Birkholz’s ownership of the car; Birkholz’s statement before sedation that his wife was
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behind him in the car (evidence showed Tracy Birkholz was seated in the back seat behind the
driver); the fact that when first approached by the sheriff’s deputy after the accident (and before
sedation), Birkholz repeatedly stated he had not been driving, even though no question was asked
regarding that issue; and the fact that when the car was turned back over onto its wheels after the
accident, Bowen was in the front passenger seat.
Birkholz’s defense was based on his argument that Bowen was driving the car. Evidence
presented at trial included: testimony that Birkholz suffered an injury to his leg three days before the
accident, and that he had been on crutches on those days and unable to drive; testimony that Bowen
was seen driving Birkholz’s car the day before the accident; evidence that the driver’s seat position
was too far back for Birkholz to have been driving; expert testimony by an accident reconstructionist
explaining how the force of the accident could have resulted in Birkholz, his wife, and Bowen ending
up in a “sandwich” such that Birkholz was on top and was the most accessible from the driver’s side
window following the accident; testimony regarding Birkholz’s history of being a responsible drinker
and driver; and a showing that Bowen’s legal blood-alcohol level was consistent with the defense
theory that Bowen was the designated driver for the evening.
Birkholz’s first issue on appeal stems from the introduction of a photograph during cross-
examination of the defense’s expert witness, accident reconstructionist Max Scott. Scott gave
testimony based on occupant kinematics, or what happens to individuals in a vehicle during an
accident. Information is gathered from measurements at the scene, witnesses, and evidence, and is
used to show what happened to car occupants during an accident.
During the State’s cross-examination of Scott, it introduced an enlargement of a picture
previously introduced, depicting Bowen after he had been taken from the car and laid on a sheet.
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The enlarged photo focused on Bowen’s torso, and showed a fragment of a seat belt draped across
his chest. Pictures of the car after the accident reveal that the seat belt fragment somehow ended up
on the headliner of the car; both sides agree that someone must have taken it off Bowen’s body and
thrown it in the car. During the middle of the trial, the State went to the impound lot and collected
that seat belt fragment from the right front headliner of the car. It is uncontested that the seat belt
fragment depicted on Bowen in the picture is the same seat belt fragment that had been thrown onto
the right front headliner of the car and brought to court by the State for introduction as an exhibit,
and that the seat belt fragment had one “belt stop button” on it.
On direct examination, Scott had testified that the fragment found in the car was part of the
right front passenger seat belt because of its location in the car. After introducing the photograph
of Bowen with the belt across his chest, the State began drawing the connection between the belt on
Bowen and Scott’s testimony that the belt was from the passenger side, therefore reinforcing the
State’s theory that Birkholz was the driver. However, upon seeing the seat belt fragment and the
enhanced photograph in court, Scott testified that he had been wrong. He argued that the seat belt
fragment and the belt seen on Bowen in the enhanced photograph were one and the same, and that
the belt was from the driver’s side of the car, based on the orientation of the belt across Bowen as
seen in the enhanced photograph. Scott further noted that the fragment on Bowen had one belt stop
button, as did the passenger side seat belt found intact in the car and introduced into evidence
through a photograph. While there was discussion of the number of belt stop buttons on the seat
belts, it was not conclusively established during testimony whether the front seat belts each had one
or two buttons. This testimony was the last of the trial, and both sides rested on a Friday afternoon.
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When court reconvened for closing arguments on Monday, Birkholz sought to reopen the
evidence. Birkholz explained that he had been surprised the previous Friday with unexpected
developments in the case when the State introduced the enlarged photo of Bowen’s torso with the
seat belt. He noted that the enlarged photograph, together with the State’s continued intimation that
the front seat belts could have each had two belt stop buttons, led him to do further research over the
weekend. As a result, he sought to reopen the evidence to introduce photographs of new and used
cars of the same model as the one involved in the accident; he also sought to introduce a replacement
seatbelt for Birkholz’s car. The photographs and replacement belt showed that the seatbelts had only
one belt stop button.
The State responded to Birkholz’s motion by indicating it would not argue in closing
argument that the seatbelts had two belt stop buttons. Birkholz argued, however, that the point had
already been introduced by the State during cross-examination of his expert witness. When the court
asked the State what it would do if it allowed to Birkholz to reopen, the State replied that it would
recall its expert witness who was in College Station. The court asked Birkholz whether this issue
was important enough to cause a delay in the trial so that the State’s expert could be recalled.
Birkholz answered that he did not understand the State’s need for its expert witness, as the State said
it did not believe the number of belt stop buttons was significant.
Birkholz sought to reopen by arguing that the new physical evidence showing only one “belt
stop” button per seat belt was unequivocal physical proof of Birkholz’s innocence. Birkholz argued
this was a critical issue in dispute, and he had exhibits that would incontrovertibly establish that the
belt on Bowen was the driver-side seat belt. The proffered evidence included the photograph
showing the portion of the passenger-side seat belt with the stop button still intact in the wrecked
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car, which by process of elimination proved the seat belt fragment with the “belt stop” button found
on Bowen was from the driver’s side. The court denied Birkholz’s motion to reopen, and received
the exhibits offered into evidence for purposes of the record only. Consequently the jury was never
presented with this evidence.1
Analysis
Peek v. State, 106 S.W.3d 72 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), established the current standard for
analysis of motion to reopen errors. In Peek, the court upheld the appellate court’s conclusion that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion to reopen; however, the circumstances
of the case and the weight of the evidence the proponent sought to introduce distinguish it from
Birkholz’s case. The Peeks were charged with injury to a child, and sought to reopen the case with
evidence of medical records from a hospital trip. Peek, 106 S.W.3d at 74 (citations omitted). The
trial court denied their motion to reopen, as evidence of the hospital trip had already been admitted
and the medical records offered nothing material to disprove that the Peeks committed the injury.
Id. The appellate court affirmed, noting that “[i]f the defendant seeks to reopen, there is abuse of
discretion only if the evidence would have materially changed the case in the defendant’s favor.”
Id. After the appellate court concluded that the medical records would “probably not have materially
changed the result in [the Peeks’] favor,” the Peeks appealed the material change test, as at that time
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… The record indicates that for various reasons, the investigation at the scene of the accident was lacking in
some respects. On-scene measurements taken were very basic; a diagram taken did not agree with the sequence of
events; and there was no technical investigation of the vehicle to determine the contact and induced damage incurred to
the vehicle. No inventory was taken of missing parts, such as headrests and seat belts. The seat belt fragment at issue
was not discovered earlier by the defense because it was taken off Bowen’s body and thrown onto the headliner in the
car wreckage, rather than bagged and entered into evidence.
The medical examiner came to the scene and surveyed it while the car was still on its roof. However, before
the bodies were extracted from the vehicle, she was called away to a homicide when four policemen were shot at another
location. In addition, there was some confusion because one medical examiner listed Bowen as the driver of the car; this
was later changed at the request of the State. The Deputy Chief Medical Examiner testified that the policemen shooting
resulted in a “less complete investigation by our investigator than would have been ideal, but that happens.”
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Texas appellate courts disagreed on the appropriate test. Id. at 74-75. The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals affirmed the appellate court, adopting the material change test for application to motions
to reopen. Id. at 79.
Although only a few Texas cases have applied the Peek analysis, an opinion issued by our
sister court in Dallas provides a similar scenario to Birkholz’s. See Reeves v. State, 113 S.W.3d 791
(Tex. App.––Dallas 2003, no pet.). Reeves was convicted of possession with intent to deliver
cocaine. Id. at 792. At trial, the State entered into evidence photographs which purported to depict
Reeves’s bathroom with incriminating evidence on the counter. Id. at 793. During his testimony,
Reeves denied that the bathroom represented in the photographs was his. Id. Reeves, who had
photographs he wanted to introduce in order to prove the discrepancy, filed a motion to reopen the
evidence before the jury charge was read. Id. The trial court denied his motion to reopen. Id.
Reeves appealed his subsequent conviction, and the appellate court reversed and remanded the case
to the trial court for further proceedings. Id. at 792.
The court in Reeves noted that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Peek did not indicate
whether a separate harm analysis should be conducted after application of the materiality analysis;
consequently, the court decided to apply both standards. See id. at 794-95. The court referenced the
following harm analysis as stated by the Court of Criminal Appeals:
For claims of non-constitutional error, we, like the Supreme Court, hold that “a
conviction should not be overturned unless, after examining the record as a whole,
a court concludes that an error may have had ‘substantial influence’ on the outcome
of the proceeding.” Put another way, if the reviewing court has “a grave doubt” that
the result was free from the substantial influence of the error, then it must treat the
error as if it did. “Grave doubt” means that “in the judge’s mind, the matter is so
evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of
the error.” Thus, “in cases of grave doubt as to harmlessness the petitioner must
win.”
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Id. at 795 (quoting Burnett v. State, 88 S.W.3d 633, 637-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (footnotes
omitted)). See TEX . R. APP . P. 44.2(b); TEX . R. EVID . 103(a) (error may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected); see also
King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A harmless error analysis requires
consideration of all evidence admitted at trial and the record as a whole. Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d
862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
In performing the Peek analysis, the court in Reeves noted the following: the motion to
reopen was timely; the appellant was present and ready to testify about the proffered photographs;
and the trial court was clearly informed the testimony and photographs would show that the room
depicted in the State’s photographs was not the same as that depicted in the appellant’s photographs.
Reeves, 113 S.W.3d at 795. The court also noted that “the evidence was material and bore directly
on a central issue in the case . . . . [a]lthough appellant had testified to these discrepancies, the
proffered photographs were more than relevant, they would have made a difference in the case . . .
.” Id. at 795-96. The court subsequently determined that the proffered evidence would have
materially changed the case in Reeves’s favor, and the error in excluding the evidence by denial of
the motion to reopen constituted harmful error, as the remaining evidence against Reeves was not
enough to support a conviction. Id. at 797. Thus, the denial of the motion to reopen the evidence
affected Reeves’s substantial rights. Id.
In the instant case, the trial court’s denial of Birkholz’s motion to reopen affected his
substantial rights in much the same way as Reeves. As with Reeves, Birkholz made the motion to
reopen in a timely fashion, and had the evidence in hand at the time the motion was made. The trial
court was clearly informed that the evidence being offered by Birkholz would show that the seat belt
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fragment found lying across Bowen was in fact from the driver’s side, substantially increasing the
likelihood that the jury would accept Birkholz’s argument that Bowen was the driver. If a jury
presented with the evidence of the enlarged picture of Bowen and the seat belt specifications of the
car in question agrees with the contention that the seat belt draped across Bowen was from the
driver’s side, the evidence could potentially prove Birkholz was not behind the wheel during this
accident. As such, the evidence was material and bore directly on a central issue in the case–whether
Birkholz was driving the car involved in the accident. See Peek, 106 S.W.3d at 78. If the jury
construed the evidence to indicate that Bowen was the driver, Birkholz could not have been
convicted for three counts of intoxication manslaughter.
Based on this analysis, the requirements of the Peek material change analysis and harm
analysis were met. Peek, 106 S.W.3d at 78; Burnett, 88 S.W.3d at 637-38. Consequently, the trial
court abused its discretion when it denied Birkholz’s motion to reopen. See Peek, 106 S.W.3d at 79.
Because Birkholz’s substantial rights were affected when he was denied the opportunity to defend
himself with this evidence, reversible error exists. See TEX . R. APP . P. 44.2(b) (reversible error exists
in the refusal to reopen if a substantial right of a party is affected); Burnett, 88 S.W.3d at 638 (“in
cases of grave doubt as to harmlessness the petitioner must win”). Accordingly, Birkholz’s first
issue is sustained.
FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY
Because we sustain Birkholz’s first issue, we need not reach the factual sufficiency issue.
However, we note that the State argued the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to reopen because the weight of the evidence was so heavily against Birkholz, therefore, the
issue of whether or not the seat belt found on Bowen indicated Bowen was the driver was not
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material to the case. We disagree. The evidence which was denied admission under the motion to
reopen could have had a diminishing effect on the evidence against Birkholz, and could have
affected the jury’s determination of the weight afforded contradicting testimony. The motion to
reopen was a separate and distinct issue presented to our court, and proper evaluation necessitated
distinguishing it from the factual sufficiency issue. Nevertheless, because we sustain Birkholz’s
first issue, it is unnecessary for us to address Birkholz’s factual sufficiency challenge.
CONCLUSION
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Birkholz’s motion to reopen with
material, potentially dispositive evidence. Consequently, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Catherine Stone, Chief Justice
PUBLISH
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